UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_150833

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OUP—391—29-4-72—10,000.

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 341.11 0821N Accession No. PG 14818

Author Osgood, R E

Title NATO

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.

NATO

The Entangling Alliance

NATO

The Entangling Alliance

BY ROBERT ENDICOTT OSGOOD



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 62-8348

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO & LONDON
THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS, TORONTO 5, CANADA

© 1962 BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. PUBLISHED 1962. COMPOSED AND PRINTED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U.S.A.

DESIGNED BY ADRIAN WILSON

For Eleanor

Foreword

NATO was created as, and is still today officially considered to be, the shield that protects Western Europe from a Soviet attack on land. Yet it has never been clear how NATO could perform that function with the forces actually at its disposal or how it could have performed that function even with the much larger forces which its official spokesmen from time to time declared to be indispensable. Nor has it been clear how such a military organization, top heavy as it is with collective agencies for the making of decisions, would operate effectively in case of war.

These are some of the doubts which arise from within NATO itself. There are others which concern the relations between NATO and the over-all political and military purposes of the Western alliance and, more particularly, of the United States. What is the place of NATO within the over-all military strategy of the United States? What functions could NATO perform for the European communities and a more closely integrated Atlantic community? What impact is the impending diffusion of nuclear weapons likely to have upon the policies and the very existence of NATO? And what of the probable replacement of the manned bomber and bases supporting it by long-distance missiles?

These are some of the questions which the Western governments should have raised long ago and answered. If they have

been raised, they certainly have not been answered. It is the great merit of Professor Osgood's book that he raises these questions and tries to answer them. As he did before in his book on *Limited War,* which has had a salutary influence upon our military thinking, he puts these questions in the over-all context of the political and military situation as it exists today and as it is likely to exist in the foreseeable future. Professor Osgood does not suggest spectacular patent solutions. Rather he reasons as the political and military statesmen ought to reason. Starting with certain fundamental political and military principles and purposes, he analyzes the possibilities which the actual situation provides and selects those which are most likely to conform to the principles and achieve the purposes.

HANS J. MORGENTHAU

Preface

This book is a study of contemporary American foreign policy as it has been transformed by the radically new conditions of the postwar period. Specifically, it examines the novel military-strategic issues that challenge the viability of the United States outstanding instrument of security in the cold war, the North Atlantic alliance.

More generally, this is a study of the role of military power in the nuclear age—of the pervasive, diverse, complex, and subtle influence of military strategies and capabilities upon international politics. In particular, it explores the political and psychological ramifications of the unprecedented task of peacetime military-strategic collaboration in NATO—the interaction of strategic logic with the demands of allied cohesion, political warfare, and diplomacy.

I have not, however, presented a comprehensive description or analysis of either the military or non-military aspects of America's relationships with her NATO allies. I have tried only to elucidate those aspects that seem to me most directly related to NATO's past, present, and future utility as a regional security alliance in the cold war.

I completed this book in the early months of 1961; thus most of its observations are cast in the perspective of events as they seemed up to the end of the Eisenhower administration. However, before the manuscript went to press later in the year, I

entered a few revisions and additions, chiefly in the concluding chapter, to make the narrative as current as possible.

Throughout this rather hazardous venture in contemporary history I have been sustained by the guidance of a master in interpreting the present in lasting perspective: Hans J. Morgenthau. For additional enlightenment, based upon reading the entire manuscript in one version or another, I am grateful to my discerning colleague George Liska, to Colonel W. M. M. Minton of the office of the United States Representative in NATO, and to Seyom Brown, graduate student at the University of Chicago. For secretarial assistance far beyond the line of ordinary duty and competence I wish to thank Margaret Harrison Case.

CHICAGO
September 1961

Contents

1	INTRODUCTION	1
2	THE INITIAL PHASE	28
3	THE IMPACT OF SOVIET NUCLEAR POWER	52
4	REARMAMENT AND RELAXATION	64
5	NATO GOES NUCLEAR	102
6	TOWARD A STRATEGY OF LIMITED RESISTANCE	147
7	THE ONSET OF THE MISSILE AGE	172
8	THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR DIFFUSION	212
9	THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS	275
10	DISENGAGEMENT	308
11	CONCLUSION	347
	NOTES	371
	INDEX	413

1
Introduction

1. THE NEED AND CAPABILITY OF COLLABORATION

No feature of the cold war more clearly marks the revolution in America's foreign policy than the North Atlantic alliance, which was created to entangle the United States more firmly in the affairs of Europe. Like America's other alliances, the North Atlantic alliance reflects the fact that American security can be immediately and drastically affected by changes in the overseas balance of power, which the United States cannot unilaterally prevent or counter. But, far more than any other alliance, this European entanglement involves the United States in active military collaboration. In the extent of military co-ordination and political co-operation it demands, NATO is unique among peacetime alliances. In fact, it has assumed tasks of multinational planning, decision, and action that few wartime coalitions have performed.

This extensive collaboration reflects a distinctive need—the need to prevent Communist domination of the single most valuable center of material power, as well as cultural affinity, outside the North American continent—and a distinctive capability of strong and stable nations who share a solid identity of security interests to concert their power.

Soviet leaders have repeatedly acknowledged the pre-eminent importance of this coalition of non-Communist powers as the major obstacle to the creation of a "socialist world sys-

tem" under Soviet direction. Only the means of eliminating this obstacle have changed. With special emphasis since the death of Stalin, they have pursued the Leninist strategy of undermining the major "capitalist-imperialist" centers in the West by varieties of indirect pressure designed to exploit the "contradictions" among them, to isolate and intimidate them, and to align the colonial and former colonial areas against them. The extension of Communist control and influence outside the NATO area in the Communists' "zone of peace" would constitute a serious blow to American values and security, but the disruption, humiliation, and paralysis of NATO would be a *vital* blow, far more serious than limited Communist territorial gains on the periphery of Eurasia. Furthermore, the demonstrated impotence of NATO would obviate effective resistance to Soviet penetration of the periphery of Eurasia.

At the same time, in its European alliance the United States possesses unique potential for supporting its vital interests through a concert of power with nations who have the political will and capacity to collaborate. No such basis of concerted power exists outside Europe; and outside NATO, America's margin of influence upon nations and events is far narrower than within it. Consequently, of all America's alliances and alignments, NATO represents by far her most vital interest, the most effective instrument of collaboration, and the greatest accretion of her strength.

But extensive collaboration is a source of trouble as well as of strength. The more extensive the collaboration, the more troublesome is the dual task of reconciling the coalition's requirements of internal cohesion with its requirements of external security. For the kinds of commitments and contributions that can elicit co-operation will not necessarily meet the demands of collective security; and the greater the demands of co-operation, the greater difficulty states must encounter in concerting security efforts at an adequate level. In the face of fundamental military and political developments that were not foreseen when the alliance was created, the achievement of this dual task has already occasioned major adjustments in the

structure and policies of NATO. It now demands further adjustments of equal significance.

The ascendance of Soviet nuclear power, the prospect of the diffusion of nuclear capabilities among other allies, and the economic and political resurgence of Western Europe now challenge the very foundation of effective collaboration, the basic political and military assumptions upon which the alliance was constructed. At the same time, these portentous developments raise fundamental questions about the utility and the vitality of such a tightly knit regional alliance in the peculiar conditions of the cold war and, more generally, about the capacity of democratic nations to meet the harsh and complex demands of security through close collaboration in peacetime.

2. THE MILITARY CORE OF THE ALLIANCE

This book is concerned primarily with the military-strategic sources of NATO's troubles. It begins with the assumption that NATO is pre-eminently a defensive military alliance and that it must be judged strong or impotent by the extent to which it advances the security of its members.

This is not to say that the central task of NATO can be divorced from its political problems—especially those that concern the division, political ties, and armament of Germany; those that involve allied interests in areas outside Europe; and those that arise from the competition for prestige and influence among the allies. They are inseparable. Nor is it to deny, as many have observed, that NATO has come to be "more than a purely military alliance." It is, indeed, a center of coalition diplomacy vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc and a multilateral framework for interallied diplomacy.

Nevertheless, I take the view that NATO's most crucial problems, whether or not they are manifested directly in a military form, are those that impinge upon its core of mutual security interests, the protection of which remains the chief justification for the alliance, and that these problems, fundamentally, pertain to the task of strategic collaboration. There is a danger of obscuring this troublesome fact in our anxiety to alleviate

NATO's external problems through a direct political resolution of international tensions or to alleviate NATO's internal problems through the elaboration of its non-military functions.

I shall deal with the first expedient in chapter x, on "disengagement." An example of the second is manifested in the report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Co-operation in NATO, released in December, 1956.[1] This report reflects the common view that, following the Kremlin's tactical shift of pressure to the political realm, the military threat to Europe has ceased to be the foremost problem in the eyes of NATO governments and peoples and that, consequently, NATO can maintain its vitality only through the expansion of political, economic, and cultural co-operation among its members. The underlying assumption here is that during a protracted period of "peaceful coexistence" NATO cannot sustain effective collaboration if its activities pertain solely to its military function and that, therefore, NATO must become something more than a purely military alliance; or, as Secretary of State Dulles put it, "the time has come to advance NATO from its initial phase into the totality of its meaning."[2]

This prescription, without coming to grips with NATO's strategic dilemmas, tries to bolster the alliance by expanding its non-military functions. In distinction to this approach, I shall stress the military-strategic sources of NATO's troubles, on the assumption that, if the alliance fails to find the basis of collaboration in an effective military strategy, NATO's non-military functions will suffer correspondingly and the political problems of its members will be of an entirely different order. But while focusing upon military strategy as the central determinant of NATO's efficacy or impotence, I shall contend that military strategy itself is infused with political significance, because strategic collaboration is a political instrument and depends upon a political process.

3. THE MEANING OF MILITARY STRATEGY

In stressing the strategic sources of NATO's troubles, I am concerned with more than the technical military problems that

fall within the special competence of the military profession, for military strategy has become far more than "the science and art of fighting battles." Military strategy must now be understood as nothing less than the over-all plan for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion—in conjunction with the economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments of power—to support foreign policy most effectively by overt, covert, and tacit means.

The ultimate rationale of military strategy, properly understood, has always been its support of the political purposes of a nation, but the exacting requirements of contemporary deterrence have made the relationship between force and policy both more intimate and more intricate. Efficacious military plans—especially those relating to the development, deployment, command and control, and use of nuclear weapons—now depend upon the most systematic calculation of their psychological impact upon governments and peoples and the most scrupulous attention to their manifold implications for political relations among allies, with the non-aligned, and with adversaries. Indeed, given the present inhibitions against the overt use of armed force, combined with the limitations of diplomacy as an instrument for resolving profound conflicts of national interest, the political and psychological consequences of the nature and disposition of armed forces may be the primary function, not just the by-product, of military strategy. Military policies, like economic policies, have become a delicate and diversified instrument of statecraft.[3]

At the same time, the unprecedented economic and technical demands of military preparedness, combined with the multiplicity of military needs facing a great power, have vastly complicated the problem of strategic choice by putting a new premium upon the systematic allocation of scarce scientific, material, financial, and human resources among a great variety of desirable functions. The profusion of military technology, the rapid rate of technological innovation and obsolescence, the impelling dynamics of the arms race, and the high cost of modern weapons systems require, more urgently than ever before,

a continual and studied selection among projects of military research, development, and production. Properly, governments can make this selection only in terms of a coherent over-all strategy that enables them to determine priorities among military functions. But the problem of devising such a strategy is greatly complicated by the diverse and indeterminate nature of the military functions that might be useful to support policy under a wide range of circumstances. For it has become inordinately difficult to anticipate the nature of the contingencies in which the use or threatened use of weapons and forces of certain kinds might serve political objectives. Even if one can identify the potential enemy and the location of the hypothetical conflict, there is considerable diversity in the possible level and scope of violence, the limitations and restraints upon combat, and the political context of anticipated wars; and there is even greater diversity in the circumstances in which one must anticipate supporting policy with military power by means short of war.

The unconscionable human and material cost of a total war fought with nuclear weapons puts a premium upon countering limited and ambiguous forms of aggression with a variety of limited responses. This complicates military planning with an unprecedented problem of combining military effectiveness with the deliberate restraint of the most "efficient" weapons. It expands the range of the forms of conflict that a superpower with global security interests must be prepared to fight and affects all military planning with a crucial interest in the political and physical restraints that are essential to make the resort to war a rational instrument of policy rather than a senseless spasm of violence.

While the diversity of possible military contingencies and political circumstances, combined with the dynamic profusion and costliness of military technology, imposes a severe burden of strategic choice upon military planners, that burden is increased by the greater importance of forces-in-being, as opposed to forces that can be mobilized in weeks or months. For when the forces-in-being may be decisive in preventing war

or determining its outcome, this not only increases the cost of military preparedness but also makes more crucial the strategic calculations that determine the selection of weapons systems—beginning with the selection of research and development programs—that will determine the weapons available five or more years ahead.

In enabling governments to discharge this great burden of choice according to some rational plan, military strategy, as I have defined it, is the indispensable bridge between arms and policy. Ideally, military strategy should be constructed of the following interdependent components, logically supplementing each other within a coherent plan: the estimate of the nature, probability, and seriousness of possible military threats to vital political interests; the calculation of the best military methods of responding to these threats in various contingencies in order to deter or resist them; the determination of military capabilities—of the weapons and forces—needed to support these responses; and the formulation of public declarations about responses and the other strategic components.

Actually, strategic logic is something to be approximated but never perfectly achieved. Complete internal consistency among these components is scarcely possible, and not necessarily desirable, where non-strategic values have a legitimate claim upon national policy. In any case, the listing of these components suggests the extent to which military strategy transcends the traditional realm of the military specialist and exceeds the bounds of purely *military* logic. The prior strategic questions—the nature of the threat and the resulting contingencies in which the use of force should be anticipated—are as much matters of political as military judgment. And even the planning of military responses and capabilities, although a highly technical operation, requires, in the absence of battlefield experience with the physical and psychological effects of modern weapons or objective empirical tests of the requirements of deterrence, a novel type of systematic analysis of imponderable and subjective factors.[4]

Indeed, the extramilitary aspects of military strategy are the

very essence of the cold war, for the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons has rendered the political and psychological exploitation of military potential a primary means by which the struggle for power and prestige is waged in support of a range of political purposes apart from military security. The situation is analogous to Clausewitz' description of the limited wars of political maneuver in the eighteenth century:

> Thus war became essentially a regular game in which time and chance shuffled the cards; but in its significance it was only diplomacy somewhat intensified, a more forceful way of negotiating, in which battles and sieges were the diplomatic notes. To obtain some moderate advantage in order to make use of it in negotiations for peace was the aim of the most ambitious.[5]

Now it is the *prospect* of war rather than the "battles" and "sieges" themselves that constitutes "diplomacy somewhat intensified."

Of course, there is nothing new about the offensive and defensive manipulation of military power by means short of war, but this manipulation acquires a new significance when it depends, ultimately, upon terrorizing the adversary with the prospect of nuclear obliteration. In the pre-nuclear age it depended primarily upon the capacity of nations to acquire or hold territory, to interdict or keep open lines of supply, to destroy the enemy's capacity to fight by defeating his forces, and, more markedly in the age of aerial bombardment, to destroy the resources of military production. But the possession of nuclear weapons gives nations the capacity to inflict such severe damage upon each other that any but the most carefully restricted use of armed force entails a grave risk of leading to a conflict far more costly than the political objectives at stake would seem to warrant. At the same time, this immense damaging power gives nuclear nations the opportunity to substitute, as a means of armed coercion and persuasion, the threat of civil damage for the actual or threatened destruction of the enemy's capacity to fight. Therefore, the threat of inflicting unacceptable damage upon the adversary—damage that may be unrelated to the capacity to gain or deny immediate territorial ob-

jectives at stake—has become the fundamental method, affecting all other methods, by which nuclear powers use their military capabilities as instruments of policy. The two most characteristic manifestations of this method are called "blackmail" and "deterrence." Each has its peculiar and highly developed techniques.

As George F. Kennan has observed, "Armaments are important not just for what could be done with them in time of war, but for the psychological shadows they cast in time of peace."[6] One should add that the psychological shadows that armaments cast in time of peace are shaped largely by what men think could and would be done with them in time of war. Today military strategists must be intimately concerned with viewing and casting these shadows. The best known shadows are in the realm of deterrence, but there are more obscure shadows in the realm of political and psychological warfare that affect interstate relations no less significantly.

4. DETERRENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

From the standpoint of the United States and her NATO allies, military strategy serves foreign policy in three principal ways: (*a*) by deterring overt or paramilitary aggression; (*b*) by meeting armed aggression with effective resistance compatible with rational limitations upon warfare if deterrence should fail; (*c*) by supporting political positions and diplomacy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union without the resort to war. The first function is the most fundamental, in the sense that the achievement of deterrence is the prerequisite of effective political relations with the Soviet Union, whereas effective military resistance largely compensates for the failure of deterrence by supporting vital political objectives with overt rather than tacit force. Therefore, quite properly, military strategists have been absorbed in the task of deterrence—although too much at the expense of the other two functions of military power.

The importance of NATO's deterrent power must be understood in the context of the larger objective of stabilizing the over-all competition for power and prestige in international

relations, for military deterrence has become the primary mechanism of international stability in the cold war, and NATO plays a crucial part in the efficacy or inefficacy of that mechanism.* Yet deterrence is a delicate mechanism that requires the utmost skill and energy to maintain in working order—and the utmost collaboration within NATO.

The stability of international relations—in the absence of a preponderance of power under supranational control or the hegemony of a dominant state or bloc—implies the moderation and regularization of the competition of power within certain conventional modes of conduct, which the participating states view as reciprocal, self-imposed restraints that work to their mutual advantage while preserving the existing state system. The most stable pattern of international relations in modern times was the balance-of-power system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which in theory—and, to a notable extent, in practice—deterred the great powers from radical assaults upon each other's interests: on the one hand, by confronting them with the prospect of countervailing alignments and alliances, and, on the other hand, by providing them with the means for limited adjustments of power and interests without the hazards of unrestricted competition. However, the conditions that enabled this system to stabilize international relations as well as it did—principally, a fairly equal distribution of power among several states, a rudimentary moral consensus among rulers and ruling classes, and a war potential of relatively limited destructive capacity—no longer exist. Instead, we live in a largely bipolar political system dominated by superpowers with intensely hostile interests and aims, who could drastically alter the international configurations of power and civilization itself in a single military encounter. And these

* Military deterrence can be defined as the dissuasion of a government from taking a hostile action (in the eyes of the deterring state) by virtue of its fear of the consequences of military counteraction. Clearly, the fear of military counteraction is only one motive among many non-military considerations that may dissuade a government from carrying out a hostile intent. However, in current usage, theories of deterrence are concerned with the calculations of benefit, cost, and risk underlying that kind of dissuasion which is presumed to depend decisively (if only as the marginal factor) upon the fear of an armed encounter. This is the sense in which I discuss deterrence as a mechanism of mutual restraint among powers with strongly antithetical aims and interests.

superpowers do not have access to the balancing mechanisms of the defunct balance-of-power system, even if they should want to use them.

The non-military balancing mechanisms of that obsolete system were primarily territorial acquisitions and compensations and shifts of alliances and alignments. The first mechanism is largely ruled out by the disappearance of the frontier, the rise of nationalism in "backward" countries, and the compelling allegiance of citizens to antithetical ideologies and political systems. The second mechanism is inhibited by the polarization of international power and politics and the over-all antithesis between Communist and non-Communist ideologies and institutions; as a result, the process of balancing power takes place primarily by the accretion of strength through collaboration within the alliance rather than by countervailing adjustments of strength through shifts of states from one alliance to another.

With the disappearance of the non-military balancing mechanisms of the balance-of-power system, the stability of the international competition for power has come to depend more heavily upon the stability of the military balance itself. At the same time, with the revolutionary increase in the destructive capacity of military potential in the last half-century, the resort to armed conflict has become a far more risky and unreliable instrument for maintaining an international equilibrium. Consequently, in the cold war the status quo powers have aspired to construct international stability largely on the foundation of military deterrence, on the assumption that the very capacity of nuclear powers to destroy each other gives them an overriding interest in observing strict restraints on the use or threatened use of armed force.

In large measure, the validity of this assumption has been confirmed so far by the relations between the Soviet bloc and the NATO powers. The Soviet Union has tried to undermine the status quo by rather carefully limited means, and NATO has resisted Soviet incursions by equally limited means. This joint circumspection reflects a kind of tacit agreement upon reciprocal self-restraints, which are greatly reinforced by mutual awareness of the new costs and risks of any armed conflict.

Yet it would be extremely dangerous, when the capacity for devastation is mutual, to underestimate the inherent instability in any military balance and, particularly, in one that depends so heavily upon threats and counterthreats of reprisals intended to constrain the adversary by sheer terror of devastation.

One source of instability is the subjective and imponderable character of the very concept of contemporary deterrence, which puts a premium upon prudent and accurate calculations of the will or intentions of nuclear adversaries to inflict unacceptable damage upon each other, even though neither side would be likely to gain a meaningful advantage if both employed their full capabilities for damage. The dependence of a military balance primarily upon the credibility of essentially punitive reprisals or counterreprisals, rather than upon capabilities to attain or deny military objectives by defeating opposing forces, creates a far more complex and uncertain relationship between military capabilities and the will to use them than existed under the balance-of-power system (which was itself far from being the mechanically predictable regulator of power that its advocates sometimes claimed). Whereas military deterrence under the balance-of-power system depended largely upon estimates of relative military combat capabilities, which, although repeatedly miscalculated, were assumed to have a fairly straightforward relationship to the will to use them in the event of a serious conflict of interests, military deterrence under the balance-of-terror system depends not only upon complicated estimates of relative capabilities but also upon estimates of interacting intentions; that is, upon a complicated process of mutual mind-reading based upon some such speculative calculus as the value of engaging in war for the sake of an objective at stake, considering the estimated effectiveness and costs of military action as opposed to inaction, in the light of the probability of various kinds of military responses.[7] Estimates of the material components of deterrence, such as "missile exchange rates," are at least susceptible to the precise, quantitative calculation of objective, though substantially conjectural, data; but estimates of the crucial non-material components must rest largely on intuitive, qualitative judgments about subjective

data. The management and control of deterrence as an instrument of policy is, correspondingly, more unpredictable and subject to miscalculation. At the same time, the consequences of miscalculation could be enormous.

The stability of the military balance is further jeopardized by novel and rapidly changing weapons systems, whose effects must remain speculative in the absence of experience with them in actual battle. Thus, the whole complex calculus of deterrence rests upon assumptions about the consequences of using a military technology that, fortunately, has never been tested in war; and one configuration of capabilities that seems to assure stability can be rapidly supplanted by another that might tempt or provoke war.

Up to a point, the very uncertainty of the requirements of deterrence, combined with the potentially disastrous consequences of miscalculating them, may help stabilize a condition of mutual restraint, since no power will dare upset the balance even at a slight risk of war. But, carried to its full logic, a strategy based upon the stabilizing effect of such uncertainty leads to a dangerous reliance upon the balance of terror to take care of itself and to deter the whole range of possible military threats, from a direct nuclear assault down to conventional limited aggressions.

In reality, the maintenance of the balance of terror, merely in terms of its material components, requires continual, painstaking strategic calculation and continual, expensive technological innovation and production. And in terms of its nonmaterial components, the maintenance of the balance of terror depends on a sensitive and circumspect vigilance that is unremittingly attentive to the vicissitudes of human fears and ambitions, to qualities of judgment and motives of decision, which cannot be comprehended in any "game theory" and which certainly cannot be relied upon to provide a self-sustaining equilibrium.

Furthermore, the stability of the military balance involves more than the balance of terror; it involves the whole spectrum of violence. If a balance of terror succeeds in deterring nuclear strikes (whether offensive or retaliatory) because of the fear of

counterstrikes, it only makes more likely the limited and ambiguous non-nuclear forms of aggression, which require a capacity for effective local resistance to deter or counter. Therefore, the over-all stability of the military balance requires a large and diversified military capability, lest stability at the top or most violent end of the spectrum of deterrence lead to instability at the lower end. This requirement is doubly imperative because ordinary prudence demands that nations prepare for the failure of deterrence by having recourse to strategies and capabilities that can wage war within rational constraints.

Viewed in the light of this latter imperative, one of the greatest sources of instability in the contemporary military environment is the proclivity of democratic nations, for the sake of economy, to rely on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter not only the most catastrophic contingencies but also a wide range of lesser contingencies, while neglecting the requirements of limiting and controlling force, should deterrence fail. The history of NATO's strategy and capabilities affords a dismaying example of this proclivity.

5. THE SOVIET THREAT

The requirements of deterrence and of the other functions of military power should be determined by an integrated assessment of all the components of military strategy. The first component—first in logical sequence and in importance—is the estimate of the nature of the threat to national interests and of the resulting contingencies in which one must contemplate the use or threatened use of armed force. This estimate should originate in a sober appraisal of Soviet ends and means in foreign policy.

The Soviet Union is implacably committed to transforming the world into the Communist image of society, to creating a "socialist world system" of states, with Russia the undisputed leader (or, according to recent formulations, the "vanguard") and all potentially opposing national bases of power under Communist control. At the same time, Soviet leaders are, by doctrine and practice, circumspect and calculating pragmatists in the aggrandizement of Russian power, which they identify

with the advancement of their revolutionary goal. Together, these two characteristics make deterrence feasible but preclude its resting on any more stable basis than the will and ability of the prospective victims to make aggression unprofitable. Therefore, deterrence is the condition that enables the United States and her allies to conduct the cold war in an area of political and psychological maneuver, an area in which the Communists operate with all the resourcefulness of practicing revolutionaries exploiting their adversaries' longing for peace and normality.

From NATO's standpoint, the stability of the balance of terror is the prerequisite for protecting the status quo from violent change, but, from the Soviet standpoint, it is the prerequisite for undermining the status quo at a tolerable risk by non-violent means. To the Western powers, international tensions are bad because they disturb normal relations and threaten to erupt in war. These powers yearn to eliminate the specific sources of tension in a step-by-step approach to peace. But, to the Soviet leaders, the raising or lowering of tensions and the threat of war are tools of policy. They regard the underlying source of tensions and war as the existence of the "capitalist camp," a source which is ineradicable until the capitalist states, step by step, are buried. In liberal democratic eyes, war is the opposite of peace, just as conflict is distinguished from the absence of conflict. But in Communist eyes, war and peace are distinguished merely by the method of waging an inexorable class conflict, in which summit conferences, disarmament proposals, peace campaigns, subversion, economic and military assistance, space demonstrations, or war and the threat of war are all tactical parts of an integrated strategy. The Communists will not hesitate to use armed force when other means of pursuing the most vital interests are impractical and the risks of successful opposition seem tolerable, but they also understand and prefer the multifarious uses of military potential in securing peaceful acquiescence.

As long as the Soviet bloc refrains from military incursions, the immediate requirements of deterrence have been met; and

the Western powers are therefore inclined to relax their preparedness in the absence of any more tangible test of its adequacy or inadequacy. Yet the most important consequence of a stable or unstable, credible or incredible, posture of deterrence may be, not the prevention or outbreak of overt aggression, but rather the maintenance or loss of prestige and morale, the strength or weakness of political positions and diplomatic maneuvers, or the consolidation or disintegration of the alliance itself. For expectations about the circumstances and consequences of war in the minds of nations and statesmen—Americans, adversaries, allies, and the non-aligned—may affect the fortunes of the cold war no less decisively than war itself. Thus, the necessity of having to choose between nuclear war and ineffective conventional resistance or acquiescence in the event of limited aggressions will weaken the diplomacy and undermine the cohesion of NATO no matter how carefully the Soviet Union may avoid crossing the brink of war.

In Europe the cold war is a struggle for prestige and influence and a test of will and nerves waged against a background of beliefs about the relative military power of the participants, about when and how they might use their power, and about what the results would be if they did. The Soviet objective is to so exploit Russian military power in conjunction with political threats and conciliatory gestures as to exacerbate the "contradictions" among allied states, stimulate neutralism and pacifism among their citizens, convince them that NATO cannot protect them but will only draw them into crises and war, induce them to abandon their collective efforts to build a "situation of strength," and persuade them to accept the Soviet terms of "peaceful coexistence." To these ends, Moscow tries to convince the Western nations that the military balance has shifted drastically against them in favor of the USSR, that they can maintain their "provocative" military bloc and sustain their "untenable" outposts like Berlin only at the risk of a catastrophic war, and that their only reasonable recourse is to accept Russia's conciliatory proposals to relieve international tensions —for example, by making West Berlin a "free city," recognizing

East Germany, withdrawing foreign troops from the Continent, disbanding military bases, abandoning nuclear weapons, and, ultimately, dismantling the alliance. At the same time, they try to demonstrate NATO's impotence by maneuvering the West into tests of will that humiliate the most powerful allies and intimidate the others, while undermining the willingness of all members to support each other's interests at the risk of war.

Clearly, Soviet success in this game heightens the risk of overt conflict by inciting overboldness and miscalculation in Moscow or desperation in the West, but the Soviet objective is to so weaken Western resistance by non-violent means that the extension of Communist power by armed force will be unnecessary. Therefore, the functions of NATO's military strategy are not exhausted with the prevention or defeat of armed aggression. Against the multifaceted Soviet threat allied military power is equally a political weapon, which must be integrally related to diplomacy, propaganda, and other non-violent instruments of policy, in order to obtain the most favorable terms of peaceful coexistence until the threat subsides.

6. THE POLITICAL FUNCTIONS OF COALITION STRATEGY

The realities of the Soviet strategy of inciting political instability mean that, if deterrence can be stabilized, the primary function of military strategy will be to sustain an unrelenting political warfare, which, although it may permit limited accommodations of conflicting interests, will be preponderantly a competition among hostile powers to achieve antithetical political aims. In this political warfare the military posture of the NATO allies can play a central role in conveying the impression and encouraging the reality of confident strength, cultivating a reputation for power combined with restraint, sustaining the morale of threatened peoples (like those in Berlin), promoting a common stand among allies, bolstering resistance to Soviet demands and pressures, and reinforcing political claims and bargaining positions in diplomatic exchanges.

When serious accommodations of political differences with the Soviet bloc are at issue, military strategy will be equally infused with political import. Thus, proposed agreements to relax international tensions through arms control or "disengagement" are inextricably connected with the military balance in Europe. The military posture of the NATO states affects the nature and scope of desirable political accommodations, and the agreement upon a political accommodation logically presupposes an appraisal of its military-strategic implications.

But the political functions of NATO's military strategy embrace relations among the allies as well as with the Soviet Union. In fact, the two are inseparable, for if the alliance is to achieve military security or to support diplomacy and political warfare, it must elicit a certain measure of cohesion among its members—an essentially political task. And allied cohesion should be measured not only by strategic collaboration but also by political co-operation; the two are interdependent.

The dual task of NATO's military strategy is, therefore, on the one hand, to support the security and diplomacy of the allies vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc and, on the other hand, to secure the measure of strategic collaboration and political co-operation that is essential for these purposes. But, as I suggested at the outset, in a multilateral alliance exacting extensive commitments and contributions this is bound to be a delicate and complex task, for the requirements of collaboration do not automatically coincide with the requirements of security. A viable alliance must permit material and political concessions to the requirements of cohesion. Yet it must do so without undermining the common security. The heart of NATO's problems lies in the need to strike a balance between these two requirements through the medium of a military strategy that demands unprecedented peacetime co-operation under revolutionary military conditions.* Naturally, the burden of this task falls

* When I refer to NATO's military strategy I mean more than the plans adopted and the forces controlled by the organization's formal instrumentalities, such as the Council, the Military Committee, and SHAPE. Rather, I refer to the whole complex of member-states' plans and capabilities that bear upon the security of the NATO area. These include, most significantly, America's and Britain's strategic nuclear forces, which are under purely national control.

most heavily upon the most powerful members of the alliance—and, pre-eminently, upon the United States.

NATO's strategic problems would be intractable enough merely as the subject of a logical exercise in military planning for the purposes of deterrence and defense—military strategy has never required such systematic and sophisticated planning on the basis of such imponderable factors. But the task of reconciling allied security and cohesion compounds the inherent complexity of military strategy with domestic and interallied, as well as with external, political considerations. The resulting military-political problems illustrate an important general proposition: In the real world neither national nor coalition strategy can or should reflect a purely military logic. We should not let our fascination with the intricate calculus of deterrence obscure that fact by giving military strategy the illusion of scientific precision.

NATO is built around a solid core of identical security interests, but its members do not always agree upon the means of promoting them or find the political consequences of promoting them mutually acceptable. One reason is that national military strategy affects, and is therefore affected by, strong domestic political, economic, and psychological pressures. Since military power under contemporary conditions depends heavily on the size and composition of forces-in-being, which impose a large and continual drain upon national resources, these domestic pressures are especially marked where strategy impinges upon public expenditures, individual taxes, notions of fiscal soundness, the conscription of manpower, and the allocation of money and manpower to the separate armed services. But there are no less significant pressures of a moral or emotional nature, particularly those that spring from popular reactions to the control of nuclear weapons—reactions that run the gamut from pride and bravado to revulsion and timidity, but that have only a tangential relationship to military logic.

Coalition strategy adds to domestic pressures the complications of foreign pressures, which spring from the requirement that a number of nations with various interests, policies, and

levels of power collaborate in a common plan. Since military coalitions are created to promote only a fraction of their members' total interests—many of which interests conflict with each other and even diverge from the central purposes of the alliance—strategic collaboration depends upon a continual process of political accommodation within a field of shifting allied interests and policies, as each of the contracting parties tries to secure the terms of collaboration most compatible with his own objectives.

Military plans—especially as they determine the armament, the economic and military contributions, and the strategic and tactical roles of an ally—can affect the political relations and prestige of that ally in concrete ways that seem of more immediate significance than their conjectural implications for military security. The rearmament of West Germany, the allied force levels recommended by the North Atlantic Council, the deployment of British and American troops on the Continent, the control and command of nuclear weapons on allied soil—strategic issues like these will continue to affect allied political interests that seem more urgent than the hypothetical requirements of security against Soviet aggression. Indeed, in a period of protracted political warfare and maneuver, each member must assess the implications of military strategy for his national interests by broader criteria than deterrence and defense. And the greater the claims of strategy upon his economic and material resources, his manpower, and his independent control of armed force, the more closely he must weigh the alleged security assets of that strategy against the possible liabilities that the terms of collaboration impose upon his ability to support special national interests, which other allies may not share.

In the absence of an actual or imminent overt military threat, the speculative character of military strategic calculations enhances the natural predisposition of democratic states to subordinate the functional requirements of collective security to more urgent and immediate demands of domestic and foreign pressures, which may be only indirectly, if at all, related to security. Consequently, a peacetime alliance like NATO is bound

to generate a continual tension between the requirements of security and cohesion almost in proportion to the extent of collaboration it requires.

The extensive collaboration that NATO requires is reflected most concretely in the mutual commitments and contributions it embodies. In order to provide its members with more security than they could obtain outside the alliance, NATO requires from them certain commitments (that is, obligations to participate in common decisions and actions under stated conditions) and certain contributions (principally, money, weapons and equipment, and manpower). But these commitments and contributions also entail liabilities, such as the risks of military involvement, the limitations upon independent action, and economic, material, and manpower costs. Therefore, each ally must predicate his collaboration upon a balance of security advantages that outweighs these liabilities. Yet, since his own security depends upon the effective collaboration of others, each ally who expects a net advantage from the alliance must respect and cultivate the incentives of other allies to collaborate, even while he tries to secure the most advantageous terms of collaboration for himself. For this purpose an ally can grant concessions, by increasing his commitments and contributions; or he can employ sanctions, by reducing or threatening to reduce his commitments and contributions.

Clearly, such concessions and sanctions have political consequences and must therefore become involved in the process of political accommodation. Conspicuously among the North Atlantic allies, the accommodation of divergent foreign interests and policies—especially those that impinge directly upon the configurations of power in Europe—has been an integral part of the process of strategic collaboration. In fact, not only has political accommodation been a precondition of strategic collaboration; strategic collaboration has become an important instrument of political accommodation. For the terms of collaboration have served as a major medium through which the allies have sought to promote their respective political interests. Thus, France's policy toward military integration and the con-

trol of nuclear weapons in NATO or West Germany's contribution and commitment to the alliance, although military issues on the surface, have actually pertained at least equally to the political issues of France's prestige and influence vis-à-vis the "Anglo-American bloc" and the place of a resurgent Germany in Europe.

This politicization of allied military policies reflects the limitations that the general military and political environment, as well as the particular constrictions of NATO, impose upon other means by which the allies might exert their political influence. Economically and militarily, the NATO states lack the power to support many of their vital interests independently of the alliance. Politically, they are unable to promote their interests by leaving the alliance or by shifting their weight from one alignment or alliance to another. The commitments and contributions exacted by NATO further constrict their room for independent political maneuver. Therefore, the allies pursue their policy goals, in large measure, by seeking the terms of collaboration that will enhance their influence and promote a favorable configuration of power within the alliance.

At the same time, to further compensate for their loss of political independence, the allies try to retain control over international relations more directly by asserting their voice in the determination of joint allied policies concerning relations with the Soviet bloc. To the extent the allies surrender independent control of their military capacity to support special interests in order to promote, instead, their common interests in a collective effort, they must seek control over foreign policy by political consultation, accommodation, and agreement with their allies instead of by unilateral means. This channel of political influence has become increasingly important as NATO has assumed some of the characteristics of an integrated organization and as the Communist threat in Europe has manifested itself more intensively in political forms. The more dependent the allies have become upon strategic collaboration and military "interdependence," the more compelling their need for political co-operation has grown.

Thus, NATO has become a kind of military-political framework within which its members have pursued a variety of interests transcending military security, and NATO's military strategy has become an inseparable part of this framework. Some observers have contended that the resulting politicization of NATO's functions and the apparent absence of an imminent military threat in Europe mean that NATO must now find its chief purpose and source of cohesion in serving as an instrument of multilateral diplomacy and interallied accommodation. But the matter is not that simple, for as long as Soviet military power constitutes a threat to the allies' vital interests (whether manifested in an overt military form or, less directly, in a political form), the overriding purpose of NATO must be to enhance the military security of its members. That threat persists undiminished. Consequently, whatever non-military interests NATO may serve, outside or inside the alliance, the viability of the alliance depends upon sustaining allied cohesion at a sufficient level of strategic collaboration to meet the requirements of deterrence and defense. Inevitably and properly, the process of eliciting collaboration requires concessions to various domestic and foreign political interests which have little or nothing to do with military security. Yet there are critical limits to which the alliance can afford to sacrifice strategic logic for the sake of achieving political consensus. In the final analysis, the incentives for collaboration must spring from an understanding and acceptance of the concrete requirements of security.

If NATO had remained, as at the outset, essentially a traditional guaranty pact, simply committing its members to come to each other's assistance and calling for minimal peacetime collaboration, the dual task of reconciling the requirements of security and cohesion would not have been so formidable. But since the Korean War and the establishment of a central command shortly afterward, NATO has acquired the characteristics of an integrated military-political organization, exacting unprecedented peacetime contributions and commitments. Therefore, it is not surprising that NATO's strategy contains some

logical anomalies that have sprung from the tension between the requirements of security and consensus. It contains disparities between stated objectives and actual capabilities, apparent contradictions between declaratory and operational strategy, and ambiguities in the declaratory pronouncements themselves.

From one standpoint, these contradictions and ambiguities can be regarded as the necessary price of cohesion, insofar as they enable the allies to live with intractable strategic dilemmas and conflicting interests that might disrupt collaboration altogether if they were subjected to the exacting demands of sheer strategic logic. But, from another standpoint, they must be regarded as a threat to both cohesion and security, insofar as they deprive the alliance of coherent rational incentives for effective collaboration and help perpetuate crucial strategic deficiencies.

7. ALTERED CONDITIONS OF SECURITY AND COHESION

In order to understand the way in which novel strategic problems have impinged upon NATO's core of mutual security interests, one must first understand the substance of that core of interests and the function of NATO in protecting it. The North Atlantic allies combined, principally, to protect their common interest in preventing the extension of Soviet control and influence in Europe, and this remains NATO's central purpose. However, other instruments might possibly serve the same purpose; for example, several bilateral pacts or simply a unilateral American commitment like the Monroe Doctrine. Why should there be a multilateral mutual-assistance alliance, let alone one exacting such extensive commitments and contributions?

Proponents of the North Atlantic alliance have attributed two primary advantages to this particular kind of alliance: (*a*) by binding several nations to regard an attack upon one as an attack upon all, it creates a more effective deterrent to aggression; (*b*) by combining the power of several nations, it creates a more effective defense against aggression. The first advantage depends upon the credibility of a joint political commitment.

The second depends upon the efficacy of collective military planning, decision, and action.

However, since the United States has held the preponderance of power in the alliance, the realization of both these advantages has depended largely upon the extent to which this unique kind of military-political instrument augments America's commitment to deterrence and defense in Europe. Yet fundamental changes in the military and political environment and in NATO itself have largely destroyed the original conditions that made this dependence upon the American commitment a satisfactory basis of allied security and cohesion.

From the beginning, the fundamental strength of the North Atlantic Treaty has been thought to lie in the simple commitment of the United States to come to the defense of Europe. Extensive collective military planning and organization arose in response to military and political developments that were not foreseen at the outset. From the beginning, America's allies have been enthusiastic, if occasionally anxious, proponents of the first conception; the United States (together with West Germany) has been the most ardent and active proponent of the second.

The founders of the Treaty, wary of America's history of isolation and conscious of Europe's dependence upon American intervention in two world wars, believed that a truly entangling alliance, formally binding the United States within the mutual obligations of several states, was essential to make America's commitment to come to the defense of Europe convincing to the potential aggressor and to the potential victims of aggression as well.[8] This consideration, combined with the precedent of the Brussels Treaty and the American preference for a regional security organization consonant with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter rather than bilateral pacts resembling "old-fashioned balance-of-power agreements,"[9] accounts for the multilateral character of the North Atlantic Treaty. But it does not account for the fact that the alliance is not only a guaranty pact but also an organization for extensive military collaboration.

As long as the alliance remained, essentially, a multilateral framework for reinforcing America's guaranty to involve herself in the defense of Europe, the problem of strategic collaboration scarcely existed. But, in the course of events which I shall describe in succeeding chapters, the alliance became more than this. Notably, in the aftermath of the North Korean invasion, it began to assume some of the attributes of an integrated military organization, with the establishment at the beginning of 1951 of a central headquarters (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) commanded by General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), followed in early 1952 by the creation of two other Supreme Commands: one for the Atlantic (SACLANT) and another for the English Channel and southern North Sea (Channel Command).* This development greatly increased the military potential of the alliance, but it also burdened it with an unprecedented task of peacetime strategic collaboration.

Combined with this change in the structure of the alliance, certain radical developments in military technology and the balance of military power—most notably the production of the H-bomb, the growth of Soviet nuclear striking power, and the prospect of several allies building their own nuclear capabilities —have complicated the problem of effective strategic collaboration, while undermining the original basis for dependence upon the American entanglement. The complications are reflected in significant doubts and apprehensions revolving around four central strategic issues: the efficacy of America's capacity for massive retaliation as a deterrent; the function of ground forces; the role of nuclear and conventional weapons; the control of nuclear weapons.

* NATO forces under these central commands are, partly, assigned to NATO under continuous operational control and, partly, earmarked for assignment either on mobilization or the outbreak of war. Generally speaking, SACEUR's tactical air forces and standing land forces are assigned; naval and reserve forces are earmarked. Thus SACLANT, unlike SACEUR, does not have forces permanently assigned to him in peacetime; but the eight maritime powers in the Atlantic Command have earmarked certain of their naval forces for SACLANT in the event of war.

These issues strike at the core of the mutual security interests that bind NATO together as a working defensive alliance. Their resolution is crucial to its security and cohesion. But, beyond their challenge to the viability of NATO strategy, they pose anew the fundamental question of the utility of a multilateral military alliance in an international system sustained by a balance of terror.

2
The Initial Phase

1. THE ALLIANCE AS A POLITICAL GUARANTY

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on April 4, 1949, formally registered a widespread belief on both sides of the Atlantic, which had crystallized during the Berlin blockade, that Soviet encroachment upon Europe could be prevented only if the United States associated herself, in a firm and formal entanglement *before* the outbreak of war, with the efforts of Western European nations to defend themselves.

In the spring of 1948 the Soviet Union seemed determined to seize the invaluable prize of Western Europe by political infiltration and subversion on the model of the Czechoslovakian coup, but she confronted the consolidation of an opposing bloc through the Marshall Plan and the Brussels Treaty. Viewing these manifestations of "capitalist-imperialist" solidarity as hostile threats to Russia's natural hegemony in Eurasia, the Soviet leaders were all the more determined to destroy the opposing bloc in order to make the world safe for Soviet Communism. Hence, they decided to apply more intensive pressure against the gathering opposition by isolating and seizing Berlin, which was the key to Germany, the crucial area in Russian plans ever since the Communists came to power in 1917. The Soviet threat against Berlin and West Germany was not a Hitlerian "blitzkreig" but a cautious, well-conceived plan of political and psychological warfare.[1] Nevertheless, in Soviet and Western calcu-

lations the conduct of this non-military warfare was closely affected by the general military balance.

There is no indication that Stalin wished to pursue his designs upon Western Europe by engaging Western forces in direct combat. He had gained a healthy respect for the vast and untouched military potential of the United States in World War II, and he evidently believed that another world war would be decided by the same "permanently operating factors."[2] On the other hand, he had demonstrated in the Czechoslovakian coup that he appreciated the utility of superior local forces-in-being as a backstop for political take-over; and he was undoubtedly conscious of similar opportunities in Berlin, which were offered by the disintegration of the Western occupation forces and the precipitant withdrawal and demobilization of American troops. For soon after the war there were only about a dozen scattered, under-strength Western divisions in Europe, while Russia maintained 25 fully armed divisions in Central Europe and, over-all, at least 140 of 175 divisions at battle strength (not counting the numerous satellite divisions).

At the time of the Berlin blockade, the United States, with total ground reserves of about 2⅓ divisions, was unable to send more than a division anywhere without resorting to partial mobilization. In the Department of Defense the West's position in Berlin was considered militarily untenable, and the government soon decided that American forces could not afford to try to break the blockade with an armed convoy. Although the United States enjoyed a monopoly of the atomic bomb and the capacity to deliver it, there were no plans or even inclinations to use the bomb in any contingency short of a massive assault upon Europe, and, in that event, it was generally assumed that Europe (at least to the Pyrenees) would soon be overrun anyway.[3] Only the unexpected success of the airlift—by a very narrow margin, at that—saved the West from the consequences of its local military inferiority.

The effect of this narrow escape was to accelerate the formation of the North Atlantic alliance (which was probably, in itself, an important factor in inducing the Russians to terminate

the blockade as a political liability). However, the statesmen who formed the alliance did not generally envisage it as a means of redressing the military imbalance on the Continent but rather as the means of committing America's military potential to the defense of Europe in order to bolster Western European resolution and deter further Soviet incursions with a show of trans-Atlantic solidarity. The deterrent effect was believed to lie chiefly in American and European adherence to Articles 5 and 3, in which the parties agreed "that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all"; that if such an attack occurred, each party would "assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area"; and that, according to Article 3, the parties would undertake "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

Militarily, deterrence was almost completely dependent upon America's Strategic Air Command, which was (and still is) outside allied control, and the combined American-European war potential, especially their superior industrial and scientific capacity. Both of these military resources were expected to perform in another general war the same vital role they had performed in the recent one. Actually, it is quite doubtful that the United States had the bombers, the bomber bases, or even the atomic bombs to stop the Red Army from rolling to the Channel.[4] But NATO was not created to marshal military power, either in being or in potential, in order to deter an imminent attack on Europe. Like Russia's huge army, it was intended to provide political and psychological reinforcement in the continuing political warfare of the cold war. There was no significant fear of a massive Russian invasion.

It was true in 1949, and it is true now, that there would be no compelling reason for this trans-Atlantic alliance if Western Europe could prevent and withstand Communist encroachment

by itself. Clearly, this was not the case in 1949. One who appraises the alliance today must ask whether America's formal commitment and tangible contribution to Europe's defense continue to be necessary, militarily and politically. If they are not necessary, then perhaps we need concern ourselves with NATO strategy only as it may facilitate the transition to Western Europe's military self-sufficiency or as it may provide the framework for collective diplomacy and interallied accommodations. But, if they are necessary, we must recognize that the strategic conditions for retaining effective collaboration between the United States and her allies have grown vastly more formidable and complex.

In the initial phase of the North Atlantic alliance, before the Korean War and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major nuclear power, the alliance embodied an obviously profitable balance of assets over liabilities for all its signatories and a clearly satisfactory distribution of benefits and burdens between the United States and her European partners. For collective defense seemed urgent, while the commitments and contributions it exacted were minimal; and the United States Navy and SAC were virtually the sole and, apparently, sufficient standing military deterrents.

To Britain and France, faced with the threefold problem of achieving a safe military posture in Europe and protecting overseas holdings while regaining their economic strength and meeting the new demands for social welfare programs—a problem compounded in Britain by an expensive atomic weapons program—America's formal political guaranty and her accompanying military and economic assistance seemed the only means of avoiding chronic overcommitment and recovering great-power status. To the other allies, also, NATO seemed to be an essential military and political framework for gaining by collective action the kind of security they could not readily reconcile with economic recovery in a purely European alliance. To the United States, now fully aware that its first line of defense lay overseas, and fully responsive to the European concern that America's political isolation should not again en-

courage aggression in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty seemed like an indispensable instrument for extending deterrence and engendering political confidence overseas. Through it, the European states might recover the economic and military strength that would enable them eventually to contain the Soviet menace by themselves.

Despite the expectations of most military men that the alliance would ultimately rest upon a large integrated standing force actually capable of withstanding a Russian onslaught, the alliance was, essentially, in its initial phase, a guaranty pact designed to enhance the credibility of America's commitment to come to the defense of Europe. For psychological reasons the alliance declared itself bound to the objective of local defense, but for internal political and economic reasons it really relied upon America's threat of nuclear retaliation. This contradiction between declaratory strategy and actual capabilities, which was regarded as the price of allied cohesion in the initial phase, subsequently became a source of trouble and confusion when unforeseen developments undermined allied confidence in the original assumptions about the nature of the Soviet threat and the military balance between the Soviet Union and the United States.

2. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF THE ALLIANCE

The alliance in its original form reflected its antecedents in the efforts of Western European countries to organize their own common defense in the face of a succession of hostile Soviet acts. The failure of the Moscow Conference (in March and April, 1947) to reach a settlement of the differences between Russia and the West over Germany, Russia's active opposition to the Marshall Plan, her formation of the Cominform, her clandestine support of Italian and French strikes, and her seizure of Czechoslovakia in 1948—these ominous events moved Britain and France (already allied in the Dunkirk Treaty) to combine with Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in the Brussels Treaty of March, 1948: a fifty-year military alliance pledging all its members to meet an "armed attack in Europe" upon

any one member with "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." In September the Brussels Treaty powers decided to form a Western Union Defense Organization, embodying a Consultative Council of Foreign Ministers and a Defense Committee, assisted by joint chiefs of staff (of which Field Marshal Lord Montgomery was appointed chairman).

In the eyes of most of its members—and especially in the eyes of the British, for whom America's commitment to bolster their waning position in the Mediterranean and Europe had become the *sine qua non* of foreign policy—this prototype of the Atlantic alliance was the preliminary step to a wider association which would include the United States.[5] Although at the time the United States was not yet ready for formal alliance with the Brussels Treaty powers, the American government had officially encouraged them to believe that, as in the case of the Marshall Plan, their joint efforts would present the United States with a suitable basis for extending some kind of political support and material assistance;[6] and it continued the same kind of encouragement even more actively after the Western Union was established. In April, 1948, the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, suggested that the Brussels powers merge in a single defense system embracing the countries of North America and Western Europe. In July preliminary negotiations leading to the North Atlantic Treaty began in Washington.

Yet, among those on both sides of the ocean who looked forward to the enlargement of the Western Union into a trans-Atlantic pact, there were really two conceptions of the alliance —one largely political and the other envisioning large-scale military collaboration—which coexisted in ambiguous relationship to each other. The military planners in the United States and Europe were the most ambitious proponents of the expansion of Western Union into a full-fledged trans-Atlantic military coalition. After the signature of the Brussels Treaty, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, convinced by hard professional experience that the American frontier lay on the Elbe, proposed a military alliance with the free nations of Europe, urged the immediate establishment of a central military command for Western

Union, and recommended an American supreme commander in the event of war.[7] When Field Marshal Montgomery of Alamein, an ardent advocate of defending Europe on the ground as far eastward as possible, was appointed commander in chief of the Western Union Defense Organization in September, 1948, his headquarters at Fontainebleau became the center for the formulation of far-reaching joint military plans by representatives from all the signatories in concert with American "observers."[8] American military collaboration proved invaluable in enabling the Brussels Treaty powers to draw up joint strategic plans and a list of military needs to support them, which the American Congress and administration regarded as the prerequisite of closer trans-Atlantic ties.

This joint military planning, looking toward a formal connection of the Western Union with the United States, received congressional approval and encouragement in June, 1948, in the Vandenberg Resolution, which proclaimed as American policy the "association of the United States by constitutional process with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid and as affect its national security." The approach to an Atlantic alliance was further advanced by Russia's imposition of the Berlin blockade at the end of June, for this crystallized the growing conviction among civilian leaders that the war-weakened European nations could not simultaneously recover their economic and political stability and build the military strength they needed to withstand Soviet pressure unless they received American material help and the assurance of American military support in a showdown.

On the other hand, civilian leaders in 1948 did not necessarily envision an Atlantic alliance as an instrument for constructing the full-scale integrated defense of Europe. Conspicuously, this was not the view of the American Congress, where Senator Vandenberg, one of the principal architects of America's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty, stressed the value of a simple political commitment in encouraging Europe and discouraging the Kremlin, while he explicitly repudiated the idea

that the United States should help in building up a sizable force-in-being.[9]

The military planners, impressed by the painful lessons of breaking Germany's hold on the Continent in World War II, were acutely conscious of the West's inability to stop the Russians from rapidly rolling over the whole of Western Europe. They were unwilling to base the defense of Europe solely upon the deterrent effect of an American promise of liberation. Yet with the existing forces in Europe—about 12 ill-equipped and poorly trained divisions and 400 airplanes—they could plan for little more than a rapid withdrawal to the Pyrenees; whereas they looked forward to creating a combined military force of between 80 and 85 divisions (about one-third of which would be reserves capable of mobilization within a period of a few days to a month) to hold the crucial Rhine line and about 15 more to hold the Italian and Scandinavian flanks against a major invasion.[10] Their conception of a massive Continental defense system was also reflected in the United States' insistence, contrary to British civilian opinion, that the proposed Atlantic alliance should include nations outside the Western Union—Canada, Portugal, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Italy—who, even if they contributed little or nothing directly to ground defense, could provide valuable bases for American air and sea power.[11]

However, this conception of the proposed Atlantic alliance does not seem to have been fully shared even by all the key civilian planners. Some, in fact, held a conception that could only be regarded as in direct opposition if the underlying issues had been more sharply defined.[12] George F. Kennan, recalling in 1957 his participation as chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff in formulating the terms of the pact, wrote that he conceived the alliance in 1948 and 1949 as simply the means of restoring Western Europe's self-confidence and providing a modest military shield, behind which the West would proceed with the prior task of economic reconstruction and, ultimately, the creation of "a new ordering of international relations . . . so patently worthy and inspiring in itself, and so wholly without menace to anyone anywhere, that peoples could

safely repair to it without raising military issues." Despite the adverse military balance in Europe, he said that he never supposed that the alliance was intended to redress the military balance in the face of any imminent danger.

> In all of this NATO had, as a military alliance, its part to play; but I think every one of us hoped that its purely military role would decline in importance as the curse of bipolarity fell from the Continent, as negotiations took place, as armies were withdrawn, as the contest of ideologies took other forms. The central agency in this concept was not NATO but the European Recovery Program; and none of us dreamed at that time that the constructive impulses of this enterprise, which looked to everyone so hopeful in those days, would be overtaken and swallowed up in the space of a mere two or three years by programs of military assistance based on a wholly different concept of the Soviet threat and of Europe's needs.[13]

Certainly, Kennan's conception of European security embodied the profound hopes of many statesmen and political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet their conception of the alliance was too ambiguous to be so clearly distinguished from that of the military. On the one hand, all shared the hope that President Truman expressed in his inaugural address in January, 1949, that "if we can make it sufficiently clear, in advance, that any armed attack affecting our national security would be met with overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur."[14] As the British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin put it:

> I would emphasize . . . that the real purpose of this pact is to act as a deterrent. . . . The situation which we had in 1914 and 1939 and particularly 1940 and 1941, when we had to hold the fort waiting and wondering when other nations would realize the gravity of the aggressive menace, while at the same time we were using up and exhausting our resources—that situation should not be allowed to occur again.[15]

But, on the other hand, allied governments also envisioned the alliance as more than a deterrent commitment disposing only a modest military shield to protect the main task of economic recovery. For they said that they looked forward to the eventual establishment of an armed force capable of redressing the mili-

tary balance on the Continent and repelling a full-scale invasion. And, although the European allies insisted that economic recovery should have priority over rearmament and welcomed United States indorsement of this axiom,[16] they also pressed the United States with some urgency to remedy their exposed condition as quickly as possible by shoring up their new political commitment with military assistance.

Yet allied governments seem to have regarded this strategy of local defense as more of a political gesture than a military necessity. For insofar as they implicitly subscribed to the military planners' conception of the alliance, it was less from fear of an imminent Soviet attack than from the fear that, if an attack should come, the alliance, instead of protecting them from invasion, could at best only liberate them after another disastrous defeat and occupation. As the French Premier Henri Queuille told an American reporter, in a much-quoted statement:

> We know that once Western Europe was occupied, America would again come to our aid and eventually we would again be liberated. But the process would be terrible. The next time you probably would be liberating a corpse.... The real frontier of Western Europe which must be defended must be moved well beyond the actual frontiers, because once the geographic frontiers of these countries are crossed it will be too late for America to save very much. Even fifteen days after the invasion will be too late.[17]

This did not imply, however, that France foresaw any real likelihood of a Russian sweep through Europe; the fear of Soviet aggression did not seize the European allies until the outbreak of the Korean War, and then only briefly.

The French were particularly articulate in calling for what became known after the Korean War as a "forward strategy." However, this was not because they expected a Soviet attack but rather because they were obsessed with suspicions, stimulated by World War II experience, that, if an attack *did* occur, British and American strategists would be content to conduct the defense of Europe from beyond the Continent or behind the Pyrenees.[18] American planners were attentive to such fears and suspicions and repeatedly declared their determination to

protect the homelands of all allies. If the British, like some so-called American isolationists, harbored a traditional preference for a "peripheral" strategy, they officially suppressed it in deference to French sensitivities and, more important, to the requirements of firmly entangling the United States in a commitment to come to their defense. Thus, quite apart from its military feasibility, the repeated indorsement of a forward strategy was conceived to be a political and psychological necessity.

However, the material support of this declaratory strategy was another matter. Since the potential aggressor enjoyed at least a 10 to 1 ratio of numerical superiority in standing divisions and an even greater superiority in trained reserves that could be quickly mobilized, the protection of Europe from another cycle of occupation and liberation would seem to have required the European allies to rearm on a massive scale in order to create and maintain an adequate holding force in a constant state of combat readiness. Yet, as a matter of fact, in the absence of the fear of an imminent attack, neither the European countries nor the United States were remotely prepared to undertake a rearmament effort of this magnitude. The Europeans were unwilling to jeopardize their economic revival or aggravate their political instability; the United States was unwilling to redress the military balance by itself.

In truth, European governments were contending with contradictory popular demands. In order to persuade their parliaments and citizenry to accept the possibly provocative commitments of the North Atlantic Treaty, they felt it necessary to assure them that the alliance could actually protect their countries from invasion. But, in order to persuade them that their commitments would not require intolerable sacrifices, they felt it necessary to assure them that military expenditures would be modest and subordinate to the advancement of their standards of living.[19] Actually, these two assurances could only be fulfilled, if at all, by the participation of West Germany in the alliance, but for political reasons this measure was no more acceptable to the European countries than a massive rearmament effort.

Taking note of the conflict between domestic economic goals and rearmament, the London *Times,* in an editorial on March 11, 1949, saw two choices facing Western leaders.

> In making an Atlantic Pact the leaders of the Western powers had a choice of two methods. They could begin, so to speak, by building the inner keep or fortress and leave the outer walls until this was strong enough to resist assault; or they could start at once with the city walls and hope that these would provide sufficient protection while the main work of fortification went on inside.[20]

The *Times* believed that the United States had chosen the second method, because the assurance that the United States would come to the aid of her allies was not a sufficient guaranty of their security unless she could actually protect them from occupation. However, the truth of the matter seems to be that neither the United States nor her allies saw any such clear-cut choice before them. Rather, they were determined to pursue both goals simultaneously by raising the outer walls just enough to encourage unimpeded progress on the inner keep, while promising to build adequate outer walls for which they had no real plans, in their confidence that American nuclear power would deter an assault on the inner fortress in any case.

In view of the prevailing assumption, then and now, that Western Europe's "outer walls" cannot possibly counterbalance the mobilized masses of the Soviet bloc, it is well to note at the outset that the failure to create forces capable of local resistance has not been dictated by any physical deficiency in war potential; in population, financial resources, and productive capacity, the NATO countries are collectively superior to the Soviet Union and her eastern satellites.[21] It has resulted, in part, from the greater number of military personnel the Western powers employ to support effective fighting divisions (the "division slice," in technical parlance) and the greater expense per man, which result from the extensive service and supply forces attached to Western divisions and the high standard of living that all Western forces enjoy.[22] But, basically, the failure has resulted, first, from the political incapacity of democratic nations to exact the domestic sacrifices and adopt the concerted meas-

ures that are necessary to prepare for war during peacetime and, second, from their facility for wishfully believing that what is politically palatable is militarily adequate. Of course, military plans must adjust to the realities of popular will no less than to the realities of manpower, technology, and production; but one must hope that this adjustment will not be made before the real strategic choices are presented and popular will is put to the test of enlightened leadership.

3. AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE

In the United States the choice between a guaranty pact, such as Kennan envisioned, and an integrated military organization, such as the military planners wanted, was never made so clear as during the debate over military assistance to Europe. But although Congress approved a military assistance program of $1.3 billion, the great bulk of which was earmarked for Europe, the underlying issue of the conception of the alliance that the program was intended to implement remained obscure.

Although the administration considered arms aid to be a necessary complement to the North Atlantic Treaty and encouraged the European governments to think likewise, it decided as a matter of legislative tactics to withhold presentation of this more controversial measure until the Treaty should be approved. In appealing for the approval of the Treaty, the administration denied that it contained any obligation to extend arms aid.[23] It explained that, in any case, rearmament would be limited to strengthening Europe's small existing forces so as to avoid impeding economic recovery, precipitating an arms race, or either provoking or tempting aggression.[24] And it denied that substantial numbers of American troops would be stationed in Europe or that Germany would be permitted to remilitarize, rearm, or contribute to allied forces.[25] To be sure, Secretary Acheson insisted that Europe must be protected from another liberation,[26] and General Bradley stated that "plans for the common defense of the existing free world must provide for the security of Europe without abandoning these countries to the terrors

of enemy occupation." "Only upon that premise," he declared, "can nations closest to the frontiers be expected to stake their fortunes with ours in common defense."[27] Yet, insofar as the administration was forced to explain the material implications of these plans, it was content to suggest that the United States role would be merely to speed the process by which a revitalized and, perhaps, reunited Europe, given time, would become capable of defending itself.

Consequently, it is not surprising that this novel entangling alliance seems to have been approved by Congress and the nation with little understanding of its practical military implications, on the general assumption that it would exert a deterrent effect upon the Soviet Union while boosting the morale of Western Europe.[28] Thus Senator Vandenberg, among others, regarded the Treaty as merely a logical extension of the Monroe Doctrine, which was distinguished from old-fashioned military alliances precisely by the fact that its value depended upon the deterrent effect of a formal commitment rather than upon collaboration in building a common armed force.[29] Senator Taft, who opposed ratification of the Treaty, said that he preferred an explicit extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Europe but that he would nevertheless vote for the Treaty, because of its deterrent effect, if the Senate would specifically repudiate any obligation either to build up the armed forces of the eleven allies or to extend them continued aid for the next twenty years "under circumstances of which we have not the slightest conception today."[30]

The administration, while strictly limiting its request for military assistance, neither indorsed nor repudiated the objective of building up an armed force capable of withstanding Soviet aggression. On July 23, 1949, the day President Truman signed the North Atlantic Treaty, he presented a bill for military assistance to Congress. In his letter of transmittal the President described the military objective of American assistance in modest terms.

> The military assistance which we propose for these countries will be limited to that which is necessary to help them create mobile defensive forces. Our objective is to see to it that these

> nations are equipped, in the shortest possible time, with compact and effectively trained forces capable of maintaining internal order and resisting the initial phases of external aggression.[31]

But the President also declared:

> At the present time, the military power which is the greatest deterrent to aggression is centered in the United States, three thousand miles away from Europe. It must be made clear that the United States has no intention, in the event of aggression, of allowing the peoples of Western Europe to be overrun before its own power can be brought to bear. The program of military assistance now proposed is a tangible assurance of our purpose in this regard.[32]

How could a program designed only to equip and bring up to strength Europe's few existing divsions give a "tangible assurance" to the peoples of Western Europe that they would not be overrun by the huge forces available to the potential aggressor? Of course, nobody claimed that Western Europe could become capable of defending itself against an all-out aggression with one American appropriation or in one year. "Our whole contention," General Bradley said, "is that it is going to take time . . . it may take five years, ten years, for these countries to build up their defenses to the point where they can stop an aggressor."[33] But, if the European allies were to become capable of defending themselves even in five or ten years, would this not mean that the Military Assistance Program of 1949 would be only a small down payment on a very large long-term investment in a ground force designed to resist a massive invasion in another large-scale land war? And, if this were not what the government contemplated, then would not the arms aid be only large enough to provoke the Russians and precipitate an arms race without being adequate to keep the Russians from overrunning Europe? These were questions that Senator Taft and other skeptics asked—and with considerable justice.

Secretary Acheson gave perhaps the only plausible answer. He repudiated the possibility of a European army ever approximating the huge Russian forces.[34] Although affirming the

necessity of protecting Europe from occupation and liberation, he stressed a far more limited strategic objective of rearmament.

> We do not believe that to discourage military aggression it is necessary to create Western European defense forces which are by virtue of their size capable of successfully resisting an all-out attack. What is required is, rather, sufficient strength to make it impossible for an aggressor to achieve a quick and easy victory.[35]

In other words, he proposed a military shield only large enough to deter limited aggression by convincing the aggressor that he could not obtain his objective virtually unopposed.

This was a strategic objective that might have been consistent with the dimensions of the rearmament effort the United States and her allies were willing to undertake, but it did not meet the problem of defending Europe against an all-out assault if the deterrent should fail. By what strategy did the United States plan to achieve this objective? Published testimony on this question indicates that plans for defending Europe were patterned closely after World War II operations, with the atomic bomb providing an additional element of firepower. However, the congressional hearings of August and October, 1949, which were precipitated by the conflict between the Navy and Air Force over the B-36 bomber program, indicate that there was some difference of opinion among military planners about the capacity of strategic bombing to defeat the enemy without large-scale land operations.

There was general agreement among the military that a Soviet attack would come in the form of a massive blitzkrieg upon Europe and the United States simultaneously, and that Europe would have to be defended initially by a European force that could hold the front long enough for the weight of American military strength to exert a decisive influence. Enthusiasts of airpower, however, were confident that a full-scale atomic counteroffensive against the heart of the enemy's war-making power (first his weapons and bases and then his industry) would secure victory fairly quickly without requiring a costly war of attrition between surface forces;[36] but Army and

Navy planners—of whom General Bradley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the most prominent spokesman—anticipated that, despite the great role of airpower, victory would depend eventually upon large-scale land operations, sustained by control of the sea, which would defeat the opposing armies.[37]

Everyone planned to fight World War III on the assumption that the United States would enjoy a virtual monopoly or a meaningful superiority of atomic striking power, and no one anticipated that she might be deterred from employing this power by a Soviet capability to strike back;[38] but it is significant that, nevertheless, there was substantial opposition on political as well as military grounds to the thesis that strategic airpower obviated the need for massive conventional surface operations. In the B-36 controversy naval officers argued against this thesis on the ground that the indiscriminate annihilation of civilians was immoral and contrary to the achievement of a stable peace after the war.[39] But General Bradley, who dissociated himself from the Navy's polemics against civilian bombing, was confirmed in his adherence to the conception of large-scale land warfare by another non-military consideration, which related directly to allied cohesion. As he expressed this consideration in a major address in April, 1949:

> It must be perfectly apparent to the people of the United States that we cannot count on friends in Western Europe if our strategy in the event of war dictates that we shall first abandon them to the enemy with a promise of later liberation. Yet that is the only strategy that can prevail if the military balance of power in Europe is to be carried on the wings of our bombers and deposited in reserves this side of the ocean. It is a strategy that would produce nothing better than impotent and disillusioned allies in the event of war.[40]

General Bradley's statement was directed not only to the allies but also against Senator Taft and other opponents of the military assistance program, with whom the thesis of victory-primarily-through-strategic-airpower was especially popular. Senator Taft saw no reason to build up a large army in Europe, considering the claims of the airpower enthusiasts; and he

charged that the administration, in asking for a military assistance program, was really committing the country to a futile, obsolete, and bankrupting strategic concept of defending Europe by large-scale land warfare.[41] Yet Senator Vandenberg, who accepted the military assistance program—although unenthusiastically, after making sure that it would be kept to a minimum—shared Taft's aversion to building sufficient forces-in-being to hold the line against Russia. He conceived the chief function of European forces as assuring adequate defense against internal subversion; he was content to rely upon the "potentials" of the United States and her allies to deter aggression.[42]

Thus both Taft and Vandenberg, although they voted differently on the Military Assistance Act, which was designed to implement the North Atlantic Treaty, vigorously opposed a strategic conception that leading military and civilian officials of the administration said was indispensable to the cohesion of the alliance. In fact, it is doubtful that *any* of the senators who approved the modest arms-aid appropriation accepted the full implications of the strategy that General Bradley advocated. Consequently, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 represented a cloudy compromise between divergent conceptions of the alliance, based upon a tenuous connection between strategic objectives and military means. The administration had failed to acknowledge or resolve the contradictions between declared strategic objectives, war plans, and actual capabilities. Congress had indorsed the results.

4. THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR INTEGRATED DEFENSE

It was unanticipated events rather than a coherent design that later transformed the alliance from a multilateral guaranty pact into a semi-integrated military organization. Yet, in one respect, the United States Congress laid the foundation for this transformation when, in order to insure the use of military aid for collective rather than purely national purposes, it injected the statutory requirement that such aid be conditioned upon the

development of joint strategic plans by the Treaty's defense committee.

Secretary of State Acheson stated the ultimate rationale of this requirement when he described the basis of allied defense as a revolutionary concept of a division of responsibilities. According to this concept, the allies would no longer maintain complete, balanced defense establishments but would, instead, specialize in the kinds of forces and military production for which each was best suited, within a pattern of integrated defense.[43] This was a concept of integration which not even the smallest allies were ready to carry very far. Yet, to a remarkable degree for a peacetime alliance, it was embodied in the strategic plans that were devised by the military representatives of allied countries and accepted by the civilian representatives of the alliance and the individual countries.

The very requirement of "an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area," which Congress had stipulated, gave impetus to the establishment in September, 1949, of the elaborate structure of civilian and military committees and planning groups that was to make the alliance an organization.* On December 1, 1949, the Defense Committee, composed of allied defense ministers, announced agreement upon a "strategic concept," which was indorsed by the North Atlantic Council on January 6, 1950, and on the basis of which bilateral aid agreements were negotiated.[44] On January 27 President Truman signed these agreements and announced his approval of the recom-

* The central policy-making organs in this structure were the North Atlantic Council, composed of the allied foreign ministers; the Defense Committee, composed of allied defense ministers; the Military Committee, consisting of the chiefs of staff of the member countries; and the Standing Group, the executive committee of the Military Committee, in which representatives of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States supervised the development of military plans by regional planning groups. In November, 1949, the Council established the Defense Financial and Economic Board, composed of allied finance ministers, and the Military Production and Supply Board, which was responsible to the Defense Committee. In May, 1950, the foreign ministers created a permanent civilian body, the Council Deputies, to be responsible for regular political exchanges among the member governments, for the execution of their directives, and for the co-ordination of the work of the subsidiary bodies of the alliance. At the Lisbon Conference in February, 1952, the North Atlantic Council was made a permanent body, with permanent representatives and a secretary general.

mendations for "an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area" based on individual national specialization.[45]

The strategic concept upon which the integrated defense plans were based was not made public, but it undoubtedly followed the outline of the concept that General Bradley had presented to Congress on July 29 after conferring with the Defense Committee of the Western Union.[46] Significantly, this concept involved a type and degree of national specialization of military functions which, under existing or foreseeable capabilities, was far more congruent with a guaranty pact than with an integrated defense system for the protection of Europe; for the United States function was confined to strategic bombing and protecting the naval sea lanes, while Europe was to provide the "hard core of the ground power in being." Nevertheless, at the time, this strategy and its concomitant division of labor seemed to fulfil the imperatives of security and cohesion adequately—or at least as adequately as the burdens of peacetime rearmament and economic recovery permitted.

5. TWO CRUCIAL ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE TERMS OF COLLABORATION

On the eve of the Korean War, NATO already embodied a degree of military collaboration that was unprecedented among peacetime coalitions. This collaboration was secured at the price of limiting allied contributions to the common defense to a level that was incompatible with NATO's announced strategic objective. However, the alliance so clearly enhanced the security of its members and provided such a satisfactory distribution of military and political benefits among them that the contradiction between declaratory and operational strategy was of little concern.

The United States, sharing an identical interest with the enfeebled countries of Western Europe in their economic recovery and security, extended them the assurance of an entangling alliance, supplemented by material assistance, without which they felt incapable of withstanding the kind of Soviet pressure displayed in the Czechoslovakian coup and the Berlin blockade.

In return, her European allies agreed to strengthen their forces and assume the obligation to defend Western Europe on the ground in accordance with a unified strategic plan. The United States backed up its guaranty to come to the defense of Europe by, in effect, extending the protective umbrella of the Strategic Air Command with the atomic bomb. In return, Europe provided the bases that the United States needed in order to strike effectively at the heart of Russia.

From the standpoint of the European allies these terms of collaboration contained only one significant liability: If America's atomic deterrent should fail and Russia should launch an all-out assault upon Western Europe, they would be overrun and occupied before they could be liberated. To offset this liability the United States assured her allies that NATO would protect every one of them from a Soviet invasion. Yet this assurance was not supported by the projected capabilities or by the strategic concept for the "integrated defense of the North Atlantic area."

The disparity between Russian and Western divisions immediately available for combat along the critical front in the center of Europe was on the order of 100 (including 22 Russian divisions ready on the forward line) to 12; yet it was generally assumed that 50 to 70 divisions would be necessary to defend this front, and the military plans devised by the Brussels Treaty powers in collaboration with the United States apparently called for 80 to 85, including reserves. The strategic conception adopted by the alliance at the behest of the United States Congress prescribed that the "hard core of the ground power in being" should come from Europe. But the European allies said they were incapable of strengthening their forces without jeopardizing their economic recovery and political stability unless the United States granted military as well as economic aid, while the American military assistance program, in accordance with the principle that economic recovery should have priority over rearmament, aimed only to bring existing European forces up to strength. Furthermore, although all military planners agreed

that the participation of West Germany in the alliance was essential to the defense of Europe, all governments agreed that this was politically out of the question.

Nevertheless, the contradiction between NATO's declaratory strategy and operational capabilities failed to jeopardize the cohesion of the alliance—in fact, it promoted it—as long as the allies were confident of two crucial assumptions about the nature of the Soviet threat and the means of countering it. The first assumption was that America's capacity to strike at the heart of Russia with the atomic bomb would deter her from pursuing her aims by overt military aggression. The second assumption was that, therefore, Europe might safely proceed with the prior task of economic recovery while undertaking only minimum rearmament and, thereby, reduce her vulnerability to the most serious Soviet threat: subversion and indirect aggression.

The first assumption was based upon the prevailing image of the next war as a more devastating copy of the last, which would be precipitated by an all-out Soviet assault upon Europe and the United States. It was consonant with the general presupposition, as Churchill had declared, that America's monopoly of the atomic bomb, alone, had kept Russia from sweeping over Europe.[47] And it was consonant with the widespread disposition to believe—somewhat inconsistently with the urgency attributed to NATO's commitment to protect Europe from occupation and liberation—that the most serious security threat lay in the capacity of the large Communist parties in Western European countries to exploit economic and social dislocation under the shadow of Soviet military might. The second assumption followed logically from the first and from the more direct impact of known internal problems, as compared to conjectural external dangers.

It is no more demonstrable now than at the time (though it is more dubious in retrospect) that America's possession of the atomic bomb and the means of delivering it played such a decisive role in deterring Russia from sweeping over Europe. Prob-

ably Stalin's respect for America's war potential and his consciousness of Russia's great human and physical losses were equally important deterrents in the light of his image of a major war as a protracted massive conflict in which the "permanently operating factors" would be decisive and in the light of his preference for political warfare where war would involve the Red Army in a direct large-scale encounter. The attribution of deterrence must always be a highly conjectural inference about calculations in other minds of which we have no firsthand knowledge, but our own common experience tells us that deterrence is seldom a product of a single factor. Yet, whatever factors may have saved Europe from invasion, as long as the Soviet Union refrained from undertaking or supporting direct military aggression, it was plausible to believe that the Communist threat to Europe lay chiefly in Europe's own weakness. As John Foster Dulles, then a senator, reasoned in approving the military assistance program in September, 1949:

> The information given me, publicly and privately, by our own government and by heads and leaders of European governments, does not indicate that the Soviet Union now contemplates open military aggression in Europe. Direct military aggression is not the preferred weapon of the Communist Party that controls the Russian government. . . . It does not seem likely that Soviet leaders would now switch from methods at which they are superior and with which they have reason to feel they are winning, in order to use methods at which they are inferior.
>
> The time may come when Soviet Communist methods of penetration and indirect aggression cease to be effective, both in the East and the West, and it may be that at that time there will be a critical moment, when open war or peace will hang in the balance. But in the view of the great vista of conquest opened up to the Soviet Union in the Far East by virtue of its present methods, direct military action does not seem to be imminent in the opinion of most competent observers, including the military.[48]

However plausible these two assumptions may have been, two developments combined to undermine allied confidence in them and, correspondingly, in the adequacy of NATO strategy. One was the emergence of the Soviet Union as a nuclear power,

marked by the Soviet explosion of an atomic device in August, 1949. The other was the outbreak of the Korean War. The impact of the Korean War was more drastic and immediate but more transitory. The impact of Soviet nuclear power has been more fundamental but more gradual and diffuse. NATO was transformed by the Korean War, and the consequences were soon evident. The full implications of the growth of Soviet nuclear power for the security and cohesion of NATO are still unfolding.

3

The Impact of Soviet Nuclear Power

1. THE STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR EXPLOSION

Logically, the Soviet explosion of an atomic device in August, 1949, some three years ahead of the West's expectation, should have caused a major revision of NATO's strategy and capabilities, if the general belief in the decisive deterrent effect of America's atomic striking power was correct. For, certainly, NATO's overwhelming dependence upon the Strategic Air Command (which was under American, not NATO, control) would become a far less reliable and reassuring deterrent once the United States could no longer devastate Russia with atomic bombs without expecting the atomic devastation of Western Europe and even the United States in return.

A few statesmen followed Churchill's lead in urging that Russia's achievement of an atomic explosion made it imperative to seek a political accommodation of the cold war while America retained a definite atomic advantage.[1] But, so far as strategic implications were concerned, most civilian and military leaders who were in any way alarmed by the Russian achievement simply concluded that the United States had to maintain her nuclear superiority (which was conceived to mean, at that

time, her ability to win a nuclear war as well as to deter one) by keeping ahead in the race for nuclear stocks and strategic bombers and proceeding to develop the hydrogen, or "super," bomb. And even those few who were concerned about the inefficacy or immorality of America's strategy of massive nuclear retaliation against non-nuclear aggressions could expect Russia to take about five years to acquire an air-atomic capability that would constitute a significant counterdeterrent by rendering the United States vulnerable to atomic assault.[2]

In any case, the ultimate implications of Russia's nuclear power for the security of Western Europe were too obscure to move allied governments to alter the generally satisfactory terms of collaboration their parliaments had so recently accepted, especially if that meant increasing their contributions to collective defense. Democracies have usually been reluctant to rearm in peacetime, but to adjust military policies and budgets to the hypothetical political and military import of an arms race in a revolutionary weapon system, whose effects would be so terrible as to challenge the rationality and credibility of using them—that is an unprecedented task to levy upon popular governments. It took the explosion of hydrogen bombs and the orbiting of earth satellites to induce the governments of NATO to begin the task of adjusting strategy to the condition of nuclear parity.

2. THE RISING FEAR OF NUCLEAR WARFARE

However, the obscurity of the new military technology's concrete strategic implications did not prevent the advance and spread of nuclear weapons technology from registering upon the consciousness of all governments and peoples in a more general way. In the West, the awesome advances in the technology of nuclear destruction soon created an uneasy balance between the desire to exploit this terrible power for compelling military and political advantages and the gnawing suspicion that the power was too fearful to be an advantageous instrument of policy except in deterring an adversary from using it. The first reaction is, perhaps, typical of nations just becoming,

or about to become, nuclear powers; but, particularly in the United States and Great Britain, one can discern a steady trend toward the second reaction, which is reinforced by the apprehensions of non-nuclear powers.

If one were to plot the trend of rising nuclear apprehension on a graph, it would be a gradual slope broken by several steep rises, which mark the dramatic impact of spectacular events —particularly, America's announcement of a thermonuclear explosion at Eniwetok Atoll on November 1, 1952, followed a year and a half later by an official description of the stupendous area of destructive blast and radiation; the Soviet Union's revelation on August 8, 1953, that she had produced a true hydrogen bomb, followed by the Atomic Energy Commission's confirmation of two Soviet thermonuclear explosions in the same month; the unexpected contamination of Japanese fishermen on the "Lucky Dragon," some seventy-five miles from an American thermonuclear explosion in March, 1954; and, on October 4, 1957, Russia's launching of Sputnik, the first artificial earth satellite and the first of a succession of space exploits that dramatized Soviet scientific and military prowess.

In response to the apprehensions created by these dramatic events, the American government for several years continued the policy of strict official secrecy on the nature and effects of atomic weapons. Its reasoning seems to have been based less on the fear of revealing information to the Soviet Union than on the fear that the atomic facts would undermine the psychological basis of its strategy of "massive retaliation" by frightening the American public into defeatism or rashness, alarming allies and neutrals, and stirring up pressure for expansion of the military budget.[3] Nevertheless, even before the Eisenhower administration decided to inform the public about the basic effects of hydrogen bombs and about Russia's parity in this field (in February, 1954, and, especially, in February, 1955),[4] America's own hydrogen explosions and her guarded official admissions of their stupendous destructive effects helped arouse the very fears the government had tried to suppress. And, in the more general statements of American spokesmen about

the horrors of nuclear war and the critical need of disarmament, the government, in effect, collaborated with the Soviet Union in crystallizing Western inhibitions against initiating the use of nuclear weapons and in convincing the entire non-Communist world that, as President Truman had said before leaving office in 1953, a thermonuclear war "is not a possible policy for rational men."[5]

3. MUTUAL DETERRENCE

As fear of nuclear war rose and spread throughout the world, abetted as much by the West's anxious advocacy of thermonuclear deterrence and disarmament as by Soviet "peace offensives" and "ban-the-bomb" campaigns, it became increasingly difficult to regard America's nuclear striking power as merely a supplement to the kind of total-war strategy that had defeated the Axis in World War II. Instead, the Strategic Air Command came to be viewed almost exclusively as a punitive deterrent, as a reprisal weapon designed to inflict such horrible damage that the aggressor would not dare launch a military attack, rather than as a means of securing a victory, in the traditional sense, once aggression had occurred.

Yet, as the emphasis shifted to the punitive-deterrent function of America's strategic striking power, the very condition that led to this emphasis—Russia's capacity to strike back at the deterrer—began undermining the credibility of America's resorting to massive retaliation except in response to an attack upon the United States or, possibly, to nuclear assaults upon her allies. In this sense, the basis of the military balance changed from unilateral nuclear deterrence to mutual nuclear deterrence.

It is significant that the depreciation of "massive retaliation" as a guaranty against conventional attacks upon other nations began even before the Soviet Union was presumed to have the capacity to destroy the United States by a surprise attack and before the United States was presumed to lack the capacity to destroy enough of the Soviet Union's strategic force on a first strike to confine her retaliatory damage to an acceptable level.

Surely this indicates that the trend cannot be halted or reversed in the missile age by any accretion of America's strategic striking power or by reaffirmations of America's determination to use it to defend her allies.

4. NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY

The inevitable decline of unilateral nuclear deterrence and the emergence of mutual deterrence gave the Soviet Union significant new leverage in conducting political warfare against the North Atlantic alliance. Even before Khrushchev dramatized Russia's growing nuclear capability, Stalin had played upon the widespread fear of atomic warfare to promote the classic Communist tactic of championing the "cause of peace" against the "warmongers." He had castigated Western moves toward collective defense—especially those leading to German rearmament and membership in NATO—as aggressive acts, which only a renunciation of military preparations, American overseas bases, and atomic weapons and the acceptance of conciliatory Soviet proposals could prevent from resulting in World War III. By alternating manufactured war scares with "peace offensives"—most notably, the world-wide campaign in 1950 to get signatures for the Stockholm Peace Appeal[6]—he had sought to neutralize America's nuclear striking power, the West's one conspicuous military advantage; undermine allied collaboration; and mobilize popular sentiment in favor of Soviet policy. But Khrushchev had new and more powerful cards in his hands, and he played them with greater skill.

Russia's achievement of a hydrogen bomb, her construction of a strategic air force, and, finally, her spectacular progress in ballistic missiles enabled Khrushchev to wage nuclear diplomacy both more boldly and more subtly. Now he could promise that any Western use of nuclear weapons—whether tactical or strategic—would be met in kind and that even the United States could not escape the terrible destruction of Soviet blows. And he could even suggest that the Soviet Union itself might initiate the use of nuclear weapons in sufficiently provocative circumstances. He exploited these new possibilities not only to neu-

tralize America's nuclear guaranty but also to refine and extend the technique of "nuclear blackmail."[7]

In the most direct form of blackmail, Soviet spokesmen on a number of occasions pointedly reminded the United States and her European allies that they would be vulnerable to Soviet-initiated nuclear strikes if they did not cease or abstain from "provocative" acts; but these threats were intermixed with a less direct and more effective form of blackmail, which depended upon maneuvering the Western powers into a position in which the *United States* would have to threaten to initiate nuclear blows.

Some examples of the first tactic were the oblique threats of rocket retaliation against Britain and France during the Suez War of 1956,* the diplomatic notes and public statements about the vulnerability of prospective European missile bases during the NATO discussion of the placement of American IRBM's on the Continent in late 1957, the veiled threat during the Quemoy and Matsu crisis of 1958 to come to the aid of Communist China with nuclear and rocket weapons against American warships if China were attacked by the United States, the similar pledge extended to Cuba in 1960 (although subsequently called "symbolic"), and the threat in 1960 to obliterate European bases from which American espionage planes were discovered to have flown over "socialist" territory. Each of these threats was carefully timed, camouflaged, and qualified so as

* Contrary to a general impression, the Soviet government did not literally threaten to inflict nuclear blows on Britain and France unless they ended the Suez War. In a note to Prime Minister Eden, Marshal Bulganin condemned Britain and France for their Suez attack and asked, "In what position would Britain have found herself if she had been attacked by more powerful states possessing every kind of modern destructive weapon?" He added, "There are countries which need not have sent a navy or air force to the coasts of Britain but could have used other means, such as rocket technique." Then, calling on the British to end the war, Bulganin concluded, "We are fully determined to crush the aggressors and restore peace in the East through the use of force. We hope at this critical moment you will display due prudence and draw the corresponding conclusions from this." He sent a similar note at the same time to Premier Guy Mollet of France (*New York Times,* November 6, 1956, p. 10). However, by this time it was clear that the United States opposed the British and French intervention and would join in calling for its termination. For an analysis of the Soviet threat in its full political and military context, see Hans Speier, "Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance," *World Politics,* IX (April, 1957), 318–27.

to extract the maximum political advantage with a minimum risk of having to carry it out or seem to back down. Yet they were ominous indications of new Soviet strength and confidence in that they marked Khrushchev's determination to play the game of nuclear blackmail more openly and offensively and reflected his avowed conviction, especially after 1957, that Russia was playing from superior strength now that the military balance had decisively shifted in her favor.[8]

However, even more significant than these incidents as a manifestation of Khrushchev's new confidence in Soviet military ascendance was the subtle intermingling of diplomatic threats and overtures with pointed references to Soviet military strength and the horrors of nuclear war, which sustained the second Berlin crisis, launched in November, 1958.[9] For here it was the United States that was put in the position of threatening to plunge her allies and the whole world into a thermonuclear war in order to resist limited and ambiguous Soviet incursions in Berlin, while the Soviet Union represented her political demands as legitimate, conciliatory offers to stabilize a dangerous situation and remove a source of international tensions and war. As a means of splitting the alliance, weakening Western will and resolution, winning local political gains, and mobilizing the "forces of peace" behind Soviet diplomacy, this was, in the long run, by far the more dangerous form of nuclear blackmail.

The major Soviet political gains in the cold war are not likely to be won by Soviet threats to meet "provocations" with nuclear blows; for, as chapter vii (on the implications of missiles) suggests, in the missile age neither Russia nor the United States is likely to extract much political advantage from a first-strike strategy, however skilfully it may be exploited. On the other hand, if mutual deterrence remains relatively stable against the initiation of nuclear weapons by either side, the military balance will be all the more favorable to Soviet political and even military incursions beneath that threshold of violence, incursions which will put the onus of starting a nuclear war upon the victims of aggression.

In this respect, the Western powers have greatly assisted

Khrushchev's tactics by remaining so dependent upon a nuclear response to non-nuclear aggression. For the disturbing thing about NATO's reaction to Russia's nuclear diplomacy has been that the allied apprehensions it excites are directed less against the serious possibility of Soviet political and military incursions than against the prospect of American nuclear retaliation. Consequently, the growth of Soviet nuclear striking power has tended to undermine confidence in NATO's nuclear strategy and strain allied cohesion without inducing those measures that might mitigate NATO's nuclear dependence.

NATO's nuclear dependence, with Soviet nuclear ascendance, has undermined allied confidence in NATO's strategy in two ways: First, the allies suspect that the United States will *not* resort to massive nuclear retaliation against a less-than-massive aggression in Europe at the staggering cost of a thermonuclear assault upon the United States and that, therefore, America's nuclear striking power is unreliable as a deterrent against contingencies short of a direct attack upon the United States itself. Second, they fear that the United States *will* resort to massive nuclear retaliation against limited aggressions (inside Europe or outside), which NATO cannot effectively counter by less drastic means, and that, therefore, American retaliation will plunge them into a war of annihilation.

Therefore, to the extent that the European allies depend upon America's capacity for massive retaliation, they must anticipate that the United States may either leave them defenseless or drag them into a suicidal war. Both prospects jeopardize the cohesion of the alliance: the first, because it undermines confidence in America's connection with Europe; the second, because it increases the liabilities of Europe's connection with the United States. Moreover, NATO's nuclear predicament renders the allies vulnerable to political pressure, tending to subordinate the fear of aggression to the fear of nuclear war and the longing to relieve the tensions that the Soviet Union manufactures. It enables Moscow to put them in the position of either adhering rigidly to a fixed diplomatic position, backed only by reaffirmations of the nuclear threat, or appearing to resort to appeasement under duress.

5. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

It is easier to discern the adverse military, political, and psychological consequences of Russia's growing nuclear striking power than it is to determine the strategic changes that are necessary to restore the military basis of allied security and cohesion. But among the many controversial strategic implications that have been derived from the changing military environment, the following seem to be the most significant and plausible:

a) As the Soviet capacity to devastate the United States grows, the essential deterrent to a nuclear attack on the United States and her allies is an obvious capability to deliver unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union with a retaliatory blow of massive or, in the event of limited Soviet nuclear strikes, proportionate scope. However, when, if not before, the Soviet Union has also acquired the capacity to deliver unacceptable retaliatory damage after being struck first (and in 1961 that condition already might exist), America's first-strike capability will have ceased to be a reliable deterrent to aggressions short of direct nuclear attacks. To stabilize the resulting "nuclear stalemate" (that is, the mutual deterrence of striking first with nuclear weapons) when both the Soviet Union and the United States can quickly launch a devastating blow permitting little warning, the virtual renunciation of a strategic first strike may become an essential supplement to an "invulnerable" second-strike or retaliatory capability, in order to avoid provoking nuclear attacks launched by fear and misapprehension of being struck first.

During the onset of the missile age the United States placed great emphasis upon stabilizing the nuclear stalemate by retaining an adequate second-strike capability and seeking agreements for mutual protection against surprise attacks launched by misapprehension. However, at the end of 1960 the government still had not fully taken account of the corrosive effect of the stalemate upon its declared strategy of initiating nuclear war against major conventional aggression in Europe.

b) In order to deter and counter less-than-massive aggressions in Europe and relieve the allies of the paralyzing choice

between annihilation and capitulation, NATO needs a capacity to resist such aggressions by means short of total war. For, since the growth of Soviet nuclear power tends to deter the United States from initiating strategic nuclear strikes against non-nuclear operations, the temptation for the Soviet Union to instigate limited, indirect, and ambiguous forms of aggression increases, as does her capacity to exert political pressure under the shadow of her vast army.

Soon after the explosion of Russia's first atomic bomb, the State Department Policy Planning Staff concluded that, unless the West substantially increased its ground forces, Soviet nuclear power might reach such proportions by about 1954 as to create a serious danger of conventional aggression or of blackmail that depended on the threat of such aggression. This conclusion was embodied in the National Security Document NSC 68, which President Truman approved early in 1950. However, until the outbreak of the Korean War, budgetary restrictions precluded the government's acting upon it. In a more explicit attempt to counter the threat of local small-scale aggression in Europe, NATO publicly subscribed to a strategy of "intermediate" responses in 1957. But by 1961 the allies still had not provided the capabilities that the military considered necessary to support this strategy, and the American government—at least in its declaratory strategy—continued to rely upon nuclear retaliation rather than on local resistance to deter non-nuclear aggressions. Moreover, even those who accepted this strategic implication of the growth of Soviet nuclear power held differing views about the nature of potential limited wars in Europe and the means of resisting them: Should NATO plan to fight a large-scale limited non-nuclear war in Europe, or should it prepare only to meet border incidents and probing actions by non-nuclear means? Should NATO initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons against conventional aggressions; if so, could a nuclear war be limited in any significant sense?

c) The protection of Europe from being overrun in a total war is no longer a feasible objective for NATO's ground forces. For since the Soviet Union has a substantial nuclear capability,

America's massive retaliation against a Soviet assault upon Europe would produce a nuclear holocaust that would be more devastating for the European allies than even a Soviet occupation. The logical implication of this is that in a full-scale invasion Europe can secure protection against annihilation or occupation not by relying upon massive land warfare and indiscriminate strategic bombing but only by relying upon the deterrent effect of controlled nuclear retaliation above the threshold of effective resistance by conventional (and, possibly, chemical) limited warfare.

In practice, the negative aspect of this implication was generally accepted by 1954, but NATO's capacity for local resistance continued to dwindle and the concept of tactical nuclear combat, rather than of controlled retaliation, predominated. Yet, in spite of the fact that NATO's original strategic objective of protecting every ally against the dreaded cycle of occupation and liberation by repelling a massive invasion had never been supported by actual capabilities, the psychological and political liability of renouncing it precluded an alteration of this declaratory strategy.

d) To offset the declining credibility of America's commitment to defend Europe at the cost of her own devastation, the United States must keep American troops on the Continent as a visible hostage to her NATO obligations.

This implication was accepted and acted upon. Although they were originally sent as a temporary boost to European rearmament, in 1960, five American divisions remained on the Continent on a semipermanent basis as a reassurance to Europe and a warning to Russia.

e) In order to compensate for the declining credibility of America's willingness to launch strategic nuclear strikes against aggression in Europe and to escape complete dependence upon the decision of the United States to use or not use nuclear weapons, the NATO countries must gain an equitable share of the control of the decision to use nuclear weapons. Some allies might seek this share by acquiring their own nuclear weapons;

others, by participating in a bilateral or multilateral system of control.

Like the other strategic implications of the growth of Soviet nuclear power, the case for sharing control of strategic nuclear capabilities is based on the imperatives of NATO's internal cohesion as well as of its external security. The very prospect of the diffusion of nuclear control, either under independent or joint control, will exert a fateful impact upon the security and cohesion of NATO, since it poses in the most acute form the question of whether an ally needs, or can afford, to base its security upon the decisions of others to go to war. Therefore, by the end of 1960 the control of nuclear weapons had become inextricably connected with NATO's other unresolved strategic issues.

Together, these inferences drawn from the growth of Soviet nuclear power, in spite of all their conjectural and controversial elements, impelled a major revision of NATO's strategy; but their immediate impact upon strategy depended more upon the catalyst of unanticipated crises, dramatic technological developments, and a variety of domestic and foreign political pressures than upon logical strategic analysis and foresight. Of all these immediate influences, the outbreak of the Korean War caused the most drastic revision of NATO's strategy and capabilities.

4
Rearmament and Relaxation

1. ALLIED INDIFFERENCE TO REARMAMENT

On the eve of the Korean War, NATO was already showing some strains from the conflict between its ambitious strategic objective and the natural reluctance of democracies to rearm in peacetime. The basic difficulty was that nations who were unwilling to rearm at the sacrifice of domestic economic and social objectives were, nevertheless, firmly committed to a strategy that called for counterbalancing a vastly larger military machine. But related to this difficulty was the lopsided distribution of power within the alliance, which made the United States the primary counterbalancer, coupled with a distribution of military functions that burdened the European allies and especially France with the unpalatable task of building up the forces-in-being, while the United States merely concentrated upon strategic airpower. The net result of these circumstances was to place the United States in the awkward position of pressing her allies, from the vantage point of her fortress three thousand miles away, to build up a Continental land army for the sake of a strategic objective—the physical defense of every ally—which they proclaimed as indispensable but which their practical preference for relying upon America's atomic deterrent made impossible to support.

European statesmen and politicians continued to call for official American and NATO reaffirmations of the pledge to protect the territory of every ally from Russian occupation.[1] The

United States and NATO continued to oblige.[2] Yet, according to press reports, the allies were planning on no more than 36 divisions in Western Europe by 1955, and by the spring of 1950 they were still unable to field more than 12 in the event of an emergency. France, which was to provide the core of ground forces, had pledged 24 divisions to NATO, but she could dispose only 3 divisions in West Germany and 6 in France, while 10 divisions were tied down in Indochina.[3]

The American government, having assumed the leadership of an effort to redress the dangerous military imbalance in Europe, became increasingly anxious as the cold war grew more intense to see signs of integrated defense planning and rearmament. In asking Congress for $1 billion in new military assistance for Europe, President Truman warned: "The military establishments of Western Europe are below the minimum level consistent with security. Those countries must build up their forces as swiftly as their resources permit, assisted by such help as we can afford."[4] But the European allies, feeling cold war tensions less directly than Russia's major antagonist, were increasingly sensitive to popular apprehensions that the United States concern to contain Russia might be shifting the order of priorities from economic recovery to an arms race just when production, trade, and income had begun to turn upward.

At the meeting of the North Atlantic foreign ministers in May, 1950, the United States urged positive action on new armed force commitments, the co-ordination of defense planning, and a re-examination of the German problem. However, the final communiqué of the conference said nothing of these matters but only emphasized that the "progressive and speedy development of adequate military defense" would be pursued "without impairing . . . social and economic progress."[5] Nevertheless, the more concerned the United States became about building up the defense of Europe, the more concerned an important body of Europan opinion became that the United States might subordinate Western Europe's social and economic progress and its very peace to purely American interests in the cold war.

In order to allay such apprehensions, the United States reaffirmed her belief that there was no imminent danger of overt aggression. Indeed, no event before the Korean War disturbed the general conviction that America's nuclear striking power was a sufficient guaranty of peace unless the United States herself should act rashly. Even Churchill, who was more alarmed than most by Russia's acquisition of nuclear power, said that a situation of "mutual terror" would give the West "the extra time and the new breathing space for the supreme effort which has to be made for a world settlement."[6] Therefore, it was easy to conclude that there really was no overriding need for a "progressive and speedy development of adequate military defense." As the French Socialist André Philip wrote on the eve of the Korean hostilities: "What menaces our existence today is not the immediate danger of war; I have less fear of the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb than of the misery of the workers —a misery which could erupt into political and social chaos."[7]

2. TWO HOPES FOR RECONCILING SECURITY AND ECONOMY

If civilian goals were granted such a clear priority, if there was no sense of urgency in meeting the rearmament goals which the allies had agreed were essential for their defense, how could NATO ever hope to become capable of withstanding Soviet aggression? How could strategy be reconciled with economy? Two answers were given: (*a*) greater military integration and (*b*) powerful new weapons would enable NATO to get more security for less money.

Under Secretary Acheson, the foreign ministers' meeting in May, 1950, indorsed the principle, which had its legislative origin in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, that adequate defense could be achieved only through "the most economical and effective utilization" of available resources by creating "balanced collective forces" on a basis of national specialization.[8] Carried out to its full logic, this principle might have enabled the allies to reconcile their military and civilian requirements, but it also would have made it difficult,

if not impossible, for them to maintain independent control of sufficient forces to support purely national interests. It is not surprising, then, that the principle was not carried out sufficiently to reconcile the requirements of security and economy.

In the field of planning and command, the foreign ministers created the Council of Deputies—a permanent civilian body, headed by an American—to correlate the economic and defense planning of subsidiary bodies of the alliance. But the United States, like France, firmly resisted the establishment of a central military command with an American Supreme Commander, which the British were urging largely as a means of binding the United States more tightly to the defense of Europe. Nor was there complete agreement on the disposition and roles of national forces. For example, the French, echoing old complaints about the allegedly faint-hearted British commitment to the defense of the Continent in two world wars, pressed the British to place substantial land forces on the Continent in the event of war, but Britain preferred to limit her contribution to air and naval operations.[9]

In a significant reservation to the principle of balanced collective forces, the foreign ministers stated that each government was expected to take "fully into consideration the requirements for national forces which arise out of commitments external to the North Atlantic area."[10] In practice, the three NATO countries with the most extensive commitments outside Europe—the United States, Great Britain, and France—followed the principle of balanced *national* forces as far as the pressures toward economy would permit. None felt that the principle of national specialization called for sacrificing the military needs of national policy to those of NATO.

In addition to advocating the principle of balanced collective forces, some American leaders looked hopefully toward wonderful new weapons, which would substitute firepower for manpower, as a means of reconciling security with economy. Thus Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, in appealing for the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1950, assured Congress that a relatively small European ground force could contain the

early phases of a Russian invasion and, in collaboration with American long-range bombers using "new weapons," defend the area, if the United States would equip her allies with "the modern weapons and increased firepower made possible by today's science."[11] Johnson's reference to "modern" weapons evidently complemented recent public statements by General J. Lawton Collins and Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, reporting the development of new conventional-warhead antitank and antiaircraft weapons and also artillery and guided missiles for the tactical use of atomic warheads.[12] However, in view of the fact that as late as 1953 military plans still called for about 100 divisions to defend Europe, one must doubt the extent to which the military planners seriously envisioned antitank and antiaircraft weapons as substitutes for mobilized divisions. And as for "tactical" atomic weapons (which, until the late 1950's, used warheads of approximately the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb), although as early as October, 1949, General Bradley had written about the great advantage they would give a defensive army against a numerically superior invader,[13] they did not begin to become available to American forces assigned to NATO until late 1953. Meanwhile, it was the shock of the Korean War, and not balanced collective forces or "modern" weapons, that momentarily narrowed the gap between strategy and capabilities.

3. REAPPRAISAL OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

The outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, temporarily destroyed the West's confidence in the assumption that America's atomic striking power would deter the Soviet Union from instigating overt military aggression. Consequently, it precipitated the first—and only—serious attempt to create the forces which the military had prescribed for withstanding a Soviet attack in Europe. In retrospect, it seems unwarranted to have inferred an imminent danger of Soviet aggression in Europe from the North Korean attack upon a peripheral strategic position in the Far East, especially since the United States had withdrawn her troops from Korea and publicly excluded it from her "defen-

sive perimeter." But the estimate of a potential aggressor's intentions is peculiarly subject to sudden shifts from complacency to alarm. In the absence of conclusive objective tests of intentions, such estimates customarily reflect hopeful assumptions in times of relatively low tension and pessimistic, even alarmist, assumptions during overt crises, according to the margin of safety governments are willing to tolerate in accommodating military needs to civilian demands.

"The attack upon Korea," President Truman proclaimed, "makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war."[14] Similarly, Secretary of Defense Johnson interpreted the Korean aggression as "undeniable proof" that international communism would invade any free nation within reach if it thought it could get away with it. "The real significance of the North Korean aggression," he charged, "is this evidence that, even at the resultant risk of starting a third world war, communism is willing to resort to armed aggression, whenever it believes it can win."[15] John Foster Dulles, writing a month after the outbreak of the war, saw the arrival of the critical moment, which he had hypothesized some eighteen months before, when international communism felt it had exhausted most of the possibilities of gain by indirect aggression. He warned that the attack on South Korea, combined with the military build-up in the Soviet Union, might mark a new phase of Communist aggression. "It may invalidate the assumption that the Soviet Union would not risk general war for several years to come—the time presumably required for it to develop a large stockpile of atomic weapons. It surely invalidates the assumption that we can continue still for a time to live luxuriously, without converting our economic potential into military reality."[16] Momentarily, Western Europe shared America's drastic reappraisal of Soviet intentions.

4. REARMAMENT

If the West could no longer safely rely upon its military potential and the Strategic Air Command to deter Soviet aggression in Europe, it would have to build up NATO's forces-in-being.

As Secretary of State Acheson warned, "The strength of the free nations is potentially great—more than enough to deal with this threat. But we must translate that potential into defense in being, with the greatest speed." NATO could no longer afford to base its defense policies on surmises about Soviet intentions, he said. "The capabilities of the Communist movement for further acts of aggression must be the measuring rod by which we judge the adequacy of our defensive strength." "By this measurement," Acheson declared, "it is evident that a forced-draft effort on a very large scale is required."[17]

Accordingly, the United States, setting the pattern for her allies, oriented her military plans toward the target date, or "year of maximum danger,"[18] of 1952 and launched an all-out rearmament program, which quadrupled her defense expenditures within three years. Britain raised her conscription period to two years, announced plans to form three new divisions, promised to increase the British contingent in West Germany to five divisions by the end of 1951, and undertook an ambitious arms program that would raise defense expenditures to 12 per cent of the national income. France increased her defense budget by 30 per cent and planned to add fifteen new divisions in three years. All the other European allies, except Iceland and Portugal, announced parallel plans for increasing their defense forces, periods of military service, and military expenditures.

The British and French governments, who were to assume the great burden of the build-up, emphasized that their progress toward achieving these new goals would depend on the amount of American military and economic assistance they received. The British were particularly dependent on this because they, unlike the Continental allies, provided their own heavy defense production. In announcing their dependence on American aid, both governments undertook, in effect, to reverse the subordination of defense goals to economic progress. For the American government made it clear that, henceforth, her aid to Europe would be directed to the support of the military build-up rather than to the promotion of economic expansion, and that it would be contingent on the recipients' progress in that direction.[19]

As a result of this radical shift in allied contributions to collective defense, the United States, even more conspicuously than before the Korean War, assumed the role of prodding allied governments with the lever of military assistance to intensify their rearmament efforts, while, in proportion to the intensity of their efforts, the allied governments demanded adequate military assistance and solid assurances of America's commitment to their defense. Again, France was particularly anxious for assurances that the Anglo-American powers would defend her on the ground and not merely with air and sea power from outside the Continent. Thus, in detailing the sacrifices that the rearmament effort would impose on her people, the French government warned that this effort "would be useless if ground and air forces sufficient to assure the maintenance of peace should not be stationed in Continental Europe" and stated, "It is necessary that the United States and Great Britain, notably, should participate in the defense with a sufficient number of divisions stationed in Continental Europe."[20]

The United States formally recognized the force of this position when President Truman, on the eve of the important meeting of the North Atlantic Council in September, 1950, announced, "On the basis of recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in by the Secretaries of State and Defense, I have today approved substantial increases in the strength of the United States forces to be stationed in Western Europe in the interest of the defense of that area." At the same time, the President indicated that he—and, by implication, the American Congress—would regard the contribution of American troops as a prod as well as a concession. "A basic element in the implementation of this decision," he said, "is the degree to which our friends match our actions in this regard. Firm programs for the development of their forces will be expected to keep full step with the dispatch of additional United States forces to Europe."[21]

The *quid pro quo* in the President's offer of troops was reinforced by an increasingly vocal current of American opinion, led by Senator Taft and former President Hoover, which opposed sending military aid or troops until the European allies

had created the means of defending themselves and which threatened to resort to a peripheral, as opposed to a Continental, strategy if the allies failed in this effort.[22] Europeans were acutely aware that this sentiment had deep roots in America's historic isolationism and in the widespread opposition, even among those who by no stretch of the word could be called "isolationists," to committing American soldiers to a strategy of massive land warfare on the Continent. Therefore, just as the European governments regarded America's pledge to defend them rather than liberate them as the indispensable condition of popular support for the burdensome commitments and contributions they had undertaken, Hoover and Taft's strictures served to warn them that America's commitments and contributions to their defense depended upon tangible evidence of Western Europe's determination to arm itself.

Thus, the terms of collaboration were changing to meet the new estimate of the nature of the threat, and it seemed that a satisfactory reciprocity between the United States and her allies would be preserved. But that reciprocity called for adjustments in the strategy and even the structure and membership of the alliance.

5. FORWARD STRATEGY

Actually, the outbreak of the Korean War did not so much change NATO's strategy as make its full implications explicit. Military planners had always regarded the integration of German territory and troops in wartime operations as essential to the defense of Western Europe. Civilian leaders had always insisted upon a concept of defense—the protection of every ally from Russian occupation—that could not be supported without German integration, given the proximity of Soviet troops to the Rhine and the unwillingness of the allies to mobilize the required number of divisions by themselves. Therefore, the intensified fear of Russian aggression was merely the catalyst that led the North Atlantic Council, meeting in New York in September, 1950, explicitly to adopt a "forward strategy" of defending Europe as far eastward as possible and, under American

pressure, to agree to examine, as a matter of urgency, "the methods by which Germany could most usefully make its contribution" to European defense.[23]

A month earlier the Consultative Assembly of the European Council, following a proposal by Churchill, had adopted a resolution calling for "the immediate creation of a united European army under the authority of a European Minister for Defense, subject to proper democratic European control, and acting in full cooperation with the United States and Canada." At its New York meeting the North Atlantic Council enlarged upon this idea in agreeing to establish "an integrated force under centralized command." The Supreme Commander (who, it was understood, would be an American) would have "sufficient delegated authority to insure that national units allocated to his command are organized and trained into an effective integrated force in time of peace as well as in the event of war."[24] In December, 1950, the Council appointed General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander in Europe (SACEUR) and authorized him to "train national units assigned to his command and organize them into an effective, integrated defense force."[25] In February, 1951, the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) was established, and in April it assumed control of the forces which had been assigned by the member nations to the defense of the treaty area.

From the standpoint of NATO's security, these measures merely extended the principle of integration, which had already been recognized in the concept of "balanced collective forces" for the "integrated defense" of the North Atlantic area. From the standpoint of allied cohesion and collaboration, the agreement, in effect, compensated the European allies for bearing the costs of rearmament by binding the United States more tightly to their defense and reassuring them that Germany's participation in the defense of Western Europe would be under collective restraints.

However, the exact formula under which West Germany would collaborate with NATO could not be agreed upon until the Paris treaties were signed in October, 1954; for the Euro-

pean members of the alliance—and most notably France—were not prepared so suddenly to subordinate their fears of a resurgent Germany to the demands of military strategy and American pressure. In the meanwhile, the ceaseless procession of proposals and counterproposals for integrating German troops in NATO was only one manifestation of the difficulties the allies encountered in reaching mutually acceptable terms of collaboration that would be compatible with the radically expanded military requirements they had undertaken to fulfil.

6. NEW COMPLICATIONS AND THE BEGINNING OF RELAXATION

The outbreak of the Korean War completed the transformation of NATO from a multilateral guaranty pact into a semi-integrated military organization designed to redress the military imbalance on the Continent. At the same time, it destroyed the original balance of assets and liabilities for the major allies and drastically altered the original distribution of burdens and benefits, while complicating the task of strategic collaboration.

In seeking new terms of collaboration that would be compatible with the higher level of allied commitments and contributions, the United States, soon after the invasion of Korea, increased her military assistance to the European allies, assumed the central military command of NATO, and promised to place additional American troops on the Continent, while the European allies agreed to put rearmament and the build-up of NATO forces ahead of economic advancement and, in principle, accepted West German participation in the common defense.

In the aftermath of the Korean scare, these new terms of collaboration increased NATO's military strength enough to restore allied confidence in the stability of deterrence against overt military aggression upon Western Europe, but they failed to elicit sufficient contributions to meet the pledged force levels, which the allies had agreed were essential to defend Western Europe if deterrence should fail. Yet, although the alliance had undertaken a military effort that exceeded the willingness of its members to execute, it could not revert to its original form

without disrupting the whole enterprise. Therefore, although the gap between strategy and capabilities was somewhat narrowed, the disparity between the pledged and the actual contributions to NATO was greatly enlarged. Now the United States, having firmly committed herself to close the gap between strategy and capabilities, once more assumed the task of inducing her allies—again, with inadequate concessions and sanctions—to fulfil their pledged contributions to collective defense.

At the same time, in the period between the outbreak of the Korean War and NATO's adoption in December, 1954, of a new strategy relying upon tactical nuclear weapons, there arose new political, economic, and military developments to complicate the requirements of allied security and collaboration: the Soviet "relaxation of tensions," the intensification of allied involvements outside the NATO area, the economic strain of rearmament, and the American and Russian achievements of hydrogen explosions. These developments simultaneously increased the hazards of depending upon America's strategic nuclear striking power and reduced allied incentives to build the ground power that might mitigate this dependence.

The decisive factor underlying all NATO's new problems of security and collaboration was the rapid decline of the fear of aggression, which had led NATO to rearm. When it appeared that the Korean War was a limited war confined to the Korean peninsula and not the prelude to other aggressions instigated by the Soviet Union, the fear of imminent aggression in Europe quickly gave way to the fear that the United States might either precipitate a world war or else become so fascinated by the Chinese Communist threat in the Far East as to neglect her European commitments.[26] The long period of stalemate and truce in Korea, starting in the spring and summer of 1951, sapped all sense of urgency.

Prime Minister Churchill, upon assuming office after the defeat of the Labor government, a defeat which was in no small part due to its responsibility for the Korean-inspired rearmament program, expressed the general revival of confidence in the efficacy of deterrence:

> Looking back over the last few days, I cannot feel that the danger of a third world war is so great now as it was at the time of the Berlin Air Lift crisis in 1948, when the Labor Government ... took great risks in a firm and resolute manner. Of course, no one can predict the future, but our feeling, on assuming responsibility, is that the deterrents have increased and that, as the deterrents have increased, the danger has become more unlikely.[27]

John Foster Dulles, speaking as the prospective Republican Secretary of State early in the presidential campaign of 1952, returned to his pre-Korean estimate of the Soviet military threat. "When we analyze the Soviet military threat," he said, "we can find many reasons to believe that it may not be more than an unused threat, designed partly for defense but chiefly to throw the free world into panic." Disputing the view that the Soviet leaders relied upon overt military force as a means of conquest, he asked why, if this were so, they had not attacked in Europe or Asia, where they would meet no "appreciable opposition," and why they should wait until the West built up its defenses. "One reason," he answered, "is that the Communist leaders of Russia are almost as afraid of the Red Army as we are. . . . A second reason is the supreme skill of the political leaders of Russia in the art of political warfare. A third reason may be that which Mr. Churchill has several times suggested, namely, that they fear the striking power of our atomic weapons."[28]

Both of these estimates of Soviet intentions were the basis, in their respective countries, upon which incoming governments reduced defense expenditures and ground force goals on the supposition that concentration upon strategic airpower would provide more security at a tolerable cost. Throughout Europe, similar estimates assured the restoration of domestic economic priorities over rearmament. To be sure, the European allies—France, in particular—continued to seek and to receive American assurances that NATO was pledged to defend their territories in the event of aggression, but they were impelled more by a desire to satisfy domestic criticisms and suspicions of the alliance than by an active fear of invasion.[29] Feeling incapable of redressing

the Continental balance of power by themselves, they were content to rely upon America's atomic might and her immense industrial and military potential to deter aggression and to let the United States, who had the most direct interest in counterbalancing Soviet power, worry about enlarging the ground forces. In the meanwhile, they were more impressed by the burden of rearmament than by the danger of aggression.

7. AMERICAN TROOPS FOR EUROPE

The most important concessions that the United States made as a stimulant to allied rearmament were the appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander of the NATO forces in Europe and the placement of four more American divisions (making a total of almost six) on the forward line in West Germany. But once these concessions were made, they provided little inducement to further European efforts, while the threat to withdraw them proved worse than useless as a sanction, since these visible symbols of the American commitment came to be regarded as the prerequisites of allied military collaboration.

However, the fundamental obstacle to a vast build-up of NATO forces was not the weakness of American concessions or sanctions but the fact that the announced strategic objectives of the build-up were not sufficiently compelling to warrant the effort. In fact, the same lack of strategic inducement to enlarging ground forces was conspicuous in the defense policies of the United States, who could far better afford the effort. In spite of the greater sense of urgency about rearmament in the American government, the debate over sending additional troops to Europe showed that Americans were no more inclined to adjust their national strategy and capabilities to a conception of massive land warfare than were Western Europeans. Yet, for less ambitious objectives, a much more modest build-up seemed sufficient.

When the Eighty-second Congress convened in January, 1951, Senator Taft reopened a lengthy debate on President Truman's announced intention to send troops to Europe. Taft did not oppose sending a few American divisions to Europe to help the

Europeans build up their armies, providing that they made a sufficient effort of their own. What he objected to was committing the United States to fight the world-wide battle of communism "primarily on the vast land areas of the continent of Europe or the continent of Asia, where we are at the greatest disadvantage in a war with Russia."[30] America's proper strategic role, he insisted, was to provide air and sea power, while the Eurasian countries provided the troops. But, with or without American aid, he could not foresee Europe providing enough troops to withstand a Russian attack. The effort would not only be futile but provocative. This theme was reiterated by Herbert Hoover, Senator Wherry, and other opponents of the President's policy.

Supporters of the President's policy relied heavily upon the persuasiveness of General Eisenhower, who returned from Europe in February in order to testify in its behalf. Yet Eisenhower's testimony fell far short of indorsing the strategic conception Taft criticized. In fact, in some respects it was more like an indorsement of Taft's position. Thus, the Supreme Commander emphasized the contribution of American troops to European morale not to creating a Continental ground force.

> What we are trying to do, ladies and gentlemen, is to start a sort of reciprocal action across the Atlantic. We do one thing which inspires our friends to do something, and that gives us greater confidence in their thoroughness, their readiness for sacrifice. We do something more and we establish an upward-going spiral which meets this problem of strength and morale.[31]

America's role in this enterprise, he said, was to serve as a center of production and inspiration but not as a supplier of troops to the various critical sectors around the vast Sino-Soviet bastion in Eurasia. "Our view in the central position must be directed to many sectors," he said. "We cannot concentrate all our forces in any one sector, even one as important as Western Europe. We must largely sit here with great, mobile, powerful reserves ready to support our policies, our rights, our interests wherever they may be in danger in the world."[32]

When Secretary of Defense Marshall revealed that the United States intended to send no more than four divisions to Europe,

this virtually eliminated the immediate issue of America's role in NATO's build-up, but it did not meet the underlying issue of the strategic objective which the build-up was intended to support. Secretary of State Acheson gave the most lucid explanation of NATO's strategy, but the strategic objectives that he emphasized neither required nor inspired the construction of the huge standing army that military plans had specified since pre-NATO days. He said that the first purpose of NATO's forces in Europe was to deter aggression and that, in order to deter aggression, reliance upon retaliatory airpower was not enough. The reason he gave for this conclusion followed the reasoning of NSC 68.

> One reason why we cannot continue to rely on retaliatory air power as a sufficient deterrent is the effect of time. We have a substantial lead in air power and in atomic weapons. At the present moment, this may be the most powerful deterrent against aggression. But with the passage of time, even though we continue our advances in this field, the value of our lead diminishes. In other words, the best use we can make of our present advantage in retaliatory air power, is to move ahead under this protective shield to build the balanced collective forces in Western Europe that will continue to deter aggression after our atomic advantage has been diminished.[33]

Here was, perhaps, the earliest official public statement of the strategic implications of Russia's capacity to neutralize the deterrent effect of America's nuclear striking power, but, pleading security reasons, Acheson declined to elaborate.[34] Moreover, he left somewhat ambiguous the precise strategic conclusion to be drawn from his analysis. If more ground forces were needed to compensate for the declining deterrent power of the Strategic Air Command, what kind of contingencies would they be designed to deter? Here Acheson reiterated his earlier statement of the function of ground forces in deterring limited aggression. He foresaw the possibility not only of indirect aggressions on the Czechoslovakian model but also of direct military incursions by Soviet satellites, which the Soviet Union could disclaim; and he warned that, "in the absence of defense forces-in-being, satellites might be used for such disguised aggression in the hope that they could get away with it, since the free nations

could respond only with the weapons of all-out general war, or not at all."[35]

But if the ground forces were intended only to deter limited *fait accompli's*, this would not require building up an army capable of stopping a major Soviet assault on the ground. Should NATO abandon this more ambitious strategic objective? Acheson indicated that it should not. The first purpose of ground forces, he said, was to deter limited and major aggressions, but, if the deterrent failed and Russia launched an all-out assault, the ground forces would have to hold air bases and detain the attack long enough to permit airpower to stem the invasion by striking at the aggressor's homeland before he could consolidate control of the great war potential of Western Europe. Apparently, ground forces were expected to perform the same protective function in a bilateral as in a unilateral nuclear war. "These are the forces," Acheson declared, "that would prevent Europe, in the event of an attack, from having to go through another occupation and liberation."[36]

The European allies might be willing to build a force capable of deterring limited aggression, but would they build a force large enough to prevent Europe from being overrun, especially when they could expect even an unoccupied Europe to be devastated by a Soviet-American nuclear exchange? Everyone avoided a direct answer to this troublesome question. Acheson simply denied any intention of matching the potential aggressor "man for man" or "tank for tank."[37] General J. Lawton Collins, chief of staff of the Army, vigorously denied that Europe need be overrun by an all-out assault, but he did not designate the size of the forces that would be required to protect Europe.[38] However, General Eisenhower, who was urging a rapid build-up by 1952, said he would have to see 40 divisions before he would "feel better"; and he looked forward to 60 fully equipped divisions by 1954.[39]

There is no reason to think that the military planners had abandoned their view that a force approaching 100 divisions would be necessary to withstand a Soviet invasion. Yet in 1951 it was already obvious that only the fear of imminent invasion,

and certainly not the temporary placement of six American divisions on the Continent, could conceivably inspire the Europeans to make sufficient contributions of men, money, and equipment to support a strategic objective which the United States herself expected to support primarily with airpower. On the other hand, NATO did seem to be making satisfactory progress toward achieving co-ordinated ground forces, airfields, and a network of supporting communications and supplies, which would be sufficient to support the strategic objective Acheson had emphasized: the deterrence of local *fait accompli*'s.[40] In the aftermath of the Korean scare, Europe's growing confidence in its achievement of this modest deterrent capability sapped the only compelling military incentive for enlarging NATO's standing army.

8. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO REARMAMENT

While the incentives for expanding allied forces sharply declined, the incentives for cutting back the whole post-Korea defense effort became overwhelming as the strains of rearmament aggravated economic problems and political discontent in the NATO countries. In spite of a general increase in the production and trade of Western Europe, the rearmament programs caused a steep rise in the price of imported raw materials in relation to a slower rise in the price of manufactured exports and thereby created acute balance-of-payments deficits, especially in Great Britain. Concomitant with the balance-of-payments crisis there was a renewal of inflation in the prices of raw materials and foodstuffs in both exporting and importing countries, which, in turn, led Western European governments to pare expenditures for civilian consumption and, in some cases, to impose rationing and price and wage controls, if only to be able to finance rearmament.

These economic repercussions created domestic political problems that were especially galling for governments that had committed themselves to extensive social welfare programs, which now seemed threatened by arms expenditures. On May 15, 1951, French Defense Minister Jules Moch was ejected from

the Socialist party's national executive committee for emphasizing the need to sacrifice certain social security benefits for the sake of defense requirements. On September 18, the Netherlands' Foreign Minister, Dr. Dirk U. Stikker, warned the North Atlantic Council that "any further lowering of the present living standard in Europe without the prospect of a rise in the near future will endanger the social peace on the home front which is so essential to our defense effort."[41]

In England the Labor government's arms program, which was expected to cost about 14 per cent of the national income, led Minister of Labor Aneurin Bevan and two of his followers to resign from the government in protest. He and his supporters gave voice to views that were widely shared by politicians in both parties, who hesitated to state them so boldly. They charged that neither England nor the other allied states in Europe could finance rearmament programs of the proposed scale and pace and at the same time maintain their programs for increasing civilian production, building homes, and improving social services. They held that Great Britain, in particular, suffered from carrying a disproportionate share of the West's defense effort, which afforded the United States and other allies a competitive advantage in industrial production and prevented Britain from manufacturing and selling enough export goods to solve its international balance-of-payments problem. Furthermore, they denied the basic strategic premise of rearmament in asserting that the real and sufficient deterrent of aggression in Europe was the American guaranty and not ground forces, while they condemned the American-sponsored build-up as provocative.[42] The victory of the Bevanites and the defeat of the Labor party in the general elections of October, 1951, forcefully demonstrated the political hazards of rearmament.

Against these formidable economic and political obstacles the United States assumed the task of urging her allies to maintain the priority of rearmament over economic advancement in order to create as many battle-ready divisions as possible by 1952, but the European allies responded by beseeching the United States to direct as much foreign aid as possible toward

meeting their economic problems in order to mitigate the strains of rearmament. As a French official explained to an American reporter, "With you Americans the big problem is the immediate threat of Russia to our collective security. With us the big problem is the immediate threat to standards of living which cannot be depressed materially without endangering public support for the rearmament program you are demanding of us."[43] The result of this divergence of interests was that the allies made just enough paper concessions to the build-up of ground forces to sustain America's attachment to NATO, while the United States agreed, in principle, that the build-up should not be made at the sacrifice of national standards of living.

At the Rome meeting of the North Atlantic Council, in November, 1951, the allied powers resolved to create a NATO ground force of 43 divisions by 1954 and to accelerate the "short-term" (1952) program of rearmament, subject to the findings of a twelve-nation Temporary Council Committee, which had been charged with determining the defense expenditures that the respective allies were economically capable of contributing to the collective effort.[44] However, the draft report of a working group (the "Three Wise Men"),[45] which was submitted to the TCC in December, proposed levels of expenditure that obviously exceeded the political, if not the economic, capabilities of the allied governments. And the specific distribution of the economic burden among the allies was as disturbing as the magnitude of the assessments. The report urged the European allies to expand production by an average of 14 per cent by June, 1954, and to increase military expenditures by from 5 per cent for France to 50 per cent for Belgium. It assured them that these goals could be achieved without increasing taxation or reducing standards of living, and it suggested that the way to accomplish this feat was for Western Europe to pay for rearmament out of increased production and for the United States to buy more defense supplies abroad. These ambitious recommendations quickly proved to be unrealistic in terms of the willingness of the allies either to subordinate domestic to defense con-

siderations or to subordinate national defense programs to a supranational determination of burden-sharing.

Although the TCC was supposed to indicate to the European allies how they should close the gap between military needs and actual capabilities by their own efforts, it was clear to all the assembled finance ministers that the essential component in the recommended prescriptions for reconciling rearmament with domestic economic goals would have to be a substantial increase in American assistance. Yet the United States secretary of the treasury had already advised the Rome meeting that Europe could not expect increased American aid for defense programs,[46] and the American Congress had reduced the government's requested funds for the Mutual Security Act, cutting most deeply into the appropriations for economic aid for Europe.[47] This tendency to reduce the total Mutual Security Act appropriation for Europe and allocate a greater proportion to military as opposed to economic aid was carried out in the requests and authorizations for fiscal year 1953.[48]

Furthermore, the United States secretary of defense had let the European governments know that the American government intended to pare down its own defense budget (with the exception of airpower) for the sake of the stability of the national economy.[49] And Congress subsequently approved this policy by cutting the administration's total defense budget (although granting generous appropriations to the Air Force, which it had consistently urged the administration to expand). Thus, even while the United States reduced the military and economic assistance that the allied powers in Europe needed in order to fulfil their rearmament pledges without sacrificing their economic and social goals, she provided them, in her own defense policies, with the irresistible formula for squaring economic retrenchment with national security.

9. THE QUESTION OF GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN WESTERN DEFENSE

Before the North Atlantic allies convened in Lisbon in February, 1952, in order to agree upon the force levels required to

implement the American-sponsored rearmament program, the United States also encountered allied resistance in pushing another logical concomitant of NATO's forward strategy: the participation of West Germany in the European security system.

In September, 1950, the State Department had proposed incorporating about ten German divisions directly under NATO command. But throughout Western Europe, and especially in France, strong opposition had developed to rushing ahead with German rearmament and membership in NATO before political safeguards against German militarism had been created.

In order to postpone German participation the French Premier, René Pleven, put forward a counterproposal, analogous to the "Schuman Plan" for economic integration through a European Coal and Steel Community. This scheme would so tightly integrate Germany's military contribution in a European framework—chiefly by confining German units to combat teams within international divisions of a European army—as to obviate the danger of independent national action. The "Pleven Plan" was widely regarded as a politically impossible and militarily unfeasible subterfuge for preventing German rearmament. Nevertheless, the United States, after first rejecting the scheme as unrealistic and unfeasible, later indorsed it in order to gain French adherence to a German contribution. She indorsed it, however, in the altered form of a European Defense Community, which would include German divisions integrated on a basis of equality with other national divisions in army groups.[50]

Thus, the French trapped themselves and their allies into accepting, in principle, a European army with supranational features, which it is doubftul that even the United States would have accepted in fact. Yet only the American government regarded EDC as an urgent military necessity, and only the West German government took a keen political interest in the project.

In France the proponents of EDC in the long, intricate debate in the National Assembly argued for the scheme primarily as a means of tying down American troops in Europe, restraining the resurgent Federal Republic within a Franco-German

rapprochement, and promoting the grand scheme of European reconstruction through unification. Both sides of the argument displayed almost total indifference to strategic military considerations.[51]

In England the support of EDC as an assurance against American isolation—and as a means of getting Germany to share the burdens of rearmament and compete on more equal terms with British trade—held an uneasy balance over the fear of German ascendance on the Continent and the traditional British opposition to becoming involved in European commitments. But, as in France, the general disposition of proponents and opponents alike was to let America's nuclear power take care of NATO's military security.

In West Germany, Chancellor Adenauer's government, against great popular and political opposition to rearmament, embraced the idea of integrating German troops in a European army—providing they were under national control—as a means of abolishing the restrictions of the Occupation Statute, restoring Germany to equal status among the major powers, laying the ancient ghost of Franco-German hostility, and interlocking Germany's destiny with that of the Western world; in short, for the sake of the larger purpose of restoring German power and prestige within an international framework that would protect Germany and her neighbors from the revival of German chauvinism. But neither inside nor outside the government was there any significant appreciation of, nor concern for, the military implications of EDC.[52]

Thus, on the eve of NATO's adoption of the most ambitious defense program in its history, the two major contributions to this program—rearmament and the participation of West Germany—depended upon the convergence of the contributing nations' disparate political aims and their common interest in securing America's commitment and material support, rather than upon educated convictions about the military requirements of common defense. It is little wonder, then, that the large force goals indorsed at Lisbon turned out to be paper promises. Yet the rearmament effort, which was built upon

those goals, eventually led to two other results that were no less important for European security and cohesion: the membership of West Germany in NATO and the further commitment of the United States and Britain to the defense of Continental Europe.

10. THE LISBON GOALS AND THEIR ABANDONMENT

In February, 1952, the North Atlantic Council, meeting in Lisbon, approved the most ambitious force goals of NATO's history: 50 divisions, 4,000 aircraft, and 704 major combatant vessels in 1952 and, provisionally, 75 divisions and 6,500 aircraft in 1953, to be followed by 96 divisions and 9,000 aircraft in 1954, with about 35 to 40 divisions to be ready for combat at all times (including 25 to 30 on the central front) and the rest to be capable of mobilization within a month.[53] The Council approved the contribution of 12 West German divisions to these forces within the framework of the European Defense Community, toward which Great Britain, the United States, and the other NATO countries not participating directly in EDC would assume the same obligations as toward NATO. (The projected force goals did not include the indigenous troops needed to defend Greece and Turkey, whose accession to NATO was now formally recognized.[54]) At the same time, the Lisbon conference took a significant step toward the political integration of the alliance by making the North Atlantic Council a permanent body, with a secretary general as chairman and with permanent representatives, who were to remain in session in the intervals between ministerial meetings.

On the face of things, the force goals indorsed at Lisbon were the consummation of defense plans urged by the military since 1948, but, measured by performance rather than by promise, they turned out to be a mirage on the bleak arms horizon in the aftermath of the Korean stalemate. Statesmen of the member countries hailed the Lisbon agreement as a great achievement, but unofficially it was received with a great deal of skepticism in Europe. The London *Times* regarded the conference communiqué as an unfortunate attempt to combine military planning with political propaganda. "Presumably the announcement

was meant to impress someone," its editorial observed, "but it will not impress the Russians, who know very well the true state of affairs and who have the sense to realize that any real plans for real divisions would be kept secret. Indeed this imaginative total [50 divisions], with the still more imaginative promise of 85 or 100 divisions in two years' time, seems to contain the maximum amount of provocation with the minimum amount of deterrent effect."[55]

Nevertheless, NATO did, thereafter, make considerable progress toward achieving the 1952 goal. In the next year or two, NATO forces available for defense of the central front in Western Europe reached a peak of military preparedness in terms of ground divisions—leveling off at about 25 nominally combat-ready standing divisions and about 25 reserve divisions in various states of readiness (before the French and British withdrawals of troops in 1954, 1956, and 1957). Moreover, NATO's "infrastructure" was greatly improved by the construction of over 100 airfields and an extensive network of communications and supply facilities. This put NATO in a fairly good position to prevent the Soviet Union from launching a sudden, unopposed, limited aggression with her 22 divisions in East Germany or from launching a major ground attack without giving the West advance warning.

Yet this level of preparedness was far short of the provisional goals set forth at Lisbon, and every military authority, including General Eisenhower and his two successors, General Ridgway and General Gruenther, had to concede that NATO's forces were insufficient to protect Europe from a major assault.[56] Moreover, it soon became evident that none of the allies was actually willing to increase or even sustain its pace of rearmament in order to create larger ground forces. Indeed, the universal trend was in the opposite direction.

On the very day the Lisbon conference opened, Churchill informed the House of Commons that defense expenditures for the current fiscal year would fall short of the estimate and that the whole program would have to be stretched out beyond the three years planned.[57] This "stretch-out" reflected more than a

mere postponement of defense goals. It was the result of a fundamental strategic decision to reconcile economic retrenchment with military security by relying more heavily on strategic airpower and nuclear weapons as opposed to ground power, and by basing defense expenditures on the concept of the "long haul" and the assumption that the danger of war by 1954 had abated.[58] On this strategic basis the Prime Minister announced at the end of July that the whole defense program was under review in order to keep it within limits compatible with the nation's economic welfare.[59] And in September he was reported to have suggested to the American government that concentration upon airpower and nuclear weapons would enable a considerably smaller number of ground forces than 96 divisions to defend Europe.[60] In October the British demonstrated the technological basis of their strategic revision by producing an atomic explosion in the Monte Bello Islands off Australia.

At about the same time that Churchill first announced a "stretch-out," the new French Premier, Edgar Faure, gambling on the provision of substantial additional American aid, submitted to the National Assembly a defense budget somewhat in excess of that suggested by the Three Wise Men for arming 12 divisions, which the Lisbon conference had established as the French contribution; and on his return from Lisbon he proposed a 15 per cent increase in taxation. The National Assembly rejected this proposal, and Faure resigned, to be replaced by Antoine Pinay. The Pinay government sought in vain for assurances of sufficient American aid to permit it, in the light of persistently rising living costs and dwindling dollar reserves, to undertake the defense expenditures projected by its predecessor. The American government declined to supply $600 million previously promised, maintaining that this aid had been contingent upon an adequate French military effort, which had not occurred. The American Congress further prepared the downfall of Pinay's government by making a substantial cut in the annual Mutual Security Program appropriations for military aid and defense support to Europe, to the accompaniment of aspersions about France's efficiency and reliability. Accordingly, Premier

Pinay announced that, in the absence of adequate American aid, France was forced to choose between production goals and manpower goals and would choose the former.[61] In November, 1952, the French government informed NATO that it would be unable to increase its military contribution in 1953 from 12 to 15 divisions in accordance with the Lisbon program.[62]

France encountered a special obstacle to meeting her defense goals in the debilitating warfare in Indochina, which consumed a frightful portion of her professional army and, over a period of five years, more money than the entire amount of all the Marshall Plan aid from the United States.[63] Although in 1952 the United States supported about one-third of the annual financial burden of this war, French authorities did not consider this aid commensurate with the importance of her exertions in the global struggle against international communism.

Britain's and France's abandonment of the Lisbon goals in the face of domestic economic and political obstacles set the pattern for other members of the alliance, who before long reduced their defense budgets and their terms of conscription. At the North Atlantic Council meeting in April, 1953, the foreign ministers formally recognized and sanctioned the relaxation of NATO's defense effort. Although the highest authorities stated then and on other occasions throughout the year that the Soviet threat had not diminished in the slightest,[64] they justified a slackening in the pace of rearmament on the ground that the objective was now to build up NATO's military strength gradually over the "long pull" at a pace compatible with economic welfare, rather than to rearm rapidly in order to achieve full strength by the "year of maximum danger" in 1954. Accordingly, the members of NATO now placed the emphasis on improving the quality of existing forces, while deferring the provisional force goals for 1953 and 1954 to some unspecified date in the future.[65]

Only the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Ridgway, soon to become army chief of staff and to be replaced by General Gruenther, dissented from this formula for abandoning the Lisbon goals. Warning that military plans must be based

on Soviet capabilities rather than on attempts to fathom Soviet intentions, he asserted that the scale and burden of NATO's defense effort should actually increase rather than diminish. "Within the strictly military field," he wrote in his annual report as Supreme Commander, "I find the disparity between our available forces and those which the Soviet rulers could bring against us so great as to warrant no other conclusion than that a full-scale attack within the near future would find Allied Command Europe critically weak to accomplish its present mission."[66]

11. GERMANY JOINS NATO

The default upon national force goals was not accompanied by any alteration of the strategy that NATO's forces were intended to serve. NATO and allied spokesmen continued to affirm that NATO's major and indispensable function was the protection of every member against an all-out Russian assault.[67] Therefore, although the pace of rearmament slackened, the fulfilment of NATO's military plans still depended upon reducing the disparity between Soviet and NATO forces. To reduce this disparity, a West German contribution of troops and material resources was indispensable. As General Eisenhower asserted in the First Annual Report of the Supreme Allied Commander, "Even with the maximum potential realized through the collective efforts of member nations, there is little hope for the economical long-term attainment of security and stability in Europe unless West Germany can be counted on the side of the free nations."[68]

West Germany's geographical position alone made her participation a prerequisite of an effective "forward strategy." For, as NATO's military leaders explained, the plans for defending Europe depended upon maintaining combat-ready covering forces to hold the initial onslaught as far eastward as possible, backed by reserve units that could be brought into action within a period of a few days to a month.[69] West Germany's active collaboration with NATO would obviously become essential in implementing this strategic concept.

On May 27, 1952, the European Defense Community Treaty

was signed, and the United States, Britain, and France concluded a Contractual Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, ending the occupation. The treaty provided for a German contribution of 12 divisions to an army of initially 43 national divisions, grouped in international army corps under overall control of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. West Germany was to receive full sovereignty when all signatories had ratified the treaty. As a special concession to France, the United States and Britain signed a declaration pledging that "if any action from whatever quarter threatens the integrity or unity of the Community, the two Governments will regard this as a threat to their own security" and expressing their "resolve to station such forces on the continent of Europe, including the Federal Republic of Germany, as they deem necessary and appropriate to contribute to the joint defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area."[70]

In the eyes of the military, EDC was a simple strategic imperative, but the subsequent history of the treaty showed that NATO's military security had become inextricably entangled with substantial political issues concerning interallied relations, issues which could be resolved within the new strategic imperatives only by a readjustment of allied commitments. The central feature of this readjustment was the firmer commitment of American and British troops to the Continent in order to counterbalance the accession of West Germany to NATO, especially for the benefit of France. Indeed, in the eyes of its principal architects, EDC became as important as an instrument of Franco-German reconciliation as of military security.

In the United States the signing of the treaty to establish the European Defense Community was hailed, not only as a boon to military security, but also as a giant step toward the ancient ideal of European unification. When the last of the six foreign ministers had signed the last document, Secretary Acheson expressed his "profound conviction that what we have witnessed today may well prove to be one of the most important and most far-reaching events of our lifetime. . . . We have seen the beginning of the realization of an ancient dream—the unity of the

free peoples of Western Europe."[71] Undersecretary of State David K. Bruce went further in proclaiming:

> I myself feel that this creation of a European Defense Community is the most significant thing that has happened in western civilization, not in my time, not in our time, but for a period of hundreds of years, because . . . the animosities between nations, these deep-seated hatreds, which are the result of history, not of generations, but of centuries, come to a focus in control over its own armed forces, because there goes with that parting with control over its armed forces a loss of control over its foreign policy, the implementation of its foreign policy, through the force of its own or the disposition of its own armies.[72]

In retrospect, it would seem that Mr. Bruce lauded the very supranational feature that would have doomed EDC to failure even if France had accepted the treaty. However, the world was deprived of this experiment, because the French National Assembly refused to ratify the device that the French government had largely invented, while the United States became increasingly impatient for the acceptance of a scheme it had originally opposed, and the German Federal Republic used the combination of American pressure and French resistance to emphasize her claim to sovereignty and equality.

The French government, fearing a resurgent Germany more than Soviet aggression, tried to gain an EDC formula that would permit greater independent control of the French army, additional guaranties of Britain's commitment to Continental defense, and Germany's renunciation of control over the Saar, contending that these were the minimum conditions for securing the National assembly's ratification of the EDC treaty. The West German government, having persuaded the Bundestag to ratify the treaty largely as the means of achieving full sovereignty, was no less ardent an advocate of EDC than the United States, although it was compelled to be more wary of French apprehensions. But the Adenauer government also had to contend with domestic opposition to the EDC treaty, for, not without reason, the Social Democratic party held that German rearmament in the context of a Western alliance would preclude Russia's agreement to the reunification of Germany. This diffi-

culty prompted the Bonn government to reinforce its claim to American support by letting American observers know that the failure of EDC might bring to power domestic forces that would turn a friendlier eye toward the East.[73]

To allay German domestic opposition, the United States insisted, in support of Chancellor Adenauer, that the best assurance of reunification lay in so strengthening the Federal Republic through EDC as to present Soviet-occupied Germany with an irresistible "attractive power."[74] But stronger inducements were needed to gain French acceptance of the treaty. On the one hand, the United States tried to mollify the French opposition by formally reaffirming her commitments to EDC and NATO and adding a pledge to regard the North Atlantic Treaty as of "indefinite duration,"[75] and by stressing in official statements the value of EDC as a move toward European unity, as a spur to Franco-German reconciliation, and as a protection against the renewal of aggressive German nationalism. Expatiating the latter theme, Secretary of State Dulles told a foreign ministers' conference in January, 1954:

> No more will there be national armies to fight each other and to invade others in a quest for national triumphs. There will be only the common army so interlocked that no single member of the community could in practice commit armed aggression. There would be no more German Army. There would be no German General Staff, and the military service of individual Germans would be closely restricted.
>
> Such a European army could go into action only in response to great and pressing needs of self-defense. It could not be used without the concurrence of countries which themselves have had bitter experience with German militarism and which could never be a party to its revival.[76]

On the other hand, Dulles sought to overcome French opposition to EDC by hinting at a revision of America's commitment to Continental defense and a cessation of American aid unless France joined EDC. Thus he told a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on December 14, 1953, "If . . . the European Defense Community should not become effective; if France and Germany remain apart so that they would again be potential

enemies, then indeed there would be grave doubt whether Continental Europe could be made a place of safety. That would compel an agonizing reappraisal of basic United States policy."[77] In January and February, 1953, during a rapid survey of European conditions before drawing up the Mutual Security Program for the next fiscal year, Dulles indicated that further American investments in Western Europe might depend upon Europe's uniting in accordance with the defense treaty.[78] And this warning was underlined by the so-called "Richards Amendment" to the Mutual Security Program appropriation for 1953–54, which made half the military aid for Europe contingent on the adoption of EDC.[79] On June 5, 1954, testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Dulles said, "I would think that it would be acceptable not to make deliveries to [France and Italy] out of next year's [foreign aid] authorizations unless and until they have ratified EDC."[80]

In the end, the French National Assembly refused to be either mollified or frightened into accepting the EDC treaty. Nevertheless, in an atmosphere of crisis that seemed to threaten the very existence of NATO as a military organization, a formula more compatible with traditional national sovereignty was found for securing West Germany's participation in the Atlantic defense system. On August 30, 1954, the National Assembly rejected the EDC treaty by a vote of 319 to 264. On British initiative a new scheme for West German participation in NATO within a restored Western European Union was devised at a nine-power conference in London and embodied in a series of protocols and conventions in Paris, which France joined in signing on October 23.

In the House of Commons Sir Anthony Eden argued for the Paris and London Agreements on broad political grounds. They were essential, he said, to anchor Germany to the West rather than let her drift in the center of Europe, and he emphasized the restraints that WEU would impose upon West Germany, which would prevent her from pursuing an independent military policy. Moreover, he warned that the failure of the British to have taken the initiative in achieving European unity within

WEU after the collapse of EDC might have caused "the complete collapse of that unity and the retirement of the United States into 'Fortress America.' "[81]

The French Premier, Pierre Mendès-France, now advocated WEU before the French National Assembly in equally political terms, arguing that if France turned down a second plan for rearming the Germans, the United States and Britain would arm West Germany anyway and the United States would withdraw from the defense of the Continent in favor of a "peripheral strategy."[82] He persuaded the National Assembly to approve the Paris Agreements on December 28 by a narrow margin of 287 to 260.

In the following four months the legislatures of the other signatories ratified the Agreements, and in May, 1955, over four and one-half years after the NATO members had accepted a German contribution in principle, the Federal Republic joined NATO on terms far more like the original American and German proposals of 1950 than like EDC. Thus, in the end, the North Atlantic allies' concern for the restraint of a resurgent Germany in Europe, for the cohesion of the alliance, and, above all, for America's firm commitment to Continental defense triumphed over their political differences—but only after a new set of commitments had been woven into the tangled strands of allied collaboration.

The demise of EDC meant that national armies under NATO command would remain under national control. In order to make the participation of a German national army acceptable to France, the old Western Union of the Brussels Treaty was revived, linked with NATO, and expanded to include Germany and Italy in a Western European Union, which was empowered to fix the maximum force levels of its members on the recommendation of NATO's military authorities. Germany was to become a member of NATO after all signatories had ratified the new Brussels Treaty and a convention providing for the continued stationing of allied forces in West Germany, subject to German consent. All allied forces on the Continent were placed under the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (except those

recognized by NATO as being properly under national command). These forces were to be located, deployed, and supported logistically by SACEUR according to NATO's strategy and were forbidden to be redeployed or used operationally without SACEUR's consent, subject to "appropriate political guidance" from the North Atlantic Council.

In a unilateral declaration of self-denial Germany undertook (*a*) not to manufacture atomic, chemical, or biological weapons and (*b*) not to manufacture guided missiles, magnetic and influence mines, warships, or long-range bombers, except on the request of SACEUR, approved by a two-thirds majority of the Council of WEU. However, in return for accepting these unique restraints, the Federal Republic gained not only assurances of Western military support but "the full authority of a sovereign state over its internal and external affairs," a national military establishment, and a major voice in the councils of the Western powers.* In short, she gained the attributes of a fully independent state and a position of strength and influence to utilize them, within a political framework acceptable to the major Western powers and compatible with the consolidation of a democratic society.

As a further restraint upon Germany, the United States, Great Britain, and France agreed that any recourse to force which threatened "the integrity and unity of the Atlantic alliance or its defensive purposes" would disqualify the offending government from enjoying its rights "to any guarantee and any military assistance provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty and its protocols." As a counterweight to German power, Great Britain promised to continue to maintain on the Continent the four divisions and the tactical air units already assigned to

* She also gained two commitments of critical importance to any political settlement with Russia involving West Germany. One stated that "the final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await" a peace settlement "for the whole of Germany"—a reference to the Oder-Neisse line. The other pledged the allies to "consider the government of the Federal Republic as the only German government . . . entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs"—that is, a pledge not to recognize East Germany.

SACEUR and not to withdraw them against the wishes of the majority of the Brussels powers. Although this pledge added little to existing commitments and was qualified so as not to be binding in case of "an acute overseas emergency" or an excessive financial strain, it was nevertheless a radical departure from Britain's traditional foreign policy and a decisive concession in securing French assent to the Paris Agreements. As a final assurance to France, the United States and Great Britain joined the six WEU countries and Canada in stating that they regarded the North Atlantic Treaty as being "of indefinite duration."

Thus it came about that the effort to obtain West Germany's active participation in a forward strategy led to the further integration of NATO's forces and the further entanglement of the United States and Great Britain in Continental defense, while the proposal for a European army, which had gained much of its impetus from the sentiment for a purely European integration, ended by binding Europe more tightly to a trans-Atlantic framework.

12. THE SOVIET "NEW LOOK" IN FOREIGN POLICY

By the time the Paris Agreements were signed, NATO had become a complex framework of European diplomacy, in which military strategy was inextricably entwined with the delicately balanced configurations of allied power and interests. However, the alliance had to operate in a far different international atmosphere than existed when the plan for securing a German contribution was initiated during the crisis following the outbreak of the Korean War. It was an atmosphere that was anything but conducive to Western rearmament and concerted diplomatic stands.

The new international atmosphere was largely the result of a change in the tactics of Soviet foreign policy in response to the military and political stalemate in Europe and a number of other developments: the growth of nuclear striking power on both sides; the resurgence of West Germany as a major military and industrial power allied with the West; the acceleration of the nationalist, anti-Western, and leftist revolution

in the peripheral areas of Asia; and the diffusion of power and influence within the Soviet bloc. The new tactics began to emerge in the midst of the EDC discussions, after the death of Stalin in March, 1953, although there had been signs of them at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952 and even before, in June, 1951, when Soviet UN delegate Malik indicated that Russia would support truce negotiations in the Korean War.

In actions, the Soviet "new look" in foreign policy was marked by somewhat better diplomatic manners and by gestures toward a *détente*—the dissolution of the Cominform, the relaxation of controls over domestic economic policy in the satellite states, the return of the Porkkala naval base to Finland, a slight lifting of the Iron Curtain to permit freer East-West communication between scientific and cultural personnel, agreement to the Austrian State Treaty (May, 1955), promotion of the Summit conference in Geneva (July, 1955) to herald the "relaxation of tensions" and "peaceful coexistence," support of its Asian counterpart at Bandung (April, 1955), and announcement of Soviet troop reductions in 1955 and 1956 of 640,000 and 1,200,000, respectively.

Doctrinally, the Soviet "new look," which received its principal formulation at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956,[83] was marked by a number of propositions defining the new bases of "peaceful coexistence": (*a*) There is no "fatal inevitability" of war as the ultimate precondition of the triumph of international communism, because the united front for peace combined with Soviet nuclear retaliatory power can deter the West from starting such a war in a desperate attempt to prevent the world-wide triumph of communism. (*b*) A "socialist society" has been achieved in the U.S.S.R., and it is advancing much faster than the capitalist societies—which it will eventually surpass—in the decisive area of competition between the two systems: material production and, especially, heavy industry. (*c*) The Soviet Union is no longer encircled by the capitalist-imperialist camp; rather, it is surrounded by allied socialist states and a huge third non-socialist, neutralist camp in the "zone of peace" (including the one-third of mankind living on the periphery of Eurasia),

which is destined to enter the Communist camp. (*d*) There are new possibilities outside the major capitalist powers, for the peaceful, even parliamentary transition to communism, although whether the transition is peaceful or violent will depend upon whether the ruling classes resist it. (*e*) The major capitalist powers are experiencing increasing "contradictions"—or political conflicts—among themselves, resulting especially from dissatisfaction with American leadership and the rearmament of West Germany.

These changes in Soviet actions and doctrine encouraged a widespread belief in the West that the hypothetical military threat to Europe was virtually of no practical significance, since Moscow had now abandoned the overt use of armed force because of the hazards of thermonuclear war and had shifted to non-military instruments of policy, such as economic assistance, propaganda, and various forms of political penetration, designed to enhance Soviet influence in the colonial and former colonial areas. To many, an old, enduring hope seemed confirmed: the hazards and expense of the arms race, the pressures of Russian consumer demands, the pragmatism of the new Soviet bureaucracy, the liberalizing tendencies of education, and Russia's fear of Communist China were producing the kind of moderation of Soviet foreign policy that George Kennan had originally anticipated. It seemed to follow, therefore, that the West should encourage these tendencies, adopting a more flexible diplomacy, more responsive to Soviet proposals for disarmament and disengagement in Europe, while meeting the challenge in the underdeveloped areas through enlarged programs of technical and economic assistance and a more favorable attitude toward "neutralism."

Measured by any realistic appraisal of internal developments in the Soviet Union and their relationship to foreign policy or of the altered international military and political environment and its relationship to Soviet *realpolitik,* these popular assumptions were extravagantly optimistic.[84] In the retrospective view of the 1960's it was clearer than in 1955 and 1956 that the Soviet "new look" in foreign policy represented an imaginative effort, not to

stabilize the status quo, even in Europe, but to capitalize upon the growth of Soviet nuclear and industrial power, combined with the intensification of the nationalist, economic, and social revolution in the "underdeveloped" areas, to extend Soviet influence and control beyond the bounds consolidated under Stalin while hastening the disintegration of the Western alliance. Khrushchev might accept the existence of a military stalemate insofar as it ruled out the calculated resort to nuclear war or direct armed aggression, but he interpreted this situation of mutual deterrence not as a basis for political accommodation but rather as an opportunity to conduct political and psychological warfare more actively against the Western coalition and its vulnerable outposts like Berlin, while destroying the remnants of Western influence in the "zone of peace" and incorporating the uncommitted nations into a "socialist world system."

In this new phase of the cold war the deterrent to Soviet military adventures was probably as much Russia's opportunities for non-violent aggrandizement as her fear of nuclear retaliation. Yet Khrushchev's growing confidence in the shift of the military balance away from the West toward the Soviet Union and his willingness to play the game of nuclear blackmail and brinkmanship more adventurously in the Middle East and Berlin foreshadowed an increasing danger that Russia might also become engaged in limited military incursions, either deliberately or inadvertently. In any event, by 1954 the range of tactical options for advancing Soviet interests had certainly grown substantially since the death of Stalin, and this foreshadowed a period of intensified Soviet probing and maneuver. Therefore, the post-Stalin phase of the cold war clearly called for new strategic flexibility in order to preserve the military basis of allied security and cohesion.

5
NATO Goes Nuclear

1. THE AMERICAN "NEW LOOK" STRATEGY

As a political arrangement for securing Germany's membership in NATO, the Paris Agreements represented a considerable advancement of NATO as an integrated military organization, but, in themselves, they did not much alter the discrepancy between NATO's declared strategy and its actual capabilities, which could only be rectified by concrete military, economic, and material contributions of the allies. It was several years before the Federal Republic, in the face of domestic opposition to rearmament, managed to contribute any significant number of troops to Western defense. In the meantime, all allied countries were busy once more subordinating their NATO force goals to domestic economic goals.

The logical concomitant of this restoration of the priority of domestic over defense requirements was a revised strategy based on the substitution of nuclear firepower for conventional manpower. In the aftermath of the Korean War, only the United States and Great Britain had the nuclear weapons to carry out this strategy, but their strategic example soon became the model for NATO as a whole; for NATO could not pursue a strategy that its two most powerful members had abandoned.

In the United States the general outline of the "new look" in military strategy was expressed in Dulles' attacks upon "con-

tainment" during the presidential campaign of 1952. His views were embraced by President Eisenhower soon after assuming office.[1] In the spring of 1953, the President announced that, in order to bring economic and military necessities "into some kind of realistic focus," defense planning would now be based on maintaining adequate preparedness over a period of years rather than achieving maximum strength by a "magic critical year."[2] However, the actual readjustment of military policies to new economic limitations, for which Dulles had provided the strategic formula, had to await the President's approval of a basic National Security Council decision in October, 1953. This decision authorized the Joint Chiefs of Staff to base their plans on using tactical and strategic nuclear weapons against conventional attacks wherever this was militarily advantageous (although by law the President retained exclusive authority to order their use in any particular contingency). On the basis of this decision the administration gained the approval of the Joint Chiefs for a substantially reduced defense budget, based upon a greater allocation of resources to nuclear striking power at the expense of conventional arms and ground forces. In December Admiral Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced, "Today, atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our Armed Forces."[3] On January 12, 1954, Secretary Dulles delivered his famous address announcing that the government, in order to get "a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost," had decided to "depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing."[4]

Actually, Dulles' pronouncement was not new at all as it applied to the NATO area but only as it threatened nuclear retaliation rather than local conventional resistance against limited aggressions outside Europe.[5] As before, massive retaliation remained the operational strategy in Europe, and massive local defense remained its ghostly partner in declaratory strategy. In fact, to counter any impression that the United States might renounce local defense in Europe, Dulles later stated in a written clarification of his January speech, "Some areas are so

vital that a special guard should and can be put around them. Western Europe is such an area. Its industrial plant represents so nearly the balance of industrial power in the world that an aggressor might feel that it was a good gamble to seize it—even at the risk of considerable hurt to himself. In this respect, Western Europe is an exception."[6] And he specifically denied that the government's new strategy foretold a withdrawal of American forces from Europe. If the Continental nations provided "a harmonious nucleus of integrated defense," he said, "the United States would expect to maintain substantial forces of its own in Europe, both in support of the forward strategy of defense and for political reasons."[7]

Nevertheless, the effect of America's "new look" was to discourage rather than encourage Western Europe to build up "a harmonious nucleus of integrated defense." For if the richest and most powerful ally felt compelled to rely more upon nuclear deterrence and less upon ground resistance in order to bring economic and military necessities into "realistic focus," why should her less affluent partners continue to sacrifice their economic advancement for the construction of a large ground force? National specialization between the United States and her allies in the functions of nuclear deterrence and conventional ground resistance might be *militarily* necessary for a while, if only because the allies (except Great Britain) lacked the technological capacity to develop their own nuclear deterrents. But a grossly unequal distribution of sacrifices, such as would be imposed by their continued rearmament for conventional warfare while the United States reduced its conventional forces in favor of a nuclear strategy, would scarcely be compatible with the *political* requirements of allied collaboration. Moreover, if nuclear firepower compensated for conventional manpower in America's armed forces, logically it should do the same for NATO as a whole. The development of tactical nuclear weapons, combined with the continued shortfall in NATO's conventional forces, assured the extension of this logic to the defense of Europe.

2. TOWARD A "NEW LOOK" FOR NATO

The development of compact and relatively low-yield nuclear warheads (10 kilotons and below), which were presumably suitable for discriminating destruction of tactical military targets in the battle zone, had scarcely begun when the Lisbon conference force goals were set.[8] Therefore, these goals were based, essentially, on a World War II concept of strategy with the atomic bombs added to enhance strategic airpower. Although even before the Korean War military and civilian authorities had pointed hopefully to the prospect of using atomic weapons tactically as well as strategically in order to close the gap between NATO's strategy and its capabilities,[9] the first concerted scientific and military study of this prospect—part of the controversial Project Vista, begun in early 1951—grew out of the impact of the Korean War on military thinking, out of the military's desire to increase the West's capacity for local resistance.[10] The failure of the allies to meet the Lisbon goals in the aftermath of the Korean scare, combined with the revision of British and American strategies to take advantage of the purported savings of nuclear deterrents, provided the major impetus for the incorporation of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO's strategic planning.

One of the earliest official intimations that tactical nuclear weapons might enable NATO to achieve its security objectives without meeting the Lisbon force goals came from General J. Lawton Collins, army chief of staff, when he told a press conference on September 6, 1952, that, although tactical nuclear weapons would not decrease "the number of divisions required initially for the defense of Europe," they would "result ultimately in the ability to do the job with a smaller number of divisions."[11] In 1952, however, NATO forces had no tactical atomic weapons, and the American military leaders assigned to Europe had scarcely begun to study the tactics and organization of the forces that might fight with these weapons. Moreover, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (or MacMahon Act, as it was popularly termed, after its sponsor, Senator MacMahon), which was enacted when the United States held a monopoly of the atomic

bomb in order to prevent the Soviet Union from getting atomic secrets, prohibited the sharing of atomic weapons and atomic information with the European allies. Thus, France's Marshal Juin, commanding allied ground forces in Europe, was forbidden to know the nature and number of atomic arms he might eventually have at his disposal.

Nevertheless, the prospect of at least the American forces in Europe acquiring tactical nuclear weapons made European governments all the more reluctant to exact domestic sacrifices in order to support the Lisbon goals, which had been devised on the basis of conventional military equipment and a World War II strategy that would soon be outmoded. As the British government's statement of defense policy for 1953 put it, "In times of stringency it is specially important to get the fullest possible value for our money; we must avoid overcommitting ourselves too deeply to equipment which will have to be replaced at heavy cost within a relatively short space of time."[12]

Therefore, while the American government held out to her allies the hope of eventually defending Europe with fewer troops by incorporating tactical nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy and tried to loosen up the restrictions that the MacMahon Act imposed on collaborating with them in the development of such a strategy, it was also wary of claiming too much for these weapons, lest it further encourage the allies to relax their defense efforts. Thus, soon after General Collins publicly anticipated that tactical nuclear weapons would ultimately enable NATO's forces to defend Europe with a smaller number of divisions, General Bradley issued a statement warning that these weapons were not sufficiently advanced to justify any slackening in the effort to build up NATO's ground forces to its scheduled goals, which were "essential to collective defense, even with the optimistic estimates of the future capabilities of atomic weapons."[13]

General Bradley's warning was confirmed by the studies and war-gaming of two-sided nuclear warfare that the United States Seventh Army Corps in Europe initiated in the winter of 1952–53. General James M. Gavin, the commander of that Corps,

later wrote, "One over-all conclusion stood out clearly, although for several years it was the basis of considerable argument: more rather than less manpower would be required to fight a nuclear war successfully."[14] Similarly, the Supreme Allied Commander, General Ridgway, held that the new tactical nuclear weapons would not only demand more manpower but would also increase the cost of defense to the taxpayer.[15] And his successor, General Gruenther, warned that "new weapons frequently have the effect of adding new problems and new tasks without eliminating those that previously confronted us."[16]

Nevertheless, each new development that facilitated the use of tactical nuclear weapons as an integral part of NATO's military establishment made it increasingly difficult to dampen hopes of substituting technology for manpower and money. In February, 1953, General Sir Richard Gale, commander of the Allied Northern Army Group in West Germany, revealed that in case of war "a certain number of atomic weapons may be available" and that the forces under his command were being trained on the basis of using them.[17] On April 22 the first "low-yield" atomic bomb to be exploded near ground soldiers was tested on the Yucca Flats in Nevada. Shortly afterward, the Defense Department announced that allied officers were to begin taking special instruction in Germany on the use of atomic weapons.[18] In October the first gigantic 85-ton, 280 mm. atomic artillery piece from the United States arrived in Europe, to be followed in 1954 by more maneuverable rockets and missiles (Honest John, Corporal, Matador, and Regulus). At the same time, the American government, acceding to the urgings of Marshal Juin and other allied commanders,[19] sought a relaxation of legislative restrictions upon sharing pertinent operational information on the new weapons.[20] The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permitted sharing additional information on the external characteristics of these weapons, such as "size, weight, and shape, yield and effects, and systems employed in the delivery or use thereof." However, in provisions apparently designed as much to restrain America's allies as the Soviet Union from developing nuclear capabilities, the Act withheld information that

might be useful to the "design and fabrication of the nuclear components," required that the warheads themselves remain under the control of Americans at all times, and gave Congress (through the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy) considerable control over executive agreements to disseminate nuclear weapons information.[21]

As the American government approached its October, 1953, decision to plan on using tactical nuclear weapons against conventional aggressions, top civilian officials in the Eisenhower administration openly advised NATO to adjust its inflated force goals to the capabilities of "radical new weapons" and even indicated their desire to reduce the number of American military personnel in Europe.[22] Although President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles were quick to calm the resulting French apprehensions by disavowing any existing plan for reducing American combat forces overseas, they did not disavow future plans. At the same time, they affirmed that the need for economy was great and that the new atomic weapons were bound to affect the composition of NATO's forces.[23]

The military justification of this supposition was as popular in Congress as in the Pentagon, and in Congress it was surrounded with fewer qualifications. Thus the Senate report on the 1954 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act stated flatly:

> America's preponderance in atomic weapons can offset the numerical superiority of the Communist forces and serve emphatic notice on the Soviet dictators that any attempt to occupy free Europe or to push further anywhere into the Free World would be foredoomed to failure.[24]

And Representative Sterling Cole, chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, declared that

> tactical atomic weapons may confront the Red Army with an impossible operational dilemma. The conventional NATO defenses are already of such a strength that the Soviets could not penetrate them without first massing their ground forces in preparation for a breakthrough. Once the legions of the Red Army are so concentrated, they expose themselves to the mortal peril of counterattack by nuclear weapons.[25]

As for the military planners, by January, 1954, even before a basic military study of the tactics and organization for employing tactical nuclear weapons had been completed, General Gruenther had evidently concluded that these weapons would permit a reduction of forces. Speaking to the American Club in Paris, he explained, "If seventy divisions, for example, are needed to establish a conventional line of defense between the Alps and the Baltic, then seventy minus X divisions equipped with atomic weapons would be needed."[26] However, he also pointed to the need for German troops in order to keep NATO's forward shield strong enough to force the enemy to attack in concentration and thereby offer a profitable target for atomic bombardment.[27]

In July the press reported certain principal features of the "cosmic top secret" study carried out under General Gruenther's direction: (*a*) warfare in the future would inevitably be atomic; (*b*) the first atomic targets would be armed forces and military installations rather than major centers of population; (*c*) the peak of destruction would come at the outset of the war; (*d*) therefore, the outcome would be determined by the active forces-in-being.[28] In August SHAPE was reported to have sent to the NATO Standing Group a three-year plan for completely reorganizing NATO's forces, compensating for the reduction of ground forces by developing air and atomic power.[29] And General Gruenther subsequently stated that this plan would give NATO a "reasonably good chance of defending Europe successfully against an all-out act of Soviet aggression," providing that it could use atomic weapons (which he feared that current Western disarmament plans, leading to the elimination of atomic weapons, might prevent) and count on a German contribution to the forward line.[30]

General Gruenther stated the crucial assumption upon which the whole plan depended when he explained in an interview, "We have determined that our strategy in the center requires the use of atomic weapons, whether the enemy uses them or not, and we must use atomic bombs to redress the imbalance between their forces and ours and to achieve victory."[31] Field

Marshal Montgomery, the Deputy Supreme Commander, stated this assumption even more categorically in a widely quoted lecture to the Royal United Service Institute:

> I want to make it absolutely clear that we at SHAPE are basing all our operational planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our own defense. With us it is no longer: "They may possibly be used." It is very definitely: "They will be used, if we are attacked." In fact, we have reached the point of no return as regards the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons in a hot war.[32]

3. THE HYDROGEN BOMB

In 1954 it was widely believed throughout the Western world that the United States could retain its relative military position by maintaining a substantial lead in the atomic arms race and that the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into NATO's forces would maintain the West's clear-cut military advantage against the masses of conventional forces in the Communist world. To be sure, in 1951 Acheson had warned that "with the passage of time, even though we continue our advances in this field [of atomic weapons], the value of our lead diminishes."[33] But three years later the gradual neutralization of America's nuclear advantage by the growth of Soviet nuclear capacity had exerted little impact upon strategic thinking. Not until March, 1955, did President Eisenhower publicly acknowledge the validity of the proposition that Acheson had suggested, when he told a news conference, "There comes a time, possibly, when a lead [in nuclear weapons] is not significant in the defensive arrangements of a country. If you get enough of a particular type of weapon I doubt that it is particularly important to have a lot more of it."[34] Still, well after 1955 the West's strategic outlook remained under the dominant influence of nostalgic memories of the period of America's atomic monopoly, when it was assumed that every addition to America's nuclear striking capacity gained the West a proportionate increase in military security.

Yet, even while the Western nations looked anxiously toward

tactical nuclear weapons as a deterrent to conventional attacks and a compensation for the shortfall in NATO's ground forces, spectacular evidence of the destructive power of nuclear energy and the capacity of the Soviet Union to utilize it incited powerful inhibitions that would, in time, cast doubt upon the willingness of any nation to use nuclear weapons, whether tactically or strategically, except as a deterrent to nuclear attacks. On November 1, 1952, at Eniwetok Atoll in the Pacific, the United States produced a thermonuclear explosion of such awesome proportions—eyewitnesses described the disappearance of a mile-wide island—as to strike the world's statesmen and military leaders as no less epoch-making than the first atomic explosion in 1945. On August 8, 1953, Soviet Premier Malenkov gave the world another shock with his portentous announcement that "the government considers it necessary to report to the Supreme Soviet that the United States has no monopoly of production of the hydrogen bomb." His boast was confirmed on August 12 and 23, when the Soviet Union exploded thermonuclear bombs that were evidently of a more advanced design than the Eniwetok device.[35] In February, 1954, Sterling Cole, chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, released details about America's first thermonuclear explosion that were as startling as the original announcement.[36] Winston Churchill later told the House of Commons that with the publication of this first comprehensive review of the effects of a hydrogen explosion "the entire foundation of human affairs was revolutionized and mankind placed in a situation both measureless and laden with doom."[37] In another statement he declared, "The advance of the hydrogen bomb has fundamentally altered the entire problem of defense, and considerations founded even upon the atom bomb have become obsolescent, almost old-fashioned."[38]

Nevertheless, it took the radioactive contamination of the "Lucky Dragon" crew in March, 1954, to dramatize for the general public the strange and terrible destructive power of the hydrogen bomb. The Atomic Energy Commission later revealed that the fall-out area from this bomb, which had an explosive

power of about twelve megatons of TNT according to unofficial estimates, covered 7,000 square miles in a cigar-shaped area downwind from the explosion.[39] This graphic description and the others that followed it seized the popular imagination with a force unparalleled by the atom bomb.

Merely by demonstrating that the United States was no longer supreme in military technology and general scientific prowess, the Russian thermonuclear explosions undermined allied confidence in America's deterrent capacity in a way the previous atomic explosions had only insinuated. But equally fateful for allied confidence in a strategy based so largely upon nuclear deterrence was the demonstration by America's own explosions that a nuclear war could now result in the sudden virtual annihilation of perhaps all but the largest nations; for ten hydrogen bombs, it was estimated, would turn the British Isles into a radioactive wasteland. Consequently, the fear of America's allies that the United States would not defend Europe at the price of thermonuclear war now began to be overshadowed by the fear that she would.

The mounting sense of vulnerability to national obliteration that underlay European apprehensions was felt even in the United States. Thus President Eisenhower on October 6, 1953, informed the public that "our former unique physical security has almost totally disappeared before the long-range bomber and the destructive power of a single bomb. . . . In its wake we see only sudden and mass destruction, erasure of cities, the possible doom of every nation and society." And two days later, in an official statement confirming reports that the Soviets possessed "a stockpile of atomic weapons of conventional types" and that the August 12 explosion "was produced by a weapon, or the forerunner of a weapon, of power far in excess of the conventional types," he said, "We therefore conclude that the Soviets now have the capability of attack on us, and such capability will increase with the passage of time."[40]

The President's warning seemed especially pertinent when Russia demonstrated in the May Day parade of 1954 that she possessed long-range and medium-range jet bombers com-

parable to the American B-52 and B-47. This intelligence seemingly (but with some exaggeration, according to subsequent intelligence) confirmed the United States Air Force's fears that Russia was building a huge Strategic Air Command of her own to strike at the United States. The Air Force, committed to the view that America's offensive striking capability was the preeminent deterrent, insisted that the United States should quickly enlarge SAC in order to maintain its supremacy. Outside the Air Force, some scientists and military advisers found a receptive response in the government to the argument that Russia's growing strategic air force increased the urgency of expensive early-warning radar lines and other components of continental defense. In 1953 the administration had already decided to buy this system of continental defense over heavy Air Force opposition, partly on the grounds that it was needed to protect American air bases and limit civilian damage and partly on the ground that the United States might be psychologically disarmed if she could devastate Russia only with the expectation of receiving equal devastation in return.

Actually, neither an increase of America's offensive (that is, "first-strike") nuclear power nor of her capability for continental defense against Soviet bombers was addressed to the more serious military and, especially, political threat to America's deterrent [illegible] Russia's intensive ballistic missile program, which was already in progress in 1954. In 1956 evidence of Russian advancement in IRBM's (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) became an instrument of psychological warfare against European allies who harbored American bomber bases, but the full impact of the Russian program did not strike home until Russia's launching of two earth satellites in the fall of 1957; for this achievement suggested that Russia might soon achieve ICBM's (intercontinental ballistic missiles), which no known defense could prevent from devastating the United States.

In 1953 and 1954, despite the President's intimations of America's physical vulnerability, the prevailing atmosphere of military planning in the United States was still, hopefully, that of unilateral nuclear deterrence, but, even then, in Europe's

changing assessment of the military gains and risks of the alliance, there were signs of the psychological and political impact of mutual deterrence, which the Sputniks would bring to a head.

4. THE DIVERGENCE OF AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN CONCEPTIONS OF NATO

While the prospect of sudden annihilation was stealthily impressing itself upon the popular imagination in Western Europe, the death of Stalin in March, 1953, and the achievement of a Korean armistice in July opened the way for a new course of "peaceful coexistence" in Soviet policy. As I have suggested, this course acted as an effective supplement to Russia's nuclear might in persuading some allies to subordinate concern about Soviet aggression to the overriding fear that a failure to resolve Soviet-created tensions might lead to a thermonuclear holocaust. It convinced many Western observers that the main thrust of Communist power had shifted to non-military means and to areas outside Europe and raised hopes that diplomacy might now relieve the political tensions which had occasioned the wearying effort to build a situation of military strength on the Continent during the Stalinist era.

In this atmosphere of anxious hope, every indication of America's reluctance to renew the traumatic diplomatic confrontations of 1946 and 1947 and every manifestation of America's determination that the allies should meet their military obligations to collective defense emphasized an important difference in the American and allied conceptions of NATO, a difference which had been of little practical significance before NATO's abortive rearmament effort. In American eyes the alliance, having been transformed from a guaranty pact to an integrated military organization, was the essential instrument for redressing the military imbalance on the Continent; but in the eyes of most European members the major purpose of the alliance remained, as before the Korean War, to commit the United States to come to their defense. To the United States the more taxing terms of collaboration that evolved in the aftermath of the Korean War provided the essential means of supporting a for-

ward strategy, but to her allies in Europe they were more the means of accommodating their political interests and appeasing American pressure than the prerequisites for meeting urgent military requirements.

Consequently, to her allies the United States seemed unnecessarily preoccupied with military considerations at the expense of accommodating divergent political interests in Western Europe and relieving the tensions of the cold war; while to the United States, who had entered the alliance to help Western Europe defend itself, her allies now seemed less interested in assuming the responsibility for their self-defense than she. In truth, the United States, as the principal contender in the cold war, had from the beginning of the alliance implicitly assumed the major responsibility for containing Soviet power in Europe, simply by virtue of her preponderance of power within the alliance. The trouble was that in her eyes the strategic conditions for discharging that responsibility had come to require not merely the extension of America's atomic umbrella but also the creation of a sizable standing army, which, according to the original division of allied labor, should devolve upon the European members. Therefore, the original balance of responsibility and sacrifice between the United States and Europe had grown unsatisfactory to both. Yet the very movement toward a greater reliance upon nuclear weapons, which was intended to render the maintenance of ground forces less onerous, helped discourage the allies from increasing their contributions to a military establishment that would depend upon fantastically destructive and expensive weapons, which only the United States and, to a far lesser extent, Great Britain produced and controlled.

It seems doubtful, under the circumstances, that the United States, by utilizing more drastic concessions or sanctions, could have induced the European allies to support their share of NATO's burdens and strategic functions more fully. The greatest American concession to allied collaboration was the stationing of additional American troops on the Continent, but, once it had been granted, the United States could not threaten to

withdraw it without cutting off her nose to spite her face—even though Secretary of State Dulles' threat of an "agonizing reappraisal" of American strategy probably played a part in securing French acceptance of a German contribution. For as the growing nuclear dependence of NATO undermined the credibility of America's commitment to defend Europe, the United States was forced to acknowledge the enhanced psychological importance of her contribution to NATO's ground forces, while her allies confined their contributions to the lowest levels compatible with American political and material support. Thus the principal purpose of America's Continental troops continued to be the promotion of allied collaboration, but their specific function changed from starting a spiral of rising confidence, which would lead Europe to build its own defenses, to stopping a spiral of declining confidence, which would leave Europe helpless in the face of Soviet political and military pressure.

5. NATO ADOPTS A TACTICAL NUCLEAR SOLUTION

By the end of 1954 the shortfall in NATO's post-Korean force goals, combined with the growth of Russia's air-nuclear capacity, had aroused considerable dissatisfaction in the American government with a strategic contradiction—the discrepancy between NATO's declaratory strategy of defending every member on the ground and NATO's actual military capabilities—which all allies had regarded as an acceptable, even indispensable, price of collaboration before the Korean War. Confronted with this contradiction, the United States reaffirmed the essential strategic objective of NATO as the defense of Western Europe by preventing the devastation or occupation of any ally. But, under her leadership, NATO now officially adopted a strategy based upon a tactical nuclear response to conventional aggression in order to support this objective at a level of economic and manpower contributions that the allies were willing to pay. Yet, contrary to original hopes, this strategic expedient, by increasing NATO's dependence upon nuclear weapons against conventional attacks in the face of rising Soviet nuclear power, only compounded the problems of gaining allied collaboration

at a level of commitments and contributions compatible with their security.

The North Atlantic Council, at its meeting in December, 1954, refrained from scheduling any significant increase in NATO's forces-in-being during 1955 and contented itself with approving "further improvements in training, equipment, and effectiveness." However, it adopted a composite military report authorizing NATO's military commanders to devise their strategic plans on the basis of using nuclear weapons, whether the aggressor used them or not.[41]

Secretary Dulles hailed this decision as at last providing the means of developing a forward strategy that could protect Western Europe from invasion and liberation and throw back the aggressor "at the threshold."[42] But by this time Dulles' assurances were no longer relevant to the central apprehensions of the European allies. The allies had long ceased to fear a Soviet invasion, and every year that passed without a Soviet attack seemingly confirmed the wisdom of their apathy toward preparing to withstand an all-out attack. On the other hand, they had not ceased to fear the consequences of resisting aggression if it should occur, for each new evidence of rising Soviet nuclear strength emphasized the catastrophic damage that they would incur in a nuclear conflict.

All countries were gratified by official assurances that tactical nuclear weapons would enable them to support NATO's strategic objectives at a saving in manpower and money, but some European members' gratification was tempered by the fact that they had bought an opportunity to defend themselves only at the cost of their obliteration. For, according to the new strategic formula, NATO's forward line was intended primarily to hold long enough to permit the initiation of a nuclear war, which would inflict incalculable damage in Europe even if it remained "tactical" from America's standpoint. On the other hand, some allies feared that the United States, hoping to avoid a nuclear war in which she might be the main target, would withhold the nuclear deterrent while permitting her allies to be subjugated in a local conventional war.

In December, 1956, the North Atlantic Council approved a directive for future military plans based on the concept of forward defense but "taking into account the continued rise in Soviet capabilities and the various types of new weapons available for NATO defense."[43] As a result of this directive the Supreme Commanders made a study of the minimum forces required to carry out their respective missions. In 1957, on the basis of this so-called "minimum-forces" study, the Military Committee adopted a five-year plan (MC–70) to create a NATO force of thirty combat-ready divisions, which were regarded as essentially nuclear forces. If the members of the alliance had actually achieved this force goal, NATO would have been in a much better position to resist any likely aggression short of a massive invasion *without* the use of nuclear weapons, since this new requirement for the forward line was actually greater than under the Lisbon goals (the reduction in the total number of divisions being made in reserves).[44] But, in fact, France's transfer of four divisions from the Continent to Algeria (beginning in 1954), which soon tied down 400,000 troops, and Britain's withdrawal of two divisions in 1957, following her decision to concentrate on building an independent nuclear capability, kept these forces below twenty effective fighting divisions. In the meanwhile, there was no change in NATO's official estimates of the number of Soviet (not including satellite) divisions: 175, of which 140 were operational standing divisions (including 22 in East Germany and Poland and about 80 in the rest of Eastern Europe and in Western Russia), and a capability of mobilizing 400 divisions in thirty days. In this situation, it was questionable whether NATO's ground forces could really do anything more than trip the alarm that would bring the nuclear forces into battle.

6. NATO'S TRIP-WIRE

In the opinion of some military circles, the tactical nuclear strategy adopted in December, 1954, failed to live up to its original promise of providing more security at less cost by substituting nuclear firepower for conventionally armed manpower.

United States Army studies and war games in 1955 and 1958 confirmed the conclusion reached by General Gavin in 1952 that a two-sided nuclear war would require more manpower than a conventional war, chiefly because of the higher rate of casualties, the greater depth of the battle line, and the more complex logistics.[45] Moreover, the progress that the Soviet Union made after 1954 in equipping her own forces with nuclear weapons shook the confidence of military experts in the original assumption that the West would have the advantage in fighting a nuclear war because of the superiority of the nuclear defense over the offense.[46] Certainly, the development and production of tactical nuclear weapons did not turn out to be a financial saving. In fact, they were so expensive that, in the opinion of some Army officers, the "modernization" of ground forces within existing defense budgets dangerously restricted the development and production of conventional weapons without producing sufficient nuclear weapons;[47] consequently, NATO seemed to be losing its capacity to fight a conventional war before it obtained the capacity to fight a tactical nuclear war, which the United States might have no advantage in fighting anyway.

However, this skepticism about tactical nuclear weapons enabling NATO to hold the forward line at less cost in men and money did not persuade the allies of the need to build up NATO's conventional capacity, for they were increasingly inclined to regard tactical, like strategic, nuclear weapons as a *deterrent* to aggression rather than as a *defense* against invasion if the deterrent should fail. This view was encouraged by the development of a widespread belief that the growth of nuclear power in the United States and the Soviet Union had created a "nuclear stalemate" or a stable "balance of terror," which made the outbreak of *any* war in such a vital strategic area as Western Europe extremely unlikely as long as both sides were convinced that any war would become nuclear. Prime Minister Churchill gave the most notable expression to popular confidence in the stability of nuclear deterrence in a speech on March 1, 1955, defending his government's decision to build a

hydrogen bomb. Referring to the immense destructive power of the recent thermonuclear explosions, he said:

> The broad effect of the latest development is to spread almost indefinitely and at least to a vast extent the area of mortal danger. This should certainly increase the deterrent upon Soviet Russia by putting her enormous spaces and scattered population on an equality of vulnerability with our small, densely populated island and with Western Europe. Then it may well be that we shall, by a process of sublime irony, have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.[48]

Churchill spoke of strategic, rather than tactical, nuclear deterrents, but in the Statement on Defense for 1955 (popularly known as the annual White Paper), which his words were intended to justify, and in the debate on the Statement in the House, tactical nuclear weapons were regarded as part of the general nuclear deterrent.[49] According to this White Paper, the North Atlantic Council decision of December, 1954, assumed the use of nuclear weapons in a "major war"; and in a major war the free nations would have to use the "full weight" of their nuclear power, or "all the weapons at their disposal," in order to counter the Soviet preponderance of conventional power.

Thus, despite an occasional suggestion that tactical nuclear weapons might not lead to an all-out war,[50] the stated official assumption in Britain, as in the United States, was that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the NATO area would be the concomitant of a thermonuclear exchange, and that this terrible possibility would deter conventional aggression. Presumably—although this point was never publicly explained—tactical nuclear weapons were a useful supplement to massive retaliation because it was more credible that, in the event of a conventional attack, NATO would employ them as a means of resistance on the battlefield than that the United States or Great Britain would immediately drop hydrogen bombs as a means of reprisal on the Soviet Union, even though the employment of tactical weapons would probably lead to a disastrous war of annihilation by a natural process of escalation.

Western leaders were understandably reluctant to define the exact nature and scope of the aggression that would warrant a nuclear response, but, having decided to rely upon nuclear deterrence as a substitute for conventional resistance, they were clearly disposed to assume that the balance of terror would deter the maximum range of contingencies—perhaps all but the smallest police actions and border incidents. This tendency was most pronounced in the United States. In 1956 the basic document for military planning (JSOP 60) followed out the logic of the National Security Council decision of October, 1953 (basing military plans on the use of tactical nuclear weapons against conventional attacks) to its ultimate conclusion by virtually excluding the possibility of a conventional war with the Soviet Union or of another limited war of the scope of the Korean War.[51]

On the basis of this document Admiral Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, led a major effort in July, 1956, to cut the armed services by 800,000 men, limiting the ground forces primarily to civil defense missions and to token forces abroad, to be supplemented by the indigenous forces.[52] As Walter Lippmann described Radford's basic strategic assumption at the time, any Korean-type limited aggression that concerned the United States and the Soviet Union was expected to lead to the use of small atomic bombs, which, in turn, would lead to the exchange of bigger ones. "The chances of general war would be so great that a local war on the Korean scale would be an incalculable military risk. It is not absolutely certain, but it is very probable, that for the visible future wars of this type will be absorbed into the over-all nuclear stalemate." Therefore, in the future the alternative to general nuclear war would be not local conventional war but guerilla warfare and political intervention and maneuver.[53]

Lippmann's interpretation of Radford's strategic assumption coincided with the reasoning that Secretary of Defense Wilson had conveyed to Congress several months before in explaining why American defense expenditures had been reduced since 1953 while Soviet military strength had been growing.[54] And

Radford's program had been foreshadowed by the testimony of General Nathan Twining, Air Force chief of staff, before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Air Power in June, when he gave the first official confirmation that there had been a top level decision "to develop a new strategy built around the use of atomic weapons in war," which would mean that "we could reduce our forces considerably." The new strategy, he said, "is the only way we can provide the forces for the country within a reasonable standard of financing." "We cannot afford to keep in our armed forces conventional forces for the old type of warfare plus those for atomic warfare. We have got to make up our minds that we have to go one way or the other."[55]

Admiral Radford's proposal to cut the armed forces was rejected, or at least its acceptance was formally postponed, because of the storm it created abroad, but its underlying strategic assumption remained the guiding one in the administration's defense policy. As a matter of fact, in 1956 even few of those who saw a danger of conventional limited wars in peripheral strategic areas considered them a danger worth preparing for in Western Europe.[56] The general assumption was that any war in that area would necessarily implicate the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union would not dare instigate a conventional attack against NATO forces, because she would thereby lose the indispensable advantage of exercising the initiative and surprise against a superior nuclear force. Thus General Bradley testified in April, 1956, that he did not believe the Russians would attack Europe and touch off World War III without launching a surprise attack on the United States first.[57] Two years earlier Prime Minister Churchill had explained more fully the logic of this assumption.

> Although I have spoken of the overwhelming superiority in conventional weapons of the Soviets, I would mention that I do not believe that a surprise attack with conventional weapons would be made upon the Western front. There would certainly be discernible movements of troops which would raise both the alert and the alarm, and this would certainly bring the use of nuclear weapons into discussion of a decisive character by the heads of all the great States that are involved. If the Soviets, as

> the weaker nuclear Power, resolved to make, which I do not believe they would, a treacherous surprise attack, it is inconceivable, to my mind, that they would begin with ground forces on the Western front and so compromise the advantage of a surprise attack by nuclear weapons.[58]

Thus, as the statement suggests, NATO's limited ground forces were more a device to activate the nuclear deterrent than a means of local resistance. At the most, they would compel the aggressor to mobilize for an attack and thereby give advance warning, hold him until nuclear retaliation could take effect, prevent him from quickly seizing allied territory from which he could be ousted only by subjecting friends to atomic attack, and force him to concentrate for breakthroughs and thereby provide targets for America's nuclear weapons. Thus, unofficially, NATO's ground forces came to be referred to as a "trip-wire" or a "plate-glass," which could not stop aggression but which would touch off the alarm that would bring the West's nuclear forces into action. In effect, they would deter a Soviet attack on Europe by insuring that it would be an all-out nuclear attack, which would be met by massive nuclear retaliation, but, as extra insurance that all aggression would entail the risk of nuclear war, there was NATO's determination to meet conventional attacks with tactical nuclear weapons. Although the trip-wire metaphor was obviously unsuitable for official pronouncements and was, in fact, repeatedly repudiated by the United States, it described operational strategy more accurately than the official declarations of NATO's commitment to a forward strategy designed to protect every ally from the dreaded cycle of occupation and liberation.

7. NUCLEAR INHIBITIONS

In the absence of a controlled experiment, we can only speculate about the effect that NATO's adoption of this nuclear strategy had in deterring the Soviet Union from undertaking military aggression in the NATO area, but we can observe some of the effects of this strategy upon the deterrers; and, as in any strategy of deterrence, the effects upon the subject and the

object of deterrence may be closely related. For example, the very nature of the deterrent threat may create attitudes toward the use of military power in the mind of the deterrer that alter the credibility of the threat in the mind of the potential aggressor. Even if the aggressor is not tempted to test the deterrent threat by overt military action, he may try to turn the deterrer's attitudes to his political advantage merely by raising international tensions so as to exploit the deterrer's anticipation of having to carry out the threat. Where there are several deterrers, as in a defensive coalition, this kind of anticipation can exert a serious strain upon their cohesion, which, in turn, can impinge directly upon their diplomatic posture and, ultimately, their security.

The public attitudes toward NATO's tactical nuclear strategy in the major allied countries have been ambivalent, reflecting an uneasy balance between hope and apprehension. Consequently, the positions of allied governments on the use of nuclear weapons have been ambiguous, reflecting their attempt to satisfy popular hopes while appeasing popular apprehensions. On the one hand, tactical nuclear weapons promise to defend Europe at a tolerable cost in men and money. On the other hand, they threaten to obliterate Europe if they have to be used. Unqualified declarations of NATO's determination to turn any overt military aggression into a nuclear war promise maximum deterrence at minimum cost. But the very prospect of having to choose between non-resistance and annihilation, which these declarations seem to assure, erodes the national will to carry out such a strategy.

The difficulty of reconciling the deterrent value of a nuclear threat with the will to carry it out became manifest as soon as NATO adopted its nuclear strategy in December, 1954. Marshal Montgomery's categorical declarations that NATO would use nuclear weapons against conventional attacks aroused considerable consternation—especially in Great Britain—about the possibility of military commanders precipitating a thermonuclear holocaust. Therefore, it became necessary for the North Atlantic Council to emphasize that the decision to use nuclear

weapons would be made by civilians. Which civilian representatives of which governments would make this fateful decision by what procedures was not specified, and there was apparently some difference of opinion on this question between the United States, who wanted to centralize and simplify the decision-making process as much as possible, and her allies.[59] But the very acknowledgment that it would be a governmental and not a purely military decision belied the automatic character of a nuclear response, which Marshal Montgomery sought to convey, and raised a question about NATO's collective will to carry out the strategy it had adopted.

Some European allies were, naturally, more sensitive to popular inhibitions against initiating the use of tactical nuclear weapons than the United States, which, in the 1950's, was less vulnerable to sudden annihilation. Therefore, European apprehensions were directed more toward the possibility that the United States might rashly precipitate a nuclear war than toward the possibility that she might be restrained from employing the nuclear deterrent. But these apprehensions were in themselves a restraint upon America's use or threat to use nuclear weapons against a conventional attack. For what if the Soviet Army should overrun part of Europe without using nuclear weapons? As General Collins put it, "We could then imagine their saying to the Americans: 'Now come and get us.' Would we in that case assume the awful responsibility of initiating atomic warfare in order to 'liberate' Europe? Would we bomb Paris, Milan, the Saar, the Ruhr?"[60] Or, as General Taylor wrote in a passage which the State Department considered especially inadvisable to publish, "In Europe, we have some 250,000 soldiers accompanied by thousands of dependents living in close proximity to superior Communist ground forces deployed in the satellite countries. If the latter suddenly advanced west without warning, they would soon be locked in close combat with the NATO armies in such a way as to restrict the employment of atomic weapons against them."[61] Both generals were arguing NATO's need for a substantial capacity to hold on the ground in order to prevent the situation they

envisioned from arising. But it is obvious that, even if NATO had the minimum forces specified, the same considerations might restrain the United States from initiating a nuclear war, which would be no less devastating to her allies if their cities were destroyed by Soviet, than if they were destroyed by American, nuclear weapons.

8. GERMANY'S REACTION TO NATO'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY

A vivid suggestion of the kind of destruction that a nuclear war in Europe might inflict was conveyed by the SHAPE war game "Carte Blanche," held in West Germany, the Lowlands and northeastern France in June, 1955. In this game it was announced that, hypothetically, 335 bombs had been dropped on military targets, killing 1,700,000 and wounding 3,500,000, not to mention the numbers affected by radioactivity. Actually, "Carte Blanche" had no relationship to a realistic military contingency, since it was confined to the Western Germany–Northern France area, was waged on a North-South instead of an East-West axis, and involved a quantity of nuclear strikes that was quite superfluous militarily. Nevertheless, the publication of these startling figures aroused, for the first time, wide public concern in Germany about the consequences of NATO's nuclear strategy.[62]

Until this time, Germans who were not opposed to rearmament on moral and political grounds had been generally disposed to accept the assurances of the United States, SHAPE, and their own military and political leaders that German contingents would contribute to a forward strategy, which would spare Germany from becoming a battle zone and military buffer. And, insofar as they had any concrete image of NATO's strategy, they had been led to believe that nuclear weapons would be used primarily against strategic targets in the Soviet Union, while the war in Central Europe would be waged pretty much as a conventional land war, perhaps on the pattern of the Korean War. Therefore, "Carte Blanche" came as a rude awakening to the real risks of NATO's tactical nuclear strategy.

Social Democrats and some independent military experts charged that "Carte Blanche" proved the emptiness of the Adenauer government's previous assurances, which had been presented as an argument for German rearmament and participation in NATO, that Germany would be protected from invasion and from becoming a battlefield.[63] "The strategy of NATO," cried Fritz Erler in the July, 1956, Bundestag debate on the conscription bill, "leaves no room for doubting that an armed conflict in Europe—even with 500,000 German soldiers—will not remain a conventional conflict. The NATO plans are based upon immediate and direct employment of atomic weapons in the event of a conflict in Europe."[64] The conclusion to be drawn from this fact and from "Carte Blanche," said the opponents of rearmament, was that German contingents in NATO would be useless for defending Germany, since they could only collaborate in a strategy that would precipitate a nuclear catastrophe. They expressed no concern about the danger of a Soviet aggression—in fact, German opinion polls showed steadily declining expectations of war throughout the nation after 1950[65] —but they were preoccupied with the popular fear that NATO might turn aggression into a nuclear war.[66]

The government tried to counter this fear by asserting that the best way to save Germany from becoming a nuclear battleground was to contribute German contingents to NATO's ground forces, so that aggression could better be resisted on a conventional basis. It even went so far as to contradict the American and British theory of nuclear deterrence by holding that the advent of Soviet-American nuclear parity would increase the likelihood of local conventional war and give greater weight to conventional armament in the balance of power.[67]

However, the government made its furthest departure from NATO's nuclear strategy when, shortly after the passage of a conscription bill in July, 1956, but before the terms of conscription had been decided, the news of Admiral Radford's plan to reduce the American armed forces by 800,000 leaked out. Throughout Europe this news aroused fears that the United States contemplated withdrawing her troops from the Conti-

nent. Although the American government, in public releases and private assurances to German military and civilian officials, quickly denied any intention to reduce or withdraw American forces in Europe immediately or without the approval of the North Atlantic Council, it did not repudiate the central objective of Radford's memorandum: to substitute nuclear deterrence for conventional local resistance.[68] Therefore, in opposition to this objective, Adenauer took the unprecedented step of publicly criticizing American military policy. Writing in the August 21 issue of the Bonn government's official *Bulletin*, he said, "As to the debate which was started by Americans about the relationship between conventional and nuclear weapons, I would like to stress that I regard shifting the principal emphasis to atomic weapons at the present time as a mistake." To counter an East German invasion of West Germany with nuclear weapons would almost certainly "trigger an intercontinental rocket war. . . . I am of the opinion that it is of special importance to localize small conflicts that may occur, and for this we need divisions with conventional weapons."[69]

Nevertheless, Adenauer himself soon decided that Germany's future lay not in bucking the overwhelming trend toward nuclear dependence in defense policies but in joining it. Bowing to popular and political opposition to conscription and blaming it on the effect of the Radford proposal, the Bonn government recommended a twelve-month instead of an eighteen-month period of conscription—the shortest term of any NATO country except Luxembourg—and announced that it could not meet its obligation to raise 500,000 troops by 1959.[70] (By 1958 no more than 125,000 West Germans were in uniform.) Then, in September, following the full logic of this "stretch-out," Chancellor Adenauer and his new defense minister, Franz Josef Strauss, began urging the equipment of the *Bundeswehr* with tactical atomic weapons (though with the warheads under American custody) in order to compensate for its shortage of military manpower.[71]

There are indications that German authorities still did not subscribe to NATO's official position that a substantial local

conflict in the center of Europe would necessarily be a nuclear conflict,[72] but West Germany could not very well plan for conventional limited warfare when the alliance as a whole, following the American and British examples, was adopting a strategy of primary reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons. Regardless of whether Adenauer would have adopted the "new look" strategy for domestic reasons alone, it was necessary that he do so in order to preserve Germany's influence in NATO, for if the other members of NATO were to collaborate with the United States in organizing, equipping, and training their contingents to fight a tactical nuclear war, then as vital a participant as West Germany could hardly retain her voice in allied councils or even support her security by pursuing a strategy of local conventional resistance. By the same logic, the other NATO states were bound to collaborate in a tactical nuclear strategy so long as the United States and Great Britain seemed determined to go ahead with nuclear conversion, for their collaboration was the condition of the Anglo-American commitment to defend the Continent.

Yet collaborating in NATO's strategy was one thing; actually equipping the German army with tactical nuclear weapons was another. Although at the December, 1956, meeting of the North Atlantic Council the defense ministers of France, the Netherlands, and Turkey joined British Defense Minister Anthony Head in requesting that American tactical nuclear warheads be made available to European forces, there was substantial opposition throughout Western Europe, and especially in Great Britain, to any suggestion that the Federal Republic should receive these weapons, even though the United States would have custody of the warheads. Domestic opposition within Germany was equally formidable.[73] Press reports of the NATO Council meeting of December, 1957, which indicated that allied governments had agreed, in principle, to a more extensive sharing of nuclear weapons, touched off a public controversy more widespread and violent than the one precipitated by "Carte Blanche" and the debate on conscription.[74] The most intense opposition to nuclear armament was framed in moral

terms, in terms of a blanket repudiation of nuclear weapons, which had no relevance to alternative strategic plans and therefore lacked concrete political impact. In the end, a majority of the voters expressed their confidence in Adenauer's foreign and military policies by giving his party a comfortable victory in the provincial elections, where the opposition had sought to submit the atomic issue to referenda. Nevertheless, the moral and emotional aversion to nuclear strategy in Germany remained a latent threat to Germany's effective collaboration, while informed and responsible criticism of Germany's participation in NATO's strategy actually increased—especially as possible political alternatives, such as disengagement and the "thinning-out" of troops, gained widespread and serious attention throughout the world.

As long as NATO's strategy rendered German forces little more than the instrument for elaborating the cause of a tactical nuclear response, which was expected to lead to general nuclear warfare, popular inhibitions against initiating the use of nuclear weapons seemed likely to grow—that is, if anything could arouse popular concern about external issues amid the preoccupation with internal material advancement. The government, on the other hand, having adopted NATO's nuclear strategy for compelling internal and external reasons, was anxious to minimize these inhibitions and maximize the credibility of the American nuclear threat; and it was determined that German forces should be equipped with nuclear weapons (without warheads) as thoroughly and quickly as possible.

9. FRANCE'S REACTION TO NATO'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY

The intensity of the sporadic German reaction to NATO's tactical nuclear strategy can be attributed to some conditions peculiar to West Germany: her vulnerable geographical position on the forward line; the strength of pacifist and antimilitarist sentiment, associated with the trauma of the Nazi period; the apparent conflict of nuclear armament with reunification. The French reaction, by contrast, was notably bland and formless. From time to time, the general moral issues of the atomic and

hydrogen bomb aroused public interest and concern in France, and disarmament attracted special attention; but the implications of nuclear weapons for NATO's strategy and French security caused little popular or political controversy.[75]

Although France had been the most insistent of all allies in urging official reaffirmations of America's and NATO's commitments to defend Europe from a devastating Russian occupation and nuclear liberation, NATO's adoption in December, 1954, of a strategy that promised to turn France into a nuclear battlefield in the event of war occasioned none of the public debate that erupted in Germany. The French were inclined to assume that tactical nuclear warfare would involve only the Germans, and, in any case, they were less impressed than the Germans by the prospect of Soviet aggression.

France readily accepted the view that the development of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons would compensate for a lack of mobilized manpower, since she was particularly conscious of the pressure of military commitments upon domestic economic and social goals. There was no controversy over the strategic concomitant of this view: that nuclear weapons must be used against conventional attacks. Therefore, the more evident NATO's dependence upon nuclear deterrence became, the less reason there seemed to be for France to meet her obligations to maintain ground forces in Europe.

At the same time, if nuclear weapons were to be the decisive measure of military power, French prestige would demand at least equal privileges with Great Britain in receiving nuclear information from the United States. Therefore, as it became apparent that the United States was not going to help France become a nuclear power or give her equal privileges with Great Britain, which was already a nuclear power, it was logical that France should concentrate her military efforts upon becoming an independent nuclear power also. For this reason the government, with little opposition, despite its agreement in April, 1955, to renounce the development of military applications of nuclear energy for at least three years, launched in 1955 a costly military atomic energy program designed to give France member-

ship in the Anglo-Saxon nuclear club.[76] Thus the principal effect of NATO's nuclear strategy upon French military policies was to intensify France's concentration upon developing a nuclear capability instead of collaborating with NATO's forces.

10. BRITAIN'S REACTION TO NATO'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY

The British, more remote than the French from a potential tactical nuclear battlefield but no less vulnerable to annihilation in a general nuclear war, were even more quick than the Germans to debate the strategic implications of NATO's December, 1954, decision. Although the British popular and political reaction to NATO's nuclear strategy was less intense than the German reaction, it was also less emotional and exerted a more coherent impact upon national strategy—or at least upon strategic pronouncements. More clearly than the German reaction, the British government's own qualifying statements about initiating the use of tactical nuclear weapons, which were intended largely to mollify domestic apprehensions, called into question the credibility of the very deterrent it relied upon to compensate for the deficiency of conventional forces in Europe. Nevertheless, Britain's actual dependence on a first-strike strategy of nuclear deterrence proceeded apace with the public depreciation of its credibility.

The White Paper on defense policies that was published in February, 1955, stated that NATO had adopted a strategy that "assumed the use, in a major war, of nuclear weapons," because only with the use of nuclear weapons and with a German contribution could the West protect the Continent from invasion and occupation against the "massive preponderance" of Soviet and satellite forces.[77] When the defense program was debated in Parliament the next month, the Labor opposition, which had already been aroused by Marshal Montgomery's vigorous pronouncements preceding the December, 1954, decision, challenged the government to explain whether it anticipated that any conventional attack in Europe, regardless of its nature and location, would be turned into a thermonuclear war. Such a suicidal strategy, said Denis Healey, would not be cred-

ible to the Russians; it would only tempt them to call the West's bluff.[78] In replying to this criticism, the government fell back on the White Paper's reference to a "major war" and said it would be dangerous to be more precise about the circumstances that would activate the nuclear deterrent. "It is important, of course, that the aggressor should know what he may not do," said Minister of Defense Harold MacMillan, "but I think that it is equally important that he should not be told too invitingly what he may do."[79]

A year later, in the parliamentary debates on the White Paper for 1956, another minister of defense, Sir Walter Monckton, went a little further than this statement in conceding that there could be circumstances in which "local aggression might be dealt with quite effectively by local retaliation" and that, if tactical nuclear weapons should be used, it would not be "inevitable that the use of this weapon . . . would necessarily lead to full-scale global war." However, he, too, warned that any attempt to define precisely, in advance, the kind of circumstances in which these weapons would or would not be used "might help others, who may be pondering on the question of whether they could take risks, to see how far they might go without bringing down upon them the ultimate deterrent."[80]

Caught between the conflicting objectives of frightening the Russians and calming the British, the government continued to pursue a military policy of concentrating on nuclear weapons and reducing conventional forces, which could only aggravate the dilemma. This policy reached its logical culmination in the defense program of 1957, presented by the new minister of defense, Duncan Sandys. Pointing to economic stringencies and Britain's disproportionately large share of the burden of Western defense, the 1957 White Paper on defense policies announced that the government would reduce the armed forces from 690,000 to 375,000 by 1962, permitting the abolition of conscription by that time; cut the British Army of the Rhine from 77,000 to 64,000 within twelve months; and rely more heavily upon nuclear deterrent power, to which Great Britain would contribute an appreciable element of her own.

"It must be frankly recognized," the Paper conceded, "that there is at present no means of providing adequate protection for the people of this country against the consequences of an attack with nuclear weapons." But from this crucial premise it drew only the conclusion that "this makes it more than ever clear that the overriding consideration in all military planning must be to prevent war rather than to prepare for it," for "it is unhappily true that, pending international agreement [on disarmament], the only existing safeguard against major aggression is the power to threaten retaliation with nuclear weapons."[81]

Mr. Sandys, anticipating the opposition's criticism of this position, denied that the White Paper assumed that every war would become a nuclear war.

> One must distinguish between major global war, involving a head-on clash between the great Powers, and minor conflicts which can be localized and which do not bring the great Powers into direct collision. Limited and localized acts of aggression, for example, by a satellite Communist state, could, no doubt, be resisted with conventional arms, or, at worst, with tactical atomic weapons, the use of which could be confined to the battle area. If, on the other hand, the Russians were to launch a full-scale offensive against western Europe, it would, I submit, be quite unrealistic to imagine that the issue could be fought out on limited conventional lines and according to rules. In such circumstances ... it is inconceivable that either the Soviet Union or the free world would allow itself to be defeated, with all that that would mean, without throwing everything it had into the battle, including nuclear weapons.[82]

Yet this verbal concession to the fears of nuclear war only drove the opposition to deprecate the credibility of a nuclear response to conventional attacks more categorically. "No human being can be absolutely certain about these matters," said R. H. S. Crossman, "but I am as certain as I can be that, except in the circumstances of the threat of direct Russian attack on this island, those [tactical atomic] weapons would not be used by British forces."[83] The Labor party's chief defense policies spokesman, George Brown, helping to confirm his own proph-

ecy, warned that, unless the government could offer some hope "that we can employ a deterrent without the certainty of being blown up, we may find that we have all the weapons, all the means of delivering the deterrent, and that it will be no deterrent at all because nobody will believe that we would have the will to employ it when the day came." "If we let this backlog of public opinion build up," he declared, "then we may find that we, the Ministers, we, the politicians, have the mechanics but that the people will control the will to make use of them."[84] And to this dire forecast Emmanuel Shinwell, a former Labor party minister of defense, added an ominous preview of an opinion that was to become increasingly articulate in Great Britain. "I can imagine a situation," he said, "where, in a conventional war, it might be more endurable to suffer defeat, even humiliation, even if it means survival on a limited scale, than to use the nuclear weapon and be completely destroyed. After all is said and done, we do not want to commit suicide."[85]

Yet, in spite of this disparagement of the nuclear deterrent, the Labor party in 1957 did not recommend abandoning Great Britain's expensive effort to develop an independent nuclear capability, which would have been a difficult position to take so soon after the Suez War. Nor did it recommend increasing or even maintaining the number of British ground forces, which would have required a continuing commitment to National Service.

Indeed, within NATO's existing strategy the only compelling reasons for maintaining any British troops on the Continent seemed to be to provide the allies with a visible token of Britain's commitment to their defense and to satisfy the conditions of American collaboration. Moreover, just as the announced reduction of British forces served as an additional argument for West Germany to relax her terms of conscription, so Germany's abandonment of the eighteen-month period of conscription increased the reluctance of the British to contribute to NATO's forward line. And America's evident determination to concentrate upon developing nuclear deterrents at the expense of her conventional forces undermined the willingness of the British, as of all

allies, to maintain any more non-nuclear forces than were necessary to preserve the American entanglement.

Yet, although all members of NATO became more dependent upon nuclear deterrence, the British government encountered increasing difficulty in maintaining the deterrent value of its nuclear currency in the face of mounting public sentiment against the hazards of a suicidal strategy. Sandys continued to resist opposition to get him to specify the method of response to contingencies between "full-scale" conventional attack, which would be met by massive nuclear resistance, and "very small incidents," which would be handled conventionally.[86] But Labor spokesmen continued to charge that to the extent Britain depended upon a nuclear response in this intermediate realm, the country would prefer surrender to resistance; and this contention began to seem less exaggerated as the advocates of unilateral nuclear disarmament became more numerous and vocal.

Meanwhile, a more moderate and reasoned but no less devastating attack upon the credibility of nuclear deterrence was conveyed in the distinction between "active deterrence" and "passive deterrence," which the *Times*'s anonymous defense correspondent, John Grant, suggested in October, 1958, and which subsequently gained considerable currency among commentators on strategy in parliament and outside.[87] According to this distinction, active deterrence aimed to prevent aggression against other powers and depended upon threatening to strike the aggressor with strategic nuclear weapons if they were attacked; but passive deterrence aimed only to prevent aggression against one's own nation and required employing this threat only against a direct attack upon the homeland. Since carrying out active deterrence would be suicidal for a nation that could not destroy enough of the enemy's strategic striking power to confine his retaliatory damage to an acceptable level (measured in terms of the value of the objective at stake), Grant concluded that Britain would have to stop relying on the American nuclear deterrent to deter aggressions that would not directly involve American territory and stop relying on the British deterrent to deter anything short of a direct attack upon Great Britain.

By 1958 even Marshal Montgomery seemed to be approaching the view that nuclear deterrence should be confined to discouraging direct attacks on the deterrer. In 1954, when the Marshal delivered his categorical declarations that nuclear weapons would necessarily be used against conventional attacks, he had envisaged a general war in Europe proceeding toward a Western victory in three stages: (*a*) the achievement of mastery of the air, while preventing the overrunning of Western bases and territories; (*b*) the destruction of remaining enemy land forces; and, finally, (*c*) the bargaining phase, in which the enemy's homeland would be at the mercy of Western air power, while the West carried the air attack "to the point where the enemy accepts our terms."[88] In 1955, however, he concluded that nobody could win an unlimited war between nuclear nations.[89] In 1956, starting from the premise that such a war would be "suicidal" and speculating about the way it might be fought in 1969, he again envisaged three phases—destruction, exploitation, and reconstruction—but the best outcome he could promise was a kind of stalemate of mutual destruction, in which the West would win only the grim opportunity to begin its own reconstruction. Nevertheless, still speaking as a top NATO official, he reasserted that SHAPE was basing all its plans on using nuclear weapons—and he recognized no distinction between the tactical and strategic varieties—with the sole proviso that "the politicians have to be asked first." "That might be a bit awkward, of course," he added, "and personally I would use the nuclear weapons first and ask afterwards."[90]

In 1958, however, Montgomery's remarks had quite a different ring. Speaking in retirement from his NATO duties, he now foresaw that in due course the United States and the Soviet Union would achieve nuclear sufficiency, and he asked himself how the West would use its nuclear weapons then.

> In the event of minor Russian aggression with conventional forces, do you believe that the West would use its nuclear deterrent *as a weapon* against the cities of Russia and receive in return Russian retaliation which would put the U.K. and the

> U.S.A. out of business? For us to act in this way would be to commit national suicide. I do not believe it will happen. When both sides have nuclear sufficiency, the deterrent will merely serve to deter each side from using it as a weapon.[91]

It should be noted that Montgomery left open the possibility that the West might use the nuclear deterrent as a *threat* against conventional attacks, even though to use it overtly as a *weapon* would be suicidal. This was a possibility that no Western government dared foreclose. For no government could accept the proposition that nuclear weapons served only passive deterrence without conceding, implicitly, that the foundation of NATO's strategy was a gigantic bluff. Therefore, in the absence of a larger capacity for conventional resistance in Europe, the British government, like the American, continued to affirm NATO's determination to meet conventional aggression with nuclear weapons even after it had virtually conceded that the nation would suffer intolerable destruction if the threat were carried out.

Of course, one could still argue that, regardless of the retaliatory damage the Soviet Union would inflict upon Britain, the Kremlin would be deterred from taking a chance that Britain and the United States would not counter aggression with nuclear weapons by the expectation that she would also incur intolerable damage if the West were not bluffing. But even if this were true, the disturbing question remained: If the function of nuclear weapons were reduced to threat and counterthreat, who would win in a test of nerves? In Britain the increasingly articulate public sentiment against the danger and evil of nuclear weapons suggested the liabilities that democratic governments might suffer in this kind of game.

Thus in Great Britain NATO's growing dependence upon a nuclear strategy exerted a dual effect, which was only partially manifested in Germany and France: It stimulated the government to seek its own nuclear capability, at the expense of conventional forces, and it aroused significant popular inhibitions about using nuclear weapons. The net effect was to depreciate the credibility of active nuclear deterrence and undermine its

utility as an instrument of policy, while accelerating the tendency in Britain—indeed, in NATO as a whole—to substitute nuclear for conventional capabilities.

11. THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ACTIVE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

In the United States, apprehensions about depending upon a strategy that seemed to be based upon the West's threat to start a thermonuclear war were most clearly expressed in the growing number of serious studies of defense policies. The official decision in 1956 to depend more heavily upon nuclear capabilities and the threat of total war to deter conventional aggression coincided with the consolidation in 1956 and 1957 of a consensus among private students of defense policies (especially in academic quarters and in RAND, the independent research organization supported by the Air Force) that the only effective strategy to deter and counter local conventional aggressions, now that the Soviet Union had achieved a substantial nuclear capability, was a strategy of limited war.[92] In these two years a few studies in the United States and England—notably those by Henry Kissinger and Sir Anthony Buzzard—favored a limited-war strategy based primarily upon meeting conventional attacks with the "graduated" use of tactical nuclear weapons, but by 1959 the trend among both private and official students was running strongly against this strategy, in favor of one based primarily on limited conventional resistance even to large-scale conventional aggression, inside as well as outside the NATO area.[93] By 1960, it had become a commonplace view —expressed by congressmen, army and navy officers, newspapers, news commentators, independent studies, and academic students of military policies, too numerous to list—that the credibility of nuclear retaliation against conventional attacks was dangerously declining in the face of growing Soviet nuclear power, and that only a larger capability of local resistance by non-nuclear means could compensate for this loss of credibility.[94]

Nevertheless, even several years after the Soviet launching of the first Sputnik, the nation as a whole did not feel the im-

mediate sense of physical vulnerability to nuclear devastation that had aroused the Germans and the British, and in all the multitude of congressional hearings and special investigations of defense policies there was no counterpart of the efforts of British members of parliament to force the government to elaborate the circumstances under which it would resort to nuclear warfare. Insofar as there was any genuine political debate on military strategy, it revolved largely around the technical and material requirements of weapons systems rather than around the circumstances in which those weapons should be used as an instrument of policy.

Before long, the development of Soviet long-range missiles was bound to undermine official as well as popular confidence in active, first-strike nuclear deterrence, since by 1960 there were already growing doubts about the adequacy of America's strategic striking power even for passive, second-strike deterrence. But the administration that had initiated the "new look" in defense policies on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used against conventional attacks was no more disposed to renounce this strategy of nuclear retaliation than it was to increase expenditures upon conventional weapons and ground forces. And there was a general disposition among congressmen and their constituents to trust the military judgment of an administration headed by President Eisenhower, while even those who did not share this disposition were reluctant to recommend significantly larger appropriations for conventional limited-war forces when Soviet missile progress seemed to require an intensified program in strategic nuclear striking power.

It is true that, with respect to areas outside the ambit of NATO obligations, Secretary of State Dulles, prompted by domestic and foreign alarm, qualified the implications of his "massive retaliation" pronouncement of January, 1954, soon after he delivered it. He denied that every small aggression would necessarily be turned into a nuclear war, and he emphasized not strategic retaliation but the use of "mobile deterrent power" on a selective basis—by which he evidently meant the dropping of tactical atomic bombs on Chinese Communist stag-

ing areas and other military targets related to the area of battle. However, in order to deter conventional aggression in the NATO area, the Eisenhower administration continued throughout its tenure to rely upon the threat of massive retaliation as a concomitant of a tactical nuclear response, on the theory that any aggression in Europe would involve the Soviet Union and that no aggression involving the Soviet Union could be limited. As Secretary of Defense McElroy explained this theory in justifying the reduction of America's limited-war forces, "I do not see how you could have limited warfare between the two major opponents, and if our major opponent is involved . . . they could hardly avoid an all-out military struggle."[95] Any limited war larger than the Quemoy and Matsu or Lebanon incidents of 1958, he maintained, would lead to the use of tactical nuclear weapons and thus become a general war.[96] Therefore, whatever forces were adequate to deter an attack on the United States were also adequate to protect Western Europe. "An attack upon our forces and friends in Western Europe would be an attack upon the United States. It would mean general war."[97] Indeed, the government was logically compelled to affirm this position as the strategic rationale of its policy of economizing on the forces and weapons for local conventional resistance, which it justified on the grounds that the requirements of limited war were covered by the capacity for general war.[98]

From this policy and the strategic assumption upon which it was based, it followed that the more dependent upon a nuclear response Western forces became, the more unequivocally the United States had to indicate that any military incursion beyond the most minor incident would result in a thermonuclear catastrophe. Therefore, although fewer and fewer observers of the changing balance of military power shared the American government's professed belief in the necessary totality of warfare in Europe, and more and more observers were horrified by the prospect, the government seemed determined, in effect, to confirm its prophecy by emphatically declaring that NATO's forces were nuclear forces and denying absolutely that a limited war was possible in Europe. As Secretary McElroy declared, "We

better never let anyone get the mistaken idea that we are not going to use our big weapons if they are needed. The free peoples are a minority group in the world, and unless we have serious resolution to use, if need be, the big stuff in order to deter aggression or to protect the free world, you are going to get into a limited war."[99]

Ironically, this declaratory policy of minimizing the chance of limited war in order to maximize the deterrent value of nuclear weapons was one with which Soviet leaders were happy to collaborate at every opportunity. For by consistently denying any distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, any possibility of limiting a nuclear war, or even a possibility of limiting any kind of war in Europe, they reinforced the insistent Soviet message that the Western powers must disarm, withdraw from their provocative outposts, abandon their "situations of strength policy," and disband the alliance if they wished to avoid a catastrophic thermonuclear war. In other words, they used the West's own deterrent strategy as a potent psychological and political lever against the West.

Yet, unlike the Soviet bloc, democratic nations could not maintain a consistent, monolithic declaratory strategy, if only because their own officials, politicians, and citizenry were free to express divergent views. Thus the more the American and British governments emphasized their dependence upon nuclear deterrence, the more their own citizens sought relief from the risks of this threatening nuclear posture in ways that tended to undermine its credibility. Notably in the United States, even military and civilian officials made public statements that contradicted the official line.

In October, 1958, Vice-Admiral Charles R. Brown, the commander of the Sixth Fleet and about to take over command of allied forces in southern Europe, told the National Press Club that he opposed using even small atomic weapons in limited war because he had no faith in "the so-called controlled use of atomic weapons" or in the distinction between tactical and strategic situations. "I would not recommend the use of any atomic weapon, no matter how small," he asserted, "when both sides

have the power to destroy the world,"[100] which, he later stated, would be in the "not too far future," when both the United States and the Soviet Union would have combat-ready ICBM's. In a more guarded statement in April, 1959, General Norstad, who since 1957 had been actively promoting a thirty-division "shield" in order to provide NATO with a capacity for "intermediate responses" between all-out war and acquiescence, told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that NATO "would deal with any situation that could be dealt with, with conventional weapons, if possible."[101] At about the same time Secretary of State Herter, testifying on his nomination before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, said that the West would not be justified in conducting a nuclear war in the initial stages of a Soviet attack before making sure that it was being carried out to the point of an all-out war, and that the President would not involve the United States in an all-out war "unless the facts showed that we were in danger of devastation ourselves."[102]

Army Chief of Staff General Taylor, after his retirement in the spring of 1959, wrote that he had struggled in vain to secure clear official guidance for military planning that would recognize the possibility of limited war in the NATO area, for he believed that "in . . . a situation of nuclear parity, where both sides had the capability of destroying one another, there was no place for a policy of massive nuclear retaliation except as a deterrent to total nuclear war or as a reprisal if one began."[103] In congressional testimony he charged that, because the administration had never resolved the strategic issue between "massive retaliation" and a "flexible response," there had never been any centralized limited-war planning in the government.[104] It is unlikely that the situation changed after General Taylor's retirement. Yet the Eisenhower administration's third secretary of defense, Thomas S. Gates, Jr., once seemed to suggest that a large-scale limited war was a contingency worth preparing for, when he told the annual meeting of the Associated Press in April, 1960, "We must be prepared for military actions of varying degrees and sizes anywhere in the world and be able to contain quickly such action. We must put out the fire of limited war in situa-

tions that range all the way from another Korea-sized conflict to one involving a small number of infantry or marines."[105] He said nothing about putting out the fire with nuclear weapons.

The impression of nuclear inhibitions that these statements conveyed was reinforced by the actual record of American policy during crises involving the use or threatened use of armed force. The United States refrained from using nuclear weapons in the Korean War, even when she had a virtual monopoly of them.[106] In the Indochina war of 1954, the President rejected French requests and American proposals to employ nuclear weapons, even though the Chinese had none.[107] In 1955 the President sided with Army Chief of Staff General Ridgway against the other chiefs of staff in opposing the use of nuclear weapons to defend the coastal islands of Quemoy and Matsu against a Communist atack.[108] During the Quemoy and Matsu crisis of 1958, it was the Russians who hinted at using nuclear weapons to defend their Chinese ally against an American attack, while American spokesmen carefully refrained from even suggesting a resort to nuclear weapons, although the United States Navy quietly delivered to Quemoy a number of eight-inch howitzers capable of firing nuclear shells.[109] In the Lebanon landing in 1958, the United States Army was not even allowed to bring an Honest John rocket ashore, because it could fire a nuclear shell.[110]

Of course, all these statements and actions put together did not provide conclusive evidence of the circumstances in which NATO might or might not resort to selective or massive nuclear retaliation; but they did suggest that NATO's nuclear policy was considerably less clear-cut than America's official statements were intended to indicate. This supposition was confirmed by General Taylor's revelation that, despite the government's categorical pronouncements about nuclear retaliation, "the services have never been given a clear-cut statement allowing them to plan with complete confidence on the use or limitation of use of atomic weapons."[111] Yet, in practice, the use or non-use of nuclear weapons seemed destined to be resolved by existing military capabilities, which provided little choice be-

tween a nuclear response and non-resistance, even though by 1960 NATO was still far from completing the conversion from conventional to nuclear equipment, organization, and training.

12. THE DILEMMA OF NUCLEAR DEPENDENCE

Within a few years after the United States had encouraged her allies to depend upon a tactical nuclear response to conventional aggressions as the means of meeting the requirements of security at an acceptable level of contributions, it was apparent that this strategic expedient had raised more problems of allied security and collaboration than it had solved. NATO had embraced this nuclear strategy as the means of reducing the discrepancy between existing capabilities and the professed objective of defending Europe against an all-out attack. Yet, with the accumulation of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union as well as by the United States, this allegedly indispensable objective lost even its theoretical appeal, for even a successful defense of the Continent in a total war would leave allied countries in no better position than if they had been occupied and liberated. As one American observer wrote, "Today one must consider that there is no more point in defending a corpse than there is in liberating it." Therefore, for the purpose of protection in a general war, the allies might better put their money into civil defense instead of ground forces.[112]

Actually, the allies were not willing to buy either form of protection. While they remained completely unprepared to protect their citizens from the consequences of nuclear war, which NATO promised to initiate in order to defend them, they were less interested than ever in spending money and manpower to resist a Soviet attack, which would destroy them in any case. In effect, NATO's ground forces seemed to have become mere accomplices to nuclear deterrence, a kind of trip-wire, with scarcely a pretense to a defensive function. While a trip-wire strategy was consistent with existing capabilities, it provided no incentive for meeting the prescribed minimum requirement of thirty NATO divisions ready for action on the central front in Western Europe. Aside from pleasing the United States, why

should the allies go to great trouble to enlarge NATO's ground forces when their primary function was only to offer enough opposition to activate a nuclear war? The question was particularly pertinent in the light of the United States and Great Britain's evident determination to reduce their own forces on the principle that nuclear deterrence was an adequate substitute for mobilized manpower.

Moreover, while NATO's nuclear strategy, reinforced by the American and British examples, further diminished the incentives for fulfilling NATO's minimum-forces goal, it increased the liabilities of strategic collaboration by raising the risks of nuclear obliteration. The general disposition of Western European governments to discount the threat of overt aggression and to let the United States worry about the details of defending the Continent, while they concentrated upon binding her to this commitment, somewhat mitigated their concern about NATO's increasing reliance upon nuclear retaliation, in spite of their awareness of growing Soviet nuclear power. Nevertheless, as the European public became more conscious of the physical consequences of nuclear war, more allied governments, like the British, were liable to come under increasing popular and political pressure to qualify their obligations to resort to nuclear warfare against conventional aggressions. Yet the more dependent on nuclear weapons NATO became, the more imperative it seemed—especially to the American government—to refute any suggestion that the nuclear deterrent might not be used, even though statements by some of America's own officials tended to confirm that suggestion.

Consequently, although NATO's nuclear strategy might help allied governments escape the domestic political difficulties of imposing burdensome defense programs upon the people, it promised to aggravate the larger difficulties that sprang from their growing dependence upon an admittedly suicidal response, the credibility of which they were themselves inclined to call into question in order to appease domestic apprehensions, even while they denied the feasibility of an alternative response.

6
Toward a Strategy of Limited Resistance

1. TWO STRATEGIES OF LIMITED WAR

NATO's increasing dependence on an unlimited nuclear response to conventional attacks at a time of spectacular growth in Soviet nuclear power threatened, in time, to undermine the credibility of the West's deterrent posture, jeopardize allied political cohesion, and weaken NATO's political defenses against Soviet pressure, while blunting allied incentives for collaborating in support of the minimum-forces goal that was held to be essential to Western security. One logical remedy for this predicament was to adopt a limited-war strategy that would provide a rational basis for NATO to equip itself with a capacity to resist limited aggressions effectively by means short of total war; that is, by a local war fought with substantial mutual restraints upon weapons, targets, and other military components of destruction.

By 1957 two strategies designed for this purpose had attracted the attention of military experts. One proposed to rely principally upon nuclear limited warfare;[1] the other, upon conventional limited warfare. Both strategies recognized the need of possessing tactical nuclear weapons, if only because the enemy might use them, but the first strategy favored initiating their use

against conventional aggression as the most effective means of local resistance, whereas the second strategy relied upon them principally to deter the enemy from using them, while depending on non-nuclear combat as the most effective means of resistance compatible with limited war.

The first strategy failed to receive official sanction. The second received only ambiguous support. By 1961 neither had been fully adopted. Yet NATO officially and urgently indorsed the objective both were intended to serve: To provide the allies, in the event of limited aggression, with some choice between suicide and surrender.

The argument for a strategy of nuclear limited war started from the same premise as that for a strategy of conventional limited war: With the growth of the Soviet counterdeterrent, the West could not safely rely on the threat of general strategic war to deter and resist a variety of possible conventional aggressions in the NATO area which could not be handled as mere police actions or border incidents. Proponents of both strategies were impressed by the danger of military conflicts in this area which would constitute such an ambiguous and limited threat to Western interests as to provide no suitable or credible cause for a massive response, but which might nevertheless grow into a limited war of considerable dimensions. They pointed to the possibility of probing actions on the northern or southern flank of the forward line, of indirect aggression in Yugoslavia, or of a conflict in the center of Europe growing out of an East German revolt or a disturbance in Berlin. But advocates of a limited-war strategy who were not deeply worried about this prospect nevertheless envisaged likely situations short of war—for example, a manufactured crisis in Berlin—in which the threat of massive retaliation would be a dangerously ineffective and politically disadvantageous instrument of diplomacy in the face of non-military incursions backed by a threat of thermonuclear counterretaliation. The very possibility of the West's having to choose between meeting Soviet terms or turning some limited aggression into a nuclear catastrophe, they feared, would offer the Kremlin a tempting opportunity to test NATO's collective nerve and will.

Of course, the proponents of a nuclear or conventional limited-war strategy for NATO believed that it was not only desirable to be able to fight a limited war in the NATO area but also feasible. They did not all agree on the specific kinds of limitations that might apply. The advocates of a nuclear limited-war strategy had greater confidence in the efficacy of explicit and precise limitations, formulated perhaps in advance of hostilities. The advocates of a conventional limited-war strategy tended to rely upon tacit, *ad hoc* limitations, based on a few simple, inherent, and obvious restraints, which might be reached by a kind of bargaining process. But both strategies assumed that, if neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. was confident that it could deliver a decisive massive strategic blow without receiving unacceptable damage in return, both would have an overwhelming incentive and the rational circumspection to find the means of keeping any military conflict local and well below the level of destruction that they were technically capable of inflicting.

From these common presuppositions, however, the arguments for NATO's depending primarily upon a strategy of nuclear limited war and the arguments for depending primarily upon a strategy of conventional limited war diverged.

2. THE CASE FOR A NUCLEAR LIMITED-WAR STRATEGY

All proponents of a nuclear limited-war strategy claimed that, compared to a conventional strategy, it was a more effective deterrent, and some claimed that it offered more effective resistance if deterrence failed. Some reasoned that, in the light of the unwillingness of the Western powers to maintain a large enough standing force to counteract the numerically superior Soviet-and-satellite divisions on a conventional basis, NATO had to utilize the superior defensive advantages of nuclear firepower—its ability to prevent concentrations for breakthroughs and the seizure of territory. In 1957 Henry Kissinger contended that in nuclear limited war "our superior industrial potential, the broader range of our technology, and the adaptability of our social institutions" would also work to the West's advantage.[2] Furthermore, it was contended, to fight a conventional

war with a nuclear power would entail either concentrating forces so that they could operate effectively, in which case one would concede the overwhelming advantage of initiating the use of nuclear weapons to the enemy, or else dispersing them to reduce their vulnerability, in which case they would be ineffective in holding a line against the enemy's concentrations. But the strongest argument for primary reliance upon nuclear limited war was that a strategy of initiating the use of tactical nuclear weapons would be a more effective deterrent than a strategy that assured the aggressor that he need not run the incalculable risks inherent in nuclear war unless he drove the enemy to desperation.

Of course, the case for a strategy of nuclear limited war in the NATO area must rest upon its feasibility as well as its desirability. Here its proponents emphasized that the limitation of political objectives rather than the nature of the weapons used was the fundamental condition for limiting warfare. In answer to those who associated the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons with all-out war, they pointed to the development of smaller and "cleaner" nuclear warheads with even less explosive power than some of the conventional TNT bombs and shells of World War II and denied that there was any logical or moral reason to distinguish one kind of explosive from the other, insofar as the intensity and scope of warfare was concerned. Those who advocated basing limited warfare upon the smallest nuclear warheads generally conceded that it would be more difficult for belligerents to observe verifiable distinctions in the destructive power of nuclear than of nonnuclear weapons, but they pointed to a number of possible supplementary distinctions, based on targets and geographical restrictions. And some contended that, given the overriding incentives nuclear powers would have to avoid unrestricted warfare, they might even be expected to establish these distinctions by advance declarations or agreements. The proponents of this nuclear strategy might grant that merely adding tactical nuclear weapons to conventional battlefield operations would probably lead to unlimited devastation, at least in the battle zone;

but they contended, as Kissinger argued in the greatest detail, that the effective utilization of tactical nuclear weapons required new formations, force structures, and tactics. Highly dispersed and self-contained units, he reasoned, need not create excessive destruction and might, in fact, result in even less devastation than a large-scale conventional war.

3. THE CASE FOR A CONVENTIONAL LIMITED-WAR STRATEGY

The case for relying primarily upon a strategy of conventional limited war to deter and resist limited aggressions in the NATO area was based chiefly on the superior feasibility of limiting a conventional war. However, by the late 1950's, partly in response to the growth of the Soviet Union's tactical nuclear capacity, the advocates of a non-nuclear strategy had also concluded that it would be militarily more effective than limited nuclear warfare.[3] The claim of superior feasibility rested mainly upon three contentions:

a) The principal advantage that is attributed to tactical nuclear weapons, their superior military effectiveness, springs from the very characteristic that makes them incompatible with limited war: their great destructive capacity. The blast, heat, and radiation effects of nuclear weapons—especially the larger ones, which might be used against airfields, military bases, etc. —are of such a large order of magnitude, compared to conventional weapons, as to preclude significant physical limitations upon the scope and intensity of warfare. Although limitation of the political objectives of war is an indispensable condition for limiting warfare between nuclear powers, it is not sufficient by itself, considering the dynamic relationship between the ends and means of war and the difficulty of keeping such great destructive potential from escalating.[4] Whereas in an earlier stage of technology the limitation of warfare was greatly facilitated, if not guaranteed, by the sheer physical limits upon the capacity of the belligerents to inflict quick and comprehensive damage upon one another, the peculiar problem of limiting warfare today is the necessity of imposing deliberate restraints

upon the most powerful military instruments.[5] This problem can be solved only if military conflict is confined to conventional weapons.

b) The distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear explosions is, by virtue of its uniqueness, simplicity, and the sanction of precedent and popular attitudes, relatively easy to apply and to verify as a basis of reciprocal restraints upon military conflict. Once the precedent is broken and nuclear weapons are used against conventional attacks, there will be no other clear distinctions of comparable stability and reliability to serve as bases of mutual restraint, and it will be virtually impossible to restore confidence in the original distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear explosions. Yet the continuous gradation in the destructive power of nuclear weapons, from the fractional-kiloton shells and grenades to the multimegaton bombs, precludes the fixing of an obvious qualitative "cut-off" point, which the belligerents could readily agree upon, verify, and enforce on their commanders.[6] At the same time, the number of profitable military targets available in Western Europe—such as airfields—would render either "natural" or contrived target distinctions ineffective for the purposes of mutual limitation in a nuclear war. Meaningful geographical restrictions and sanctuaries, in the absence of any other form of physical limitation, would be infeasible because they would require the immediate victim of aggression to accept annihilation while the aggressor struck from his nuclear-exempt tactical air and missile bases.[7]

c) Whatever might be the actual result of new tactics designed, theoretically, to permit use of nuclear weapons within reliable physical limits, in the absence of battlefield experience our military planners have not yet been able to devise any tactics with which they are confident of waging nuclear limited warfare. In the meantime, so far as military foresight can tell, the great pace, fluidity, mobility, and depth of the battle zone that military plans for tactical nuclear warfare envision would be distinctly uncongenial to limitations on the scope and intensity of nuclear conflict, especially in the European zone.

These arguments for the comparative feasibility of limiting conventional warfare are more persuasive in suggesting the dif-

ficulty of limiting nuclear warfare than they are in demonstrating the practicability of limiting conventional warfare in the NATO area. Similarly, the arguments for the comparative military and political utility of relying principally on a strategy of conventional limited war (assuming its feasibility) seem stronger in their negative than in their positive thrust. The case for comparative utility rests on the following psychological, political, and military grounds:

a) Subjectively, nuclear weapons are popularly associated with a catastrophic total war. Whatever the objective possibilities of limiting nuclear warfare may be, this popular impression will not be altered by argument, assertion, or analysis, in the absence of actual wartime experience. Therefore, a tactical nuclear strategy will incite much the same apprehensions and inhibitions and suffer almost the same depreciation in credibility as a strategy of massive retaliation, and the Soviet Union will enjoy increasing success in exploiting these subjective attitudes to paralyze and divide the Western powers as she continues to develop a devastating second-strike capability while denying the possibility of a limited nuclear war. Although the threat to initiate nuclear war may be more fearsome, it is a less credible and, in the long run, probably less effective deterrent than the threat of substantial conventional resistance. It is also less prudent because it would be far less useful if the threat should fail to deter.

b) Considering the strength of nuclear fears and inhibitions, NATO's dependence on initiating nuclear warfare against conventional attacks will incur the grave political disadvantage of seeming to leave the allies no choice between suicide and surrender. Even if the allies believe that nuclear warfare could be limited to the extent of confining hostilities to the Continent, they will not be consoled by the thought that extra-Continental powers will be spared while their countries are devastated. On the other hand, some may be equally fearful that the United States will withhold the nuclear deterrent while they are occupied conventionally. In either case, a nuclear strategy entails a differentiation in sacrifices, benefits, and responsibilities among allies that must seriously impair allied collaboration. It enables

Moscow to subject the European "hostages" to pressures that may either hamstring the United States or compel her to act unilaterally. It subordinates the will to meet common military needs objectively to subjective fears and suspicions of American policy.

c) NATO would not derive a military advantage from fighting a limited war with nuclear as opposed to conventional weapons. In fact, the situation is just the opposite. A nuclear limited war would require more manpower, if only to replace the greater number of casualties and handle the more complicated logistics. Since nuclear weapons would seem to be as capable of breaking up a defensive line as an offensive concentration, there is no reason to think that the defending nation in a bilateral nuclear war could offset his numerical inferiority with firepower.[8] Both conventional and nuclear warfare would require highly mobile units capable of rapid concentration and dispersion, simply because of the possibility that nuclear weapons might be introduced. Anyway, if nuclear weapons do favor the defense, NATO forces would be at more of a disadvantage in counterattacking in order to expel the aggressor than the aggressor would be in penetrating allied territory during the initial phase of fluid and far-ranging operations.[9] On the other hand, in conventional warfare, portable antitank weapons and a great range of other non-nuclear devices that are already developed do promise to give the Western powers the generally assumed three-to-one numerical advantage of defending forces and whatever compensation firepower may provide for numerically inferior manpower. Moreover, whereas use of nuclear weapons would tend to neutralize differences in technological and productive strength, in which the Western powers are still supreme, conventional warfare would capitalize upon them. Therefore, if tactical nuclear weapons were reserved as a sanction to enforce the limitations upon conventional conflict, the comparative advantages of fighting limited warfare on a conventional basis would be worth the risk of the enemy's initiating the use of nuclear weapons.

What conclusions emerge from these arguments? The arguments for not relying primarily on a nuclear limited-war strate-

gy have become more persuasive as the objective and subjective obstacles to a useful first-strike tactical nuclear war apparently grow more formidable. Yet the utility of depending heavily upon large-scale conventional resistance in the NATO area has not appeared to grow proportionately. The conjectural advantages of augmenting NATO's capacity for non-nuclear resistance do not strike the European allies as a compelling compensation for the palpable disadvantages of having to contribute more money and troops to an effort that may only provoke the Soviet Union to raise her force levels while further depreciating the credibility of the tactical nuclear threat upon which the allies, in fact, remain heavily dependent. Nevertheless, if a limited-war strategy is advisable at all (as almost all students of the matter contended in 1961), it would seem, on balance, that NATO's military and political advantage lies in depending on conventional weapons to raise the threshold of effective non-nuclear resistance to a level at which the resort to tactical nuclear warfare would constitute a really credible step. It follows that NATO ought to develop its forces—their organization, equipment, and tactics—chiefly for the purpose of supporting local defense with non-nuclear weapons,[10] while relying upon tactical nuclear weapons to deter the aggressor from employing them and to deter him from expanding a conventional war to a scope that might force the West to initiate the limited use of nuclear weapons as a last resort. A thirty-division force would give the West better than a one-to-three ratio in relation to the forces that the Soviet Union might rapidly deploy on the forward line. This would be a ratio adequate for conventional defense, for a limited-war strategy would not require numerically matching the Soviet bloc's standing forces ("man for man and tank for tank," as the opponents of that proposition put it). A limited-war force would not be designed to contain a massive all-out conventional invasion. To prevent a massive assault on the Continent or to counter a major conventional conflict that could not be won or contained by Western conventional forces, NATO would rely primarily upon the deterrent effect of graduated tactical nuclear blows; that is, blows not directed at strategic striking power or civilian

and industrial targets but at the enemy's battlefield capabilities, the purpose of which would not be to win a protracted nuclear war—a self-defeating objective—but to raise the level of violence and heighten the risk of strategic nuclear warfare sufficiently to induce the termination of hostilities without at the same time irrevocably committing either side to a war of annihilation.* Since the West cannot afford to lose a conventional war in Europe or relieve the aggressor of the risks of nuclear war inherent in any large-scale conflict, it cannot categorically renounce the first use of tactical nuclear weapons as a last resort, but it should be able to wage effective conventional resistance of a large-scale and protracted nature in order to raise the threshold of violence to a point where limited nuclear resistance would be sufficiently credible to exert its intended political effect.

This last-resort nuclear strategy assumes, of course, that the NATO powers would develop and publicly declare a strategy of limited or graduated nuclear blows as a necessary concomitant to a conventional-resistance strategy, instead of regarding the first use of tactical nuclear weapons merely as a substitute for large-scale conventional warfare and a step on the automatic escalator to massive strategic nuclear exchanges. It also assumes that nuclear weapons will not become so widely diffused throughout NATO's command structure that the central command will be unable to control whether and when they should be employed or unable to limit and proportion their use under political guidance. Perhaps the best way to meet this

* This strategy, like limited strategic nuclear retaliation, aims to persuade the enemy to terminate hostilities on reasonable terms without trying to deprive him of his war-making capability, but it applies persuasion through tactical blows directed at military objectives that serve effective resistance rather than through purely punitive blows designed, not to affect the local balance of military power, but primarily to demonstrate the will to inflict damage that the enemy will consider unacceptable in relation to the value of the objective he seeks. This latter strategy would be far less amenable to meaningful limitation and to the communication and bargaining process it is intended to facilitate. Moreover, a coalition of democratic powers would be at a peculiar disadvantage in engaging in such controlled strategic punitive blows, tit for tat, even if the exchanges did not lead to all-out war. For a full discussion of this and other strategies of limited nuclear reprisals, see Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 197–224.

problem is to create a few carefully selected special units primarily equipped and trained to employ tactical nuclear weapons, while the other units are designed to fight conventional war and co-ordinate with the nuclear units when necessary.[11]

Yet, clearly, it will be more expensive for the major allies to maintain any genuine dual capability than to concentrate upon a nuclear capability designed to deter aggressions and leave only a residual conventional capability to resist aggression if the deterrent should fail.[12] This would be especially true if an increase in NATO's forward forces would precipitate a countervailing increase in the Soviet forward forces. Therefore, this raises the question whether the necessarily speculative advantages of creating a sizable conventional capability would really be worth the additional cost. The question can be answered only in terms of the kind of insurance and the margin of safety one seeks in preparing for uncertain contingencies. But, unfortunately, the actuarial figures for this kind of insurance are unknown; and the insurance itself might alter those figures. Even if a dual capability would increase the margin of security, how serious is the threat of limited aggression in the NATO area, and by how much would a larger conventional capability reduce this threat? Might not an explicit conventional limited-war strategy encourage limited aggression by depreciating the deterrent value of nuclear weapons and the threat of total war? How large a conventional war should NATO be prepared to fight on a limited basis? What are the chances of limiting any kind of military conflict in such a vital area and still fighting it effectively, and by what increment might these chances be increased if NATO had a larger conventional capability? What would be the actual physical consequences of a conventional limited war in this area? Would the allies whose homelands were in the battlefield regard such a war as significantly less disastrous than a war in which the West employed graduated nuclear retaliation to secure an armistice? Would their nerves really be any stronger if their military security depended upon a strategy that virtually conceded the first nuclear strike to the enemy?

Considering the imponderability of these questions, it is not

surprising that NATO's actual strategy at the beginning of the 1960's was an ambiguous compromise between conventional local resistance, graduated nuclear deterrence, and massive retaliation, reflecting domestic pressures and foreign sensitivities as much as strategic logic.

4. DULLES' BRIEF FLIRTATION WITH NUCLEAR LIMITED WAR

Tactical nuclear weapons were originally adopted by NATO as a substitute for conventional weapons in carrying out the existing strategy of withstanding a Soviet attack in an all-out war, not as a means of resisting aggression effectively by limited means or even of terminating aggression short of total war by graduated nuclear reprisals and bargaining. However, the American government, like the British, could not long ignore the adverse implications of a strategy that would defend the Continental allies by means that promised to destroy them—and, perhaps, the United States, too.

In April, 1957, Secretary of State Dulles, reiterating a favorite theme of President Eisenhower, said, "With modern weapons, any general war could not be won by anybody. It would be a disaster of worldwide proportions, which would threaten indeed the very existence of the human race, certainly in the Northern Hemisphere."[13] The only strategic implication he drew at this time was that "the principal objective now must be not to win war but to prevent war." But two years before he had hinted at another solution to the dilemma of nuclear deterrence and defense: At a news conference in March, 1955, he suggested that the availability of smaller atomic weapons would offer a chance of securing victory on the battlefield without harming civilians, without precipitating a war of mass destruction like World War II.[14] And at other times he implied that nuclear deterrence might rest on the threat of limited, graduated reprisals, not intended to secure victory on the battlefield in the sense of destroying the enemy's fighting capabilities or holding territory but rather to impose unacceptable costs by selective strikes. As he stated in November, 1954:

> We must have the capacity to respond at places and by means of our own choosing. This, however, does not mean that any local war would automatically be turned into a general war with atomic bombs being dropped all over the map. The essential thing is that we and our allies should have the means and the will to assure that a potential aggressor would lose from his aggression more than he could win. This does not mean that the aggressor has to be totally destroyed. It does mean a capacity to inflict punishing damage.[15]

These adumbrations of a strategy of limited nuclear war were made in the context of discussing American policies outside Europe. But in an article published in October, 1957, Dulles applied the strategy more generally—to Europe as well as to peripheral strategic areas.[16] Heretofore, he wrote, our allies have had to depend upon a strategy of deterrence based upon America's great capacity for nuclear retaliation against the aggressor. However, dependence upon a capacity to destroy vast segments of the human race has been acceptable only because there was no alternative. But now, with the development of smaller and cleaner nuclear weapons, "their use need not involve vast destruction and widespread harm to humanity"; their effects can be confined "substantially to predetermined targets." "In the future," he concluded, "it may thus be feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power. It may be possible to defend countries by nuclear weapons so mobile, or so placed, as to make military invasion with conventional forces a hazardous attempt." Nations around the Sino-Soviet periphery could, therefore, possess "an effective defense against full-scale conventional attack" without endangering themselves or friendly peoples in the area, so that "instead of those who are non-aggressive having to rely upon all-out nuclear retaliatory power for their protection, would-be aggressors will be unable to count on a successful conventional aggression, but must themselves weigh the consequences of invoking nuclear war."

This is the nearest that the United States or any of her allies ever came to announcing a strategy of limited nuclear war. Whether the deterrent threat that Dulles had in mind was to

punish the enemy by graduated nuclear reprisals against predetermined targets or to fight a limited war of nuclear resistance against opposing forces was never clarified. The American government failed to elaborate or even repeat Dulles' suggestion. By 1957 it did refer to tactical nuclear weapons as though they were designed chiefly for reprisal or punishment, but it left the impression that, whereas in some special cases their use for selective retaliation might not necessarily lead to total war, the United States and her allies were not basing their strategy on this expectation in the NATO area but rather on the probability that any conventional aggression in Europe would lead to nuclear war and any nuclear war would lead to unlimited nuclear war.

Thus in March, 1959, in the midst of a new Soviet campaign of political warfare against West Berlin, President Eisenhower said that the West was determined to defend Berlin but that it certainly would not fight a ground war in Europe because it would be outnumbered. Therefore, he saw no function for a few more thousands, or indeed even a few more divisions, of troops in Europe. Although he was confident that the Soviet Union would not dare to start a war, he implied that, if she did, the United States would defend its interests with nuclear weapons, even though a nuclear war could not "free anything" and would be "self-defeating."[17] Consistent with this reliance upon uncontrolled nuclear deterrence, the President told anxious congressmen that the United States had adequate forces to deal with the Berlin threat, that he intended to go ahead with proposed cuts in American conventional forces, and that any effort to build up conventional or missile forces in response to crises like Berlin would only play into the hands of the Communist strategy of getting the United States to spend itself into bankruptcy.[18]

5. NORSTAD'S RE-EMPHASIS UPON NATO'S SHIELD

While the Eisenhower administration continued to rely primarily upon the threat of a catastrophic nuclear war to deter aggressions in Europe, General Lauris Norstad, who became

NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in November, 1956, conceived his primary strategic task as developing the kind of military plans and forces that could relieve NATO of depending exclusively upon nuclear retaliation.

It was largely under his leadership that NATO adopted the five-year plan, called MC–70, designed to create a standing forward line or "shield" in Western Europe of thirty divisions. In appealing to the allies to support this minimum-force goal, General Norstad set forth three strategic objectives of NATO's shield.[19] Two of these objectives had been recognized in official statements from the beginning of the alliance, although the second was now assigned a relatively higher priority than before: (*a*) to protect all NATO territory against major aggression by holding an attack until the total weight of retaliatory power could be brought to bear; (*b*) to deter a border incident or a limited probing action by making it clear to the potential aggressor that "he would have to use substantial force to breach the shield, an act he knows would bring down upon him the full weight of the deterrent, including our heavy strategic power."

The logical connection between these two objectives and a thirty-division shield was tenuous, since fewer than thirty divisions ought to be sufficient for the second; and, even if thirty were sufficient for the first, NATO would only succeed in "defending a corpse."

On the other hand, Norstad's third strategic objective constituted a coherent justification for the minimum forces he requested. It was specifically aimed at meeting the altered requirements of external security and internal cohesion in the face of Russia's emergence as a full-fledged nuclear power. The third function of the shield, Norstad said, was to provide new military and political flexibility, to relieve the allies of having to choose between total war and passive acquiescence, by enabling NATO to respond to "less than ultimate incidents with something other than massive retaliation"—with some intermediate means. If allied security depended exclusively upon a capacity for massive retaliation, he warned, we would be

"piecemealed to death. We wouldn't survive here for six months. This is the most dangerous position we could put ourselves in."

Taking these words at face value, one might suppose that they argued for a strategy of local non-nuclear resistance. But General Norstad stopped short of extending this third strategic function to its full logic. Like spokesmen of American defense policies, he pointedly denied that a limited war was possible in the NATO area, and he emphasized that the shield "can no longer be considered as 'conventional forces,' " although it would retain a "residual conventional capacity." On a conventional level the shield's role would be confined to briefly holding a limited probing action in order to "force a pause" long enough to compel the Russians to make a deliberate decision that they either would or would not go to war while they weighed the costs of the total war that would result from an affirmative decision.

The outsider cannot know to what extent this minimum strategic function coincided with operational plans.[20] Probably, it did not represent the maximum function Norstad looked forward to. Certainly Norstad's reformulation was a compromise between NATO's old strategy and its new imperatives, an attempt to reconcile new strategic requirements with existing capabilities. On the one hand, the Supreme Allied Commander recognized that NATO's dependence on America's threat of massive retaliation had become dangerous to allied security and cohesion. On the other hand, he conceded that NATO was compelled by the minimum number of troops it was willing to raise and support to rely primarily upon the deterrent effect of a nuclear ground force, which could hold an attack only until the full weight of retaliatory power was brought to bear. In order to relieve NATO of the choice between obliteration and occupation, he proclaimed the strategic objective of an alternative intermediate response. But, lest he diminish the deterrent value of the nuclear forces upon which NATO in reality primarily depended, he denied the possibility of a limited war or of a conventional response beyond a brief holding action.

This strategy did not succeed in satisfying the conflicting

demands of more deterrence at less risk and of better defense against limited and major aggressions if deterrence should fail —all at no greater cost in money and men. But no strategy could. The question is whether General Norstad's was the wisest strategic formula, given the limited forces available to him, or whether NATO might meet its minimum force goals and achieve a more satisfactory balance between security and cohesion if it were to clearly embrace a conventional limited-war strategy. As long as NATO was dependent upon forces and weapons that were inadequate for effective local conventional resistance, except to force a pause for decision upon the aggressor, there was a reasonable argument for not depreciating the credibility of the threat of a tactical nuclear response against conventional aggression by openly formulating a strategy of conventional limited war. For to do so might cast doubt upon the West's resolution to initiate the use of nuclear weapons while it lacked a convincing capability of resisting limited aggression by non-nuclear means. On the other hand, NATO might never acquire an adequate shield, which it so badly needed, unless it were openly to adopt a strategy of conventional limited war, since such a strategy might provide the only rational incentive that could induce the allies to enlarge the shield.

Whatever the resolution of this dilemma might be, at the end of 1960 NATO's shield in fact remained at little more than half the operational strength that had been projected in 1957 as a bare minimum. Although ostensibly it contained 21⅓ combat-ready divisions assigned to the central front from Norway to Italy, most observers considered 12 to 16 a more accurate figure and regarded even these divisions as seriously inferior in arms and equipment to the huge Soviet bloc forces facing them in Central Europe.* The numerical gap between the shield's ac-

* In 1959 the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, in an authoritative but unofficial collation of intelligence data, estimated that Soviet force-reductions actually amounted to only 1,100,000 of the more than 2,000,000 claimed, leaving about 2,350,000 in the army and 350,000 security, border, and labor troops. The total number of divisions, it estimated, remained 175, 75 per cent of which were stationed on the western border of the Soviet Union and in Eastern

tual and required forces might be virtually closed if Germany fulfilled her goal of twelve divisions (only seven of which had been raised by 1961), if France (which maintained only two divisions in Europe) returned the two or more divisions in Algeria, and if Great Britain restored the two divisions she had withdrawn in 1957. But, even so, the task of equipping an enlarged shield with sufficient modern conventional weapons to supplement NATO's capacity for nuclear deterrence with a limited-war capability beyond a mere "residual conventional capacity" would be a far more expensive project than any of the allies, including the United States, seemed prepared to undertake.

In the strategic circumstances of 1960, the only compelling incentive for the European allies to increase their defense budgets was not their concern for enlarging and diversifying collective capabilities but rather, in the case of Britain and France (and, possibly, West Germany before long), their desire to acquire or expand independent nuclear capabilities. If the most powerful members of NATO were to channel their military resources and energy principally into the development of independent nuclear capabilities, to the further neglect of

---

Europe. Equally significant, these Soviet forces were said to have undergone a major reorganization in order to improve atomic capabilities (*NATO Letter*, VII [December, 1959], 22–23). On January 15, 1960, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. announced a further reduction of 1,200,000 in over-all forces. However, in his report to the Supreme Soviet on January 14, Khrushchev maintained that the effective fighting power of Soviet forces would actually be increased by modernization and the advancement of nuclear capabilities, including strategic missiles. He also indicated that reserve forces would be enlarged by a "territorial system" of training labor forces (*Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XII, No. 2, 11). On July 8, 1961, Khrushchev, pointing to the Western build-up during the Berlin crisis, announced the suspension of projected force reductions and a substantial increase in the Soviet budget (*New York Times*, July 9, 1961, pp. 1, 2). At this time Western experts estimated that there were 126 Soviet divisions west of the Urals (including 26 in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary), two-thirds of which were maintained at 70 per cent or more of war strength (*ibid.*, September 10, 1961, p. 6). Administration sources stated that there were about 150 line divisions in the Russian army, with probably fewer than 30 at full strength (located in Eastern Europe and western Russia), but they pointed out that the Soviet Union could put 125 divisions in the field in Europe in thirty days and mobilize 300 divisions in ninety days (*ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1961, p. 4), a capacity that far exceeded that of the NATO powers.

their contributions to local defense, it would be difficult to stop the steady erosion of allied military and political solidarity and the steady deterioration of the West's whole position in the cold war.

6. INTERDEPENDENCE

In 1959 a mounting dissatisfaction with NATO's reliance upon nuclear retaliation, the increasing cost of nuclear and conventional weapons, and a growing technical requirement for military integration stimulated a new interest in some allied quarters in an old solution to the problem of meeting NATO's military needs at an acceptable cost: "Interdependence";[21] that is, a co-ordinated specialization of national forces and arms, matériel, and strategic functions in order to use total resources most efficiently. There is much to be said for greater interdependence on grounds of efficiency and economy, but the pursuit of these objectives is, inevitably, qualified by considerations of separate national interests, by the political requirements of military collaboration. In the light of these considerations, interdependence, while militarily and economically more urgent than ever before, is limited as a solution to NATO's strategic troubles.

Militarily, the need for greater allied interdependence springs, chiefly, from the technical requirements of rapid mobility of ground forces, geographically widespread co-ordination of air and submarine defenses, and central control of tactical nuclear weapons. None of these essential military operations could be performed effectively by national forces without a degree of specialization and co-ordination within a common force that exceeds what De Gaulle has called national "co-operation."[22] Each requires considerable subordination of national to central control of weapons, forces, and logistics.

Economically, the need for interdependence springs from the discrepancy between the cost of strategic flexibility and the price allies are prepared to pay. The less the allies are willing to contribute to meet collective requirements, the greater the need for interdependence. It is true that after 1953 the mem-

bers of NATO were progressively better able to meet their obligations to the alliance without straining their domestic economies. The substantial economic recovery of Europe by 1953 and then the tremendous growth in per capita gross national product on the Continent (one of the highest rates in the world), as well as the great production of basic industry and consumer goods (greater, in many categories, than in the Soviet Union or even the entire Sino-Soviet bloc),[23] enabled America's allies to assume much larger defense expenditures, both absolutely and in relation to America's expenditures, than ever before.[24] However, the total economic burden of defense had also risen considerably and would rise more if NATO were to create an effective dual-capability force. And, politically, any substantial increase in defense expenditures (say, 5 or 10 per cent) seemed impracticable in the absence of a major crisis or limited war to dramatize the Soviet military threat. Economically, such an increase would exert inflationary and other disturbing effects in many allied countries. Moreover, by 1960 defense expenditures began to compete seriously with the costs of rising foreign economic aid to the underdeveloped areas.

Similarly, there were narrow practical limits within which the allies were willing to increase their contributions of armed forces to NATO. Domestic pressures against conscription itself in Britain and against the numbers of conscripts and period of service in West Germany and elsewhere, along with competing overseas commitments in France, the United States, and Britain, strictly limited the manpower that allied countries would contribute to the common defense in Europe in the absence of war or imminent war.

Therefore, militarily and in terms of money and manpower, it seemed to some that NATO's strategic imperatives in the 1960's, if they could be met at all, would be met not by a massive increase of national contingents and defense budgets but by the more efficient and economical use of total allied resources through specialization and co-ordination of national contributions and strategic functions. The essential thing was that whatever marginal increase in defense expenditures and

armed manpower the allies might be induced to contribute should be devoted to NATO's limited-war capabilities and utilized in the most effective way, rather than channeled into purely national forces (especially independent nuclear forces), at the expense of the defense of Europe. Otherwise, NATO would be faced with a growing discrepancy between its requirements of strategic flexibility and its actual capabilities.

By 1952 NATO already embodied a degree of interdependence in defense planning and organization that was unprecedented among peacetime coalitions. To be sure, NATO as such could not control national contributions (or withdrawals) of forces, the length of military service, or other elements of military programs that bore upon its collective capabilities. Nevertheless, through the Annual Review it exerted significant pressure on its members to adjust national contributions and programs to the over-all needs determined by the international staff at SHAPE.[25] SACEUR's authority over the location, deployment, and training of NATO's forces (with the notable exception of American and British nuclear warheads and strategic nuclear forces) made NATO far more than a collection of merely co-operating national armies and navies on the pattern of traditional military coalitions, even though it remained something far less than a united supranational force.

Still, at the beginning of the 1960's, NATO had fallen far short of achieving the ideal of economy and efficiency through interdependence to which its members had been dedicated in principle even before SHAPE was established. Actually, there had been a most inefficient use of combined allied resources, resulting from uneconomical duplication of research, development, and production programs; at the same time, the tendency to create forces, matériel, and weapons for independent national purposes at the expense of an integrated plan showed signs of increasing. Britain's decision in 1957 to reduce her troops in Europe in order to build up her strategic nuclear capability; the pressure in the United States, beginning in 1956, to reduce American troops in Europe in order to implement the "new

look" and, after 1958, in order to rectify an adverse international balance of payments; France's decision in 1959 to withdraw her naval units from the Mediterranean Command, her refusal to stockpile nuclear warheads on French soil except under French control, and her determination to follow the American and British lead in giving first priority to an independent nuclear capability—these developments were part of a trend that ran directly counter to interdependence.*

Until 1954 or so, the specialization and integration of allied forces were chiefly products of massive American economic and military assistance and the preponderance of the United States in military production and forces, combined with the inability of her allies to compete or to pursue self-sustaining military programs. Thus America's virtual monopoly of strategic nuclear striking power, though not under NATO command, represented NATO's most notable division of strategic labor, and her pre-eminence as a supplier of the major armaments (most of them without cost) was the primary source of standardization in weapons and equipment. However, this situation changed when the major allies became able to afford diversified arms programs of their own. In Britain and France these programs included even the instruments of strategic nuclear striking power, in addition to the naval power and non-NATO ground forces that they had held from the beginning. The resurgence of allied economic strength, the drive for equality of status, and the reassertion of divergent national foreign policies posed a further threat to the co-ordination of allied strategies, forces, and arms.

NATO's one conspicuous success in interdependence was its "infrastructure" program, that common network of air bases, pipelines, naval facilities, and communication lines created in the aftermath of the Korean invasion for the ground and air defense of Western Europe. However, in 1960 not more than

* On the other hand, in September, 1960, integration was advanced by the establishment of a unified European air defense command, ending France's long refusal to assign her air units to such a command, and the transfer of the Central Army Group in West Germany (composed of German, American, and French troops) to allied command, ending the United States long insistence upon an American command (*New York Times*, September 24, 1960, p. 1).

2 per cent of the total defense expenditure of the NATO powers was channeled through the infrastructure program, and the United States provided 37 per cent of that.

To rationalize the economic and logistic base of NATO's military strategy, the allies needed to standardize weapons and equipment and concentrate their production in countries where it was most economical. In 1960 Alastair Buchan proposed that, instead of relying on bilateral aid agreements, the allies should extend the infrastructure principle—that is, common financing for commonly used facilities—beyond fixed installations to the new weapons systems and facilities (nuclear stockpiles, tactical aircraft, missiles, etc.) on the authority and in accordance with the recommendations of SACEUR.[26] However, these logical expedients were impeded by substantial obstacles of national pride and military tradition, abetted by domestic business and labor pressure. In 1960, despite some indications that the United States and other allies were beginning to move toward greater rationalization of what the French military authority General Gallois called a "strategy of means,"[27] rising nationalist pressures threatened to reverse the trend.

Therefore, there remained a large discrepancy between the generally acknowledged need and the specific implementation of allied interdependence. This discrepancy, however, was not merely a result of the revival of the independent strength and purpose of the European allies. Nor could the allies be expected to regard increased co-ordination and integration purely as military and economic imperatives. The fact is that interdependence has political consequences, which conflict with the oldest and most crucial hallmark of national sovereignty: the ability of a state to support national policy with an independent military establishment. The greater the degree of allied interdependence, the greater the loss of actual (even if not formal) independent national control over military power—especially where interdependence takes the form of the specialization and integration of national forces. Clearly, there are strict limits to the sacrifice of independent military control that allies can be expected to make for the sake of collective defense and, therefore, strict limits to the compatibility of interdependence with

allied cohesion. For to sacrifice independent military control is to subordinate national policy to allied policy or, at least, to the policy of the strongest ally.

Furthermore, interdependence may conflict with the configuration of allied concessions and sanctions that sustains the delicate balance of assets and liabilities and the distribution of benefits and burdens that supplement the basic incentives for collaboration. Thus the deployment of American and British troops on the Continent, although an uneconomic use of resources, is a necessary political contribution to collaboration. And what allies may regard as an equitable distribution of the economic burdens and benefits of collective defense may facilitate collaboration even if it is economically wasteful.[28]

Ideally, each ally would be sufficiently farsighted to subordinate his particular interests to the demands of interdependence for the sake of his larger interests in an efficient and economic use of allied resources. But, actually, such subordination depends not simply on states eschewing national parochialism but, fundamentally, on their assessment of the compatibility of their vital interests with the military strategy and foreign policy that interdependence promises to serve. In other words, before accepting the limitations of specialization and integration, each ally must ask, "Interdependence for what?" and assess the answer to that question in terms of the contribution of NATO's strategy to his military security and the compatibility of that strategy with his foreign policy inside and outside the NATO area.

Therefore, the determination of allied strategy and the proper strategic function of each ally within the over-all plan must be prior to the achievement of interdependence, and interdependence must be subordinate to the requirements of allied military collaboration and political consensus. Viewed in this light, one of the greatest obstacles to interdependence has been the failure of NATO's strategy to provide the allies with clear and compelling incentives for subordinating their national defense policies to the kind of co-ordination and integration of functions, forces, and production that their security objectively

requires. Because NATO's strategy is an excessively ambiguous compromise between the old concept of nuclear deterrence and the new need for local resistance capabilities, it fails to provide a persuasive reason for enlarging NATO's capacity for fighting conventional limited warfare, which the enhancement of its military flexibility demands. Unless this strategy receives a more coherent formulation, it will offer neither incentive nor guidance for a new pattern of interdependence.

Thus the prospect of integrated forces and supplies in the 1960's depends less upon considerations of military efficiency and economy as such than upon a resolution of the existing ambiguity concerning the kinds of wars the members of NATO intend to fight in various contingencies.[29] Such a strategic clarification would involve an explicit recognition of NATO's primary reliance upon conventional local resistance, supplemented by graduated nuclear deterrence. Otherwise, the European allies will either be content to depend upon America's nuclear deterrent, while contributing only enough to NATO's shield to maintain the American commitment, or else they will insist upon acquiring their own nuclear deterrents, while reducing their contributions to the shield in order to pay for them. Already, by the end of 1960, the issue of the control of nuclear weapons, which is discussed in chapter ix, had emerged as the decisive test of the future of interdependence.

By itself, a reformulation of NATO strategy might still fail to elicit the contributions in money and manpower needed to sustain a dual-capability force of thirty divisions or more, considering the demonstrative reluctance of democratic nations to increase arms and manpower expenditures except under the fear of imminent aggression. But at least it was the prerequisite of a new pattern of interdependence—supplemented, perhaps, by a new configuration of concessions and sanctions, by new terms of collaboration—which could substantially narrow the gap between widely acknowledged strategic needs and NATO's existing capabilities.

7
The Onset of the Missile Age

Just when the preponderant strategic thought in NATO's headquarters and in the United States and Britain (with the conspicuous exception of some top civilian and air force officials in these two governments) seemed to have become convinced of the need of an enlarged and diversified limited-war capability on the Continent, another dramatic technological development in Russia's nuclear striking power called into question the fundamental stability of the strategic nuclear balance, which was by that time generally taken for granted. This was the Russian demonstration in the fall of 1957 that she had achieved a rudimentary intercontinental-range ballistic missile capability that the United States did not yet possess.

The onset of the "missile age" at first distracted allied strategists from the task of building up NATO's limited-war capability, as many realized that the requirements of strategic deterrence were more complex and difficult to achieve than had been generally imagined. But as they recovered from the initial shock of the Russian achievement, they reached a new consensus that the urgent task of maintaining a strategic nuclear balance in the missile age would actually put a greater premium than before upon the development of reliable nonnuclear tactical deterrents. This familiar strategic issue was now complicated, however, with a whole realm of unfamiliar issues relating to arms control, the danger of a pre-emptive strategic

attack springing from misapprehension, the diffusion of nuclear control and capabilities to other states, and the intricate requirements of a stable over-all military environment.

These issues added a new dimension of perplexity to the problem of calculating and meeting the requirements of allied security and cohesion. They created a new urgency in the need for a revision of NATO strategy and the terms of allied collaboration. They posed a new challenge to America's strategic and political leadership.

1. THE MISSILE GAP

Well before 1957 many responsible American and allied observers had begun to doubt the credibility of America's threat to meet conventional aggression upon her allies by initiating a nuclear war, which, it was officially conceded, would result in disaster for the United States. The evidence of Soviet missile progress raised doubts about quite another aspect of America's nuclear deterrent capability, the adequacy of which had been generally taken for granted: the deterrence of a massive surprise attack on the United States. To be sure, proponents of a larger strategic air force had been sounding alarms about the inadequacy of this deterrent capability for several years, but they had been preoccupied with the threat of a Soviet long-range air force.[1] Partly in response to their alarms but largely against their original preference for spending limited defense funds on more bombers, the government had constructed a vast continental defense system, complete with early-warning radar stations in Canada. But these countermeasures, like the alarms, were directed at the threat of manned bombers. The problem of deterring a missile attack was quite different and, generally, unanticipated in its details.

Soviet scientists, like their counterparts in the United States, had been developing and refining the German V-2 rocket ever since 1945. However, the Soviet effort to develop a truly long-range missile was more substantial than the American effort, partly because the United States, which already possessed the

highly trained and war-tested Strategic Air Command, saw less need for such a missile. Moreover, before the development of a hydrogen or fusion explosion, there was no warhead small enough yet powerful enough to make long-range missiles seem militarily useful, considering their anticipated inaccuracy. The Russians went ahead anyway, developing intercontinental as well as intermediate-range rockets with great thrust. In the United States the long-range ballistic missile project, started in 1948, was canceled in 1950 as impractical and was barely kept alive by the private firm Convair until it was reinstated in 1953.

When fusion explosions were achieved in 1953, the Soviet Union undertook a full-scale, top-priority program to develop and produce intermediate and intercontinental missiles in order to bypass the stage of the manned bomber and gain a technological victory over SAC. The American missile effort, afflicted with budgetary restrictions, administrative confusion, and interservice conflicts, proceeded at a more leisurely pace. By 1956 the Soviet Union was well on the way toward achieving an operational IRBM with a range of 1,500 miles, theoretically capable of wiping out America's overseas bases in the NATO area. Then in August, 1957, the Soviet Union announced a successful test of a "super long-distance intercontinental ballistic rocket," an announcement that was apparently confirmed by American radar observations on the Turkish Black Sea coast. Less than two months later, in October, she used the launching of the first two space satellites to dramatize her claim to have achieved an ICBM of powerful thrust, "a mighty hydrogen warhead of a new design," and "new and improved instruments" for guidance.

American military experts, always quick to respond to developments affecting strategic air power and general-war capabilities, did not conceal their alarm. A number of unofficial reports of official intelligence estimates claimed that the Soviet Union was capable of possessing at least three times as many ICBM's as the United States by 1962 or 1963, and Secretary of Defense McElroy was said to have conceded the possibility of this ratio.[2] From this alleged possibility many concluded that before the

late 1960's, when the United States was expected to have quantities of operational solid-fuel missiles placed in protected or mobile bases on land (the Minuteman) and on concealed and mobile bases at sea (the Polaris), the Soviet Union would probably have the capacity to launch a surprise attack that could knock out enough of America's retaliatory power to spare the Russian homeland from unacceptable damage. Military specialists with access to classified information elaborated the complicated mathematics of strategic striking power in the missile age to show what a "delicate balance of terror" America's security against a Soviet "first strike" would depend upon during the critical period of the "missile gap" in the late 1960's, when the Soviet Union would have an impressive numerical advantage in operational ICBM's and the United States would still depend chiefly upon the bombers of the Strategic Air Command.[3]

The administration responded to these critical alarms by assuring the country that, although there might be a temporary "missile gap"—that is, a numerical lead in Soviet over American ICBM's—there would be no "deterrent gap," because American retaliatory power depended, not only upon ICBM's, but upon a variety of strategic weapons systems, including a superior bombing force, which would readily compensate for the missile gap until the United States acquired numerous solid-fuel, mobile, land- and sea-based missiles.[4] Adherents of this position also maintained that before the latter half of the 1960's, even if the Russians did obtain a three-to-one numerical advantage, they would not be sufficiently confident of the reliability of their missiles nor of their mastery of the complicated task of co-ordinating a massive instantaneous salvo to undertake such a fateful act at a tolerable risk of failure.[5] Then, in late 1959, the administration announced that revised intelligence estimates—evidently based largely on radar and plane observations of a very low rate of ICBM test firings[6]—indicated that the Soviet Union probably would not produce nearly as many ICBM's as, theoretically, she might have been capable of producing and that, therefore, the government did not expect the

estimated Soviet missile superiority to reach a three-to-one ratio. Furthermore, by the end of 1960 the administration could point to the imminent operational status of the first of several squadrons of submarine-launched Polaris missiles; the operational status of the land-based intercontinental Atlas and its remarkable accuracy (an average two-mile "circle of error probability" under testing conditions); the imminent "hardening" of ICBM bases; the development of electronic and other countermeasures to maintain SAC's ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses; the development of air-launched ballistic missiles; and the deployment before 1962 of new forward radar missile warning systems (especially BMEWS), to be followed by the early-warning and surveillance satellites Midas and Samos.

The critics, in rebuttal, pointed to the comparable accuracy of Russia's ICBM's; her probable achievement of a considerable numerical advantage in operational ICBM's before enough of the solid-fuel and mobile Polaris and Minuteman missiles would become operational to offset them; the vulnerability, in the meantime, of the liquid-fuel, slow-firing, stationary Atlas and Titan; the superiority of Soviet civil- and air-defense measures; the vulnerability of SAC bases and the large percentage of planes that remained on the ground; the absence of early-warning devices during the critical period of the missile gap; and the danger of basing estimates of Soviet ICBM's on calculations of "intentions" rather than capabilities.

And so the missile debate went on, becoming more deeply enmeshed in technical data and speculative calculations, which failed to provide any clear-cut basis of judging where truth lay amidst the disputed mathematics of the balance of terror—until the missile-gap alarms subsided shortly after the presidential election. Yet, from the standpoint of America's contribution to the security of the NATO area, the very terms of the debate about the purported missile gap were more revealing and more disturbing than the assertions and counterassertions about the technical data involved. From this standpoint the most significant aspect of the debate was that it was waged, on both sides, almost entirely in terms of America's ability to deter a direct

assault upon the United States (that is, in terms of "passive deterrence"), to the virtual exclusion of any consideration of America's ability to deter aggressions upon her allies (which is the objective of "active deterrence").

There could be no more convincing indication of the serious depreciation of the credibility of America's strategic power as a means of responding to aggressions in Western Europe, even in the eyes of the government that still proclaimed its determination to meet such aggression with nuclear retaliation. For in defending the adequacy of America's strategic nuclear striking force, the American government defined the requirements of this force entirely in relation to the objective of passive deterrence, which depends upon a second-strike capability, and thereby implicitly conceded that this striking force was not designed to meet what would soon be the far more demanding requirements of active deterrence, which depends upon a first-strike capability.* The momentous implications of this strategic emphasis for America's nuclear strategy in Europe, for her monopoly of nuclear control within the alliance, and for the strategy of NATO's shield must be understood in the light of the diverse requirements of deterrence in the missile age.

2. THE REQUIREMENTS OF PASSIVE DETERRENCE

Essentially, passive deterrence—in this context the deterrence of a direct Soviet attack on the United States—requires convincing a potential aggressor that one can inflict unacceptable damage upon him on a second, or retaliatory, strike. As insurance beyond this, especially to prevent uncontrolled destruction and an adverse bargaining position in the event of a failure

* In contemporary strategic semantics "first strike" and "second strike" are used in a special sense to distinguish between the initial use of nuclear weapons and the retaliatory use in response to an initial use. Repeated official disavowals of an American first-strike strategy during the Eisenhower administration referred to the initiation of nuclear blows "out of the blue," not to the initiation of nuclear blows in response to aggression. This semantic ambiguity tended to conceal the fact that the United States and NATO were ostensibly committed to a first-strike strategy, in the special sense, in order to defer "major" aggressions in Europe.

of deterrence, some "counterforce" capability* is essential in order not to be compelled to strike only at a fixed number of cities and industrial facilities while the enemy has a large enough capability to strike at some military installations in addition to the major civilian targets.†

At one time, perhaps as late as 1960, it was feasible and conceivably useful for the United States to have a counterforce capability of quite a different sort for passive deterrence: one that could actually blunt a massive Soviet nuclear attack by a pre-emptive blow or, after an attack, win the war by knocking out the enemy's war-making capacity—his striking weapons, command centers, and supporting logistics. But when both the United States and the Soviet Union can be expected to have hundreds of dispersed, hard-based, mobile, and concealed long-range missiles—by 1965 or so—there will be no sense in trying to gain a passive deterrent capability designed either to blunt

* I use "counterforce" capability here in the narrow sense of strategic weapons designed to destroy or damage the opponent's strategic striking power.

† Along with the moral opprobrium attached to a strategy that aims exclusively to inflict unacceptable civilian damage and the immorality as well as irrationality of a strategy of uncontrolled destruction, the great disadvantage of a strategy designed only to annihilate a fixed number of civilian targets is that it would preclude the expedient of responding to nuclear attacks on military targets by countermilitary attacks. Such a response might be the only way to prevent a limited nuclear attack—for example, one springing from miscalculation or accident or the escalation of a more limited conflict—from becoming total. It might also be the only way to prevent the Soviet Union from striking first at American military targets and then extorting surrender under the threat of completely disarming America's strategic force and devastating all of her major cities if she struck at Russian cities with the minimum force remaining. In any case, since the exact nature of a general war or of any war involving strategic nuclear strikes is not predictable, it would be prudent to be prepared to fight a war in which intercontinental nuclear exchanges could be directed at military rather than purely civilian targets, while the residual capacity of the belligerents to obliterate each other's major cities served as an ultimate sanction to limit and terminate the war short of an irretrievable catastrophe for both. The most thorough criticism of "finite" or "minimum" deterrence and the most notable case for the utility of counterforce capability and civil defense in a post-attack situation is Herman Kahn's *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), especially pp. 7–116, 138 ff. However, Kahn's argument for counterforce insurance is directed chiefly toward the need for a credible first-strike strategy. For an equally cogent analysis of the uses of counterforce blows in a second-strike strategy, see Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 63 ff.

an imminent attack with a pre-emptive blow or to "win the war" through protracted nuclear exchanges. These objectives, barring some truly spectacular unilateral technological innovation, will simply be technically, not to say economically, unfeasible; for one could not even be sufficiently confident of locating the major targets of a pre-emptive strike, and an effort to destroy the enemy's war-making capacity would produce a self-defeating spasm of uncontrolled mutual destruction.

So let us assume that America's chief objective, for the purpose of passive deterrence, is to have a convincing capability to inflict unacceptable second-strike damage on the Soviet Union by controlled nuclear retaliation. What damage will the Kremlin regard as unacceptable? If the objective of a premeditated offensive strike (as distinguished from a pre-emptive strike) were to eliminate the United States as a serious obstacle to Soviet hegemony—and it is difficult to imagine the Soviet Union undertaking the costs of a strategic nuclear war for a lesser objective—conceivably Soviet leaders might be willing to accept tremendous damage if they were quite sure of achieving their objective, although probably not so substantial as to destroy Russia's great-power status in relation to other nations, including Communist China. Since even Khrushchev probably does not know exactly what this minimum level of acceptable retaliatory damage would be in advance of the particular political circumstances that might move him to launch a surprise attack, it is prudent not to assume that the Kremlin would be deterred by anything less than the destruction of at least thirty of Russia's major cities and industrial complexes.

The adequacy of such a second-strike capability will depend heavily upon its degree of invulnerability; that is, its ability to escape or survive a first strike and to strike back. As the accuracy, reliability, penetrating power, and numbers of enemy missiles increase, concealment and mobility will be the most useful attributes of invulnerability.

Conceivably, by the latter half of the 1960's both the United States and the Soviet Union might achieve sufficiently invulnerable second-strike capabilities to compel each other to con-

clude that it would be materially infeasible or economically disadvantageous to build first-strike capabilities sufficient to confine the other's second-strike to an acceptable level of damage, while, at the same time, both would be confident of maintaining adequate retaliatory power to deter the other from striking first. In this case, the strategic arms race would nevertheless continue, especially qualitatively and in research and development; but the objective of the strategic nuclear powers in this race would then clearly be, not the achievement of a first-strike capability, but rather the maintenance of a second-strike capability against the danger of the adversary's achieving a sudden offensive or defensive advantage that would upset the balance.

Already, by 1959, major spokesmen of the United States Army and Navy had concluded that the United States could not afford to pursue a sufficiently credible first-strike counterforce capability but should concentrate, instead, upon achieving an invulnerable second-strike capability and a larger capacity for local resistance.[7] Moreover, there were signs in 1960 that Soviet leaders were as preoccupied with an invulnerable second-strike capability as the American government. On January 14, the day after Secretary of Defense Gates assured the House Committee on Appropriations that there was no "deterrent gap" because "even a surprise attack by all the missiles the Soviets could muster would not suffice to destroy enough of our retaliatory strike forces to enable him to make a rational decision to attack,"[8] Premier Khrushchev assured the Supreme Soviet that Russia's striking force was adequate for the same reason.

In this speech Khrushchev maintained that missiles and nuclear warheads had become the decisive weapons in warfare (an emphasis subsequently supplanted by a re-emphasis on balanced forces) and that Soviet missile strength and nuclear firepower more than compensated for his announced reduction of 1,200,000 men in the Soviet forces. He conceded that in the event of a general war Russia "would suffer heavy misfortune, would sustain great losses of life"; but he avowed his confidence that, even if some capitalist states were to gain parity with

Russia in modern armaments, they would not rationally launch a first strike, because the Soviet Union had a sufficiently secure retaliatory missile force—by virtue of dispersion, camouflage, and duplication of missiles assigned to targets—to "literally wipe the country or countries that attack us off the face of the earth."[9] It is true that Khrushchev, while proclaiming that the West's first-strike capability had been neutralized, did not explicitly renounce a *Soviet* first strike, but neither did he denigrate the capacity of the capitalist states to maintain an adequate second-strike force. Rather, he conceded that, hypothetically, they might gain "parity" with Russia and that, in any case, Russia would suffer immensely in a nuclear war.

In fact, for several years Soviet spokesmen had been saying that nuclear war would inflict grievous losses on the Communist camp, even though communism would survive and capitalism would perish. But in 1960 this significant admission received new emphasis. For example, the Party's theoretical monthly, *Kommunist* (September, 1960), declared that

> the working class cannot conceive of the creation of a Communist civilization on the ruins of world centers of culture, on desolated land contaminated with thermonuclear fallout, which would be an inevitable consequence of such a war. For some peoples the question of socialism would in general cease to exist: they would physically vanish from the planet. It is thus clear that a present-day nuclear war in itself can in no way be a factor that would accelerate revolution and bring the victory of socialism closer. On the contrary, it would hurl mankind, the world revolutionary workers' movement, and the cause of the building of socialism and Communism back by many decades.[10]

In October, 1960, the leading Soviet military theorist General Nicolai A. Talenski, writing in a prominent Soviet magazine on foreign affairs, indorsed this proposition and reaffirmed Premier Khrushchev's analysis of its strategic implications. In a nuclear war, he contended, "the world population would be reduced by one-half . . . the most active, capable, and civilized portion of mankind would be wiped out . . . the material and technical basis for life would be destroyed . . . humanity would be thrown back and its way to Communism would become immensely longer." Therefore, Talenski concluded, in effect, that no power

could derive an advantage from a surprise attack: "The 'saturation level' of nuclear weapons, their disposition, and methods of using them are at present such that the attacked country would always be left with sufficient nuclear means to inflict a counterblow of sufficient proportions to cause tremendous losses and destruction."[11]

The disutility, for Communists as well as capitalists, of a general nuclear war (the only kind of nuclear war that Soviet doctrine acknowledged) was again affirmed in the statement issued by the representatives of eighty-one world Communist parties meeting in Moscow in November, 1960, and in Khrushchev's discussion of this statement in a speech to a meeting of Soviet Communist party organizations on January 6, 1961. The Moscow statement declared:

> Monstrous means of mass annihilation and destruction have developed which, if used in a new war, can cause unheard-of destruction to entire countries and reduce key centers of world industry and culture to ruins. Such a war would bring death and suffering to hundreds of millions of people, among them people in countries not involved in it.[12]

Khrushchev elaborated this proposition in terms of the explosive power and the probable number of deaths resulting from H-bombs dropped on major cities, thereby giving the greatest detail on nuclear destruction that any Soviet leader had yet made public. Although he used Western figures concerning American and British damage in a nuclear war, he did not claim that the Soviet Union would be exempt from comparable damage. Rather, he asserted that nuclear war would not even "spare the people in the countries not directly subjected to the bombing; in particular, millions would die as a result of radiation." Inserting the orthodox Soviet qualification, he said, "We know that if the imperialist madmen were to begin a world war, the peoples would wipe out capitalism." But he added, "We know that the first to suffer in the event of war would be the working people and their vanguard—the working class."[13]

Communist statements about Soviet missile strength at the

beginning of the 1960's were generally made in the context of asserting that, as Khrushchev put it, "The present balance of world forces enables the socialist camp and the other peace forces for the first time in history to set themselves the entirely realistic task of forcing the imperialists to refrain, for fear of seeing their system destroyed, from starting a world war."[14] Significantly, there was no attempt by Khrushchev or his military spokesmen to deny that the military calculus that gave the Soviet Union the power to deter a first strike also gave the West the power to deter a Soviet first strike. Moreover, in 1961 there were no signs that the Soviet Union was undertaking the tremendous missile program that would be needed to acquire an adequate first-strike capability, while there were many signs that her civilian and military leaders understood the requirements of such a capability as well as did Western leaders.

Therefore, at the beginning of the 1960's it seemed very likely that both the United States and the Soviet Union would refrain from trying to build first-strike capabilities adequate to confine retaliatory damage to an acceptable level or second-strike capabilities designed to win the war through protracted strategic counterforce exchanges. Instead, they would probably content themselves with invulnerable second-strike forces adequate for passive deterrence, plus counterforce insurance. This would mean the achievement of that nuclear stalemate that Churchill envisioned in 1955—a "stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation"—although it would probably not lead to complete "saturation," as he called the hypothetical state of nuclear weapons sufficiency; for invulnerability would continually be threatened by technological innovation.

However, as Churchill foresaw, this kind of nuclear stalemate—that is, stable mutual passive deterrence—would not diminish the threat of Soviet aggression upon America's allies, especially aggression of a non-nuclear, limited, and ambiguous nature. In fact, it would tend to encourage such aggression in proportion to Soviet assurance that the United States would not respond with a nuclear attack. So stability of passive deterrence would tend to create instability of active deterrence insofar as

active deterrence depended upon the threat of nuclear retaliation. In this way the onset of the missile age aggravated NATO's most serious strategic deficiency: the lack of a sizable conventional limited-war capability.

3. THE REQUIREMENTS OF ACTIVE DETERRENCE

One American reaction to the onset of the missile age—most marked in the Air Force—was to try to maintain the viability of the dominant strategy of "massive retaliation" by enlarging America's counterforce capability. However, this effort ran counter to the prevailing psychology of deterrence and to the technical and economic limitations upon a first-strike strategic striking force.

Theoretically, as a minimum condition, active nuclear deterrence—that is, the deterrence of aggressions upon others by the threat of nuclear attack upon the aggressor—requires a capability to knock out enough enemy retaliatory power to confine one's damage to acceptable levels, unless one can unilaterally develop a substantial defense against incoming missiles (which seems quite improbable, if only because of the relative ease with which the enemy could develop counter-antimissile measures). A comprehensive civil defense program would be a logical concomitant of such a capability.

But will not anything approaching the destruction of thirty or more of America's major cities be considered an unacceptable price to pay for punishing even a "major" aggression in Europe? If so, by the late 1960's a first-strike capability adequate to prevent such damage will require such a vast and effective counterforce capability as to be technically and economically infeasible. For as the numbers, accuracy, dispersion, mobility, concealment, and protection—in short, the relative invulnerability—of Soviet long-range missiles increase (as they must, if only to neutralize America's first-strike capability), it will become prohibitively difficult for the United States to possess the intelligence data and the striking force to give her sufficient assurance of substantially blunting Russia's retaliatory salvos. At the same time, the effort to acquire such a capability

would lead to an immensely expensive and, possibly, unstabilizing arms race, if only because both sides would be anxious to protect the threatened invulnerability of their second-strike forces. In any case, even a technically adequate counterforce capability would not guarantee deterrence of a great variety of aggressions upon America's allies, for even when the United States enjoyed a virtual monopoly of nuclear striking power, the credibility of an American first strike began to decline under the influence of growing American and allied inhibitions against nuclear warfare.

The United States might still maintain an adequate first-strike capability if she could safely rely upon either a strategy of limited nuclear war or graduated nuclear reprisals against attacks upon her allies. But, even though these strategies may be credible deterrents and rational responses against Soviet nuclear attacks upon America's allies, they will be no substitute for conventional resistance against conventional attacks. We have already discussed the difficulties and disadvantages of a strategy of limited nuclear resistance. A strategy of graduated nuclear reprisals—that is, a strategy of striking a limited number of selected targets as a means of imposing disproportionate costs in a bargaining process leading to a political settlement[15]—would be no more efficacious as a response to any but the most overt and massive conventional aggression, considering the difficulties of co-operating with the Soviet Union in controlled nuclear reprisals and counterreprisals and the political and psychological liabilities of explicitly relying upon such a strategy.

Therefore, at the onset of the missile age effective active deterrence seemed bound to depend primarily, if not exclusively, upon local resistance forces capable of denying the aggressor the attainment of his immediate objective at an acceptable cost to the defender, rather than upon nuclear forces designed to disarm the aggressor, blunt his attack, or inflict unacceptable damage upon him. If the creation of such denial forces might somewhat hasten the declining credibility of active nuclear deterrence, that would be a price worth paying for relieving one's

self of depending upon an obsolescent strategy. On the other hand, if the West neglected its limited-war capabilities, it would remain dependent upon active nuclear deterrence while it lost the first-strike capability required to make its strategy plausible. For this reason, probably the greatest threat to the stability of the military balance in the 1960's, given NATO's lack of local-resistance capabilities, would be limited aggression, which might escalate into unlimited destruction.

Of course, American forces that were incapable of knocking out enough of Russia's second-strike capability on a first strike to confine her retaliatory damage to an acceptable level might nevertheless be an adequate deterrent against aggressions upon the allies, since the potential aggressor might place a very low value on the pursuit of his objectives by military means, in the light of attractive alternative non-military courses of action. As NATO entered its second decade it was generally assumed that the Soviet Union did place some such low value upon military aggression in the NATO area, as she concentrated upon the opportunities for non-military aggrandizement or local "national-liberation wars" outside the area.* However, even if this was a correct estimate, it was dangerous to assume that the Kremlin would not, under changed circumstances—for example, the frustration of Soviet designs in the "zone of peace" or pressure for a more adventurous policy from China or elements within the Soviet Union itself—decide to exploit opportunities for military probes even in Europe, if the "relationship of forces" appeared sufficiently advantageous. The Soviet nuclear

* In his speech in Moscow on January 6, 1961, Khrushchev condemned "world wars" and "local wars" (that is, limited wars between states, waged by the "imperialists," like the Suez War of 1956). He said that world wars could be deterred and that local wars must either be deterred or nipped in the bud by Soviet intervention. But he declared that "national-liberation wars," as in Viet Nam and Algeria, "are not only justified, they are inevitable." "The Communists," he said, "support just wars of this kind wholeheartedly and without reservations and they march in the van of the peoples fighting for liberation," while the imperialists are deterred from directly intervening in such wars by the threat of Chinese and Soviet intervention and the danger that the fighting could develop into a world war (text in *World Marxist Review* [London], for January, 1961, reprinted in *Two Communist Manifestoes* [Washington: The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1961], pp. 48–52).

striking force, which in 1960 might be intended only to deter the United States from launching a massive nuclear strike could, in 1965, embolden the Russians to assume large risks of limited war. In any case, they will be tempted to test Western resolution by limited and ambiguous incursions short of military aggression, and they will certainly try to exploit any deficiency in America's active deterrent capabilities diplomatically and psychologically by convincing America's allies that their dependence on the United States leaves them no choice between catastrophe and capitulation.

4. THE REQUIREMENTS OF MUTUAL ASSURANCE

The onset of the missile age also emphasized another danger that conspired against the efficacy of active nuclear deterrence: the danger of a Soviet defensive first strike, delivered because of a misapprehension of an American first strike. For in order to offset this danger the United States would have to be more concerned about assuring the Russians that it would *not* strike first than about convincing them that it would.

Underlying a growing concern about this new threat to the stability of military deterrence was the anticipation that the United States and the Soviet Union would soon have quantities of long-range missiles of great accuracy and speed, which they might launch, with no more warning than electronics could provide, in a surprise attack that would cripple the other's capability to retaliate effectively. The potential victim of such an attack, to the extent that his striking force was vulnerable, would have to react to a warning of attack as quickly as possible in order to preserve his second-strike capability or, perhaps, to blunt the attack by a pre-emptive blow. Yet, at best, the United States and the Soviet Union could receive scarcely thirty minutes' warning from the time of launching. The reduction of reaction time, in turn, would increase the possibility that the imagined victim might feel compelled to launch a defensive first strike because he mistakenly believed that the adversary was about to launch or had already launched a first strike on him. Such a misapprehension would be most likely to

arise from a misinterpretation of warning information, especially during the tension of an international crisis or a limited war.

Like so many other hypothetical military contingencies with which we have no concrete experience, this one seems more logical than likely. But is it so unlikely that, considering its disastrous consequences, one can afford not to plan strategy and capabilities so as to prevent it? That is the insistent question confronting the whole spectrum of military planning. At least a Soviet defensive first strike of this nature seems more likely than the offensive strike "out of the blue"—the Pearl Harbor attack—with which the public debate on the "missile gap" or "deterrent gap" was preoccupied. Nothing that we know of Soviet foreign policy or military thought, or of the trend of the cold war, supports the implicit assumption behind much of this debate that the Kremlin takes such a desperate view of its opportunities for advancement through "peaceful coexistence" and such an optimistic view of its capacity to escape disastrous damage in a general nuclear war as to assume the risks of launching a knock-out blow against the United States on a problematical calculation that Russia's costs might be confined to a certain number of "mega-bodies" or obliterated—even if evacuated—cities. On the other hand, a strategic force perfectly adequate for deterring a Soviet offensive blow would not necessarily deter a defensive strike launched in anticipation of an imminent or actual American attack. For any nation that believed it was about to receive a massive nuclear attack would be under great pressure to launch its striking force before it was hit. Considering America's and NATO's announced strategy of meeting conventional attacks with nuclear retaliation, while both American and Soviet leaders denied the possibility of limiting nuclear warfare, one should not dismiss the danger that Russia might strike first out of fear of being struck first herself, especially during a limited war.

The appearance of a doctrine of pre-emptive attack in Soviet military writings in 1955 lent further credence to the possibility of a Soviet defensive strike.[16] Although some military specialists interpreted this pre-emptive doctrine as the guise for an

offensive knock-out strategy, it seems more plausible, in the light of the Soviet preference and opportunities for less drastic forms of offensive action, to suppose that it was aimed, as stated, at deterring or blunting an American first strike, which the doctrine of massive retaliation proclaimed and which NATO strategy embodied.

For that matter, although a pre-emptive doctrine received only partial and unofficial support in American military and civilian circles, the government's frequently proclaimed fear of a Pearl Harbor strike suggests that one cannot dismiss the danger that the United States might also feel compelled during some intense crisis to launch a defensive first strike on the basis of information suggesting an imminent Soviet attack.

Therefore, although neither major nuclear power might wish to launch an offensive first strike, their forthcoming reliance upon long-range missiles created a danger that either might launch a defensive first strike on the misapprehension that the adversary was about to strike first, perhaps because he too feared a surprise attack. The attempt to mitigate this danger led beyond passive deterrence to a strategy of mutual assurance; that is, to a military posture which aims to prevent a first strike by providing potential adversaries with mutual assurance that neither has launched or intends to launch a first strike. Clearly, the search for means to assure the adversary that one will *not* strike first tends to undermine the credibility of active nuclear deterrence, which depends upon convincing the adversary that one *will* strike first.

Officially and unofficially, a number of measures—some unilateral and some requiring international agreement—were suggested to enhance mutual assurance against surprise attack.[17] The most obvious unilateral measure is to abstain from the kind of mobilization, deployments, and maneuvers that might suggest that one is contemplating the initiation of nuclear warfare, such as taking pre-attack civil defense measures or flying formations of bombers across Soviet radar screens.*

* The Air Force argued for the continued utility of manned bombers in the missile age partly on the ground that in an air-borne alert they could serve as a

Other unilateral measures would be designed to minimize the chance of touching off nuclear exchanges through miscalculation, accident, or unintentional provocation by developing a second-strike capability that does not depend on a quick, irrevocable, and total reaction to warning of a surprise attack. Essentially, what is needed is a second-strike capability so invulnerable and so susceptible to central control that one need not use it precipitantly or totally—a capability that will relieve a state of the necessity for having such a quick trigger finger as to preclude a thorough and cautious appraisal of the existence or source, scope, and intention of an enemy attack before delivering a controlled counterstrike. Patent invulnerability would compel a state contemplating a defensive first strike to interpret the adversary's *probable* intentions extremely conservatively in the light of the *certainty* of his ability to inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage. It would also avoid giving the impression, which might be conveyed by a vulnerable striking force, that one's striking power was intended *only* to deliver a first strike because it would be useless for a second strike. Moreover, if an enemy strike did occur, an invulnerable second-strike capability that permitted deliberation could at least hold open the possibility of ending hostilities short of a catastrophic sequence of unrestrained nuclear exchanges, which might otherwise be virtually automatic.* As the numbers, accuracy, reliability, and

---

visible sign on Communist radar screens of American preparedness. Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White conceded that this act might be provocative, in that it could suggest that the United States was launching a first strike (testimony on February 3, 1960, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, Missiles, Space and Other Major Defense Matters,* 86 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 137–38). Herman Kahn has argued for a "Preattack Mobilization Base" and a program to evacuate urban populations to fall-out protection partly on the ground that, quickly activated, they would make an American first strike more credible in a tense situation (*On Thermonuclear War* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960]). These examples suggest the difficulty of reconciling a first-strike strategy with mutual assurance against a first strike. The problem is to make a first strike credible enough to restrain the adversary and enhance one's bargaining power but not so credible as to provoke the adversary to strike first himself.

* Of course, it can be argued that the longer the United States took to deliberate about retaliatory blows, the less certain an unacceptable retaliatory blow would become and the better the Soviet bargaining position would be; and that,

penetrating power of missiles increase, concealment and mobility will be not only the most effective attributes of invulnerability; they will also be less provocative than increasing the numbers of missiles and bombers, since they will not so directly threaten the invulnerability of the adversary's striking force.

Let us follow the logic of this position further: If invulnerability were based on sufficient concealment and mobility, as well as upon hardened bases, dispersion, and diversity of strategic weapons systems, the United States would not need to rely so heavily upon early-warning devices, which would be subject to technical failure and misinterpretation and which would put a premium upon quick reaction. With an invulnerable second-strike capability of this kind the United States could be so confident of her retaliatory force surviving a first strike and delivering unacceptable damage in return that she could further reduce the danger of a defensive surprise attack by explicitly renouncing recourse to a pre-emptive blow and publicly adopting a policy of not launching missiles until hostile missiles had actually struck her territory or bases. She might also ask the Russians to adopt the same restraints. Even if the Russians did not reciprocate or did not trust the American renunciation, the policy would be a considerable safeguard against the United States precipitating an all-out nuclear exchange by miscalculation, accident, or (if a number of states had nuclear weapons) anonymous or pseudonymous attack.

Pursuing the rationale of mutual assurance against surprise attack even further, the United States might explicitly renounce a first-strike strategy as an instrument of active as well as passive deterrence—at least to the extent of declaring that she would

---

therefore, an instantaneous and automatic massive retaliatory blow is the most effective deterrent. Theoretically, this is true, although, actually, it seems extremely improbable that the Soviet Union, faced with an obvious American capability to deliver unacceptable retaliatory damage, would strike first in the expectation of securing a bargaining advantage in a limited nuclear exchange. But, in any case, whatever deterrent advantage might have to be sacrificed by renouncing instantaneous, automatic, all-out retaliation, would be well worth the compensating reduction in the risk of miscalculation and provocation and the increase in rational control of strategic nuclear blows.

use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union only if Soviet nuclear weapons were used against her or her *allies*. To renounce the first use of nuclear weapons in these terms might, in fact, enhance the credibility of a promise to use them in response to nuclear attacks upon allies. She might then seek Soviet indorsement of this policy of self-denial and even make it the subject of an international resolution. To further enhance the credibility of such a renunciation the United States could make it as obvious as possible—for example, by conspicuously foregoing or disclosing certain weapons and their deployment—that she did not possess and did not intend to acquire the kind of capabilities that would be useful for a first strike. Thus, instead of undertaking an ambitious and possibly unstabilizing program of satellite reconnaissance, designed to discover military installations and deployments, the United States might publicly renounce the use of such satellites and invite Soviet inspectors to verify the renunciation.

Consistent with the logic of mutual assurance, the United States might also unilaterally grant the potential *aggressor* an invulnerable second-strike capability—especially since it will be extremely difficult to prevent this anyway. For, logically, mutual assurance is served as well by the adversary's possession as by one's own possession of the kind of striking force that permits the conservative appraisal of intentions, obviates the need for a trigger-quick response, and avoids a provocative posture. It follows that any American capability or action that threatens the invulnerability of Russia's striking power—like great counterforce capabilities, aerial reconnaissance, or harassment of Soviet communications, radar, or missile-launching submarines —works against the stability of the nuclear stalemate. It may not be easy to develop an adequate second-strike capability that would be obviously inadequate for a rational first strike, but the effort demands, at the least, that second-strike capabilities should be maintained by increasing one's own invulnerability, not by trying to decrease the enemy's.

The practical advantage of all these unilateral measures of mutual assurance against surprise attack is that they do not

necessarily require the formal collaboration of the adversary in order to achieve their purpose, yet most of them could be the object of an appeal for informal reciprocity based on mutual interest. The complexity and uncertainty of the requirements of deterrence, the dynamic nature of military technology, and the existence of a deep-seated political conflict render any military "co-operation" or mutual restraint between potential belligerents rudimentary, fragile, and tentative. Therefore, the promotion of reciprocal restraints requires the flexibility of informal and tacit agreements, which can be formed, altered, or abandoned without involving the prestige or good faith of the parties too directly. If the West has a suitable second-strike and limited-resistance capability, what is needed to consolidate a basis of mutual interest in avoiding defensive first strikes at this stage of the cold war is not complicated formal schemes of co-operation, verification, and sanctions but, rather, the development of simple, obvious, and reliable informal restraints and the cultivation of purposeful communication between the potential belligerents.[18] Formal procedures, in proportion to their elaborateness, are likely only to multiply the opportunities for, and therefore the suspicions of, both sides dissembling their intentions and manipulating the modes of co-operation for hostile purposes. If only because of their high rate of technological obsolescence, elaborate international inspection and surveillance schemes would be peculiarly susceptible to subversion or simple misunderstanding, so that, in proportion to the co-operation they required, they might actually incite the fear and suspicion they were intended to allay. Nevertheless, one cannot exclude the possibility that there may be mutually acceptable formal bilateral and multilateral agreements that would incorporate adequate methods of disclosure and verification and yet contain sufficient safeguards against deception and subversion to enhance mutual assurance against surprise attack.[19]

But whatever the desirability and feasibility of formal or informal agreements for arms control may be, the point to be made here is that before the West commits itself uncritically to

the logic of mutual assurance, it must examine the full implications of the objective itself and recognize that carrying it to its logical extreme would contravene the requirements of active nuclear deterrence and, possibly, even some of the requirements of passive deterrence. If the stability of passive deterrence tends to unstabilize the West's posture of active nuclear deterrence, the mere effort to achieve stable mutual assurance against surprise attack tends to make a first-strike strategy that much more untenable.

If active deterrence depends upon the credibility of one's threat of initiating the use of nuclear weapons against conventional aggressions, and one cannot rely upon limiting nuclear war, the efficacy of this first-strike strategy must certainly depend upon exploiting the advantages of a surprise attack. That is, if there is any advantage in striking first strategically, it must depend on catching the enemy's retaliatory forces unaware and destroying them in a sudden attack. Therefore, only a strategy of active deterrence that does not depend upon the threat of initiating the use of nuclear weapons can be completely compatible with a strategy of providing assurance against surprise attack, unless one can count upon limiting a local tactical nuclear war or a war of strategic nuclear exchanges intended purely for "bargaining" purposes. A nation that wishes to avoid provoking a defensive first strike but does not wish absolutely to renounce its own resort to nuclear war against non-nuclear aggression in extremities must try, somehow, to strike a balance between assuring the adversary that it does *not* intend to strike first in most circumstances and convincing him that it *might* strike first in some circumstances, if only with tactical nuclear weapons. But if at the same time such a nation does not have an adequate capacity to counter conventional aggression without resorting to nuclear weapons, it will de-emphasize its first-strike threat only at the cost of encouraging non-nuclear aggression.

Some measures of mutual assurance might also be incompatible with passive deterrence; for example, those that depend upon the disclosure of strategic forces and their deployment. For, if passive deterrence depends upon an invulnerable second-

strike force, and invulnerability depends upon concealing the location and numbers of one's strategic weapons, measures that reveal the location and numbers might actually encourage a surprise attack. This difficulty would be only partially mitigated by agreements designed to disclose positive evidence of peaceful intentions by occasional inspections upon mutual request rather than to provide negative evidence by continual surveillance.*

5. THE NEED FOR AN OVER-ALL STRATEGY OF STABILITY

Let us summarize these observations on the diverse requirements of stable deterrence in the missile age. The stability of military deterrence is not an automatic result of the strategic nuclear arms race. On the contrary, the military balance contains inherent elements of instability, which are aggravated by rapid technological change. To mitigate these elements, stability must be achieved in all sectors of the military environment, lest stability in one sector create instability in another. This means that comprehensive stability can be achieved only at the price of foregoing or de-emphasizing some deterrent capabilities and strategies for the sake of a consistent posture of active and passive deterrence. The most significant price must be paid in terms of decreased dependence upon active deterrence by the threat of initiating the use of nuclear weapons, but this price can purchase stability only if it is accompanied by a substantial increase in local-resistance capabilities by non-nuclear means. If

* It would be easier for states occasionally to prove that they were not about to launch a surprise attack than for them continually to provide such negative evidence, without at the same time jeopardizing the invulnerability of their second-strike capability. However, such selective disclosure schemes assume that states will be completely free to choose the occasion for disclosure in order to prove their peaceful intentions. On the contrary, the very existence of the machinery for disclosure would probably create irresistible pressures—upon the United States, at least—to use it during crises at the request of hostile or neutral states, even though this might interfere with one's desire to enhance the credibility of a first strike or to assure the invulnerability of one's passive deterrent at the moment. Yet to refuse to use the machinery during a crisis would probably destroy its future utility and constitute a serious provocation in itself, in addition to creating a presumption of guilt in the eyes of others.

a stable, consistent posture of active and passive deterrence is achieved, the greatest threat to military stability in the missile age will be the possibility of a defensive first strike. The mitigation of this threat requires measures of mutual assurance against surprise attack. But to achieve their purpose of stabilizing the total military environment against armed conflict, these measures must be consistent with the strategies and capabilities of active and passive deterrence, with which they should be integrated within an over-all strategy of stability.

Considering the complexity of the problem of stabilizing the military environment when deterrence is, essentially, a relationship between two nuclear powers, one must expect the diffusion of independent nuclear capabilities to other powers—especially to powers not aligned with the United States—to create instabilities of a new order of magnitude and complexity. However, the momentous military and political consequences of that prospect is a subject in itself, beyond the scope of this discussion.

This discussion should be sufficient to show that, merely in terms of bipolar deterrence, as the "balance of terror" comes to depend increasingly upon numerous long-range missiles, the diverse requirements of deterrence demand that the United States and her allies make a basic decision whether to try to stabilize the military environment by giving up a first-strike counterforce strategy (except, minimally, as insurance in case of the failure of deterrence), by building up NATO's conventional local-resistance capabilities, and by seeking mutual assurances against surprise attacks or whether to try to achieve and maintain such overwhelming nuclear striking power and such effective civil defense and, possibly, active defense against missiles as to obviate the need for building up NATO's local-resistance capabilities by enhancing the credibility of a first strike, at least on a tactical basis. Any compromise between these two positions that is not purely temporary and transitional seems bound to incur the liabilities of both. If the United States does not make this decision with full recognition of the concrete implications of an over-all strategy of stability, it is in grave danger of drifting into the anomalous position of remaining dependent upon a

strategy of active deterrence by nuclear reprisals, while in the name of stability it steadily undermines the credibility of this strategy.

6. THE CONTRADICTIONS IN AMERICAN STRATEGY

At the end of 1960 the American government showed few signs of reconciling the contradictions within its deterrent strategy or the contradictions between its deterrent strategy and its arms control policy. Although it was explicitly concerned with "stabilizing the military environment," it had developed no coherent over-all strategy of stability.

At the onset of the missile age the United States continued to rely primarily upon the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter non-nuclear aggression in the NATO area, for it had declared, in effect, that NATO was dependent upon a nuclear response to any conventional aggression larger than a border incident or a minor probing action and it had denied the possibility of fighting even a *conventional* limited war in the area. Yet President Eisenhower, while proclaiming America's unwillingness—indeed inability—to fight a war of local resistance on the ground and emphasizing his conviction that any war in Europe would become a thermonuclear war, had also declared that such a war would be "self-defeating" and would bring about "the destruction of civilization as we know it."[20]

This declaratory position logically left the United States dependent upon a first-strike strategy for deterring aggression upon her NATO allies, although it is difficult to see what advantage there could be in striking first in a "self-defeating" war. Yet despite certain concessions—chiefly in defense appropriations and in the determination of strategic targets—to the Air Force's appeals for a full-scale win-the-war counterforce strategy,[21] the government did not begin to undertake the massive build up of counterforce capabilities that would soon be necessary to have a chance of knocking out enough of Soviet striking power to confine her retaliatory damage to an acceptable level. Nor did it show interest in the comprehensive civil defense program that

could, theoretically, serve the same purpose. Moreover, as if further to depreciate the credibility of its own declaratory strategy, the administration, in the debates of 1959 and 1960 on the "missile gap" or "deterrent gap," as in the debate on air power in 1956, proposed and defended the size and composition of America's strategic striking power entirely in terms of passive deterrence and a second-strike capability.

At the same time, the Eisenhower administration, to the end, remained adamantly opposed to compensating for the declining credibility of active nuclear deterrence by enlarging local resistance forces. Instead, it remained wedded to the thesis—with which neither the Army, the Navy, or any prominent private student of strategy agreed—that nuclear firepower would compensate for a reduction of mobilized manpower, and that the forces that would prevent a big war would also prevent a small war, since the chances of even a limited war growing into a thermonuclear conflagration would deter all overt military aggression.

Actually, the government's strategy was even more contradictory and ambiguous than this, for it appeared not to have secured a strategic consensus within its own councils, even on the strategy and capabilities of passive deterrence. All administration spokesmen, with the occasional exception of Air Force representatives, appeared to regard the sole objective of a strategic nuclear force as passive deterrence, but the representatives of the military services and the Defense Department actually recommended three different kinds of capabilities and concepts of passive deterrence: "finite" or "minimum" deterrence, finite plus some counterforce insurance, and counterforce capabilities to "win the war."

In January, 1959, Secretary of Defense McElroy defended the adequacy of America's deterrent forces against critics of the "missile gap" entirely in terms of deterring an offensive surprise attack on the United States. For that purpose, he explained, "we have enough retaliatory power remaining after we take losses from a surprise attack so that we can still inflict upon [the aggressor] a degree of destruction that will deter him from

launching the attack in the first place."[22] This implicit description of general deterrent requirements was the same as SAC Commander Curtis LeMay's before the hearings on air power in April, 1956. "A deterrent force," LeMay had said, "is an effective nuclear offensive force which is secure from destruction by the enemy regardless of what offensive and defensive action he takes against it. The striking force is considered effective if it can still inflict unaceptable damage on the enemy."[23] Evidently, both McElroy and LeMay regarded this kind of deterrent force as equally effective against attacks on America's allies, on the theory that the Soviet Union would not attack any NATO power without attacking the United States;[24] but, since no one raised the question of *active* nuclear deterrence, its strategic requirements were not clarified.

Only Secretary of the Air Force Douglas and General Thomas D. White, chief of staff of the Air Force, indicated that the requirements of deterrence differed, depending upon whether the United States were responding to a surprise attack upon its homeland or to an attack on other powers. In the first case the United States "would turn toward the problem of doing the greatest damage possible to the country as a whole," whereas in the second case the first priority would be to destroy the bases from which the aggressor might destroy the United States.[25] However, these Air Force spokesmen did not directly assert that a first-strike strategy was the nation's actual strategy, and they did not explain specifically the different requirements for a first and second strike. Secretary Douglas implied that far fewer missiles would be needed for passive than for active deterrence and said that for passive deterrence the same number of missiles the Soviet Union could be expected to have would constitute a "wholly unnecessary overkill to accomplish your purpose."[26] But in 1956 General LeMay had described second-strike as well as first-strike requirements in terms of eventually gaining control of the air and then winning the war.[27] And in May, 1959, General White seemed to follow this same prescription when he said that an effective deterring posture, implicitly even for a second strike, required forces with the "capacity to

prevail over an enemy" and "selectively and decisively—destroy his military forces and warmaking capacity."[28]

At the other extreme of views on the strategy and capabilities of deterrence, the chiefs of staff of the Navy and Army, Admiral Arleigh Burke and General Maxwell Taylor, testified in 1959 and 1960 in favor of a minimum second-strike capability designed only to inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage by destroying a finite number of civilian targets in the Soviet Union. They said nothing about the requirements of active nuclear deterrence, but implicitly they were in favor of abandoning a first-strike strategy, and explicitly they advocated greater expenditures upon limited-war forces at the expense of the nuclear counterforce capabilities the Air Force was seeking. For the Navy, which saw the Polaris submarine-launched missile as the nucleus of an invulnerable second-strike capability, this conception of minimum deterrence represented a radical shift from the time of the B-36 hearings in 1949, when it had argued against the deterrent strategy of concentrating upon bombing civilian and industrial targets on the grounds that it was ineffective, self-defeating, and immoral. So it was fitting that the Air Force should now adopt the Navy's former arguments and point to the dangers and evils of relying entirely upon countercity instead of counterforce strikes.

At the beginning of the missile debate, in 1957, the Navy had taken the initiative in advocating a strategy of minimum deterrence,[29] but in the congressional hearings of 1959 it was General Taylor who explained most explicitly the requirements of this strategy:

> I would say that it is possible to establish the fact that "X" targets successfully attacked with "Y" megatons is equivalent to the destruction of the enemy. . . . Then, having determined the bombs required on target, you can calculate all the possible losses due to enemy action, aborts, ineffectiveness of the weapons, and so forth, and determine how many delivery vehicles are required.

Taking account of a factor of safety, one would then arrive at the requirements of a strategic nuclear striking force.[30] On the basis of this kind of calculation, both he and Admiral Burke

reached the conclusion that the United States was already "overinsured" in strategic retaliatory power, because the United States could "destroy" Russia "many times over" with the weapons she then possessed[31]—although in other contexts General Taylor saw an urgent need for restoring the mobility (under Army control) of the IRBM Jupiter in order to forestall an emerging missile gap,[32] and Admiral Burke stressed the importance of speeding the 40-submarine Polaris program for the same reason.

Whereas Taylor and Burke believed that the United States either had achieved, or readily could achieve, sufficiency in her second-strike capability, they held that the Soviet Union had already achieved, if not sufficiency, at least a measure of invulnerability in her second-strike capability that no American counterforce capability could vitiate.[33] And General Taylor's successor, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, said that the period in which both the Communist and free world would have a "virtually indestructible nuclear capability" was near at hand.[34]

In response to this attack upon a counterforce capability, Air Force spokesmen charged that Polaris was not invulnerable, that no one, including Khrushchev, knew what retaliatory damage would be unacceptable, that the delicate balance of striking power might easily tilt so as to induce the Soviet Union to launch a first strike, and that a strategy of finite deterrence would be immoral and dangerous because it would deprive the United States of the important option of striking at military targets instead of civilian centers. Yet, like Army and Navy spokesmen, they justified their appeals for weapons and appropriations chiefly in terms of achieving an invulnerable passive deterrent force. Thus General Thomas S. Power, commander of SAC, appealed for a continuous air-borne alert and appropriations for the B-70 bomber as essential contributions to the "survivability" of America's second-strike force. Although he believed that the Soviet-American nuclear balance was currently only in a state of "nuclear stalemate," in which the Kremlin might dare to attack, rather than in a state of "nuclear impasse," in which neither side would have an advantage in striking first,

he said that American security demanded reaching the latter state as rapidly as possible.[35] Only General White alluded to other functions of a strategic striking force. Although his statement of the requirements of deterrence, submitted in the hearings of January, 1960, started by discussing deterrence entirely in terms of passive deterrence, two of his specific objections to finite deterrence were set forth in terms of active deterrence. Finite deterrence, he said, disregarded "the possibility of reaction on our part to strategic warning"—a clear reference to a pre-emptive strike on Soviet bases—and conflicted with "broad national policy objectives" that depended on supporting America's allies without leaving the United States subject to a direct attack by unimpaired Soviet striking power—a clear reference to the original strategy of massive retaliation.[36]

However, the civilian branch of the government did not subscribe to this view of the dependence of allied policy upon active nuclear deterrence. It is true that in these same hearings the new secretary of defense, Thomas S. Gates, said in his written statement that the first objective of America's defense program continued to be "to deter the outbreak of general war by maintaining and improving our present capability to retaliate with devastating effectiveness in case of a major attack upon us *or our allies.*"[37] But in the give and take of discussion he, like his predecessor, defined the "deterrent gap" exclusively in terms of passive deterrence:

> It is the situation when your total deterrent force ceases to be sufficient to deter a potential enemy, as contrasted with a simple numerical comparison of a single weapon. . . . If you can be satisfied that your deterrent power exists, is real, and will survive a surprise attack, regardless of what force he can attack you with, then you have no deterrent gap.[38]

As for the material requirements of deterrence, Gates struck a compromise between the Navy-Army and the Air Force positions. He said that it would be hard to tell exactly what targets the United States would go after in a second strike:

> However, it would be correct to say that in order to maintain a valid deterrent we have to maintain a deterrent force capable

> of knocking out [the aggressor's] military power and not just bombing his cities. What we would actually do depends on circumstances, but we are adjusting our power to a counterforce theory; or a mixture of counterforce theory plus attacks on industrial centers and things of that character. We are not basing our requirements on just bombing Russia for retaliation purposes.[39]

Thus, in effect, the administration seemed to be saying through its secretary of defense that the United States was not overinsured in its strategic striking force, because she needed some counterforce insurance in addition to a countercity capability for a second strike, and that she was not underinsured, because the decisive requirement of deterrence was to be able to deliver unacceptable retaliatory damage after a surprise attack on the United States. Although Gates conceded that the Soviet missile force might enjoy at times "a moderate numerical superiority during the next three years," he said this would not constitute a deterrent gap, because "it is the conclusion of those who have analyzed this matter that even a surprise attack by all the missiles the Soviets could muster would not suffice to destroy enough of our retaliatory strike force to enable him to make a rational decision to attack."[40]

General Nathan Twining, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, voiced an old concern of his when he expressed the fear that charges of a missile gap might "downgrade our capability" so much that "the public will become frightened some day" and the enemy might be encouraged to attack or cause the public to knuckle under to missile-rattling.[41] One does not know how the Russians interpreted the missile debate, but if they interpreted American statements as reflecting the kind of studied indirection they applied in their own esoteric pronouncements, nothing that was said about America's numerical deficiency in missiles could have encouraged them to discount America's threat of nuclear retaliation against aggression in Europe as much as the government's own preoccupation with passive deterrence and a second-strike capability.

More than likely, the American government simply had not managed to resolve the conflicting views and contradictory ele-

ments of its deterrent strategy, and as a result the hiatus was filled by strategic pronouncements more representative of the tactics of service competition for appropriations than of concerted official plans, if any such plans existed. How the United States might actually respond to aggression in Europe might have no more relation to plans and pronouncements than its decision to intervene in the Korean War. Yet, in the absence of a test case, not only the Russians but America's allies were bound to draw their own inferences about her strategy and capabilities, and these inferences might have military and political consequences quite beyond American plans or expectations.

7. THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION'S ARMS CONTROL POLICY

While seeming to abandon by default the pursuit of a first-strike capability suitable for active nuclear deterrence, the administration more indirectly cast doubt upon the viability of its strategy of nuclear retaliation in Europe by stressing in its arms control policy the goal of mutual assurance against surprise attack. It cast doubt upon this strategy, not because there was much likelihood of reaching an agreement with the Russians on arms control or even because such a scheme could actually provide mutual assurance if the Russians did agree to it, but because this position indicated that the government, in its concern about the dangers of surprise attack in the missile age, had turned from stressing its determination to deliver a first strike, as at the time of Dulles' "massive retaliation" pronouncement in 1954, to stressing its common interest with the Russians in allaying fears of a first strike. This radical shift of emphasis represented the culmination of the government's implicit acceptance of the psychology of mutual deterrence, reflecting the condition of parity in second-strike destructive capabilities, in place of the psychology of unilateral deterrence, which had reflected America's monopoly of a nuclear first-strike capability. Sooner or later, the credibility of a first-strike strategy is bound to wither in an atmosphere of mutual deterrence.

Ever since President Eisenhower, at the Geneva "Summit" conference in July, 1955, presented the abortive "open skies" proposal for mutual disclosure of military "blueprints" and mutual photo-reconnaissance over national territory, mutual assurance against surprise attack had been a prominent objective of American arms control proposals. In fact, the government seemed to have reached the conclusion that the best hope for disarmament—that is, the reduction and abolition of arms—was not disarmament at all, strictly speaking, but rather the stabilization of the existing balance of terror by arms control, by measures of surveillance and inspection designed to mitigate the risk of wars springing from miscalculation and the fear of attack. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter gave this objective a new emphasis when, on February 18, 1960, he described America's first goal in disarmament policy as the creation of "a more stable military environment" by reducing the risk of war resulting from miscalculation and from the promiscuous spread of nuclear weapons production. To reduce the danger of surprise attack by miscalculation, Mr. Herter suggested aerial and mobile ground inspection, ground observers both inside and outside the zones of inspection, arrangements for the exchange of information about events in outer space, and armament controls. "If these safeguards are effective," he said, "there will be less chance of one side being moved to surprise attack by a mistaken belief that the military moves of the other side portend such attacks. This danger may be particularly acute in a major international crisis, when tensions are high and both sides are moving to heightened readiness."[42]

In May, 1960, the government seemed prepared to pursue this proposal at another summit conference. When Khrushchev torpedoed that conference, following the shooting down of the American U-2 photo-reconnaissance plane deep over Russian territory, President Eisenhower and his secretary of state said the incident pointed up the urgency of an "open skies" agreement to relieve both sides of the fear of surprise attack, a fear which had compelled the United States to fly over Russian territory.[43]

In September, Eisenhower elaborated Herter's February proposal in an address to the U.N. General Assembly. Explaining its purpose, he said:

> The advent of missiles, with ever-shorter reaction times, makes measures to curtail the danger of war by miscalculation increasingly necessary. States must be able quickly to assure each other that they are not preparing aggressive moves—particularly in international crises, when each side takes steps to improve its own defenses which might be misinterpreted by the other. Such misinterpretation, in the absence of machinery to verify that neither was preparing to attack the other, could lead to a war which no one had intended or wanted.

In order to prevent such a war the President proposed to set up a United Nations surveillance body, which would verify the absence of preparations for surprise attack "when requested by any nation seeking to prove its own peaceful intention." Then, continuing his explanation of the rationale of such machinery, he came close to renouncing active nuclear deterrence altogether. "The United States," he said, "wants the Soviet Union and all the nations of the world to know enough about United States defense preparations to be assured that United States forces exist only for deterrence and defense—not for surprise attack." Moreover, he reaffirmed the danger of military secrecy in such absolute terms as to jeopardize even passive deterrence based upon invulnerability through concealment. "In an age of rapidly developing technology," he asserted, "secrecy is not only an anachronism—it is downright dangerous. To seek to maintain a society in which a military move can be taken in complete secrecy, while professing to reduce the risk of war through arms control, is a contradiction."[44]

In practice, it would be extremely difficult for a surveillance body satisfactorily to verify the absence of preparations for surprise attack, especially where such verification would depend upon revealing the numbers and location of air-borne and sea-borne missiles. In any case, the Russians persisted in regarding any such scheme that was not a part of total disarmament as a mere subterfuge for espionage. Nevertheless, the President's apparent renunciation of the initial use of nuclear weapons by surprise and his virtually unqualified indorsement of the prin-

ciple of mutual assurance through military disclosures were eloquent, if inadvertent, testimony to the obsolescence of the strategy of nuclear retaliation upon which NATO still depended.

8. THE SOVIET VIEW OF STABILITY

At the end of 1960 the United States in its capacity as the leader of the North Atlantic alliance lacked and badly needed an over-all strategy of stability in order to co-ordinate military strategy with arms control and one strategy of deterrence with another. In the absence of such a strategy, NATO could not be expected to resolve its own strategic contradictions and ambiguities, which were largely a reflection of America's military policies. However, an over-all strategy of stability could not properly be formulated merely in terms of the military environment. It would also have to take account of the relation of the military to the political environment. A central element of this relation was the Communist view of stability.

Perhaps, in our conviction of the absurdity or "impossibility" of nuclear war, we tend to exaggerate the autonomous effect of a novel military technology in stabilizing—or, for that matter, unstabilizing—the military environment. After all, military conflicts still arise from political conflicts. They are not created spontaneously by the military configurations of power themselves. Therefore, we should not expect the wisest choice of military deterrents to eliminate all warfare from international relations, especially warfare that springs from political conflicts beyond the control of the major nuclear powers. And, by the same token, we should not expect a common Soviet and American interest in avoiding suicidal war and an unrestricted arms race to engender, by itself, much co-operation in alleviating the political sources of tension and conflict. In short, we should not expect a reversal of the historical relationship between arms and politics, which renders a stable political environment the condition, not the result, of a stable military environment.

For the Soviet Union to accept the complete stability of the military environment would mean for her to give up even the

threat of war as an instrument of policy. But to give up the threat of war would be to accept the political status quo or else to be content to alter it without reference to the prospect of war as an instrument of coercion and persuasion. As Soviet policies, both courses would be directly contrary to Communist doctrine and practice and to the announced expectations and tactics of Khrushchev and all Communist leaders.

As Khrushchev explained to Walter Lippmann in 1958, he thinks of the status quo as the ineluctable process of revolutionary change, which is leading to the steady erosion of Western power, including its vulnerable forward positions in the North Atlantic area.[45] And, as the statement of the eighty-one Communist party representatives in November, 1960, declared, "The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace. Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle, as the revisionists claim. The coexistence of states with different social systems is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism."[46] It is, in Khrushchev's words, "a form of intense economic, political, and ideological struggle between the proletariat and the aggressive forces of imperialism in the world arena."[47] The belief that the Communist bloc is winning this struggle by peaceful means—by sheer economic and scientific progress and appeals to nationalism, neutralism, economic advancement, and peace—makes resort to overt military aggressions like the Korean War unnecessary. In this sense, the vulnerability of the "zone of peace" to Communist pressure and blandishments is the West's greatest deterrent to direct military aggression. However, this situation does not recommend itself as a policy.

Furthermore, the avoidance of direct military aggression does not exclude the indirect and ambiguous support of limited aggression or the political and psychological exploitation of unused military power. Although Khrushchev expects the triumph of the "socialist world system" to come about without war "between states," he considers "national-liberation wars" inevitable and vows to support them. We can take Khrushchev's word for

his avowed determination to avoid general war. To this extent he wants to stabilize the military environment, and perhaps the West may even secure Soviet co-operation in elaborating its mutual interest in this objective through tacit understandings and limited agreements to provide mutual assurance against surprise attack and a counterforce arms race. But this does not mean that Soviet leaders perceive a common interest in stabilizing the military environment as a general goal. On the contrary, they manifest a disturbing new confidence in Russia's military ascendancy, which they are eager to exploit for diplomatic and propagandistic purposes. Apparently, they are uninterested in mollifying the West's fears of nuclear war, at least insofar as those fears spring from the prospect of having to counter lesser Soviet incursions. Rather, they show considerable zest and skill in playing upon these fears in order to divide the Western coalition, intimidate allies who provide strategic bases, undermine the uncertain status quo in the center of Europe, seize the propaganda initiative in disarmament discussions, and present Russia to the uncommitted nations as the champion of peace.*

---

* The importance as an instrument of Soviet policy of keeping alive a sense of instability, springing from the fear of thermonuclear war, can be inferred from the previously cited statement of the eighty-one Communist party representatives of November, 1960, and Khrushchev's speech in January, 1961. According to the statement, "The peace movement is the broadest movement of our time, involving people of diverse political and religious creeds, of diverse classes of society, who are all united by the noble urge to prevent new wars and to secure enduring peace." Thus it viewed peace as the principal fighting slogan for gaining broad mass support throughout the "zone of peace" and in other countries for Soviet policy goals in the struggle against the "capitalist-imperialist" states. As Khrushchev explained, "The slogan of the fight for peace by no means contradicts the slogan of the fight for communism. The two go hand-in-hand, for in the eyes of the masses communism appears as a force capable of saving mankind from the horrors of a missile-nuclear war, whereas imperialism is, increasingly, associated with war as a system engendering wars. That is why the slogan of the fight for peace is, as it were, a satellite of the slogan of the fight for communism." But peace is more than a popular slogan; it is a program. Thus the representatives' statement defines the tasks of peace as: "to stop the arms race, ban nuclear weapons, their tests and production, dismantle foreign war bases and withdraw foreign troops from other countries, disband military blocs, conclude a peace treaty with Germany, turn West Berlin into a demilitarized free city, thwart the aggressive designs of the West German revanchists, and prevent the revival of Japanese militarism" (*Two Communist Manifestoes* [Washington: Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1961], pp. 55, 57, 63–64).

Undoubtedly, Moscow was pleased to receive assurance against an American first strike through America's policies, actions, and statements, as well as through the growth of her own retaliatory power. This assurance emboldened her to stir up trouble in the West's forward positions, to take greater chances of "local war," and to support "national-liberation wars." On the other hand, at the beginning of the missile age Soviet leaders showed no signs of wishing to co-operate with the West in providing *mutual* assurance against first strikes. Rather, they remained inveterately suspicious—not without some color of reason—that the proposed co-operative measures to minimize the danger of a defensive first strike were merely devices for redressing America's inferior espionage capabilities in order to facilitate a first strike.* Therefore, in the absence of a convincing posture of active deterrence based upon non-nuclear resist-

---

* The American government gave some credence to Soviet suspicions when, after the U-2 mishap, it argued, on the one hand, that the United States had been compelled to undertake the U-2 espionage program in order to get the kind of intelligence data that the Soviet Union could readily acquire by ordinary means in our open society and, on the other hand, that the unfortunate incident resulting from this necessity demonstrated the urgent need for an "open skies" agreement to secure the same kind of information on an international basis.

The U-2 program was publicly justified in terms of gaining protection against surprise attack. But Khrushchev had a plausible point when he contended that the kind of information the U-2 acquired—for example, the construction of missile bases—could not give tactical early warning of a Soviet surprise attack in the missile age but could have significance only for a state that intended to strike first (*Pravda*, June 22, 1960, p. 31). President Eisenhower gave credence to this contention in his radio and television address to the nation, explaining the U-2 incident and the collapse of the summit conference. For, in comparing the ease with which the Soviet Union could acquire militarily useful information about the United States with the United States difficulty in acquiring such information about the Soviet Union, he referred not only to information about cities but also about such facilities as dams and highways; and, in showing the kind of vital information the U-2 could acquire, he displayed an aerial photograph of an American air base (*New York Times*, May 26, 1960, p. 6). Actually, it is not clear whether the U-2 program, at the time of its demise, was intended to be an instrument of either a counterforce first-strike or second-strike strategy; but, as a general instrument of protection against surprise attack, it was evidently a remnant of pre-missile technology, when surveillance of highways, communications centers, and bases might have given useful tactical warning. Moreover, the program could have been useful for other purposes even in 1960; for example, it could have helped determine whether the U.S.S.R. was building a counterforce striking force or merely concentrating upon building an invulnerable second-strike force.

ance, America's concern to allay mutual fears of surprise attack seemed more apt to encourage Moscow to play an adventurous game than to induce her to co-operate in creating safeguards against the hazards of the missile age.

This is not to say, however, that there is no solid ground of mutual interests upon which the United States might reasonably hope to secure Soviet co-operation in stabilizing the military environment. It is only to say that the Soviet appreciation of this ground, and willingness to act in accordance with it, will depend not upon American ingenuity in devising schemes of formal co-operation but, first, on American resolution in developing with her allies a consistent over-all posture of deterrence that is credible without being provocative and, second, on American skill in utilizing that posture to achieve tacit and informal understandings of reciprocal restraint.

8

The Problem of Nuclear Diffusion

1. THE PROSPECT OF NUCLEAR DIFFUSION

As NATO entered its second decade, it no longer conveyed to its members the simple, compelling relationship between its demands upon them and their security needs that had sustained the vitality of the alliance in a less complicated period—before the Korean War, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major nuclear power, the post-Stalin departure in foreign policy, and the onset of the missile age. In light of the perplexities of sustaining a common military strategy requiring an unprecedented level of peacetime contributions and commitments for the sake of an esoteric calculus of deterrence and defense, this is not surprising. Consequently, some allies now became receptive to military and political courses that promised to enhance their security by more direct means than delicate adjustments in the terms of strategic collaboration.

In the absence of any large or well-organized support for neutralism in allied countries,* two courses seemed particularly

* Perhaps the most articulate and best-organized minority that favored its nation leaving NATO was the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, beginning in 1958. However, not all those who favored unilateral nuclear disarmament supported British neutralism, and there was overwhelming support for remaining in NATO in Britain as a whole. For, quite apart from NATO's

promising: (*a*) the acquisition of an "independent" (in the sense of independently controlled, not necessarily self-sufficient) nuclear capability or at least a larger share in the control of an American or collective nuclear capability, in order to escape the liabilities of depending exclusively upon the United States decision whether or not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons; (*b*) an agreement of "disengagement" with the Soviet Union, in order to alleviate the political and military sources of NATO's security problems. The latter course, apart from its absolute unacceptability to West Germany, France, and probably other allies, seemed to be precluded by Russia's complete lack of interest in a genuine political accommodation, but the former course seemed available to several allies by dint of their own efforts and, possibly, American assistance. Although neither course would in itself be an alternative to NATO, both would impinge directly upon NATO's strategy and capabilities—indeed, upon the very core of mutual interests that provides the motive power of the alliance.

Well before 1957 and the launching of the Sputniks, the growth of Soviet nuclear striking power, coupled with the general political and prestige value of nuclear weapons, had fostered in Britain and France some powerful incentives for acquiring nuclear capabilities under independent national control. Technically and economically, probably at least three other allies—West Germany, Italy, and Canada—were capable of producing some kind of rudimentary nuclear warheads by 1965.[1] By 1970 still other allies (at least Belgium and the Netherlands) could join the nuclear club, especially if promising new processes made the production of nuclear warheads easier and cheaper.[2] Acquiring suitable means of delivering nuclear warheads was another matter but—as British, French, and German technological progress indicated—not one that need preclude the production of usable nuclear weapons systems if several

---

contribution to British security, the alliance was seen as an essential means by which Britain could preserve her great-power political status and exert her influence on the United States and other allies in behalf of British views on international questions.

allies independently or in collaboration wanted to allocate enough resources to that end.

These material possibilities raised the disquieting prospect that a number of allies would devote their major defense efforts to the proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities rather than to the integrated conventional forces the alliance so badly needed. This would not only cause a diversion of allied contributions from collective needs; it also seemed likely to arouse distrust and intensify divergencies of interests within the alliance. Furthermore, the spread of independent nuclear production and ownership among NATO members would probably stimulate the proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities among powers outside the alliance, and this development could upset the stability of the whole international military and political environment.

Of course, the technical and economic possibility of several allies building nuclear capabilities of their own did not mean that they would consider such efforts worthwhile—especially in view of the great financial and technical requirements of building a sufficiently invulnerable striking force to constitute a useful deterrent without being provocative. However, the experience of the British and French suggested that allies who had the material means to become nuclear powers would find a net balance of incentives over disincentives to do so, if this appeared to be the only way to avoid leaving the crucial decision of whether or not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons entirely in American hands.

But there might be another way of avoiding this abnegation of allied to American will. In 1960 the proposal to create a jointly controlled NATO nuclear force received considerable support as the best way to relieve all allies of their exclusive dependence upon America's decision to employ nuclear weapons, without at the same time stimulating the production of independent nuclear capabilities. However, this proposal raised almost as many problems as it was intended to resolve. For one thing, it implied a subordination of national to collective will that challenged the traditional conception of military in-

dependence and political sovereignty more radically than simple acquiescence in American control of nuclear weapons. It also implied a severe problem of achieving effective centralized command and control of nuclear weapons and of reconciling the requirements of a multinational decision with the requirements of deterrence. By the end of 1960 the allies had not yet agreed on a procedure for the political control of the decision to use nuclear weapons. This delicate matter could no longer be postponed if the United States were to surrender her *de facto* control of these weapons, through her exclusive custody of the warheads, to NATO. Furthermore, effective joint control of nuclear weapons would absolutely require allied agreement upon a common strategy for the use of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons—a politically sensitive issue that could be left somewhat ambiguous as long as the United States, in effect, exercised exclusive control over nuclear weapons.

Thus the prospect of several allies being able to build their own nuclear capabilities raised the broad problem of nuclear diffusion,* which, in turn, intensified unresolved issues of strategy and interallied relations that underlay the over-all problem of NATO's security and cohesion. As in the case of other issues of allied strategy and politics, American policy toward nuclear diffusion was a key factor. For, despite the economic resurgence and the great scientific and productive power of her allies, the United States continued to be the only ally that could provide in quantity the sophisticated delivery systems that were essential to an invulnerable strategic striking force and a diversified arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. Equally important, the United States continued to be the only ally that could initiate and carry through the major strategic and political readjustments that either the facilitation or discouragement of nuclear

* Generally, "nuclear diffusion" refers to spreading the control of the decision to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons among states. The most direct means of such control for a state is through physical possession of nuclear weapons, and the most direct means of obtaining physical possession is national production of the weapons. However, nuclear diffusion also embraces arrangements for *sharing* the ownership, production, operation, and decision to use nuclear weapons; and even the diffusion of nuclear information and material is obviously related to the diffusion of actual control of nuclear weapons.

sharing would involve if it were to be compatible with NATO's security and cohesion. At the same time, in shaping her policy toward diffusion, the United States would have to take serious account of allied attitudes and interests; and in all probability, these would compel her to promote a new formulation of NATO's strategy, new terms of allied collaboration, and a new distribution of power between the United States and her allies.

2. AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD NUCLEAR DIFFUSION

From the first relaxation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (the so-called McMahon Act), which had been designed to protect America's atomic monopoly by guarding her nuclear "secrets," the United States government was torn between its desire to promote allied collaboration by sharing nuclear information, material, and weapons control and its fear of undermining allied cohesion and promoting nuclear diffusion among other powers by spreading, or appearing to spread, the independent production and control of nuclear weapons.

The first substantial measure of nuclear sharing came in 1954, when the Eisenhower administration persuaded Congress to liberalize the Atomic Energy Act's restrictions on dispensing information and equipment to the allies. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permitted the President to direct the Atomic Energy Commission to deliver atomic weapons to the Department of Defense for such use as he deemed to be in the national interest, but the secretary of defense was not permitted to give the weapons to an ally for training except under the continual custody of American nationals. Nuclear warheads were to remain in the physical possession of Americans. The act also added categories of information on the external characteristics of nuclear warheads that could be imparted to allies in order to facilitate allied training and operations with tactical nuclear weapons without facilitating allied manufacture of nuclear warheads—a dual purpose which, Secretary Dulles conceded, entailed a "difficult task of definition."[3]

The motive for this modest measure of nuclear diffusion arose from the 1954 decision that NATO should plan on the basis of

initiating the use of tactical nuclear weapons against conventional attacks in order to compensate for its deficiency in standing forces; if the allies were to be dependent upon this tactical nuclear strategy, they would feel entitled to share at least the essential information for carrying it out. As Dulles told the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, there was among the allies

> a growing feeling of almost futility on their part unless they can get more information than they now have about tactical weapons. They know we have them and they know the enemy has them, and they stand in between with no knowledge at all at the present time; and it is extremely difficult to retain the morale of the NATO force under the top command of General Gruenther under present conditions. . . . They tend to feel: "what is the use of having any armies at all under the present condition?"[4]

After the passage of the amended Atomic Energy Act, Dulles went to the NATO Council of Ministers meeting in December, 1954, and secured the adoption of a tactical nuclear strategy, in accordance with the "long-haul" concept of cutting back on the rearmament programs undertaken after the outbreak of the Korean War.

But, however much the 1954 amendment facilitated training the allies in tactical nuclear warfare, it did not solve the political problem inherent in America's desire to preserve a monopoly or, strictly speaking, a duopoly of nuclear production and custody within the alliance. On the contrary, it only whetted the allies' appetites for a larger share of the control of nuclear weapons and stimulated the British and French efforts to get American assistance in building independent nuclear capabilities.

At the December, 1956, NATO Council meeting France and West Germany urged greater integration of nuclear weapons with allied forces.[5] The United States promised to speed the distribution of tactical nuclear weapons and warhead stockpiles and accelerate allied training in their use,[6] but she insisted on maintaining exclusive custody of the nuclear warheads. This dual course, inevitably, made the allies more dependent upon weapons which, in effect, the United States alone controlled. Therefore, the logic of a tactical nuclear strategy seemed des-

tined to jeopardize America's relations with her allies unless she would increase their share in the control of the decision to use these weapons (with their warheads, of course), contrary to the letter and spirit of the Atomic Energy Act.

An obvious alternative for some allies was to build their own nuclear weapons. But they would probably want to build *strategic* nuclear weapons, which would presumably give them the most power and status for their money. Strategic nuclear weapons programs, however, would make immense demands on the financial and scientific resources of even the most powerful allies; therefore, American assistance would be extremely valuable to them. Accordingly, the British used their strategic nuclear weapons program as a lever to pry nuclear information and material out of the United States and to persuade the American government to resume the fuller and more confident sharing of nuclear technology of the war period, which had been so abruptly terminated in 1946.[7] Within the tight and detailed restrictions of the McMahon Act and its amendments, Britain did, in fact, succeed in becoming a privileged partner in receiving American nuclear assistance,[8] for every British advance in nuclear technology confronted the United States with a refutation of the basic rationale of the Act: to preserve American secrets. Britain's success in this tactic, in turn, provided an additional incentive for France to develop her own nuclear program, but France's failure to secure equal access to American nuclear technology served as an additional grievance against the special Anglo-American partnership. The Suez War, in which both Britain and France withdrew in the face of American pressure and oblique Soviet threats to drop bombs on London and Paris, strengthened both governments' cases for building independent strategic nuclear forces.

To gain equal status with the Anglo-American bloc, France not only pushed her independent effort to become a nuclear power, but, lacking American assistance, she moved toward forming a consortium with West Germany and the other Common Market states for the development of nuclear technology. One instrument of this consortium was the Euratom (European

Atomic Energy Community) agreement, signed by France and the other members of the "Little Six" on February 20, 1957. Although Euratom was ostensibly created to develop peaceful uses of the atom, those inside and outside the agreement well knew that military and non-military nuclear technology went hand in hand. Moreover, the industrial program that the members of Euratom envisaged was to be based on dual-purpose reactors, capable of large-scale production of plutonium, and on gaseous diffusion plants for the separation of weapons-grade material. And a few weeks after the agreement was signed a West German bulletin summarizing its provisions disclosed that the Federal Republic, like the other members, would have access to the military atomic secrets of all its partners.[9]

German spokesmen properly denied their desire to revoke the WEU restrictions on their military establishment in order to become an independent nuclear power, but, if France were to become a full-fledged nuclear power, then West Germany, whether through a consortium or independently, seemed likely to claim equal privileges, for she was rapidly becoming the most powerful military and industrial member of the alliance in Europe. The prospect of the Federal Republic becoming a nuclear partner of France or an independent nuclear power was particularly disturbing, because of the strongly adverse reaction it caused, not only in the Soviet Union, but among some of America's allies—notably the British.

Faced with the specter of the diffusion of nuclear weapons production and ownership among the allies and beyond, Secretary of State Dulles turned to two major devices to stop this trend: (*a*) international control of nuclear production through the International Atomic Energy Agency and (*b*) joint allied control of the use of nuclear weapons. The first device failed to serve its purpose. The second was not put into effect.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which went into operation in July, 1957, had originated in President Eisenhower's "atoms-for-peace" proposal before the United Nations in 1953.[10] It was intended to promote the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by enabling donor-

states to transfer nuclear materials under safeguards, which the agency would establish and administer, against their diversion to military uses. In this respect IAEA was an attempt to internationalize the safeguards provided in America's bilateral agreements for the transfer of nuclear materials. Thus, in appealing for Senate approval of the IAEA statute in May, 1957, Dulles said:

> We must realize that atomic energy materials and know-how will spread, Agency or no Agency. The spread of nuclear technology and facilities is to our interest. But a rapid and unsupervised development of nuclear power around the world raises the specter of nuclear weapons ultimately becoming quite general, the byproduct of nuclear power plants.... These power plants are going to be built. It is just a question of whether their spread around the world will or will not be supervised in the common interest.[11]

However, the IAEA, while undoubtedly helping to spread nuclear technology, proved to be completely ineffectual as a means of dissuading any member-state from continuing to develop its nuclear military program; and it was incapable of deterring any other power from developing a weapons program with fissionable materials acquired through bilateral channels.

In July, 1957, Dulles indicated that he was moving toward a more controversial but, possibly, more effective device for discouraging the spread of nuclear weapons production when he disclosed that the United States was studying a plan for transferring custody of nuclear stockpiles to NATO itself, so that all allies would have equal access to nuclear weapons without having to build their own or remain wholly dependent on the United States.[12] The next day President Eisenhower emphatically indorsed this idea and asserted that the stockpiling proposal would make it unnecessary for others to manufacture nuclear weapons.[13] However, in the face of congressional objections to altering the Atomic Energy Act and the inauspicious circumstance that Harold Stassen was trying at the London disarmament conference to negotiate a ban on transferring nuclear weapons, the administration failed to present the plan for formal allied or congressional consideration at this time.

Then, in October, 1957, a sensational new technological development, Russia's orbiting of the first earth satellites, and her claims of a superior intercontinental missile technology intensified allied pressures for relief from nuclear dependence on the United States. For this development dramatized America's vulnerability to Soviet counter-retaliation and, therefore, deepened the suspicion that America's nuclear striking power was an unreliable basis of allied security. At the same time, it made the allies more vulnerable to nuclear obliteration and blackmail, especially if their territories held American strategic bases. The latter consideration became of immediate practical importance when the United States indicated, in November, 1957, that she hoped to protect herself against a possible "missile gap" —that is, a deficiency in her second-strike capability—by placing medium-range missiles on allied soil.[14]

At the annual North Atlantic Council meeting in December, Secretary Dulles presented the American plan to disperse IRBM's in Europe. He tried to sweeten the pill by promising the dispersion of accessible nuclear stockpiles for tactical as well as strategic weapons, giving assurances that the decision to use the missiles would be bilateral and stating that the United States would, in the future, transmit to any interested ally the secrets of how to build an atomic submarine for a truly invulnerable strategic force, if Congress were willing.[15] France, Italy, and the Netherlands were interested in the submarine offer (Britain was already assured of such American assistance). However, France and other Continental allies expressed doubts and objections concerning the placement of missiles on their soil. As a result, the United States had to be content with an agreement "in principle."

The plan which the Council approved, in principle, entailed the negotiation of bilateral agreements between the United States and her allies for the placement on allied soil of IRBM's, in accordance with NATO plans. The understanding was that the United States would retain custody of the warheads, but the ally would operate the missiles, so that the decision to use the missile would be a joint one, in which both powers retained

a veto. In addition, the agreement approved the establishment of stocks of nuclear warheads, for tactical as well as strategic weapons, in places that would be readily available in case of war; but these stocks would be in the custody of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, acting in his capacity as an American commander in charge of American forces in Europe (CINCEUR).[16]

Britain and Turkey quickly expressed willingness to accept missiles under this arrangement (indeed, Prime Minister Macmillan and President Eisenhower had already reached an agreement to establish missiles in England at the Bermuda conference in March, 1957); but France, Greece, Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands refused to commit themselves, and later all but Italy declined, while Norway and Denmark expressed the hope that they would not be asked to accept the missiles and Germany retained a tactful silence. In February, 1958, the United States signed an agreement with Britain to establish missiles in England, to be controlled by a "double-veto" arrangement, which was later revealed to include the installation of the warhead in the missile under a "two-key system."* During 1959 and 1960 four IRBM squadrons were emplaced, containing a total of about sixty above-ground, liquid-fuel Thor missiles. In 1959 the United States negotiated agreements with Italy and Turkey to establish a total of three Jupiter IRBM squadrons, containing a total of about forty-five missiles.

However, these missiles suffered the great military and political liability of being so vulnerable and slow-firing as to be virtually useless for anything except a first strike. Partly for this reason, the United States announced, in October, 1959, that it would not establish any more liquid-fuel missile bases in Europe. Instead, it looked forward to distributing in 1960 and 1961 mobile and solid-fuel Polaris missiles (and, in the case of

* In February, 1960, a number of newspaper and magazine articles disclosed that warheads were actually installed in the Thor missiles in England under a system that required one key, operated by Americans, to be turned in order to activate the warheads and another key, operated by the British, to be turned in order to launch the missile. See, for example, *U.S. News and World Report*, February 29, 1960, pp. 50–51; *Time*, August 8, 1960, p. 21.

Britain, also the air-borne Skybolt missile, which, however, was not expected to be ready until 1964 or 1965). It was later reported that about half of the approximately three hundred Polaris batteries would be based in France.[17]

Meanwhile, France declined to accept missiles or nuclear stockpiles on French soil unless she could control the warheads as well as the means of delivery. She continued to develop her independent nuclear weapons program. And she continued to hold out the possibility of a Continental nuclear consortium as a counterweight to the Anglo-American bloc.

In order to forestall Euratom from becoming the basis of a Continental nuclear weapons consortium, the United States hoped to keep it purely a regional effort to develop power reactors by offering it attractive subsidies and scientific and technical assistance, by promising to buy back plutonium by-products at preferential rates, and by receiving, in return, the right to inspect plants to prevent the diversion of plutonium to weapons manufacture.[18] To help forestall the development of a Franco-German-Italian nuclear axis, Britain took the initiative in establishing a West European Union arms pool for the research, development, and production of various types of arms, including missiles but excluding nuclear weapons.[19] However, the final terms of the American agreements with Euratom, signed in May and June, 1958, and approved by Congress in August, considerably reduced the scope of American assistance and left out the plutonium buy-back provision—both modifications being due to congressional opposition—while leaving all inspection and policing in the hands of Euratom itself, on the insistence of its members.[20] Moreover, neither the subsequent Euratom agreements nor the operations of the WEU arms pool deterred the French from proceeding with their independent nuclear program. General de Gaulle's investiture in June, 1958, guaranteed that.

Thus the other members of the alliance seemed to be faced, not only with nuclear dependence on the United States, but, even more disturbing, with nuclear dependence on Britain, France, and possibly even Germany, unless some means could

be found to share the control of nuclear weapons among all the allies. With this in mind, the Dutch parliamentarian J. J. Fens, acting as rapporteur of the Western European Union's Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments in its annual report to the Assembly, called upon the United States and Britain to share the control of nuclear weapons before the diffusion of independent nuclear capabilities destroyed NATO's interdependence:

> As the employment of an A or H weapon by aircraft or missile against a Russian site today spells immediate counter-bombardment on targets in the entire free world, the monopoly of two countries to decide unilaterally on the destiny of themselves and others cannot any longer be maintained lest the alliance be weakened.

If the British argument for an independent nuclear capability were valid, Fens continued, "It is essential that both the technical knowledge required for the production of these weapons, together with the power of decision over their use in a strategic role, should be shared among all member countries." Otherwise, he warned, the trend toward the multiplication of independent nuclear powers would cause "the complete negation of interdependence" to the disadvantage of all.[21]

Faced with mounting pressures within the alliance for relief from the Anglo-American nuclear monopoly, the American government continued to press Congress to relax the restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act in order to satisfy allied demands for a larger share in the management of the tactical nuclear strategy to which they were committed, in the hope that this would stimulate their active collaboration under American leadership and deter them from moving toward either political or military independence. The government explained its reasoning more clearly than before in its appeals for the amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, which became law in July, 1958. Deputy Undersecretary Robert Murphy emphasized the political importance of giving the allies more information about the operation of nuclear weapons in order that they would "have confidence in their ability to meet aggression swiftly and effec-

tively" and in order that there might be "less incentive for additional countries to enter the atomic weapons field."[22] Secretary of State Dulles elaborated the point.[23] The liberalization of American atomic secrecy laws was essential, he said, in order to facilitate allied collaboration in NATO's tactical nuclear strategy:

> Our NATO allies will not feel the strength and confidence needed to pursue vigorous anti-Communist policies if they feel that they are dominated by a Soviet nuclear weapons capability and that we will not share our nuclear capability with them, even to the modest extent required to enable them to share in the planning of a nuclear defense and make them capable of using nuclear weapons received from us if hostilities should occur.

If the United States did not grant her allies a larger share in the operation of her nuclear capability, he warned, they might "either intensively seek to develop nuclear weapons capacity for themselves, or move toward neutrality, or at least nonparticipation, in what should be a common military effort." The first course "would divert the efforts of our allies into a needless and costly duplication." The second would "place a far greater burden on the US and radically alter the power balance with serious damage to our vital security interests." Dulles put his finger on the nature, if not the primary source, of the threat to allied cohesion. But the trouble with his argument was, first, that it was directed only at giving the allies a greater share in the operation of tactical nuclear weapons, when the French and British, at least, were primarily concerned with gaining independent control of strategic nuclear weapons; and, second, that it was applied only to the sharing of operational information, whereas the crucial point of allied dissatisfaction was America's exclusive control of the employment of nuclear weapons, by virtue of her custody of the warheads.

The 1958 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act permitted the United States to give allies additional information on the external characteristics of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material, and certain non-nuclear weapons components and delivery systems. But they retained the requirement of American cus-

tody of nuclear warheads. And, so far as information of more direct assistance in the production of weapons was concerned, they merely permitted the United States to extend her discriminatory treatment in favor of Great Britain through a provision that technical information and materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons should be given only to a nation that had made "substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons."[24]

If it had any effect on the French, this 1958 act must have confirmed their conviction that France could gain equal status with Britain only if she made "substantial progress" in the development of her own nuclear weapons. In July Dulles flew to Paris to confer with De Gaulle on major world problems, but, despite reports of a "large identity of views" on most problems, De Gaulle was said to have reaffirmed "bluntly and unequivocably" his determination to arm France with nuclear weapons, with or without American aid. The Secretary of State was reported to have told the General that, under the Atomic Energy Act, the American government did not have the authority to aid France directly in this objective, but that, instead, the United States might assist France in building a nuclear submarine engine.[25] However, when objections were raised in the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and after France decided to withdraw her ships from the NATO fleet and refused to stockpile atomic weapons on her soil, the State Department decided to offer France only enriched uranium fuel but not any data on propulsion reactors. The decision was probably made less for the security reasons that troubled Congress and the AEC than because the department had concluded that such information seemed likely only to help rather than deter an unco-operative France in becoming the fourth nuclear power.[26] (In May, 1960, the State Department, with the support of the Defense Department but the opposition of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Pentagon, revived the submarine plan; but the administration abandoned it after the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy objected.)[27] De Gaulle had made it clear that he intended to use France's nuclear program to support some

outstanding national claims, such as equal partnership with the United States and Britain in tripartite consultations on global political problems and the use of atomic weapons anywhere in the world. The United States was not prepared to assist him in revising interallied politics under the threat of his nuclear program.

Even if the American government had been inclined to help France become the fourth nuclear power for the sake of allied cohesion and of mitigating a wasteful duplication of nuclear efforts, it would have been restrained from openly doing so by the growing popular sentiment throughout the world against nuclear testing. By 1958 the fears of nuclear testing, which originally had been directed against radioactive fallout, were focused upon preventing the emergence of the fourth or "*n*th" nuclear power; and the Russians had skilfully transferred the opprobrium of nuclear testing to underground as well as atmospheric tests—even to those undertaken by states who had already acquired nuclear weapons. On March 31, 1958, after a series of tests, the Soviet Union announced that she was unilaterally stopping all nuclear tests. This led to the protracted Geneva test-ban negotiations, beginning in October, and to America's voluntary cessation of all nuclear tests for fear of alienating world opinion or thwarting the chances of achieving an agreement that might prevent the proliferation of nuclear capabilities among states. These developments mobilized domestic and world-wide fears of thermonuclear war, not only against nuclear tests of all kinds, but also against any policy or action that appeared to promote the spread of nuclear capabilities to other states; so that any relaxation of American restrictions upon transmitting nuclear information and material to France would have to bear the onus of seeming to spread nuclear capabilities, unstabilize the military environment, and foster thermonuclear war, contrary to a tacit agreement with the Soviet Union to prevent these evils. President de Gaulle guaranteed this onus by repeatedly proclaiming that France was determined to join the nuclear ranks and would not be bound by a nuclear test ban, formal or informal, unless the

cessation of testing were linked with the cessation of nuclear production.

Therefore, in pushing for a nuclear test ban and opposing the transfer of nuclear weapons and weapons production technology to the non-nuclear allies, the United States put herself in the unenviable situation of collaborating with the Russians in preventing her ally France from gaining nuclear equality with Britain, for the sake of the overriding objective of preventing the diffusion of nuclear production, an objective which France was determined to defy in any case. The special irony of this situation was that much of the same opprobrium that was attached to testing and nuclear production assistance was also attached to any plan to share the *control* of nuclear warheads, even though the chief appeal of such a plan in the American and other allied governments was that it might be the only means of discouraging the diffusion of nuclear *production.* Moscow carefully cultivated a suspicion, which was shared by some influential American congressmen and military and civilian leaders, that if the United States abandoned exclusive custody of her nuclear warheads, any scheme for the joint control of the decision to use them would merely be a subterfuge for spreading independent nuclear capabilities, which, in turn, would compel the Soviet Union to give China and her satellites nuclear weapons. Consequently, even if Congress, SAC, France, and the other allies could be satisfied with a system of joint control that technically left the warheads in the custody of Americans (perhaps under the command of an American NATO authority), this would be difficult to represent to the rest of the world as anything but a step toward the spread of independent nuclear capabilities.

To be sure, the French might not forego the production and the completely independent control of nuclear weapons on any condition, but, on the other hand, they surely would not join a nuclear test ban without at least receiving a larger share of the control of nuclear weapons in the alliance. And what good would a nuclear test ban be if France did not adhere to it? Therefore, as long as the United States kept exclusive custody

of her nuclear warheads, she seemed bound to get the worst of both positions by simultaneously jeopardizing allied cohesion and promoting the diffusion of nuclear production.

Despite these difficulties of reconciling any plan to share the decision to use nuclear warheads with the objective of preventing or discouraging the diffusion of nuclear production, the United States was under mounting pressure in 1959 and 1960 to share her control of nuclear weapons under some arrangement that would provide a more effective alternative to independent nuclear production and ownership than the "two-key system." Part of this pressure came from NATO itself, in the person of Supreme Commander General Norstad. Thus in a speech in August, 1959, Norstad posed the questions: "How do we meet a growing but still somewhat confused and conflicting desire among our European allies for a broader sharing in the control of nuclear weapons? How can the alliance as a whole be assured that such weapons will be available to them in all reasonable circumstances for their defense, the defense of Europe?" Taking note of France's move toward an independent nuclear capability and the great concern of other allies at the prospect of other states following France's example, he urged, in a tentative manner befitting an exploratory proposition, that the alliance consider transferring the control of nuclear weapons to NATO itself, as the "fourth nuclear power." He warned that this scheme would not necessarily "influence the desire of some nations to pursue their own quest for an atomic weapons capability," but he thought that it "might very well remove a good part of the motivation of others to do so."[28]

In December, 1959, Frederick Mulley, Labor member of the House of Commons and rapporteur of the Western European Union Defense Committee, submitted to the WEU assembly a committee report that recommended meeting these same problems by making the Western European Union the fourth nuclear power, with joint power of decision on the use of strategic weapons. The assembly adopted the recommendation 42 to 9, with 16 abstentions,[29] but this was merely an expression of opinion, since the plan depended on the action of governments,

not WEU delegates. In fact, Mulley's proposal that Britain assume the leadership of the plan by placing her nuclear warheads and V-bombers, or some of them, under the joint decision of the seven WEU countries failed to win the approval of either party in his own country.

In Britain, as in the United States, there was bound to be strong opposition to any plan for the joint control of nuclear weapons, if only because it would probably mean transferring custody of symbolically as well as physically potent weapons to other nations. Yet, amid reports that the administration was considering turning over nuclear weapons to certain allies, such as Britain, President Eisenhower, in a press conference on February 3, 1960, seemed to suggest that American laws should be changed so as not to deny America's allies the information and weapons the Russians had.[30] The enthusiastic foreign reaction to the President's statement anticipated a fundamental change in American policy. Western embassies in Paris interpreted it as an effort to persuade De Gaulle to accept the results of a test-ban agreement by assuring him that the United States would end its discrimination against France.[31] However, Senator Anderson and Representative Holifield of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy warned that the President would not be allowed to violate the 1958 Atomic Energy Act, and soon the White House denied any intention of changing the act or basic American policy toward nuclear sharing.[32]

On February 13 the French exploded their first atomic device in the Sahara and set off a new wave of policy initiatives. As though to precipitate a change, Paul Reynaud, President of the National Assembly Finance Committee, declared, "The young French scientific elite now returns to the place which it held before World War II—in the vanguard of atomic investigation. Now the question is whether Americans will help us take the second step forward. Let them not wait until Mr. K. outdistances them."[33]

On March 2 General Norstad reiterated his suggestion of a NATO nuclear force in the specific form of a highly mobile multinational unit with conventional and nuclear weapons, composed initially of a brigade each from the United States,

Britain, and France, under a single commander, who he hoped would not be an American.[34] American officials in Washington supported the plan but emphasized that the United States would continue to control the nuclear warheads in the multinational units.[35] It was disclosed that State and Defense Department officials were holding exploratory talks with the Justice Department over the legal authority to make a limited transfer of nuclear weapons under existing law, but this transfer apparently applied only to a plan to make nuclear warheads available to Britain for air-to-air missiles under the inherent powers of the President as commander in chief.[36]

The French were cool to Norstad's plan. German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss ruled out West German participation in the proposed multinational units, partly, it appeared, because it would obscure French and British refusal to accept full integration of NATO forces.[37] Khrushchev added his dash of cold water on Norstad's plan when he warned President Eisenhower, in a letter on March 8, that it would heighten international tension before the summit meeting in May and compel the Soviet Union to consider giving her allies nuclear weapons.[38]

In any case, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was adamantly opposed to any plan that would transfer custody of nuclear weapons to an ally. Representative Holifield, referring specifically to the transfer of custody under the President's inherent constitutional power but bearing in mind Norstad's plan, declared that any such transfer would cause "the greatest debate of our generation. The impact and reverberations of such an act would be calamitous to our international relations." It would

> be used to sustain and prove the Communist charge of imperialistic warmongers. It would destroy our prestige as a proponent of peace and disarmament. It would make a complete farce of our long negotiations for the cessation of nuclear bomb tests at Geneva. It would cut the ground from under our negotiators in the approaching international conference on disarmament in March. It would give Khrushchev a propaganda platform of deadly effectiveness in the scheduled summit conference in April.[39]

The next day General Norstad assured the Joint Committee that there were no plans to turn over American nuclear warheads to the proposed mobile brigades.[40] And President Eisenhower soon assured Khrushchev that American laws prohibited sharing nuclear weapons with her allies and that the United States had no plans to the contrary.[41]

Still, the United States did not abandon her plans to disperse missiles on European—and especially French—soil; and this meant that she could not abandon the effort to find some formula for nuclear sharing that would be equally acceptable to her allies, to Congress and SAC, and to all those who were primarily worried about multiplying the number of nuclear powers in the world. The approaching operational stage of the Polaris missile reactivated the 1957 plan for dispersing IRBM's in Europe, which had been suspended pending the availability of mobile, solid-fuel missiles. At the NATO defense ministers meeting in Paris in April, 1960, Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., proposed the deployment of hundreds of Polaris missiles on barges and flatcars, when they were expected to become available in a year or two. At the same time, he suggested a modification of the system of dual control which would give NATO's supreme commander the decision to join the missile and activated warhead and send them off.[42]

The British, who were to launch their first nuclear submarine in October, welcomed the forthcoming availability of Polaris, which they looked forward to receiving on a special bilateral basis; and they seized upon this prospect as the occasion to abandon their own program to build the vulnerable and outmoded liquid-fuel Blue Streak.[43] However, De Gaulle would have none of the new version of the 1957 plan. Instead, he was reported to have advised Norstad that he would be prepared to accept Polaris installations in France if one-third of them (about fifty) were given to France for her own use with her own nuclear warheads.[44] In July NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak explored the possibilities of such a deal with De Gaulle,[45] but this did not produce an agreement—whether because of French or American opposition, or both, the published information does not reveal.

In September Spaak and General Norstad combined with Chancellor Adenauer to promote the plan of making NATO the fourth nuclear power, which they hoped the United States would indorse at the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council.[46] In October the West German government, consistent with its interest in promoting a tightly integrated alliance and in diverting the pressures leading to independent nuclear programs within the alliance, publicly backed Norstad's plan.[47] By this time Secretary of State Herter was also understood to favor such a plan, against considerable opposition in the Pentagon. But the plan that he was considering proposing to the December Council meeting, now revised by Norstad and supported by a private study for the State Department,[48] depended on American-operated Polaris submarines under NATO command instead of on land- and river-based Polarises or multinational "fire brigades." In November General Norstad, speaking before the annual conference of NATO parliamentarians, publicly urged the alliance to take "a great and dramatic new step" by agreeing upon a NATO-controlled nuclear force.[49] The conference adopted a resolution, interpreted as tacit approval of Norstad's plan, saying that it was "urgent and essential" that the council study the whole question of the "integrated" use and control of nuclear weapons.[50] However, the resolution to study this question reflected considerable uncertainty, already voiced officially in Britain, about the feasibility of sharing the decision to use nuclear weapons among fifteen states—the problem of "fifteen fingers on the trigger," as it was now called.

Finally, on December 16, Secretary of State Herter announced America's indorsement of the "concept" of a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile force to the ministerial council, meeting in Paris.[51] The concept included, first, an offer of five ballistic missile submarines armed with eighty Polaris missiles, to be assigned to NATO before 1963, if the allies would agree on a "multilateral system" of political control; and, second, allied purchase from the United States of 100 more medium-range missiles, to be placed on other kinds of ships, under NATO control.

Some of the members of NATO expressed great interest in

this concept, but their enthusiasm was dampened by its conditional nature. In the first place, agreement upon a multilateral system of political control would be a long and tedious process. In the second place, the whole plan would depend upon congressional approval, which would probably require, as a minimum condition, that nuclear warheads remain in the custody of Americans. And, in the third place, the outgoing Eisenhower administration could not commit the incoming Kennedy administration to any plan; and the incoming administration declined to take a position on this plan in advance. Furthermore, the allies were not eager to buy 100 missiles, and it was not clear whether this was a condition of receiving the five submarines. Nor was it clear who would provide and pay for the special ships to hold these additional missiles. In any case, allied approval of this tentative American plan was not fostered by Herter's concurrent suggestion that the United States might have to "redeploy" some of its Continental troops unless the allies shouldered a greater share of NATO's financial burdens in order to relieve America's balance-of-payments problems.

The final communiqué of the ministerial session noted, simply, that "the United States government suggested the concept of an MRBM [Mid-Range Ballistic Missile] multilateral force for consideration by the alliance. The Council took note of the United States suggestion with great interest and instructed the permanent representatives to study the suggestion and related matters in detail." However, the Council "welcomed the assurance of the United States to maintain in the NATO area United States nuclear weapons made available to NATO."[52] In short, the allies explicitly recognized the problem of the multilateral control of nuclear weapons but suspended a concerted attempt to resolve it until new and firmer initiatives should come from a new American administration.

3. SOURCES OF THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR CONTROL

Fundamentally, the problem of the multilateral control of nuclear weapons in NATO arose from the Soviet achievement of a capacity to inflict immense damage upon the United States

if the United States were to strike at the Soviet Union in response to an attack upon America's allies. For this undermined allied willingness to remain entirely dependent upon America's decision whether or not to use nuclear weapons, both because of the fear that the United States might *not* use them (and also that the Soviet Union might not believe that she would use them) and because of the fear that the United States *might* use them (and also that the Soviet Union, believing that the United States would use them, might use them first). However, allied dissatisfaction with the American control of nuclear weapons would not have been so marked if the alliance had not been so dependent on a strategy of *initiating* the use of both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons; for it was the threat to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against a Soviet conventional aggression that constituted the least credible, most provocative, and potentially most fateful aspect of NATO's nuclear strategy.

Nevertheless, even if the Soviet capacity to devastate the United States and her allies with nuclear weapons had not become so substantial and the allies had not been so dependent upon a strategy of initiating the use of nuclear weapons, the problem of sharing or not sharing the control of nuclear weapons would have arisen to challenge the cohesion and security of the alliance. It would have arisen because of the growing ability and the actual or potential determination of several allies to produce their own nuclear weapons. For the spread of nuclear weapons technology offered some allies the opportunity to enhance their prestige and reduce their dependence on American control of nuclear weapons by acquiring, at the expense of their contribution to NATO's shield, an independent nuclear capability. And it confronted all the allies with the disturbing political as well as military consequences of nuclear diffusion, including the possible encouragement of nuclear diffusion outside the alliance. Therefore, the technical possibility of independent nuclear efforts added a new incentive for sharing the control of nuclear weapons: to provide an alternative to the contagious multiplication of independent nuclear programs within the alliance.

We have seen how the American government tried to facilitate allied political cohesion and strategic collaboration by measures of nuclear sharing, while simultaneously trying to avoid the disruptive military and political effects of independent nuclear efforts and the diffusion of nuclear control. And we have seen how the creation of a NATO nuclear force emerged as a means of reconciling these two objectives. Yet the tentative plan to make NATO a nuclear power raised almost as many political and military problems as it was intended to solve: for example, the problem of sharing the decision to use nuclear weapons without undermining the military or psychological effectiveness of the deterrent and without encouraging or appearing to encourage the diffusion of nuclear capabilities outside the alliance. Furthermore, there was no guaranty that the creation of a NATO nuclear force would dissuade France or any other ally from developing an independent nuclear force. Consequently, whether or not the allies created or tried to create a NATO nuclear force, the problem of sharing the control of nuclear weapons in such a way as to enhance deterrence and cohesion without fragmenting nuclear control and multiplying nuclear capabilities would remain.

In grappling with this problem the United States, at the beginning of the 1960's, still retained the decisive initiative, if only by virtue of her vastly superior nuclear arsenal and technology compared to her allies. Yet she had only limited control over the basic elements of the problem. The United States could not restore her nuclear monopoly or reverse the Soviet achievement of a devastating second-strike capability. She might diminish or delay the capacity of her allies to build their own nuclear capabilities, but she could not prevent it. The basic elements of the problem, however, were not just the material facts and possibilities but, more important, their impact upon the political interests and attitudes of nations. Consequently, the existence of great Soviet nuclear striking power and the growing capacity of allies to build their own nuclear striking power did not, by themselves, lead inexorably to the diffusion of independent nuclear capabilities or to any other particular disposition of

the control of nuclear weapons. That disposition would depend on how the desires, the fears, and the will of allied governments would respond to a variety of possible military strategies and terms of collaboration, which were subject to deliberate control.

To be sure, the United States had only a limited capacity to affect the political interests and attitudes of her allies with respect to the control of nuclear weapons, but this capacity might nevertheless be decisive in determining the future of the alliance. In particular, America's preponderant role in shaping the strategy of NATO and the terms of allied collaboration could determine whether the system of the command and control of nuclear weapons would enhance or undermine the security and the cohesion of the alliance.

However, to exercise this decisive influence wisely the United States would have to appraise correctly the basic interests and attitudes that motivated the policies of her allies toward nuclear control under the existing technological, political, and strategic circumstances. The diversity of allied policies toward the control of nuclear weapons in 1960 indicated that different allies would approach the prospect of nuclear diffusion in different ways, depending on their technological and economic resources, their political status in the alliance, and a number of other considerations; but the British and French experiences suggested that any ally who possessed the necessary resources would have strong incentives to build an independent nuclear capability under existing circumstances. Yet it was necessary to understand the precise relationship between these particular circumstances and allied nuclear policies before one could surmise how a different set of circumstances might alter allied interests and attitudes toward the control of nuclear weapons.

Of course, in the final analysis, the United States would have to determine her policy toward the control of nuclear weapons on the basis of her independent analysis of the merits of the issue; but the merits of the issue could not be divorced from the interests and attitudes of her partners in this entangling alliance.

4. THE BRITISH EXAMPLE

Among America's allies, the British had the most extensive experience with an independent nuclear capability. The British attitude did not necessarily set the pattern for other allies—though it strongly affected French nuclear policy—but it constituted the most complete case study of a major ally's response to the prospect of nuclear diffusion.

From the outset, when the Labor government decided to build a British A-bomb after World War II, national pride was a powerful motive in Britain for developing an independent nuclear capability.[53] Although British scientists had made an important contribution to the Manhattan project during the war, the United States virtually cut off all exchange of information on nuclear weapons with the British after the war. This helped convince politicians and civil servants that Britain could remain a great power and retain a favored position with the United States as a partner in diplomatic and military affairs only by becoming an independent nuclear power. The British correctly calculated that they would secure America's scientific and material assistance in becoming a nuclear power to the extent that their scientists and technicians demonstrated an ability to develop nuclear weapons independently.

This policy met with negligible opposition and was reinforced after the outbreak of the Korean War, when the strains of rearmament gave the Conservative government an additional argument for developing a British nuclear striking force built around the A-bomb (which Britain exploded in 1952) and the V-bombers. This was the argument that nuclear deterrence could provide Britain with greater security without the burdensome costs of maintaining a large ground force on the Continent.[54] Considerations of national prestige and Britain's influence with the United States militated against relying more heavily upon American nuclear striking power. Also, this would have deprived the government of an excuse for not meeting ground force goals. It was also argued that Britain needed her own nuclear striking force in order to be sure of knocking out

Russian bases which would be a threat to Britain but which the Americans might assign a lower priority. This argument, based on a counterforce strategy, became obsolete with the development of H-bombs and the growth of Soviet strategic air power, but it was not abandoned until Russia had begun building long-range missiles.

The 1955 white paper on defense policies dealt largely with the implications of thermonuclear bombs, stating and defending the government's decision to build a British H-bomb. In defending this decision before the House, Prime Minister Churchill argued that an independent air-nuclear deterrent would increase Britain's influence over American policy and actions and would enable Britain to give the proper attention to targets—he mentioned airfields, administrative and industrial centers, submarine bases, and other naval targets—that might be a matter of life and death.[55]

In defending the political grounds for the H-bomb decision, Churchill said, "Personally, I cannot feel that we should have much influence over their [i.e., American] policy or actions, wise or unwise, while we are largely dependent, as we are today, upon their protection. We, too, must possess substantial deterrent power of our own." Although he refrained from elucidating this point in public, the implication was that Britain could not bargain with the United States so effectively unless she could bargain with the Soviet Union effectively by being able to support her policies, when they diverged from American policies, with an independent nuclear striking force.

However, the government did not yet argue for an independent deterrent as a substitute for America's nuclear striking power or as a means of compensating for the declining credibility of America's deterrent. For, although Churchill anticipated that Russia might achieve an H-bomb in two to four years, he did not acknowledge that the Soviet capacity to deliver a thermonuclear attack would unstabilize the existing deterrent balance in any way. Rather, he contended that Britain's nuclear striking power would help deter a Soviet surprise attack during the next three or four years, in which the West would retain an

overwhelming superiority in hydrogen weapons, and that after that the nuclear nations would enter a state of "saturation" or nuclear sufficiency, in which surprise attack would be deterred by the certainty that both sides would inflict crippling retaliatory damage upon each other.

The relevance of this argument was, logically, confined to passive deterrence, but at this time the effectiveness of passive nuclear deterrence was not clearly distinguished from the credibility of active nuclear deterrence, upon which the strategy of massive retaliation depended. Consequently, the radical effect of a Soviet thermonuclear capability upon the strategy of initiating the use of nuclear weapons against a Soviet conventional aggression was generally ignored. The distinction between the requirements of active and passive deterrence emerged only with the general recognition that the British Isles could be obliterated by ten to fifteen thermonuclear explosions. But in 1955 the government still maintained that civil defense measures could substantially mitigate the destruction of a thermonuclear attack and argued that the assumption that there was no defense against a thermonuclear attack was merely defeatist.[56]

Some members of the opposition challenged the government's assumption that the credibility of the West's nuclear striking power would remain undiminished in the face of Russia's thermonuclear capacity and charged that, at least in the event of a non-nuclear attack on allied powers, the government would choose appeasement rather than self-destruction, if its only means of countering aggression were to initiate a thermonuclear war.[57] But the 1956 white paper on defense stoutly maintained that "the increased power of the deterrent, that is, the nuclear weapon and the means of delivering it, has made global war more frightening and less likely," and, answering opposition criticism, flatly asserted, "It is sometimes argued that, with the buildup of a stock of thermonuclear bombs by the Russians, the deterrent value to the Western powers of building up a stock of bombs and the means of delivery will diminish. This is not so."[58]

The 1957 white paper, largely the work of Minister of De-

fense Duncan Sandys, was the logical culmination of the policy of substituting nuclear deterrence for mobilized ground forces, which Prime Minister Churchill had inaugurated in 1953. The policy of concentrating on the construction of a British strategic nuclear force was presented as a necessary corollary to reducing the British forces on the Continent and ending the compulsory conscription of manpower in 1960. In defending this policy, the government strongly emphasized the economic necessity of concentrating resources on building up the nuclear deterrent instead of on maintaining the forces to wage local or general war if the deterrent should fail. It now explicitly recognized that there was no way to protect the country against the consequences of an H-bomb attack, but from this fact it drew the conclusion, not that active nuclear deterrence ceased to be a credible policy for a defenseless island, but rather that "the available resources of the nation should be concentrated not upon preparations to wage war so much as upon trying to prevent that catastrophe from ever happening."[59]

In arguing specifically for an independent nuclear capability, the government no longer contended that it would enable Britain to strike vital targets that SAC might overlook. Instead, it explicitly used a new argument that had arisen in response to the growth of Soviet nuclear striking power, the argument that British striking power was necessary to reinforce the nuclear deterrent as the United States became more vulnerable to direct Soviet attack and less dependent on European bases. Referring obliquely to this argument, Sandys told the House:

> So long as large American forces remain in Europe and American bombers are based in Britain, it might conceivably be thought safe . . . to leave to the United States the sole responsibility for providing the nuclear deterrent. But, when they have developed the 5000-mile intercontinental ballistic rocket, can we really be sure that every American Administration will go on looking at things in quite the same way?[60]

Labor party spokesmen criticized the government's 1957 white paper on the grounds that it would make Britain too dependent on a nuclear response to conventional aggression, and

they openly expressed doubts that Britain would use thermonuclear weapons except in response to a direct attack on the British Isles. But they were not in a strong position to challenge the basic policy of substituting nuclear firepower for manpower, since the party had already criticized the 1956 white paper for making "no provision for an immediate cut in the period of National Service nor for any specific plan for its eventual abolition,"[61] and since it had not recommended substituting larger conventional forces for nuclear expenditures. Moreover, the 1957 Labor conference indorsed the decision to build an H-bomb, as the dominant faction argued on political grounds against leftist opponents of a British thermonuclear capability. John Strachey, a former Labor war minister, warned that Britain's abandonment of the H-bomb would make the nation "the wholly dependent satellite of the United States" and render a future Labor foreign secretary "unable even to consider policies which were not approved by the State Department in Washington." And Labor's prospective foreign secretary, Aneurin Bevan, the old left-wing critic of American policy, declared that renunciation of the H-bomb would send a British negotiator "naked into the conference chamber."[62]

This left the opposition approving Britain's program to build an independent nuclear capability but rejecting the government's primary strategic argument for doing so: to provide a more reliable substitute for America's active nuclear deterrent. Needled but undaunted by this criticism, the government reaffirmed the value of Britain's strategic nuclear force for active deterrence but dropped the claim that Britain's force would be more credible than America's. Thus the 1958 white paper stated:

> The democratic Western nations will never start a war against Russia. But it must be well understood that, if Russia were to launch a major attack on them, even with conventional forces only, they would have to hit back with strategic nuclear weapons. In fact, the strategy of NATO is based on the frank recognition that a full-scale Soviet attack could not be repelled without resort to a massive nuclear bombardment of the sources of power in Russia.[63]

At the same time, the government continued to develop a British liquid-fuel IRBM, the Blue Streak, which would be so vulnerable as to be useful only for a first strike.

Having retreated from its military-strategic argument for building a British nuclear striking force instead of relying upon America's, the government came to justify its nuclear program almost entirely on political grounds. Thus, in a television interview in February, 1958, Prime Minister Macmillan explained the need for a British H-bomb entirely in terms of national prestige and influence. "The independent contribution," he said, "gives us a better position in the world, it gives us a better position with respect to the United States. It puts us where we ought to be, in the position of a great power. The fact that we have it makes the United States pay a greater regard to our point of view, and that is of great importance."[64]

As a symbol of national greatness and a psychological reinforcement against Soviet nuclear blackmail, a British nuclear capability needed no military justification. In this respect the memory of the traumatic experience of being "deserted" by the United States in the face of Soviet rocket threats during the Suez War in 1956 was still a powerful argument for an independent nuclear force in 1958. As Randolph Churchill stated before the American Chamber of Commerce in London, in November, 1958, "We are in a very fortunate period when America has absolute air supremacy over the Russians," but even Britain, he declared, could knock out twelve cities in the region of Stalingrad and Moscow from bases in Britain and another dozen in the Crimea from bases in Cyprus. "We did not have that power at the time of Suez," he added. "We are a major power again."[65]

Some members of the opposition drew a different lesson from the Suez incident—that, regardless of an independent nuclear capability, the United Kingdom could not successfully pursue a strong policy even outside the NATO area, at the risk of nuclear war, without American support. But the basic sentiment that an independent nuclear capability was an essential attribute of an independent foreign policy was as strongly indorsed by the

Labor as by the Conservative leadership. Nevertheless, after 1957 affirmations of this basic sentiment had a more shrill and apologetic quality in the face of mounting strategic, economic, political, moral, and emotional counter-arguments.

In the fall of 1958 the *Times* joined opposition critics in charging that Britain's nuclear power contributed nothing to active deterrence, since it was inconceivable that Britain would use it except in response to a direct attack.[66] It continued to maintain that an independent nuclear capability was necessary for passive deterrence, but the opposition began to question whether the second-class striking force that Britain could build was worth the very sizable expenditures it demanded. As R. H. S. Crossman put it, "The trouble about the nuclear deterrent is that if we have one big enough to be militarily significant, we ruin the country, and if we have one within the economic resources of the country, then it is so trivial that it impresses no great power." Therefore, it seemed to him that the British were paying 300 million pounds a year to be a member of a nuclear club they could not afford.[67]

These strategic and economic counter-arguments were buttressed by a more profound, if less coherent, protest against an independent British nuclear force on political and emotional grounds. The 1958 white paper, coming after the announcement in the spring of 1957 of the Anglo-American agreement to base American missiles in England under joint control, raised a protest against Britain's whole nuclear effort on the grounds that it would involve Great Britain in a suicidal thermonuclear war and encourage a disastrous diffusion of nuclear capabilities throughout the world.

The plans for establishing four Thor missile bases in eastern England provoked fears of attracting Soviet H-bombs that far surpassed the fears occasioned by the presence of American bomber bases. Although the bombers made England just as much a target and were under less effective British control (since the United States could operate both the nuclear warheads and the means of delivery out of British bases), the prospect of England suddenly becoming a missile base dramatized

the risks of contributing to the nuclear deterrent in a way that the bomber bases, to which the British had become accustomed, had failed to do. Moreover, considering the vulnerability of the liquid-fuel, above-ground Thor missiles to a first strike, they might constitute a greater temptation or provocation for a Soviet attack.

Coupled with the government's announced strategy "based on the frank recognition that a full-scale Soviet attack could not be repelled without resort to a massive nuclear bombardment of the sources of power in Russia," the establishment of missile bases encountered widespread opposition among British of all political complexions.[68] However, the protest against missile bases did not depend on any particular strategic reasoning. For the majority it was not so much a protest against bases as such as against America's share in the control of the missiles. For a vociferous minority it was not only a protest against Britain's dependence on American-controlled missiles but against her dependence on any nuclear weapons. Thus in 1960 the protest against Thor missiles was transferred to the Holy Loch in Scotland, where Britain had granted the United States a base for Polaris submarines—an "invulnerable" sea-borne second-strike weapon, which, nevertheless, in the popular protest it aroused, bore all the psychological liabilities of a vulnerable first-strike weapon.

The Holy Loch sentiment was part of a general moral, political, and emotional protest movement against nuclear deterrence which emerged in late 1957 and 1958 and which became the focus for leftist, pacifist, and neutralist sentiment, opposing not only British production but also British possession and use of nuclear weapons and, soon, Britain's whole involvement in NATO. This was the movement for British unilateral nuclear disarmament. In February, 1958, this movement was organized in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, led by Bertrand Russell and joined by an impressive list of clerics, journalists, literary men, and professional people. The Campaign opposed British ownership and production of nuclear weapons and the establishment of strategic bases on British soil. Most of its pro-

ponents also, implicitly or explicitly, opposed Britain's *use* of nuclear weapons. A strenuous expression of these antinuclear sentiments was launched with the first of the annual Easter week-end protest marches from London to Aldermaston, the site of an atomic weapons research laboratory, fifty-four miles away.

This march was probably a more representative expression of the general reformist zeal and fear of nuclear war that motivated the unilateralists than any specific policies or reasoned analysis presented by the Campaign's leadership.[69] But insofar as the movement had an intellectual content, Bertrand Russell set the tone by repeatedly maintaining that disarmament was the only alternative to an otherwise inevitable thermonuclear castastrophe and that, if it came to a choice between disarmament and Communist conquest, he would prefer the latter, since Communist domination would be less of a disaster than the irrevocable extinction of civilization. As immediate measures, however, he put his faith in East-West political and disarmament agreements; and he was content to urge only *British* renunciation of the H-bomb, in the belief that, whereas this would have no measurable effect upon the East-West balance of power, it would exert great moral pressure against the diffusion of nuclear weapons to other powers.[70] Labor party opponents of Russell's position asserted, among other things, that Britain's renunciation of the *use* of nuclear weapons would end her collaboration with NATO and encourage the collapse of the alliance, upon which British security depended. But Lord Russell maintained that a neutral Britain would not only spare the British from nuclear extinction but would also serve the interests of friendly nations and of civilization itself by putting Britain in the vanguard of the uncommitted nations in mitigating the hostility between the Soviet Union and the United States.[71]

The respected military analyst Commander Sir Stephen King-Hall reached similar conclusions on the basis of military-strategic reasoning in his well-publicized book *Defense in the Nuclear Age.* His advocacy of unilateral nuclear disarmament and a strategy of non-violent resistance emerged from an

analysis of the futility of NATO's nuclear strategy. Like Lord Russell, he preferred non-violent resistance to nuclear retaliation, not on the traditional pacifist grounds, but "because I am convinced that as between Britain occupied by the Russian army and Britain a smoking radioactive charnel-house the former is the lesser of two great evils."[72]

Although the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament failed to receive outright Party indorsement, it was strongly supported by the left wing of the Labor party; and the party leadership came under increasing pressure to make concessions to the sentiment for renouncing at least production, if not ownership and control, of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, in 1958 the party congress, under Mr. Gaitskell's leadership and supported by Aneurin Bevan, voted down resolutions sponsored by pacifist and leftist elements for unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons and missile bases and accepted the proposition that a future Labor government should be free to continue to manufacture nuclear weapons unless they were banned by international agreement. Gaitskell maintained that unilateral nuclear disarmament would be ineffective as a step toward disarmament and would leave Britain in the cowardly position of sheltering behind American bombs or ceasing to collaborate with NATO altogether. To the view that Britain ought to get out of NATO, he replied that this would cause America to go isolationist, leave Britain defenseless against Soviet pressure and aggression, and deprive her of any influence over American policy.[73]

Instead of advocating unilateral nuclear disarmament, Labor party spokesmen in the House, led by Hugh Gaitskell, George Brown, and Denis Healey, urged reducing the West's reliance upon the employment of strategic nuclear weapons for active deterrence, increasing Britain's and NATO's capacity for conventional resistance, and concentrating upon the achievement of international agreements on disarmament and disengagement.

Nevertheless, in the spring of 1959 the party adopted a proposal that Great Britain should become the charter member of a "non-nuclear club" if she could secure agreements, preferably

under U.N. auspices, with other potential nuclear nations to leave the production, testing, and ownership (though not the control and use) of nuclear weapons solely in the hands of Russia and America.[74] This position was not only an intraparty concession; it reflected the party leadership's reasoned resignation to sheltering behind America's nuclear power on the grounds that the political and deterrent value of an independent nuclear capability was not worth the cost, whereas the renunciation of production was a prerequisite to preventing the diffusion of nuclear capabilities. At the same time, the proposal reaffirmed the absolute necessity of collaborating with NATO's strategy, including the acceptance of American missile bases in England, lest America be driven to isolation, the alliance destroyed, and Western Europe left wide open to Soviet pressure. "At best," it claimed, "European independence would be precariously maintained under German leadership and by reliance on an American threat of 'massive retaliation.' At worst the Western community which we have helped to build since 1945 would collapse."

The plan for a non-nuclear club, however, failed to excite interest outside the party or to appease the "unilateralists" inside, and after France succeeded in exploding her first atomic device there was even less reason to think that she might join any such club. Indeed, Labor leaders did not have much enthusiasm for the scheme either. Thus, in the defense debates of March, 1960, Mr. Gaitskell weighed the advantages and the disadvantages of an independent nuclear capability about equally.

On the one hand, he argued that an independent second-strike capability would relieve Britain of excessive military and political dependence on the United States and give her more freedom in standing up to the Russians on matters about which the Americans might not feel so strongly. But, on the other hand, he agreed that there was a case against an independent nuclear capability on the grounds of cost, taking money away from conventional weapons, and encouraging the spread of nuclear weapons. As for the choice between these two positions,

he said, "These are matters of balance on which, frankly, I find it impossible to say that it is absolutely clear one way or the other. We have to weigh them." He concluded, "What we have said in our proposals for the so-called non-nuclear club is that we ought to be prepared to give up our own independent nuclear weapon if thereby we can stop the spread."[75]

Yet, despite this luke-warm conditional pledge of nuclear abstinence, when the party conference convened later that spring, Gaitskell led the executive committee to recommend, in effect, that Britain cease the manufacture or ownership of nuclear weapons even if she had to do so unilaterally. "We believe," the committee stated, "that in the future our British contribution to the Western armory will be in conventional terms, leaving to the Americans the provision of the Western strategic deterrent." Although Gaitskell made it clear that Britain would retain a V-bomber force and nuclear bombs as long as they were serviceable and would go on providing American bomber bases as long as they were required, the party's official statement rather ambiguously "opposed" the establishment of Thor missile bases in England but said nothing about the Thors already in place. Although the committee's statement stopped short of renouncing the use of strategic or tactical nuclear weapons and said that Britain should remain a loyal supporter of NATO, it recommended that there be "strict NATO control," that Germany should not manufacture or be armed with nuclear weapons, and that Britain should seek an agreement with the United States that strategic nuclear weapons would not be used without the agreement of NATO. In the most explicit renunciation of active nuclear deterrence by any Western political party, the executive committee rejected the thesis that the West could be defended by threatening to initiate the use of the H-bomb, although it refrained from renouncing the initial use of tactical nuclear weapons. It recommended, instead, that NATO forces should be "armed and trained to defend Western Europe without immediate reliance on nuclear weapons," for which purpose it recommended that Britain return the 22,000 men withdrawn from the British Army of the Rhine.[76]

However, these concessions to antinuclear sentiment did not appease the left-wing unions, who, in October, 1960, succeeded in gaining the annual Labor conference's approval, against Gaitskell's impassioned opposition, of two resolutions demanding the "unilateral renunciation of the testing, manufacture, stockpiling, and basing of all nuclear weapons in Great Britain" and calling for the party's commitment to "a complete rejection of any defense policy based on the threat of the use of strategic or tactical nuclear weapons."[77]

In 1960 there was little evidence that the Labor party's steady disaffection with an independent British nuclear capability forecast a radical change in the attitude of the nation as a whole. The polls indicated that, although a majority opposed the placement of American missiles on English soil, a larger majority continued to favor a British nuclear capability;[78] and, of the minority that wanted Britain to give up her H-bomb unilaterally, almost one-fifth opposed this if it meant going against the wishes of the United States and other NATO countries.[79] An overwhelming majority preferred to rely on nuclear weapons rather than increase conventional forces, but a clear majority also opposed Britain's using the H-bomb against a Russian conventional attack upon the West.[80] These polls and other indications suggest that the British public's chief concern with nuclear striking power was to avoid being too dependent on the United States, on the one hand by building a British strategic force and on the other hand by limiting American control of British-based missiles and missile-submarines. Qualifying this strong sentiment of national pride and independence was a consciousness that Britain could not save herself from annihilation by using her nuclear deterrent and an unwillingness to incur annihilation by using it against a conventional attack on her allies. However, there was no significant public sentiment for trying to escape the risks of annihilation by making Britain neutral. And there was great reluctance to reduce Britain's dependence on nuclear weapons at the cost of increasing conventional forces.

Consequently, the government was under no compelling popular pressure to abandon an independent nuclear effort.

Rather, it was under pressure to maintain that effort but to keep the cost down and to assure the public of British independence of American military and political decisions, on the one hand, and of the compatibility of an independent nuclear effort with the cohesion of NATO and her special relationship with the United States, on the other, while playing down the strategy of initiating tactical nuclear weapons and abandoning the threat of using the H-bomb first. This was, in fact, the course that the popular Macmillan government pursued.

The government stopped justifying a nuclear capability in terms of a first-strike strategy for active deterrence and professed to be completely reassured about America's determination to honor her obligations to defend her European allies. But it continued to regard a British nuclear force as a "contribution" to the general deterrent posture of the West, although the success of the American Polaris submarine program made this argument obsolete; as a necessary instrument of passive deterrence and of protection against Soviet blackmail; and as an essential means of preserving British political influence, especially in the diplomacy revolving around disarmament and political accommodations with the Soviet Union.

In April, 1960, the government announced the abandonment of work on the liquid-fuel missile Blue Streak, which promised to be not only very costly but also too vulnerable and slow-firing to be useful for passive defense by the time it would become operational, in the latter part of 1960. However, it entered into negotiations with the United States for the solid-fuel Polaris, under the same arrangement of joint control that applied to the Thor missiles, and for the air-launched Skybolt, which, when ready (in 1964 or 1965), was expected to give new utility to the independent nuclear deterrent employing Britain's V-bombers, which were to be dispersed among bases overseas. As a further indication of her determination to acquire an independent invulnerable second-strike force, in October, 1960, Britain launched the first of her nuclear submarines, constructed with American co-operation as part of a program expected to lead to British missile-firing submarines.

Nevertheless, the government could not ignore some of the

adverse consequences of persisting in an independent nuclear effort. In particular, it showed increasing apprehension about the eventual diffusion of nuclear capabilities to other nations and the more immediate prospect of West Germany acquiring control of nuclear weapons. This apprehension suggested that the government, like the opposition, *might* be willing to trade the pursuit of an independent nuclear capability for some scheme that promised to halt the trend toward the proliferation of independent capabilities, for which its own policies served as a powerful precedent and stimulant, providing that Britain would not be left entirely dependent upon American control of the nuclear deterrent. And Britain's dependence upon American assistance suggested that the United States *might* still exert considerable leverage in bringing about such a scheme. One result of these two possibilities was that the British government might be persuaded to subordinate its independent nuclear capability to an allied nuclear authority, depending upon the conditions of political control. But, so long as British leaders looked upon their independent "contribution" to the Western deterrent as an essential instrument of both political independence and a privileged interdependence with the United States, they had little incentive to exchange either their "two-key system" or their "one-key system" for a dubious multi-key system.

5. THE GERMAN AND FRENCH ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR DIFFUSION

Strategically, West Germany and France had better reason than Britain to seek independent nuclear capabilities, since they were more likely to incur direct conventional aggressions in which their threat to initiate the use of nuclear weapons—perhaps in desperation or unreasoning anger—might be more credible to the Kremlin than America's threat. And they were at least as much in need of an independent deterrent to discourage Soviet nuclear attacks or nuclear blackmail. Furthermore, there was no reason that Britain's non-strategic arguments for being a nuclear power—especially, those appealing to national prestige and independent political influence—should not be just as

persuasive for Germany and France. Yet, for special political reasons, France was the most outspoken advocate of an independent nuclear force, while Germany became the most outspoken advocate of a joint NATO nuclear force.

After her decision in 1957 to reduce the period of conscription to twelve months and to slow down the pace and scope of rearmament, the Federal Republic, like her senior allies, tailored her military policies to the thesis that nuclear firepower would substitute for conventionally-armed manpower. Therefore, like her other non-nuclear allies, she became progressively more dependent on nuclear warheads and weapons, which she could neither build nor control. However, West Germany was under legal and political constraints against seeking an independent nuclear force that did not apply to Britain or France. Therefore, she staked the enhancement of her military and political influence not on a privileged bilateral partnership with the United States or on an independent nuclear program but on the tight military and political integration of the alliance, within which she pressed for a larger role commensurate with her great power and pivotal position, including a larger share of the control of nuclear weapons.

The Bonn government, conscious of West Germany's proximity and vulnerability to Soviet forces and sensitive to her allies' fears of Germany becoming a major military power again, disclaimed any interest in receiving American IRBM's—at least, until mobile solid-fuel missiles would become available—although it signed the NATO agreement of 1957 that would permit her to receive them and in June, 1959, indicated that it looked forward to the joint production with her allies of IRBM's to replace fighter-bombers.[81] However, the government persistently expressed its strong interest in becoming a full participant in NATO's *tactical* nuclear strategy. Understandably, in the light of NATO's dependence on a tactical nuclear response and the reorganization of the German army to fight a tactical nuclear war, West German leaders after 1957 repeatedly urged the United States to speed the process of arming Germany with nuclear weapons. Under the NATO agreement of 1957 Ger-

many did receive a variety of tactical surface-to-surface and antiaircraft missiles, in addition to the atomic artillery and nuclear-bearing fighter-bombers received and contracted for under regular bilateral agreements. And some of these weapons—particularly, the 600-mile Mace—could be considered strategic as well as tactical.

West German leaders refrained from publicly stating the misgivings about the credibility and reliability of America's control of nuclear warheads that British and French leaders freely voiced. However, there can be no doubt that they were dissatisfied with the extent of their dependence on a unilateral American decision to employ or not to employ tactical nuclear weapons. Being on the front line, and having committed themselves wholeheartedly to tactical nuclear deterrence of conventional attack, they had a special reason to seek equal control of the decision to use these weapons. Although German military and civilian officials pointed to the necessity of deterring limited conventional grabs with conventional forces, far more urgently than any other allied officials they insisted that the Russians must be convinced that NATO would not hesitate to initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

While tactfully pressing for more nuclear weapons, the Bonn government refrained from seeking custody of nuclear warheads or abrogation of the WEU treaty prohibition upon Germany's production of her own nuclear warheads. Nevertheless, as atomic weapons were more widely integrated into NATO's formations and more widely dispersed within these formations (according to some reports, two-man and even one-man nuclear weapons would be available in the 1960's), the technical, as well as political, feasibility of American soldiers remaining the exclusive guardians of the warheads became increasingly doubtful. Under the circumstances, the nuclear armament of Germany might become tantamount to German possession of nuclear warheads.

At the same time, if France remained determined to achieve nuclear parity with Britain, the prospect of collaborating with Germany, who might help provide a much-needed solid-fuel

missile, was bound to be tempting. And if France were to gain a substantial nuclear striking force, with or without German help, how long could NATO deny Germany, who of all the European allies had potentially the greatest economic and technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons, the opportunity to join the nuclear club? There was no published evidence that Germany and France agreed to a formal nuclear weapons consortium, although France was apparently interested in a limited nuclear partnership in 1958. In this same year, however, Defense Minister Strauss indicated that if France continued her development of an independent nuclear capability, the Federal Republic might have to follow suit.[82]

On the other hand, the intense popular and partisan reaction to "Carte Blanche" suggested that the domestic opposition to German control and ownership of nuclear weapons might, in some circumstances, become every bit as strong as it was in Great Britain. Certainly, allied opposition was far stronger. Consequently, whatever their private wishes might be, German officials were constrained from seeking unilateral control of nuclear warheads and weapons by their recognition that this might upset the carefully cultivated status of West Germany as a safe and valuable ally, the outstanding proponent of integration and interdependence.

Chancellor Adenauer was sensitive to the dilemma that France's pursuit of an independent nuclear capability posed for West Germany, because of the domestic and foreign opposition to an independent German nuclear force, on the one hand, and the desire not to be excluded from an expanding nuclear club, on the other. Therefore, after the fall of 1960 he and Defense Minister Strauss openly favored an integrated NATO nuclear striking force as an alternative to De Gaulle's policy. But, while emphasizing his opposition to any move that would contravene Germany's consistent promotion of military integration in NATO and indorsing an allied nuclear deterrent, the Chancellor also insisted on equality of arms for all its members. "It would be an intolerable situation," he warned, "to have a force on one side with the most modern weapons confronting forces not

similarly armed. We must give all the NATO forces the same arms as are available to the Russians or we might as well give them bows and arrows."[83] By the end of 1960 it began to look as though the creation of an integrated allied nuclear—at least, tactical nuclear—capability, in which Germany would have equal access to nuclear weapons but remain under the restraints of joint control, was the only politically acceptable way to grant equality of arms to the Federal Republic.

While West Germany operated under powerful restraints against seeking nuclear weapons under independent control, France seemed absolutely determined to follow Britain's example in building her own nuclear force. Officially, the French government took the position that only if the nuclear nations should stop nuclear production and enter a general nuclear disarmament agreement would France agree to a test ban or any other restriction that would keep her from becoming a member of the nuclear club. Otherwise, what was good for the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom certainly was not to be denied to France. Accordingly, although she was unable to acquire nearly as much American nuclear information and assistance as Britain, France continued from 1952 on to push ahead at great expense in developing nuclear warheads and the means of delivery. The two nuclear explosions in the Sahara early in 1960 were not generally regarded as true warheads, but there was no doubt that France would soon achieve them. Like Britain, France suffered the disadvantage of relying on bombers (principally the Mirage IV) to deliver the warheads, but to overcome this deficiency she invested great money and effort in developing a ram-jet missile and a solid-fuel IRBM and showed considerable interest in building missile-firing nuclear submarines. In 1960, in spite of very strong opposition in the National Assembly, President de Gaulle pushed through a nuclear program costing the equivalent of two billion dollars.

What was the justification for this burdensome effort to make France the fourth nuclear power? French spokesmen said little or nothing about enhancing France's deterrent capacity or military security. In the domestic controversy over France's nuclear

program, military strategy was a negligible consideration. Instead, De Gaulle said France must become a nuclear power in order to have the military autonomy that was the prerequisite of political autonomy and an equal voice with the "Anglo-Saxon" nations in diplomacy and discussions of disarmament. In his mind it was an axiom of international relations that military power must have a "national character." Especially considering the fateful consequences of a nuclear war, "France," he proclaimed, "cannot leave her own destiny and even her own life to the discretion of others."[84] Consistent with this notion of national independence, he declared that France wanted allies but not "protectors." Therefore, France must be ready to meet the totalitarian threat, "not as a protégé, but as an ally which has disposal of herself, including her means of defense."[85] In reality, this would strengthen the alliance, not weaken it, he held. Thus Foreign Minister Couve de Murville answered the criticism in the National Assembly that a national nuclear deterrent would isolate France from her allies by asserting that it would strengthen France's voice in formulating NATO's strategic plans in co-operation with the United States and Britain.[86] And President de Gaulle, approving the unity of France, the United States, and the United Kingdom at the abortive summit conference of May, 1960, asserted:

> Our alliance appeared a living reality. In order that it become even more so, France must have her own role in it, and her own personality. This implies that she too must acquire a nuclear armament, since others have one; that she must be sole mistress of her resources and her territory; in short, that her destiny, although associated with that of her allies, must remain in her own hands. It goes without saying that such an autonomy must be coupled with an ever-closer coordination among the Western world powers, regarding their policy and their strategy.[87]

Thus, in his private memoranda to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan in September, 1958, General de Gaulle coupled his demand for equal nuclear status with a demand for equal political status. In particular, he suggested that the three allies with interests and responsibilities outside

the NATO area should consult regularly, as a kind of tripartite board, on global policies and military strategy.[88] To demonstrate his determination to pursue this policy of independence-with-co-operation, he withdrew French ships from NATO command, refused to accept missiles or nuclear stockpiles on French soil unless France were given control of the warheads, and requested that the United States seek France's consent before using nuclear weapons anywhere in the world.

De Gaulle's juxtaposition of his demand for tripartite nuclear equality with his demand for tripartite political equality within NATO might be an indication that he would accept certain military and political terms of collaboration as a substitute for the pursuit of an independent nuclear capability; that he would, for example, abandon or at least phase out France's nuclear program in return for a special and equal role in controlling a joint nuclear force and an equal voice in regular tripartite political and strategic consultations. However, the sweeping nature of the arguments he used for developing a French nuclear capability might also mean that France's nuclear program was far more than a bargaining lever, a negotiable asset, to be traded in for better military and political terms of alliance. Thus, in a news conference in November, 1959, De Gaulle exclaimed:

> Who can say that if in the future, the political background having changed completely—that is something that has already happened on earth—the two powers having the nuclear monopoly will not agree to divide the world? Who can say that if the occasion arises the two, while each deciding not to launch its missiles at the main enemy so that it should itself be spared, will not crush the others? It is possible to imagine that on some awful day Western Europe should be wiped out from Moscow and Central Europe from Washington. And who can even say that the two rivals, after I know not what political and social upheaval, will not unite?[89]

These did not sound like the words of a man who would trade a unilateral nuclear program for a scheme of joint control under any conditions. Rather, they sounded like the expression of a basic conviction that the only safe and sound condition

for pursuing France's historic destiny was an independent nuclear capability, free of the unreliable unilateral control of the United States or of the equally unreliable multilateral control of an integrated NATO deterrent group. Nevertheless, it was possible that as France encountered the difficulties of building a useful nuclear striking force and discovered its limited political efficacy, even De Gaulle might become more receptive to alternative arrangements for the command and control of nuclear weapons, which could actually be more compatible with the equal and effective voice in allied councils that he sought.

6. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES FOR INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

Clearly, although the problem of sharing or not sharing control of nuclear weapons would exist anyway, it would be less urgent and more tractable if several of the allies did not have the actual or potential capacity and will to build their own nuclear capabilities. Therefore, in order to formulate a policy toward the control of nuclear weapons from the standpoint of the interests of the United States and the alliance as a whole, one must appraise the nature, strength, and validity of both the incentives and disincentives for the individual members of NATO to acquire independent control of a nuclear force.

The most influential reasons for acquiring an independent nuclear capability are probably the following: (*a*) to obtain a more credible and reliable deterrent to military incursions that the United States might not counter with American-controlled nuclear weapons; (*b*) to gain greater protection against "nuclear blackmail"—that is, against various forms of Soviet pressure backed by the threat of nuclear attack or a conventional conflict entailing the risk of nuclear war; (*c*) to contribute to the West's combined deterrent posture by supplementing America's nuclear striking force; (*d*) to support political and military courses of action, including those outside the NATO area, that the United States might not be willing to back at the risk of her own military involvement; (*e*) to enhance bargaining power and influ-

ence vis-à-vis the United States and other allies in matters of foreign policy, military strategy, and disarmament; (*f*) to enjoy the most impressive military attribute of national autonomy and prestige and avoid dependence upon another nation's control of this fateful weapon; (*g*) to rationalize economies in other military expenditures, and especially in mobilized manpower, by offering the public military strength at a tolerable cost; (*h*) to avoid being left out of an expanding nuclear club.

The principal reasons for not acquiring an independent nuclear capability are: (*a*) to avoid the great expense and technological effort required, even with American assistance, to develop, produce, and maintain an adequate quantity and quality of nuclear weapons; (*b*) to avoid the increased danger of attracting a Soviet nuclear attack; (*c*) to avoid stimulating the spread of nuclear capabilities and thereby increasing the hazards of joining the nuclear club by impeding disarmament, unstabilizing the military environment, and undermining allied collaboration, while reducing the benefits by diffusing them to other members; (*d*) to avoid contravening a domestic moral and emotional aversion to owning and producing nuclear weapons.

The principal military-strategic justification that allied nuclear aspirants have given for an independent nuclear program rests on the premise that there are circumstances in which an ally's control of nuclear striking power would be a more effective deterrent to Soviet aggression in Europe than America's control. The validity of this assumption depends, in the first place, upon the kind of nuclear force the ally controls and, in the second place, upon the kind of contingency it is intended to deter.

Clearly, a few squadrons of vulnerable liquid-fuel missiles would be worse than useless to an ally as a second-strike force to deter a direct Soviet nuclear attack. They could not survive a first strike, but they might provoke one. And they would be almost equally useless as a first-strike force for deterring a direct non-nuclear attack or an attack upon other allies. During a crisis the ally controlling these weapons would be more likely to go out of his way to assure the Russians that he would not use them

than to try to convince them that he would. Therefore, an ally's nuclear striking force must be relatively invulnerable to be useful for either passive or active deterrence. The British experience, and for that matter the American experience, shows how difficult it is for even a great scientific and industrial nation to build or maintain an invulnerable striking force in the face of increasingly numerous and accurate Soviet missiles.[90] Nevertheless, by the 1970's a few allies could probably acquire—especially if they combined resources or obtained American assistance—sufficiently invulnerable nuclear striking forces, based on solid-fuel sea- and air-borne missiles, to inflict extensive damage on the Soviet Union, even on a second strike, without increasing the risk of attracting a Soviet first strike on their homeland. (If inflicting maximum damage were their *only* aim, they might compensate for the relative vulnerability of their striking force by using very dirty bombs.) However, so far as the enhancement of deterrence is concerned, the physical capabilities of an ally's nuclear force would be valuable only insofar as they made the ally's will and capacity to respond to aggression more credible and fearful to the Russians than America's. Under what circumstances, if any, would this be the case?

Would an ally's independent nuclear capability be any more effective than America's nuclear deterrent against a major conventional attack in Europe? There is no reason to think that the United States, faced with the loss of the most vital area among all her overseas commitments, would be any less willing to employ nuclear weapons than her allies, or to suppose that the Russians would count on her being less willing. If it is doubtful that the United States would initiate the use of nuclear weapons in this contingency, it is even more doubtful that any of her allies would prefer obliteration to occupation or some political escape from war, since their resort to nuclear strikes would not spare them from occupation in any case. Of course, the Soviet Union might estimate an ally's response to such aggression more cautiously than she would estimate America's response, on the assumption that a desperate ally would be more likely to resort to an irrational gesture of nuclear defiance. Yet this is certainly

a tenuous reason for an ally to seek an independent nuclear capability: that its threat to commit suicide will be a more convincing deterrent than America's capacity to devastate Russia.

But let us suppose that the object of deterrence were a local conventional incursion upon allied territory—say, a seizure of Berlin, a conflict in West Germany growing out of a disturbance in East Germany, or an attack in Norway or Greece—which the United States would regard as limited but which the ally would regard as comparable to a threat to its survival. No ally could build a sufficient first-strike (or antimissile and civil defense) capability to save it from virtual extinction if it launched a nuclear blow. Yet, conceivably, an ally with only a rudimentary nuclear capability might be able to inflict enough damage on the aggressor to deter such an incursion, despite the utter devastation the Soviet Union could inflict in return. In the same situation, the aggressor might take a chance that the United States would be unwilling to incur the penalties of nuclear devastation for the sake of her ally, even if American troops were being killed.

This proposition has a certain plausibility in the abstract. Yet, in reality, the capacity of an ally to exploit a nuclear force for such ends would depend on imponderable factors of national psychology, leadership, and nerve, which must qualify any theoretical calculus of deterrence. It is extremely unlikely that these qualities would be sufficient to embolden nations who are still haunted by the destruction of two world wars and who would be helpless to prevent their annihilation *and* occupation in another one to attempt to stave off the Soviet colossus with a threat to engage him in nuclear war. In any case, the hypothetical credibility of a threat of suicide is not a sound basis for an ally's pursuit of military and political independence.

If there is a case for an ally enhancing its deterrent power with an independent nuclear capability, it must be made in terms of a second-strike capability. But against what contingencies would an ally's retaliatory strike against a nuclear attack be more credible than America's? Certainly not against a general

nuclear assault, in which America's nuclear force would be a primary target, but conceivably against a limited nuclear attack confined to the ally in question. Yet it seems most improbable that rational Soviet leaders would ever assume that the nuclear stalemate with the United States were so stable that they could start a nuclear war against America's allies, singly or collectively, without America's nuclear intervention. Such a war would be too direct a threat to a vital American alliance and to American prestige and security in the world at large for Soviet leaders to count on the United States being willing to leave her allies to their fate rather than meet Soviet nuclear attacks with at least a proportionate nuclear response. This would be true even if the United States had withdrawn her troops and bases from Europe, for America's interest in preserving the strength and independence of Western Europe is rooted in considerations of sentiment and security that transcend the protection of American troops or bases.

Nevertheless, the interest of the United States and her allies in resisting Soviet incursions is not identical in all conceivable circumstances. It is, therefore, not certain that the United States would support her allies against all Soviet nuclear threats at the risk of her own involvement. For example, one can imagine that a NATO member's action might provide the Soviet Union with the pretense of a legitimate excuse for striking or threatening to strike with nuclear weapons under circumstances in which the United States might not be willing to respond in kind because she did not support that member's action. But would an ally be any better prepared to withstand such a threat if it had an independent nuclear capability? Or might not its threat to employ nuclear weapons independently of the United States merely reinforce America's unwillingness to become involved in its behalf, without bolstering its position against Russia? Unless the ally were clearly capable of imposing great damage on the Soviet Union, it probably could not credibly threaten to trade nuclear blows, knowing that it would surely be destroyed long before Russia if the game were played out. Therefore, it is quite unlikely that an ally could be more confident of calling a nuclear bluff or deterring a genuine threat by brandishing its own nuclear

power than by relying upon the United States, which could both deliver and absorb far more damage. In fact, if an ally could secure American nuclear backing, it might gain more protection against a Soviet nuclear threat by *not* possessing a nuclear striking force (or by prohibiting a foreign-owned force to use its territory) than by threatening to impose unacceptable retaliatory damage independently.

But we have assumed so far that the efficacy of an ally's independent nuclear force as a deterrent depends only on the relation of power and will between that ally and the aggressor, whereas its efficacy may also be affected by the force's influence upon America's nuclear deterrent. Thus an ally might use the threat of its own nuclear response as a threat to involve the Soviet Union in a nuclear war with the United States. For example, it might threaten to launch a nuclear blow or retaliate against a limited Soviet nuclear blow in the expectation that the United States could not fail to back it up with her own nuclear force and that the Soviet Union could not take the chance of acting on the contrary assumption. Or the ally might calculate that because the Soviet Union would not dare to upset the military balance with the United States by expending her striking power on the United States ally, she might either be restrained from attacking the nuclear-armed ally or else be impelled to attack the United States simultaneously. The mere possibility that an ally's striking power might thus act as a trigger on America's striking power might increase the risk and uncertainty facing the aggressor in some circumstances, when there neither existed nor appeared to exist a conflict of interest between the United States and her ally. On the other hand, it might have just the opposite effect in other circumstances. For to the extent that the ally threatened to use its independent nuclear force to trigger off America's force under circumstances in which the United States did not wish to become involved, the United States would have to protect herself from her ally by qualifying her obligation to consider an attack upon one as an attack upon all, thereby leaving the ally in a weaker and more isolated position than before. Moreover, an ally's very possession of an independent nuclear force might depreciate the cred-

ibility of an American response by suggesting to the aggressor that the United States had, in effect, turned over her local deterrent responsibilities to her ally.

The British government, faced with the difficulties of enhancing Britain's deterrent power directly by disposing an independent nuclear capability, claimed to enhance that power indirectly, by making an independent contribution to the West's general deterrent posture. But, if it were true that an ally could supplement America's nuclear striking force by providing such values as dispersion, geographical proximity, and a larger number of missiles, that would not be an argument for decentralizing control of nuclear weapons. Quite the opposite. Besides, in 1961 the United States—with the operational status of the Polaris—achieved an adequate second-strike force without allied contributions, and the allies were in no position to enhance America's waning first-strike capability.

The arguments for an independent nuclear capability on grounds of military security are no more applicable to tactical nuclear weapons than to strategic nuclear weapons. For, even if tactical nuclear warfare were regarded as a more effective means of local resistance, an ally upon whose soil such a war would be fought would probably be even more reluctant than the United States to initiate it. In any case, the distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear war had become quite fuzzy by 1961, since tactical nuclear weapons were regarded as instruments of graduated deterrence—as a step up the ladder to massive retaliation—and since some of NATO's nominally tactical planes, rockets, and missiles could reach Soviet territory from the forward line. Indeed, General Norstad regarded the land-based Polaris missiles, which he sought for a NATO nuclear force, as a tactical substitute for medium-range bombers. Of course, if an ally were to completely replace American-controlled tactical nuclear warheads on its territory with its own, that would give the ally a power to *withhold* the use of local nuclear weapons, although the U.S.A. could still employ weapons from outside the territory. But the credibility of the nuclear deterrent would be diminished rather than increased.

There remains the possibility that an ally might increase its

military power outside the NATO area by possessing an independent nuclear force. However, the allies with specific interests and commitments outside the NATO area could not protect them with nuclear weapons. The British and French experiences showed that, politically and militarily, the only forces that are useful for this purpose are conventional and paramilitary forces. And, as for resisting Soviet nuclear threats against the use of such forces, the British experience in the Suez War indicated that an independent nuclear capability would be no help if the United States did not support her ally politically.

Therefore—quite apart from the possible liabilities of pursuing an independent nuclear program—on grounds of military security an ally's development and maintenance of an independent nuclear force would not be worth the great effort required. As long as the United States manifested an identical interest in maintaining the basic conditions of allied security, any ally would be better off depending on America's nuclear forces, under assurances that they would be used for the benefit of all the allies, than trying to supplement or supplant those forces with its own. However, like most of NATO's military problems, the problem of the control of nuclear weapons was saturated with political implications, which could not be encompassed within any purely military-strategic calculus.

Then what political value could an ally derive from an independent nuclear capability? If an ally could gain no deterrent power by controlling its own nuclear weapons, it probably could not gain greater protection against nuclear blackmail either; nor could it gain more effective backing for political and military courses of action that the United States was not willing to support. For, like enhancing deterrence, these two political reasons for an independent nuclear capability rest on the dubious assumptions that the Soviet Union would be more fearful of an ally's nuclear power than of America's, and that in the absence of American political support an ally could increase its influence on the Soviet Union by disposing its own nuclear power. Similarly, insofar as an ally's bargaining power with the United States and other allies is a function of its capacity to pursue an independent course with respect to the Soviet

Union, there is no reason to suppose that an independent nuclear force can enhance an ally's bargaining power any more than it can enhance deterrence.

Of course, where the relationship between military power and its objective is so indirect and unspecific and where many other factors must also account for power and influence, it is extremely difficult to calculate the political efficacy or inefficacy of a nuclear force. Perhaps the symbolic value of a nuclear capability can reinforce an ally's influence irrespective of its exact utility if it had to be used. Even the relationship of nuclear weapons to deterrence, which can at least be calculated according to such relatively precise and tangible data as missile exchange rates, is very inexact and speculative. When it comes to national prestige, the military contribution is peculiarly subjective; in a sense, if other powers regard nuclear weapons, for whatever reason, as a potent status symbol, then an independent nuclear capability is an important index of national power.

Yet there is no evidence that permits one to attribute the British, French, or German capacity to resist blackmail, to pursue an independent policy, or to exercise bargaining power inside or outside the alliance to their possession or lack of possession of nuclear weapons. One can more readily attribute their political influence to the quality of their diplomacy, their national leadership, their internal cohesion and economic strength, their geographical position, their historical image, or even to their conventional military power. And, although the possession or non-possession of nuclear weapons may affect their prestige in some general sense, it is difficult to show how it has affected their political influence for specific purposes. The evidence for the influence of an ally's independent nuclear capability upon American policy is equally scant. Surely, Britain's special relationship with the United States—based on a distinctive combination of coinciding interests, shared culture and experiences, and personalties—would have existed whether or not she had become a nuclear power. And it is doubtful that an ally can enhance its influence on the United States merely by demonstrating its will to exploit an independent nuclear force

in pursuit of an independent political course. The attempt to do so is more likely to lead to contrary results.

Nevertheless, there are at least two ways in which it is fairly clear that an ally can translate into concrete political results its capacity to build an independent nuclear force: (*a*) by offering to stop or moderate an independent nuclear effort in return for military and political concessions; (*b*) by gaining access to disarmament discussions and influence on disarmament policies. There is little doubt that France, by first developing a significant nuclear capability and then skilfully exploiting it for these ends, could increase her voice in the alliance and in shaping the broad range of militarily and politically significant policies associated with disarmament. Her success in these directions would provide an example for others to follow. So one cannot dismiss the political arguments for an independent nuclear capability as anachronistic appeals to national pride and vanity.

Yet the most persuasive reason for an ally to seek an independent nuclear capability is of a more general and profound nature than any of these. It is simply that military autonomy is the most striking symbol of political autonomy and that the capacity to choose war or peace is the most vital attribute of national sovereignty. Even though military autonomy can only be approximated in reality, a great nation must not surrender any more of it than it can help. Therefore, to leave such fateful decisions as whether or not to use nuclear weapons and how to use nuclear weapons entirely in the hands of another nation amounts to a gross abnegation of national will. No other nation, however mighty and trustworthy it may be, can always be relied upon to make these crucial decisions in a manner completely compatible with a nuclear dependent's own vital interests. The United States is no exception.

Such a patent abnegation of control over one's military fate must be especially galling to an ally when the instruments of its fate are stationed on its own soil. But, in fact, those allies who do not have nuclear weapons on their soil are likely to be as vulnerable to the destruction of a nuclear war as those who do. Therefore, all allies have an interest in avoiding dependence on

another nation's exclusive control of nuclear weapons on the simple principle that there should be no annihilation without representation. If they cannot obtain a satisfactory degree of control over the use of these weapons by other means, those allies who have the material capacity will be under some compulsion to secure it by building their own nuclear weapons. At least, the British and French nuclear efforts convey the distinct impression that it is this simple but profound impulse of military and political autonomy, more than any of the specific strategic or political purposes with which they have rationalized it, that has impelled them to seek their own nuclear capabilities at such great expense.

To a lesser extent, the same impulse that impels allies to seek control over the instruments of their national survival or annihilation also leads them to seek nuclear weapons in order to support subordinate national interests. There may be no convincing evidence that an independent nuclear force will enable an ally to support its political objectives more effectively, but there is no conclusive evidence that it will not; for, by its nature, the relationship between military and political power is subtle and indefinite. Under the circumstances, allies may reasonally prefer not to depend entirely on American nuclear power to back their policies if they can help it. In such a crucial yet speculative endeavor as supporting deterrence and diplomacy with military power, it is understandable that governments should want to rely, as much as possible, on their own control of nuclear weapons rather than on the will and ability of the United States to control them in their behalf.

Still, it might be easier for allies to tolerate dependence upon America's nuclear capability than on America's capability *and* the nuclear capabilities of several other allies in addition. For, in a sense, non-nuclear nations would be more nearly equal partners if the United States had a monopoly of nuclear weapons in the alliance than if Britain and France and another ally or two should also possess significant nuclear capabilities. In a situation of rampant or even incipient nuclear diffusion, allies who would not otherwise have chosen to develop independent

nuclear forces might do so simply because they did not wish to be left out of an expanding nuclear club. They might wish to control their own nuclear weapons because, although they were willing to depend on the United States to use her nuclear power to their benefit under the existing lines of influence, they were not willing to depend on a number of other nuclear powers doing so when the lines of influence would be more diverse and complicated. Therefore, even if only two or three allies were to act upon the incentives to obtain an independent nuclear capability, the movement might spread by sheer contagion.

On the other hand, any ally contemplating an independent nuclear effort would have to reckon with some formidable liabilities, which might create countervailing disincentives to undertake such an effort. Already, by the time the British canceled their Blue Streak program in 1960, the great expense required to build a useful nuclear capability had dampened one earlier incentive for joining the nuclear club: the desire to get more security for less money. Although this economic motive remained an excuse for not increasing conventional forces and for preserving NATO's nuclear strategy, by 1960 it had ceased to be a convincing justification for an individual ally to try to substitute its own nuclear power for conventional forces.

Soon after the onset of the missile age, allied states also came to understand the modern calculus of deterrence well enough to regard a vulnerable striking force as more of a liability than an asset, since it would be inadequate for a second strike but might attract a pre-emptive attack. Yet it would take any ally, including Britain, a number of years to acquire a sufficiently invulnerable force—especially one based on sea-borne mobility and concealment—by which time that particular weapons system might be obsolescent.

Furthermore, tending to counteract popular sentiment for nuclear autonomy there was the emergence of organized popular sentiment for nuclear abstinence—most notably in Britain, Norway, Denmark, and West Germany. This countervailing sentiment sprang, partly, from a moral and emotional revulsion toward weapons of such terrible destructive capacity and, part-

ly, from a general identification of nuclear abstinence with disarmament and peace. And these motives were powerfully reinforced by the simple fear of physical vulnerability to nuclear obliteration and by the desire to escape obliteration through avoiding the responsibility for deterring it.

At the same time, the possible contagion of an expanding nuclear club was, to some degree, offset by the fear of exacerbating the contagion. The fear was not only that the political advantages of joining the club would diminish with the increased membership but, more important, that the creation of several centers of nuclear control would undermine the cohesion of the alliance and unstabilize the whole international military environment.

To the extent that independent nuclear capabilities actually convinced allies, rightly or wrongly, that they could pursue deterrence, diplomacy, and their separate policies independently, nuclear diffusion would tend to destroy the incentives for military and political co-operation. Supposing a nuclear-armed ally really believed that it had achieved the military autonomy it sought. It would then raise fears in the minds of other allies that it intended to use or threaten to use its nuclear weapons in circumstances that would implicate them in risks of nuclear devastation which they did not wish to incur. These fears would move non-nuclear allies to qualify or rescind their obligations to support this nuclear ally, and it would incite them to seek their own nuclear capabilities in the apprehension that combined forces were no longer a reliable guaranty of their interests. If several allies thereby came to base their security primarily on their independent control of nuclear weapons rather than on the forces and decisions of the alliance as a whole, every ally would be reluctant to commit its armed force for any purpose except opposing blackmail and aggressions that impinged directly and immediately upon its own security or on its exclusive national interests outside the treaty area. In this way the mutual obligations of NATO could readily dissolve in mutual suspicions and fears.

A particularly virulent source of these suspicions and fears

would be an independent German nuclear capability, regardless of the restraint with which the German government might exercise this new-found power. But the corrosive effect of nuclear diffusion would be even more serious if it loosened the ties of the United States to her European allies. On the one hand, nuclear diffusion might increase American suspicion, if not the actual likelihood, of some ally involving or threatening to involve the United States in nuclear war under circumstances in which she would not be willing to become involved. After all, to pose a more credible threat of nuclear war than the American threat, to threaten to act when the United States might not, was one of the primary justifications that the British and French presented for their nuclear programs. And, considering the limited nuclear capability that any ally was likely to achieve in the near future, the ability to trigger American nuclear power might appear to be its chief utility. On the other hand, the diffusion of allied nuclear capabilities might lead to a devolution of responsibility for exercising nuclear power, away from the United States and to the allies, which they were not really prepared to assume. And, in that case, the United States would either find herself in the position of acting as the unwanted trigger on *their* nuclear forces; or else, despairing of the task of presenting a common front to Soviet incursions, she would reserve her nuclear power to protect her own most immediate interests. In either case, the effect would be to sever the vital entanglement of the United States and Europe, to drive the United States to do exactly what her allies have always feared: to diminish her obligation to come to the defense of Europe. Since the United States would no longer need strategic bases in Europe, and since her allies would prefer to contribute to their independent nuclear forces rather than to the common defense of Europe on the ground, the United States might even withdraw her troops and return to the position of an overseas guarantor instead of an active European collaborator. But she would be a guarantor under radically different conditions than at the beginning of NATO, before the rise of Soviet nuclear power.

The most immediate and likely consequences of these corrosive effects of nuclear diffusion would not be anything so dramatic as the dissolution of the alliance or an overt armed aggression. Rather, the loosening of allied cohesion would lead to the intensification of the Soviet game of creating crises to test the resolution of the alliance and to exploit political differences, and to more adventurous tactics of subversion and indirect aggression.

Along with these ominous possibilities, prospective nuclear powers would also have to include the following consequences among the hazards of expanding the nuclear club: increasing the risks of a nuclear war by accident or miscalculation, killing the chances of an international agreement to curtail the diffusion of nuclear capabilities, and accelerating the process of nuclear diffusion outside the alliance. Even the diffusion of nuclear capabilities among the allies would tend to unstabilize the military balance by multiplying the sources of potential nuclear mistakes and obscuring the sources of nuclear control and responsibility. But the proliferation of nuclear powers outside the alliance would be vastly more unstabilizing, as new sets of volatile military balances would tempt old rivals and enemies to engage in risky political adventures and pre-emptive or preventive wars, which, in turn, might involve the United States and her NATO allies. As long as there seemed to be any prospect of preventing this development, any ally that feared the contagion of nuclear diffusion could not reasonably claim for itself a privilege of joining the nuclear club that it would deny to others.

Considering the obstacles to America's allies' achieving anything but a token nuclear force in the 1960's and considering the liabilities of their trying to achieve even that, one might expect prospective allied members of the nuclear club to estimate the benefits of membership more modestly than when Britain and France began their nuclear programs, before the implications of the missile age and of nuclear diffusion were understood so well. If the most basic motive for an independent nuclear capability was the compelling impulse to

achieve military and political autonomy—that is, the desire to acquire a decent measure of national control over one's military fate—a sober appraisal of the facts of nuclear life in the 1960's should convince allied governments and peoples that an independent nuclear program is not a fruitful investment.

Along with the many costs and liabilities of an independent nuclear program, an ally would have to reckon with the fact that, even if it regarded its nuclear force as a useful supplement to America's second-strike capability, that force would not enhance its control over America's decision to use or not use her own nuclear force. For an ally's nuclear weapons would be no more useful as a safety catch than as a trigger on America's nuclear weapons. They would not meet one of the basic sources of allied dissatisfaction with nuclear dependence on the United States: the fear that the United States might use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under circumstances in which an ally was not willing to incur the risks and costs of nuclear war. Only if an ally could completely supplant America's responsibility for nuclear retaliation with its own, could it gain control over the decision *not* to use nuclear weapons. But, in that case, it could not also expect to enhance the credibility of a positive nuclear decision. More likely, it would be left isolated in the face of Soviet threats, having sacrificed America's nuclear backing for an illusory military autonomy.

In truth, an ally's real guaranty of a decent measure of control over its military fate is not nuclear independence but military and political interdependence. With effective interdependence, based on a strategy compatible with close military and political collaboration, the locus of production, ownership, and custody of nuclear warheads might be dissociated from, or at least subordinated to, the method of making the decision to use them. Then there might be an equitable allied participation in the use of nuclear weapons without a disastrous fragmentation of nuclear control.

9

The Control of Nuclear Weapons

1. POLICY ALTERNATIVES

In the light of the nature and strength of these incentives and disincentives for allies to acquire their own nuclear weapons and the probable consequences of their joining the nuclear club, what policy should the United States adopt toward the control of nuclear weapons in order to advance the security and cohesion of the alliance?* That was the urgent question confronting the United States in the 1960's.

The principal policy alternatives were: (*a*) to keep the existing system of unilateral American control of American- or sea-based nuclear weapons, supplemented by dual control of nuclear weapons on allied soil, with custody of the warheads in American hands; (*b*) to actively assist all those allies who wanted to acquire independent nuclear capabilities to join the

* By "control" I mean the power to govern the use of nuclear weapons, of which physical possession is only one means. The "command and control" of nuclear weapons generally refers to the whole technical and organizational system for co-ordinating the use of weapons under responsible military command, but in this chapter I deal, primarily, with the political locus of the strategy and the decision to use nuclear weapons. On the technical, organizational, and many of the strategic aspects of the problem of maintaining central control over dispersed nuclear weapons, see Thornton Read, *Command and Control* (Princeton University Center of International Studies, Policy Memorandum No. 24 [1961]).

nuclear club; (*c*) to grant the allies a joint share of the control of the decision to use nuclear weapons under a NATO or European command, directed by a joint political body. In reality, these policies were subject to a number of variations and combinations; but, as stated, each represented a distinct strategy for handling the command and control of nuclear weapons, and each would have distinct results.

From the American standpoint there was no *direct* security advantage to be gained by relinquishing custody of nuclear warheads and giving the allies a larger share of their control. On the contrary, sharing nuclear custody and control would complicate the problem of the politically disciplined and responsible employment of nuclear weapons and, possibly, reduce the credibility of nuclear retaliation. *Indirectly,* however, the security of the United States and all the allies might be benefited if nuclear sharing enhanced allied collaboration and directed allied resources toward the support of non-nuclear conventional resistance instead of toward independent nuclear capabilities. Moreover, the cohesion of the alliance had a vital political value in the non-violent struggles of the cold war, quite apart from its contribution to military security.

2. THE EXISTING SYSTEM

The system of nuclear control that existed at the end of 1960 had the virtue of preserving the centralized control of America's nuclear forces, and, in effect, the centralized control of the nuclear weapons in the whole NATO area (except those under British command). But one big disadvantage of this system, which led NATO officials and the American government to explore alternative systems of control, was that it would fail to discourage independent nuclear efforts by other allies—efforts that would reduce their contributions to NATO's shield. In fact, America's Atomic Energy Act provided a positive incentive for nuclear aspirants to make "substantial progress" in the development of nuclear weapons so as to receive more nuclear assistance. And, for France, an independent nuclear program was not only a means of getting more nuclear assistance but also the

prerequisite for gaining an equal voice with the Anglo-American bloc in determining matters of military strategy and political policy.

In addition, the existing system incurred the political and psychological liabilities of leaving all the allies dependent on American decisions about if, when, and how to use nuclear weapons—decisions which could be a matter of national survival or extinction for all. Even if this lopsided power of decision within the alliance did not lead to the proliferation of independent nuclear efforts, it tended to blunt the incentives for full military and political collaboration, while stimulating the forces of nuclear pacifism and neutralism.

Nations that could not control the use of the principal weapon upon which their security depended could not be expected to contribute fully to the required build-up of conventional forces, which were intended only to enforce a "pause" and touch off nuclear warfare. Moreover, such dependency grated against the quickening sense of national autonomy on the part of resurgent political communities, which were no longer the weak and devastated states of the Marshall Plan era.

The situation was especially galling to nations upon whose territory American nuclear weapons were deployed. The 1957 system of dual control was intended as a concession to national sentiment in order to make the deployment of missiles and stockpiles on allied soil acceptable, but it was doubtful that it met the problem satisfactorily. For, quite apart from the political acceptability or unacceptability of this compromise, physical separation of the American-controlled warheads from the missiles would create technical problems concerning the combat readiness of the weapons,* yet the placing of the warheads in the missiles under a two-key system as in England would create serious doubts about the effectiveness of American custody, especially in the minds of American congressmen.[1]

---

* Presumably, in the case of tactical nuclear weapons there would be time to solve this problem in the event of war by a presidential order releasing the warheads from the stockpiles. In any case, worse than any inefficiency in combat readiness would be the chance of accident resulting from numerous widely dispersed tactical nuclear weapons that were "loaded."

In any case, dual control did not seem to be an effective alternative to the push toward unilateral allied control. It was acceptable to Britain only because it was part of a preferential partnership and a close working agreement with the United States on the decision to use the weapons and because Britain had her own nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles anyway. But it was not acceptable to France, who preferred building her own nuclear weapons to accepting any system that denied her custody of the warheads on her soil.

Furthermore, there were more intangible liabilities to the existing imbalance of power in the control of nuclear weapons. It encouraged America's allies to view the crucial problems of military strategy too much through the distorting perspective of their dependence on American responsibility and too little through the perspective of common responsibility. Consequently, allied governments and peoples did not have to face up fully to the real nature and demands of military strategy, especially where they impinged on defense expenditures and conscription. Their nuclear dependency encouraged a kind of innocence and indifference toward these questions, which impeded a concerted and realistic approach to the complex issues confronting the alliance as a whole. Too often the United States took the responsibility for strategic dilemmas and frustrations which she alone could not resolve, while her allies tended to approach these dilemmas and frustrations from the standpoint of influencing American policies rather than solving common problems. The British movement for unilateral nuclear disarmament, which deplored American policy but ignored the real complexities of the hard issues of military power, in the assurance that whatever Britain might do the United States would maintain the balance of terror, was only an extreme manifestation of the psychological aberrations accompanying nuclear dependency.

Yet these adverse effects of the existing system of nuclear control upon allied security and cohesion were the result not only of dependence on America's nuclear weapons but also of NATO's overdependence on nuclear weapons in general, to-

gether with considerable ambiguity about the strategy for using them. If there had been an agreed strategy and the capabilities for fighting limited wars in Europe with conventional weapons, distinguishing nuclear counterforce from purely punitive civilian blows, reserving both as second-strike deterrents except in the most extreme and unlikely circumstances, and employing them in a graduated or proportionate manner, there would probably have been less dissatisfaction and anxiety about America's custody of warheads, and there would probably have been more realistic estimates of the military and political utility of nuclear weapons and less incentive for allies to acquire their own.

Therefore, the political liabilities of the existing system of nuclear control might be substantially mitigated if the allies agreed on a military strategy that would delineate more clearly the special and restricted functions of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. The very process of deliberately and explicitly reaching such a strategic consensus would go far toward giving the allies the needed sense of participation and responsibility. The strategic consensus would, moreover, clear the way for a much-needed measure of concerted political control over nuclear weapons. It would remove a big obstacle to allied agreement on the procedure by which the members of NATO would participate in the decision to use nuclear weapons; for as long as the allies were so dependent on the initiation of nuclear warfare as a substitute for conventional resistance—or, put another way, as long as the threshold between conventional and nuclear war were so low—they would find it extremely difficult to agree, either in advance or *ad hoc,* on the circumstances in which nuclear weapons should be used.

Possibly, with such a consensus the United States might then, with no adverse effects, maintain the custody of her warheads and refrain from assisting her allies in their nuclear efforts, while counting on the sobering facts of nuclear life to discourage them from engaging in burdensome, unnecessary, and futile nuclear programs. With the growth of her Polaris submarine force, the United States would not need to ask her allies

to place strategic missiles on their soil and could point to the complete adequacy of her own second-strike strategic force to deter nuclear attacks upon them. If the operational control of tactical nuclear weapons were confined to special interallied battalions or brigades, instead of being diffused throughout all units, and if there were agreed procedures for the political control of the decision to use these weapons according to an agreed strategy, then the formal American custody of warheads might not entail serious technical or political difficulties.

The United States would, of course, continue to keep her troops in Europe and reaffirm her determination to defend Europe by all means necessary, and she would maintain a continuing strategic consensus with her allies on the circumstances in which nuclear and non-nuclear weapons would be used. Implicit in the maintenance of such a strategic consensus and agreement upon the political control of nuclear weapons would be the requirement of continual political consultation about the foreign policies that military power should serve. There would be every reason that France should be granted an equal role with Britain not only on European matters but also on the global strategic and political problems of special concern to France, Britain, and the United States.

The maintenance, by these means, of a strategic and political consensus would be a far better guaranty to an ally of substantive nuclear control—that is, the power to govern use of nuclear weapons—than an independent nuclear force, which, at best, could not control the nuclear forces of the United States or of other allies. If, under all these conditions, France and other allies nevertheless engaged in their own nuclear weapons programs, it should be clear to them and to others that this was for reasons of national prestige, not for valid reasons of security and political autonomy or influence. In this case, they might, at least, have no incentive to try to carry out their nuclear programs beyond the requirements of a token force. And the United States would, at least, have refrained from actively promoting the proliferation of nuclear production and the decentralization of nuclear control.

If the existing system of nuclear control, combined with a strategic revision and an extension of strategic and political consultation, could halt independent nuclear programs, or at least confine them to token efforts, that would be the best alternative. But suppose it could not. Aside from De Gaulle's demanding views of the requirements of political autonomy in the nuclear age, there was the obstacle of the British nuclear force and program. Having achieved a nuclear force at great expense and effort, the British seemed unlikely to give it up—thus trading their special relationship with the United States for equality with France, while granting the United States a monopoly of nuclear production and ownership—merely on the dubious supposition that France might forego her nuclear program in return. Yet as long as Britain retained an independent nuclear force, France would not deny herself the same privilege, merely in return for political concessions or in deference to the American view of strategic logic. And if France joined Britain as a nuclear power, could West Germany be dissuaded from following their example?

3. ACTIVE DIFFUSION OF UNILATERAL CAPABILITIES

If the diffusion of nuclear production and ownership would take place regardless of any plan for the command and control of nuclear weapons that the United States might advance, there was an argument for following the second alternative policy and actively assisting all allies who wished to join the nuclear club to join with a minimum of effort and a maximum of efficiency. At least this policy would relieve the United States of the political liabilities of trying to retain a special nuclear status among allied dependents, and it would save the allies from diverting their economic and scientific resources into wasteful duplication of America's research and development program, enabling them to apply their energies most efficiently to the achievement of invulnerable nuclear deterrents instead of obsolescent weapons. When the United States acquired a sufficient number of nuclear submarines and missiles, she might even

offer to sell her allies surplus weapons in this system, so that the process of nuclear diffusion would at least take a less hazardous and possibly useful military direction. At the same time, the United States could positively promote the military posture of the alliance if she could trade her nuclear assistance for increased allied contributions to the conventional forces of NATO's shield.

Perhaps, if the United States stopped opposing her allies' acquisition of their own nuclear capabilities, they would more readily discover, in time, that independent nuclear capabilities would not really give them military and political autonomy, that they were no substitute for military and political interdependence. The nuclear-armed allies might continue to regard their weapons as a gratifying status-symbol and as insurance for the possibility of a serious divergency of interests with their allies; but, like the British, they would go through a process of education that would moderate the extravagant expectations of nuclear newcomers, and, in effect, their nuclear forces would become merely contributions to the general deterrent forces of the alliance.

Yet a policy of actively aiding the diffusion of nuclear capabilities would surely be justified only as a measure of desperation, after all other methods of preserving NATO's security and cohesion by discouraging such diffusion had been tried. For, at best, the multiplication of national nuclear forces would complicate the crucial task of co-ordinating the use of nuclear weapons—especially the use of tactical nuclear weapons. It would also increase the danger of nuclear accidents and foreclose whatever chance there might be to prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons among non-NATO powers. Its adverse effects upon allied cohesion could only be mitigated to the extent that the nuclear aspirants became disillusioned with their original expectations of military and political autonomy, but this process of education might not come in time to save the alliance from the corrosive effects of fragmenting the control of weapons that could precipitate a common disaster.

4. THE GALLOIS PLAN

A policy of active nuclear assistance at least had the virtue of avoiding some of the liabilities of the existing system of nuclear control while minimizing some of the adverse effects of nuclear diffusion. This was more than could be said for some schemes for combining the two policies. The most prominent scheme of this nature was advanced by General Pierre M. Gallois, former member of the Planning Group at SHAPE, military author, and adviser to the French government under De Gaulle.[2] Gallois proposed that the United States make nuclear weapons available to allied governments (individually or in groups) under dual control, with the agreement that she turn over the "key" to the warheads under critical conditions specified in advance.

General Gallois based his plan on the premise that America's nuclear deterrent was no longer sufficiently credible for her allies to depend on. To overcome this situation, he argued, it was no longer sufficient for the United States to station her armed forces in Europe as a hostage. Consistent with De Gaulle's oft-repeated prediction that American troops would not long remain on the Continent when the United States no longer depended on strategic bases in Europe, Gallois insisted that "such a solution is neither practical nor lasting, for it is subject to limitations which may be imposed by either or both governments involved."[3] According to Gallois, the only way to enhance the credibility of the threat of nuclear retaliation was for the nation whose vital interests were directly threatened to have the power to retaliate. Yet he recognized that, if each ally were to depend entirely upon the independent control of its own nuclear weapons, this would produce a dangerous proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities and would strain mutual-defense obligations. So, to avoid unnecessary risks and to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons at the expense of a considerable duplication of effort in research and production, he proposed that the United States give her allies nuclear weapons under the safeguards of his scheme for combined dual and unilateral control.

Gallois's plan would, purportedly, relieve the allies of exclusive dependence upon America's control of nuclear weapons without requiring them to develop their own nuclear capabilities. It would impose some restraints upon the exercise of independent control without requiring the cumbersome procedures of a collective decision of all the allies. However, the central premise upon which the plan was based is dubious. This premise was that a small nuclear striking force under the control of an ally most directly threatened would be a more credible deterrent than America's striking force or a joint deterrent. Thus, Gallois imagined that a small country—he took Denmark as an example—would enhance the deterrence of a missile strike against one of its cities or of a major conventional aggression across its frontiers if it had a striking force capable only of inflicting enough damage to outweigh the benefits the aggressor could hope to win. He assumed that Denmark would choose annihilation rather than capitulation and that its choice would be automatic, or at least that the aggressor would be deterred by this possibility.

As the preceding discussion has suggested, it is highly questionable, in terms of the operating psychology of the situation, that a single ally will get more deterrence against the threats Gallois envisaged by threatening to hit a few Soviet targets at the cost of certain nuclear obliteration than by relying upon the support of America's striking force. And Gallois conceded that a Soviet threat to hold the United States responsible for a Danish strike "would be meaningless since it could not be carried into effect; the Soviet Union would not consider it worthwhile to risk exchanging ballistic missiles with the United States just for the sake of subjugating Denmark."[4] But, however that might be, an ally that depended upon an independent suicidal counterthreat as a substitute for an American or NATO response would give the Soviet Union dangerous opportunities to isolate and intimidate it by the kind of political and psychological warfare that the Russians would vastly prefer to overt military action anyway. The greatest deterrent to this kind of warfare and, in the long run, to overt military aggression too is

the Soviet belief that she cannot exert her military power against one ally without implicating the others. The Gallois plan would create a situation distinctly uncongenial to the credibility of that belief.

Furthermore, it is doubtful that General Gallois's proposal would really avoid the principal political disadvantage of the existing system of dual control, which is that the United States has the exclusive power to decide when to use the nuclear warheads. An advance definition of the special and extreme circumstances in which the United States would release control of the warheads would, indeed, give the ally greater control and responsibility; but it would not make an ally any less dependent upon an American decision than a simple pledge by the United States to use the weapons herself under those same circumstances. Moreover, the very agreement to release control of the warheads to an ally in order to reinforce deterrence might diminish deterrence by indicating so explicitly that the United States regarded her own deterrent threat as deficient. The worst time to transfer nuclear responsibility would be during a crisis.

In short, although the Gallois plan was intended to solve the problems of nuclear diffusion and dependence by combining the military and political advantages of American and independent control, it seemed more likely to combine the disadvantages of both systems.

5. EUROPEAN DETERRENT GROUP

If the existing system of American custody of nuclear warheads —supplemented by a strategic revision, the achievement of a strategic consensus, and the extension of political consultation —would not advance allied security and cohesion and would not confine and moderate the diffusion of independent nuclear efforts, then the best alternative would be some form of joint allied control of nuclear weapons. At the beginning of the 1960's there were, principally, two plans for giving nuclear control to an allied group. One was to create a European group deterrent; the other was to make NATO itself a nuclear power.[5]

In a European nuclear force, several European allies (including at least France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) would jointly own and control combined strategic nuclear forces, separate from the United States SAC and Polaris systems and, if Britain were not a member of the European group, separate from the RAF Bomber Command. These forces would be under central military command and political direction, so that they would be developed, deployed, and used as a unit. The Soviet Union would be likely to treat it as a unit if only because the national identity of nuclear weapons and the decision to use them would be obscure, especially if they were sea-based. Therefore, each member, while avoiding complete dependence on America's nuclear deterrent, would supposedly benefit from the deterrent power of the group's total strategic nuclear forces rather than suffer the handicap of relying upon its own rudimentary and politically isolated force. At the same time, each member would avoid the political and military dangers of fragmenting the control of nuclear weapons.

With American gifts and assistance, combined with its own co-ordinated scientific and production resources, a European group might in time develop a sufficiently large and invulnerable second-strike capability to constitute a truly self-sufficient deterrent. Or, at least, it could be substantial enough to seriously complicate the Soviet calculations that would have to precede a major aggression by confronting the Russians with another large deterrent force in addition to America's. If the full effectiveness of the European deterrent nevertheless depended upon triggering America's deterrent, it would have a considerable advantage over a single nation's nuclear capability for two reasons: (*a*) politically, because the United States would be less apt to dissociate herself from the use or threatened use of strategic weapons by several European nations acting in concert; (*b*) militarily, because in order to knock out a group deterrent the Soviet Union would have to launch a massive attack, which would threaten the whole of Europe, and probably leave the United States with a decisive nuclear advantage if her striking force were spared from attack.

Thus, by combining allied resources and involving all members in an attack upon one, a European group deterrent might eventually contribute more to allied security than either the existing system or the multiplication of independent capabilities, while, at the same time, it would relieve the allies of dependence on America's nuclear weapons without diminishing the credibility of nuclear retaliation. However, the realization of this hypothetical advantage would depend critically upon the willingness of every member to regard an attack on one of the group as an attack upon itself and, more directly, upon the appearance of this willingness in Soviet eyes. Would a European deterrent group manifest sufficient cohesion for this purpose?

There are precedents for European collaboration in the political and military activities of the Western European Union, political consultation and debate in the Council of Europe, scientific co-operation in EURATOM, and economic integration in OEEC, ECSC, and EEC (the European Common Market). However, these organizations have entailed no abdication of national sovereignty comparable to what a European deterrent group would require. That deterrent would require the subordination of the life-and-death decision to wage nuclear war to some central political authority and military command acting, as far as possible, under a pre-arranged set of directives. Could the members of a European deterrent group organize a political consensus sufficient to sustain this degree of military collaboration?

There is one element of such a political consensus in the somewhat nebulous notion that Winston Churchill expounded before the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty and that continues to find ardent and articulate spokesmen among prominent statesmen and journalists in several European countries: the notion that Western Europe is a distinct cultural, economic, and political community, whose destiny is to become a united and independent force in the world. This sentiment has encouraged, and been encouraged by, its most concrete manifestation: the movement toward European economic integration. It has gained vitality from Western Europe's impressive economic

resurgence and prosperity, which has largely freed America's allies from their previous dependence upon her aid.

But, clearly, the subordination of national will to joint custody and control of the most powerful instruments of destruction must be sustained by something more compelling than these sentiments and aspirations. It must be sustained by a coincidence of vital national interests. The European allies continue to share the identity of security interests against the expansion of Soviet control that led to the Brussels Treaty and subsequently to the North Atlantic Treaty. But the acceptance of joint control of nuclear weapons implies a close concidence of a wide range of foreign policies that military power might serve, as well as an identity of security interests against hypothetical military threats. Do the prospective members of a European deterrent group have this kind of political consensus? That is a question which each nation would have to answer before deciding whether to join such a group.

The Benelux countries and Italy, who have little opportunity to become independent nuclear powers by their own efforts and who recognize that their political as well as military interests lie in collaborating with the more powerful nations of Europe rather than in pursuing an independent course, would probably participate in a European deterrent group if France and Germany were members. But would France place the fruits of her nuclear effort under joint control after making such a large investment in an independent nuclear capability as the essential condition of her sovereignty, prestige, and political influence in the world?

If France could really achieve such a large and invulnerable nuclear force as to be confident of deterring Soviet aggression independently of the Anglo-American deterrent, there would be little reason to suppose that she would prefer a joint effort. However, Britain's difficulty in developing an independent second-strike force even with American aid might give France a strong incentive to seek the technical and industrial collaboration of Germany and other allies in a joint effort. In that case, France might be content to pursue her overriding goals of national prestige and political influence by assuming the leader-

ship of an independent European deterrent group, which could be the nucleus of a Third Force in the cold war. That prospect would be compatible with De Gaulle's vision of France's destiny, if—and it is a significant "if"—the system of joint control could be reconciled with his general opposition to supranationalism and military integration. It would be compatible with his efforts to consolidate the Franco-German entente, which has been a central feature of France's foreign policy since Germany joined NATO; and it would be a more attractive alternative to an independent German nuclear capability than the more diffuse restraints of a NATO deterrent. If France conceived of a European deterrent group as a counter to Anglo-American power, she might oppose Britain's membership. On the other hand, she might welcome British membership as a means of sharing Britain's nuclear weapons and knowledge, ending her privileged nuclear relationship with the United States, and gaining an additional counter to Germany, as when Britain's association with WEU eased France's acceptance of German rearmament in NATO.

From West Germany's standpoint, sharing nuclear weapons with her European allies under joint control would be acceptable if it appeared to be the fulfilment of Chancellor Adenauer's goal of achieving national equality within a network of obligations binding Germany to the West so closely as to rule out a resurgence of parochial German nationalism. The move would be congenial with his "Europeanism" and his advocacy of greater military integration. However, in reality, German leaders showed a marked preference for NATO-wide integration to any purely European grouping, for they attached special importance to Germany's ties with the United States. Therefore, the Federal Republic would join a European deterrent group, if at all, only on the firmest assurance that this would not weaken America's military and diplomatic support. And, as during the negotiations on Germany's joining a European army, the Federal Republic would greatly value Britain's association with a European deterrent, providing that Britain's policies toward Berlin and the two Germanys were not too divergent.

British participation in an integrated European deterrent

would be very important, materially and politically, to its success; yet Britain is the major European ally least likely to join. Her chief objections would be those she has cited for staying out of European economic organizations with supranational features: Britain's commitments to the Commonwealth and her special relationship with the United States. To be sure, it is difficult to see how Britain's membership in a European deterrent would interfere with meeting her military obligations toward the nations of the Commonwealth, some of whom (conspicuously, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) now look primarily to the United States for their protection, others of whom (India, Ceylon, etc.) insist upon meeting their defense obligations unilaterally, and few of whom seem as concerned about Britain's becoming politically and militarily entangled on the Continent as the British. And, as for Britain's special relationship with the United States, it is based not only on a transitory technological superiority over other European allies but also on deep cultural and political affinities, which would not suffer from Britain's contribution to Europe's independent strength and unity. Nevertheless, the sentiments opposing tight and exclusively European commitments are strongly rooted in Britain's historical experience as an insular power for many decades before World War II and as a privileged ally aspiring to consolidate an Anglo-American community after World War II. Moreover, like Germany's interests, Britain's special interests, as she conceives them, would in fact be better protected in a NATO-wide military and political grouping, firmly entangling the United States in Europe's affairs, than in a purely European grouping in which she would have to accommodate her interests to those of her major allies without the mediating influence of the American presence.

Of course, with America's blessings and urgings, this view might yield to some countervailing considerations of national interest. And if joining an integrated European deterrent group appeared to be the only alternative to the proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities, Britain might prefer it as the more promising way to maintain a strategic nuclear force independ-

ent of America's. Moreover, like her allies, Britain would be subject to inducements. If France and Germany participated in a deterrent group with American support, Britain might find it difficult to remain aloof, just as she was finding it difficult to remain aloof from the thriving Common Market.

But who would command the deterrent group, and how would its members agree on the procedures for giving the command political direction? It is not likely that the political consensus among a purely European group of allies would be strong enough to resolve these awkward questions. Again, the absence of continual American influence would be a crucial obstacle to allied collaboration.

Nevertheless, let us assume that with American backing it is possible, though not likely, that a number of the European allies, including Great Britain, might perceive a sufficient coincidence of vital national interests to assume the collective responsibility of controlling a nuclear capability independent of the United States. Since this step would surely affect the ties between the United States and her European allies, both would have to consider a European deterrent group not only in terms of the cohesion of the group but also in terms of the cohesion of the United States with her NATO allies, which it has always been a dominant objective of the alliance to consolidate. The two considerations are, in fact, related, since it may be that there is a firmer foundation of political consensus for the support of a joint nuclear deterrent in a grouping that includes the United States than in one that is confined to her European allies.

The firm commitment of the United States to the military and diplomatic defense of Western Europe against Soviet pressure seems likely to remain imperative throughout the 1960's and probably far beyond. If Europe were capable of developing not only an adequate nuclear deterrent but also an adequate shield for local resistance without the collaboration of American strategic and tactical nuclear forces and without American troops, weapons, and matériel, there would be no urgent *military* reason to entangle the United States in Europe's defense. But,

in fact, it is quite improbable that Western European nations could achieve such a state of military self-sufficiency for a long time, even if they had the collective will to make the effort. At the same time, their concentration upon this effort would surely be at the further expense of their maintenance of adequate conventional forces.

Moreover, as long as American power and diplomacy remain indispensable elements of constraint upon Soviet designs in Europe (as in Berlin), Europe will need America's close collaboration in the political and psychological warfare that will continue to rage beneath the threshold of overt military conflict. For this purpose the European allies have to be able to commit American military power to the support of common interests and policies on the Continent. Therefore, the question is whether the formation of a European deterrent would help or hinder the necessary degree of American military and political collaboration.

Let us posit the most favorable results: The establishment of an independent European deterrent force would not, in itself, lead the United States to abandon her commitment to come to the defense of her allies. Western Europe is too valuable to the United States for too many reasons. Rather, it would relieve the United States of the major responsibility for supporting this commitment with strategic nuclear power, while relieving her allies of depending on the United States to fulfil that responsibility. This might give the Europeans a responsibility for their own destiny that would actually advance the deterrence of aggression and even enhance American-European solidarity.

The creation of an independent European deterrent would probably create pressures on both sides of the Atlantic to turn over the other elements of American- and NATO-controlled military power to the European powers; but, according to the rationale of an independent European nuclear group, this would be a desirable objective, to be promoted for the sake of a strong and united Europe rather than resisted for the sake of preserving the American entanglement.

In the transitional period there would be a problem of co-

ordinating a European strategic force with NATO's tactical nuclear force, since any tactical use of nuclear weapons might lead to their strategic use and since the very distinction between tactical and strategic warfare is blurred when "tactical" weapons can reach hundreds of miles outside the area of battle. Moreover, as Alastair Buchan suggests, since the members of the European group probably would not comprise the whole of NATO in Europe, an integrated European deterrent would "cut across the command structures and political arrangements in NATO which have been built up with so much effort over the last ten years."[6] But let us assume that the difficulty of coordination would not be beyond the organizational ingenuity of SHAPE, the United States, and her allies to surmount. Then, eventually, it would be logical for the European group to take over the control of all nuclear weapons in Europe and include all the European members of NATO. Under these circumstances it would be difficult to envision the United States long retaining her troops on the Continent, since they would no longer be needed as a trip-wire on America's nuclear deterrent. But, ultimately, it would be logical anyway for Europe to assume the entire responsibility for a forward shield as well as for the nuclear deterrent. For, ultimately, America's European allies could possess the independent military strength and political cohesion to contain Soviet pressure on Western Europe in a much looser association with the United States, resembling the original conception of a guaranty pact but without the original dependence on American nuclear power. The United States could then follow her original intention of turning over the day-to-day maintenance of Europe's security to Europe, and she could devote more resources and attention to the diverse tasks of her own security outside Europe.

Surely, this happy sequence of developments is not beyond the realm of possibility. But to perceive the formidable obstacles to its fulfilment one has only to think of the crucial matter of timing involved in the devolution of power and responsibility. At the end of 1960 it seemed certain that a European group could not acquire for at least a decade a sufficient strategic nu-

clear capability to support an independent military and political policy. But the need for an alternative to the proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities was more immediate. Consequently, if the plan for an independent European deterrent were to serve the immediate purposes of nuclear integration, it would run the distinct risk of starting off the devolution of responsibilities from the United States to Europe at a pace that would exceed the actual shift of power to support those responsibilities. Thus the vital ties to the United States might be loosened prematurely, before the European nations actually acquired the power or the cohesion to pursue a strong independent foreign policy. The very agreement to the plan of shifting America's deterrent responsibility to her European allies would jeopardize the credibility of America's nuclear response to aggressions upon them.

But there is a more basic consideration than transition or timing involved in the transfer of power and responsibility to a European group. That consideration is the kind of foreign policy that such a group would pursue if it *did* acquire the military strength and cohesion to act independently of the United States. Would it be a policy compatible with American interests? As a general objective there has been substantial support in the United States for a united, self-sufficient Europe; but, in practice, this sentiment has been sustained by the general desire to see the advancement of international integration or the specific desire to relieve the United States of material burdens, not by the desire to encourage an independent European political policy. Within the context of her entanglement with Europe, the United States has been able to achieve a satisfactory compromise with and among her European allies on somewhat divergent approaches to the political issues at stake in Europe. Would such a compromise be feasible if Europe were to move toward military independence? Would the European allies, free from the entangled strands of American military and political collaboration, enjoy the political cohesion as well as the independent military strength to contain the resourceful Soviet colossus?

6. NATO NUCLEAR FORCE

It was partly an intuitively negative answer to these questions, by American and other allied leaders, that made the creation of a NATO nuclear force seem more feasible and desirable than the creation of a European deterrent group. Like the proposal for a European nuclear force, the plan for making NATO a nuclear power was envisioned as a means of giving America's allies an equitable share in the control of nuclear weapons, consonant with the altered distribution of power within the alliance, while discouraging the spread of independent nuclear capabilities. At the same time, the proponents of a NATO deterrent hoped that it would avoid the dangers of a purely European deterrent by preserving and, in fact, extending the military entanglement of the United States and Europe, so as to enhance the cohesion of the alliance and insure it against Russian attempts to isolate Europe militarily or politically. Thus, through an integrated nuclear force, nuclear sharing could become an instrument of allied consolidation rather than disintegration.

Clearly, the problem of a safe transfer of deterrent responsibility to NATO would be far easier than to a European group. The United States could give or sell the nuclear weapons to be placed under NATO command and political direction at a pace consonant with her independent deterrent requirements without jeopardizing the military balance, for she would retain a large share of the control of these weapons through her voice in NATO. Given the continuation of an American SACEUR, the United States might even preserve formal custody of nuclear weapons while transferring command and control of them to NATO. To establish the joint nuclear force as swiftly and smoothly as possible, the United States would simply earmark for NATO portions of her nuclear forces, including a part of SAC, which are at present obligated to protect the area, while preserving sufficient forces for her independent purposes. The British and French would also be expected to place their nuclear forces under NATO command, except perhaps for token elements.

If this process of nuclear sharing took place within the context of a general plan for the disposition of all kinds of weapons and forces, as it most certainly should, the creation of a NATO nuclear force might then be used to dramatize a readjustment of NATO's entire military posture. In this way it could provide a badly needed initiative and momentum to an overdue revision of allied strategy and capabilities, a revision designed to make the allies less dependent on nuclear responses to conventional aggression, to enlarge their capacity for limited conventional warfare, and to clarify the method of using tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Having taken the initiative, the United States would be in a position to facilitate this revision. For example, she might adjust the pace of her assignment of nuclear weapons to NATO to coincide with tangible contributions by her allies to the conventional capacity of NATO's shield.

But even if the establishment of a NATO nuclear force took place under these favorable conditions, the problem of nuclear control would still pose a serious difficulty. Could the operational control of nuclear weapons be shared without, in effect, turning them over to national possession under only nominal central command? How could the command and control of nuclear weapons be shared among fifteen nations in such a way as to permit effective political direction and, at the same time, smooth, decisive operation? Would not any arrangement that effectively put "fifteen fingers on the trigger" and on the "safety catch" undermine deterrence? These were questions that worried both the opponents and the advocates of a NATO nuclear force.

In the case of tactical nuclear weapons, the allies had never determined the exact procedure by which fifteen nations would authorize SACEUR to start a nuclear war, but they could no longer afford the resulting ambiguity if the United States were to give her allies an equal share of the control of nuclear weapons. If effective deterrence would demand the capacity to make a quick and concerted decision to use these weapons and the capacity to use them with discrimination in politically as well as militarily appropriate ways, it might be exceedingly difficult

to satisfy the formal requirements of political consultation among fifteen states. Of course, a quick response to the *aggressor's* use of tactical nuclear weapons might be authorized in advance by joint contingency directives, but there could be no advance directives to cover the situations in which the *defenders* would choose to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. If a major conventional aggression developed slowly to the point at which the allies would have to choose between using nuclear weapons or accepting defeat on a conventional basis, there would be time enough for full consultation. But, in this event, it is difficult to imagine fifteen nations resolutely reaching such a fateful decision under the pressure of Soviet psychological warfare, backed by the threat of nuclear retaliation and, possibly, accompanied by offers of political settlement.

Similarly, in the case of strategic nuclear weapons, the problem of combining effective military with effective political control on a multilateral basis was not just how to secure time for political consultation but, fundamentally, how to reconcile the requirements of political control with the requirements of deterrence. In the event of a massive enemy first strike, the response would be virtually automatic, regardless of formal requirements of political consultation. But in contingencies short of that, it would be necessary to determine the use of nuclear weapons by deliberation. If NATO had a sufficiently invulnerable strategic striking force (for which the sea-borne Polaris seemed especially well suited in the 1960's), it might afford the time for some sort of political consultation. But the very process of consultation, almost in proportion to the time it consumed, might diminish the certainty of a nuclear response and provide the Soviet Union with dangerous opportunities for nuclear blackmail and division of the alliance.

Nevertheless, the problem of effective military and political control of a joint nuclear capability might be less serious in practice than it seemed in theory. For in any system of joint control the requirements of maximum speed and smoothness of decision would exceed the requirements of deterrence. With so much at stake, the Russians would surely hesitate to act as

though the fingers on the safety catch, so to speak, would check the fingers on the trigger, even though they suspected that the process of multilateral decision-making did not permit a quick or certain collective response.

If deterrence failed, however, the problem of using nuclear weapons in a controlled way so as to maximize the chance of terminating the war short of an unmitigated spasm of violence without simply capitulating would be extremely difficult to solve on a multilateral basis. The strategy, technical means, and organization of the system of central command would have to be very carefully prepared in order to preserve effective political direction and yet remain sensitive to multilateral interests. To gain the latter quality, some price would have to be paid in terms of the former.

For that matter, even the existing dual system of control was not foolproof against decentralized national control either before or after an attack. If the men who operate the weapons components and make the decisions to use them are of different nationalities, they will owe their primary allegiance to different national governments. Therefore, under this condition no system can eliminate the possibility that one nation will try to veto the decisions of other nations or of a supranational command, or the possibility that it will try to override the vetoes of others, perhaps even by seizing custody of warheads. The alternative is, of course, to keep the complete operation of the whole weapons system under unified national control; but that is scarcely feasible, either militarily or politically, in the case of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons, which are the primary nuclear deterrent to conventional aggression. At the same time, there is no sure distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear blows.

Consequently, some "slippage" in military and political control would seem to be a necessary cost of an equitable multilateral participation in NATO's nuclear strategy. The basic assurance of nuclear co-ordination would have to be a strategic and political consensus concerning the use of nuclear weapons, without which no system of control could operate effectively.

Beyond this, what is necessary and not impossible is a politically acceptable system of sharing and control of nuclear weapons under central command that would give sufficient promise of a controlled joint response to aggression to deter the Soviet Union from trying to exploit the process of decision-making, militarily or politically, by playing upon allied differences and paralyzing the collective will. This is a problem of organization but also, fundamentally, a problem of strategic and political consensus.

The precise organization of the system for controlling a NATO nuclear force could only be determined on the basis of a period of discussion and bargaining among the allies, since this is an intensely political, not just a complicated technical, question. The rudimentary plans proposed by NATO officials in 1960 would utilize the existing NATO structure by giving SACEUR (as an officer of SHAPE and of American forces in Europe) military command of the nuclear weapons assigned to NATO. There might be a good case for giving command of sea-based striking power to SACLANT or a special naval commander. In any case, an organization that gave command of nuclear weapons, at least initially, to an American officer would be more politically acceptable to the United States and to all her allies than any plan that would give nuclear command to a European officer of a different nationality. On the other hand, Alastair Buchan proposed creating a SACDET (Supreme Commander, Deterrent) and appointing a European senior officer to fill it, partly to avoid adding to SACEUR's burdens and partly to reassure European public opinion.[7] There could, of course, be mixed schemes of organization, such as creating a tripartite or a rotating military command.

But even more important than the organization of the military command would be the organization of the political command of a NATO nuclear force, for it is especially important to preserve civilian control and political direction of such a decisive weapon. For this purpose a much smaller group than the unwieldy North Atlantic Council would have to assume detailed responsibility for the composition, deployment, operation, strategy, and use of nuclear weapons. Henry Kissinger

suggested giving these powers to a defense steering committee —composed of four permanent members (representing the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany) and three rotating members elected by the council—which would also have broader responsibility for military strategy, defense policies, and disarmament.[8] To further assure effective political control, there was merit in Buchan's suggestion to revitalize the military Standing Group (composed of the representative of the American, British, and French chiefs of staff) as a link between the political and military planners in NATO. With some such organization of centralized political as well as military control of nuclear weapons, the problem of physical custody of warheads would be far less important. If American laws and sentiment or considerations of international politics and arms control still required continued American custody, that would no longer be such a serious obstacle to collective allied participation in the control of nuclear weapons.

Surely, it is not utopian to suppose that there are modes of organization like these—extensions but not supranational transformations of existing modes—which could satisfy the requirements of deterrence and post-attack control without imposing unacceptable deprivations of national sovereignty. After all, the participant in a NATO nuclear force would have no less control over his military fate than if he were to rely on America's and Britain's independent nuclear capabilities, let alone on two or three additional allied capabilities; and, in the end, he would have far more control than if he were to rely on his own nuclear force. But, clearly, no organization of a collective nuclear force would be either efficacious or acceptable unless it were based on a solid strategic and political agreement concerning the circumstances and ways in which the allies would use and threaten to use all kinds of weapons.

The practical importance of achieving allied agreement on a strategy and capability less dependent on nuclear weapons is apparent when one relates the specific circumstances of decision-making to the requirements of political control. There are

two ways of providing political control of decisions to use nuclear weapons. One way is to prescribe in advance the contingencies in which the military command would be authorized to employ nuclear weapons in a particular fashion. The other way is to determine the use or non-use of nuclear weapons when the contingencies arise. (The two ways are not, of course, mutually exclusive.) In some circumstances the first method would be essential, even if only one decision-maker were responsible; but in other circumstances the second method would be necessary, especially if a number of decision-makers were responsible. The first method would put no special strain on the political cohesion of allies, but the second method would. Therefore, so far as possible, the common strategy must be designed to avoid putting the allies in situations in which *ad hoc* nuclear decisions would be necessary or in which they would be particularly difficult to reach.

The members of a joint nuclear force should not find it difficult to specify, in advance, the kinds of Soviet nuclear attacks in which the central military command would be authorized to retaliate proportionately without waiting for extensive political consultation, if any. But it would be impossible or irresponsible for them to anticipate in an instrument of authorization the entire range of conceivable circumstances in which nuclear weapons might be used and to specify precisely how they ought to be used. Moreover, the attempt to do so might only help the prospective aggressor circumvent the conditions that would call for a nuclear response and deprive the allies of the necessary flexibility in managing deterrence. Obviously, making an *ad hoc* decision is more difficult and dangerous for a number of governments than for a single government. Yet, within the framework of a strategic consensus, it should not be impossible to reach a multilateral decision on how to respond to a limited nuclear blow or accident. The kind of multilateral decision that *might* be impossible to reach, at least without disrupting the alliance and playing into Soviet hands, would be whether or not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is essential for

the feasibility of a NATO nuclear force, as it is essential for the maintenance of allied security and cohesion in any case, that NATO have a strategy and capability for non-nuclear resistance that will enable its members to reserve the decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons for the most extreme and unlikely contingency of a major conventional conflict. To the extent that tactical and strategic nuclear weapons are second-strike rather than first-strike weapons, and therefore confined to the highly specialized functions upon which allies might readily agree, the problems of joint control will be manageable.

If there were an appropriate strategic consensus in the alliance and the military means of supporting it, the creation of a joint nuclear force, separate from but interlocked with America's force, need not diminish the credibility of nuclear deterrence. Those who fear that it would, reason that allied inhibitions would hamstring the operation of a joint force, whereas a unilateral American force, free of allied vetoes, would be less inhibited. It is true that the United States might, in some circumstances, be less reluctant than her allies to initiate the use of nuclear weapons and perhaps more willing to use nuclear weapons against limited nuclear attacks upon an ally, but even in these extreme cases it is not reasonable to suppose that the Soviet Union would defy the threat of nuclear deterrence if the United States had to get the formal consent of her allies in order to use NATO's nuclear force, but not defy the threat if the United States relied entirely upon her own forces. That would suppose that Soviet leaders would attach unusual importance, for enormous stakes, on the efficacy of formal restraints in a capitalist coalition.

Whether or not a system of joint control existed, America's allies could not compel her, any more than she could compel them, to either use or not use nuclear weapons; and this fact, together with the continual need to sustain allied collaboration, would exert a restraining influence on one power or another regardless of the formal requirements of multilateral decision-making. There might always be some differences of opinion among various allies, and between them and the United States,

on whether and how to use nuclear weapons. The organization of a joint nuclear force would not eliminate these differences, but it would actually enhance deterrence if it provided a regular and systematic means of resolving and minimizing such differences, an organized means of maintaining a continual strategic and political consensus in which all allies participated and for which all were responsible. Besides, in the give-and-take of this process one need not assume that the allies would always diminish the American will to use nuclear weapons; the United States might also increase allied will.

The most serious temptation to defy the West's nuclear deterrent and to exploit the threat of war for political ends would be a situation in which the Soviet Union believed it could isolate one ally from the others. Throughout the cold war Soviet leaders have tried to divide the alliance—to apply military and political pressure on one or several allies under circumstances in which the others would not support them—and, especially, to divide the United States from her European allies. But the best protection against this tactic is not to keep the deterrent responsibilities in unilateral American control but to present a common front, which, in collaboration with a resurgent Europe, can only come from shared responsibility. The credibility or incredibility of deterrent threats that determine Soviet action will spring from the continuing evidence of a concerted military resolve, or a lack of it, not from Soviet conjectures about the votes in NATO's nuclear control body in the event of aggression.

If the allies exhibited a common will to meet aggression with the appropriate means, the organizational forms for controlling the use of nuclear weapons would be of secondary importance to the credibility of deterrence. On the other hand, the form of organization could affect the strength of that common will by providing a framework conducive to its development and continual cultivation. The existence of a formal institutionalized means for the collective control of nuclear weapons would be an immense asset to deterrence if it focused attention upon the continual need to maintain the kind of strategic and political

consensus upon which the security and cohesion of NATO depends. The very process of organizing a NATO deterrent could provide a new incentive and a dramatic occasion to achieve such a consensus.

But is the creation of a NATO nuclear force politically feasible in the first place? This cannot be determined in the abstract but only on the basis of specific initiatives and detailed negotiations. With vigorous and tactful American support, it might prove acceptable to the British and the non-nuclear allies; but, quite possibly, France would decline to participate —at least at first. And even if France did participate, she might not, under De Gaulle, do so at the price of her nuclear program, regardless of what concessions in military command and political consultation the United States might offer. If, because of the contagious effects of France's nuclear effort, the creation of a NATO nuclear force seemed unlikely to achieve one of its major objectives, NATO might be served better by keeping the existing system of nuclear control and extending strategic and political collaboration on a more informal and gradual basis. Nevertheless, the proliferation of independent allied nuclear forces would probably spell the end of NATO as an integrated military and political organization.

Finally, even if a NATO nuclear force were desirable and feasible on all the aforementioned grounds, its utility would also have to be appraised on another ground: Would it stimulate the diffusion of nuclear capabilities outside the alliance? Some opponents of nuclear sharing contended that it would because (*a*) a NATO nuclear force would give the allies access to nuclear weapons, which they would, in fact, use for independent purposes; (*b*) whether or not a NATO nuclear force actually amounted to spreading nuclear capabilities to independent allied control, it would seem this way to the rest of the world; and (*c*) any actual or apparent diffusion of nuclear capabilities among the allies would stimulate the diffusion of nuclear capabilities among other powers and preclude an arms control agreement to prevent such diffusion. On the other hand, the defenders of a NATO nuclear force contended that (*a*) nuclear sharing under joint command and control offered the best op-

portunity to prevent the proliferation of nuclear production and ownership within the alliance; (*b*) there would be just as effective restraints upon the independent use of nuclear weapons for extra-allied purposes within the framework of central control as under the existing system of dual control; and (*c*) the joint sharing of nuclear control within the alliance would not affect the acquisition of nuclear capabilities outside, but it might be the necessary condition for securing the accession of potential nuclear powers among the allies to a treaty to prevent nuclear testing, production, or lending.

If one regards the spread of nuclear capabilities outside the alliance as a more serious menace to Western security than America's refusal to assist nuclear sharing under joint control within the alliance, the decisive questions upon which the adoption or rejection of a NATO nuclear force should rest are (*a*) whether achievement of an effective international agreement (tacit or formal) to stop the spread of nuclear capabilities would be made likely if the United States were to reject nuclear sharing under either independent or collective control and (*b*) whether creation of a NATO nuclear force would be likely to stop the spread of independent nuclear production and ownership among the allies. If the answer to the first question is affirmative and the second negative, then it would not be worth sharing the control of nuclear weapons by creating a NATO nuclear force, at the risk of spreading or appearing to spread independent nuclear capabilities among the allies and beyond. If the answer to the first question is negative and the second affirmative, it would not be sensible to forego the opportunity of stopping the diffusion of independent nuclear production and ownership among the allies by creating a NATO nuclear force merely in order not to appear to impede nuclear diffusion beyond. If the answer to both questions is negative, then the adoption or rejection of a NATO nuclear force should be based on other grounds than its effect upon nuclear diffusion. But, if the answer to both questions is affirmative, one is indeed faced with a delicately balanced issue, which must be judged on the basis of relative probabilities.

In 1961 the likelihood of an international agreement that

would stop the spread of nuclear capabilities seemed extremely remote. A nuclear test-ban agreement was the most likely of all agreements intended to stop diffusion, but it seemed clearly infeasible. Moreover, even if a formal test ban were achieved and all potential nuclear powers acceded to it, by itself it could have only a slight psychological effect toward stopping diffusion by transfer or production without testing. In any case, Communist China would surely acquire her own nuclear capability regardless of international agreements, world opinion, or any other political obstacle.

The establishment of a NATO nuclear force seemed far more feasible than the achievement of an effective international agreement to stop nuclear diffusion, but it would carry no guaranty of stopping the spread of independent nuclear production and ownership within the alliance. On the other hand, if a NATO nuclear force would be a contribution to allied security and cohesion on other grounds, there was enough of a chance that it might also at least confine and moderate the spread of independent nuclear efforts among the allies to make it unwise to forego this opportunity merely on the tenuous supposition that a joint force would stimulate the diffusion of independent nuclear production and ownership outside the alliance.

Non-nuclear powers outside the alliance would have no additional reason, except the contagion of fashion and relative prestige, to acquire nuclear weapons merely because the NATO allies received them under joint control. Even if these powers did not trust the restraints of joint control, they would not need nuclear weapons to counter allied weapons, since it is quite improbable that the allies would need or want to use nuclear weapons independently against these powers. If an international agreement to stop nuclear diffusion were feasible, a NATO nuclear force would not necessarily be incompatible with it. It would not be incompatible with a nuclear test ban or with a production cutoff; it might, in fact, be the necessary condition for gaining allied adherence to either. It would be difficult to square with an agreement by the nuclear powers not to transfer weapons, even though they would be transferred to

the allies under formal joint control. But the Soviet Union would not transfer nuclear weapons to the unilateral control of other powers merely because the United States shared nuclear control with her allies, and neither the United States nor her allies would have any interest in transferring weapons to powers outside the alliance anyway.

The conclusion that emerges from these speculations is that the choice posed for the alliance by the diffusion of nuclear technology was not simply between complete nuclear abstinence and unrestricted nuclear indulgence but rather between the diffusion of nuclear capabilities under independent control and the diffusion of nuclear capabilities under joint control. From the standpoint of the general stability of the military environment as well as from the standpoint of allied security and cohesion, joint ownership and control seemed preferable. It would be an unfortunate irony if the United States and her allies, in order not to jeopardize an international agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to others, should forfeit the opportunity to check the spread of independent nuclear capabilities among themselves by failing to establish an effective framework of joint control.

But whatever view one might take of the desirability and feasibility of alternative policies for the control of nuclear weapons, at the beginning of the 1960's it seemed that a choice would have to be made, if only by default, on the basis of many uncertainties. For the time to make a choice was probably limited to the few years in which the decision of allies to enter or not enter the nuclear club would still lie in the balance and in which the United States would still retain the preponderant initiative by virtue of her technological supremacy.

10
Disengagement

1. THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF DISENGAGEMENT

The history of NATO has been one of mounting difficulties in meeting the requirements of allied security and collaboration in the face of political, economic, and military developments (preeminently, the growth of Soviet nuclear striking power) that were not foreseen at the outset. Necessarily, in a defensive alliance entailing a high level of contributions and integration, the chief instrument by which the members of NATO have sought to merge their particular national interests with the mutual advantages of a collective effort, has been military strategy, broadly conceived. Yet, on the threshold of the missile age, there was cause to doubt that the members of NATO would find a satisfactory solution to the problems of security and collaboration within the complex realm of planning, developing, and declaring military capabilities, deployments, and responses. Consequently, the risks, sacrifices, and perplexities of a joint military effort enhanced the appeal of a more direct resolution of the problems of mutual security by a negotiated accommodation with the Soviet Union, intended to mitigate the political source of strategic difficulties. Like the proposals for nuclear sharing, the proposed political accommodations were replete with strategic and political implications that directly affected the core of mutual security interests sustaining the alliance.

Hopes for a political amelioration of the sources of tension

and insecurity in the center of Europe have been focused upon a variety of proposals that are commonly subsumed under the general term "disengagement."[1] Some of these proposals have called for nothing more than arms limitation and control in the center of Europe. In this category the most notable were British Foreign Minister Sir Anthony Eden's suggestion at the Geneva summit conference in July, 1955, of "a demilitarized area between East and West" and Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki's proposals in 1957 and 1958 of a "denuclearized zone," prohibiting the production, stationing, and use of nuclear weapons and reducing conventional forces in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the two Germanys.* However, the most comprehensive proposals have envisaged, in addition to the limitation and control of weapons and forces in a central zone, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the reunification and neutralization of Germany under a mutual security guaranty. The two most in-

---

* Actually, Eden presented two different plans at different times. On January 29, 1954, at the Four-Power Conference of Foreign Ministers in Berlin, he proposed, simply, the reunification of Germany by free and supervised all-German elections. However, the Eden Plan that was repeatedly referred to in Soviet proposals was the one Eden presented at Geneva on July 18, 1955. The part of this threefold plan that got the most attention and came to be identified with the plan as a whole was the proposal of a demilitarized area between East and West. However, the other parts proposed a supervised limitation of forces and armaments in both Germanys and in the neighboring countries and a mutual security pact to guarantee a united Germany against aggression. Eden said that the whole plan was intended to provide the Soviet Union with reassurances that would make the unification of Germany, free to join NATO, acceptable to the Soviet Union, but Soviet leaders, in their subsequent references to the plan, chose to ignore this aspect.

Rapacki presented his first plan to the United Nations General Assembly on October 2, 1957, and in a memorandum to the powers concerned on February 15, 1958. It proposed an "atom-free zone," to include Poland, Czechoslovakia, and both parts of Germany, in which "nuclear weapons would be neither manufactured nor stockpiled, the equipment and installations designed for their servicing would not be located there, the use of nuclear weapons against the territory of this zone would be prohibited," under a system of ground and aerial control. Rapacki announced the second version of his plan in Warsaw on November 4, 1958. In this he added a reduction of conventional forces in the zone, to go into effect after a first-stage ban on nuclear production and simultaneously with the other denuclearization features.

The complete texts of the two Eden and two Rapacki plans are among the appendixes in Eugène Hinterhoff, *Disengagement* (London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1959).

fluential plans of this scope were presented in 1957 by the British Labor party leader Hugh Gaitskell and by George F. Kennan.*

Kennan's proposal, coming at a time when Russia's launching of the Sputniks had made Europe acutely conscious of the hazards of NATO's nuclear dependence and coinciding with a Soviet diplomatic offensive aimed toward "summit" talks, which were designed in part to forestall the placement of American missiles in Europe, caught the fancy of many Europeans. To them, and especially to the British, it seemed like the basis for a political breakthrough in the menacing perplexities of military security. In the course of 1958, however, Russia's renewed intransigence and her patent opposition to the reunification of Germany, together with the coolness of Western governments to a scheme of such far-reaching implications for the strategic and political bases of the security system they had so laboriously created, rendered disengagement a dormant issue.

Premier Khrushchev, confidently proclaiming that the bal-

---

* Gaitskell first presented his plan on January 11, 1957, in the Golkin Lecture at Harvard, which was published in *The Challenge of Coexistence* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957). Here he proposed the reunification of Germany, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the limitation, inspection, and control of armed forces in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and, if possible, Rumania and Bulgaria. He speculated that "the Russians might refuse to contemplate the plan without the neutralization on both sides [of Germany] from the start." He opposed the withdrawal of American troops from the Continent. In an article in *Foreign Affairs* in July, 1958, entitled "Disengagement: Why? How?" he presented a modified version of this plan. Gaitskell's plan was almost identical to the plan formulated by his colleague Denis Healey, who largely devised it.

Kennan made his proposal in the Reith lectures at Oxford in November, 1957, and in BBC broadcasts that December. He published it in his book *Russia, the Atom, and the West* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), chaps. iii and iv. It included the reunification and neutralization of Germany and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Germany and Eastern Europe, all under guaranties by the great powers. Germany would be under some kind of military restriction (certainly including the prohibition of nuclear weapons), and the European and NATO countries would depend for local defense on "paramilitary" forces "of a territorial-militia type." In his broadcast on December 20 Kennan said he was prepared to see all American forces withdrawn from the Continent and eventually from Britain. In January, 1959, Kennan defended his original proposal and indorsed the Rapacki Plan but said that Geman security should depend on twelve German divisions instead of on paramilitary forces ("Disengagement Revisited," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII [January, 1959], 187–210).

ance of power in the world had shifted to the Soviet Union, now concentrated on getting the West to recognize East Germany and withdraw from Berlin. He regarded the only basis of negotiations as Western accession to such stock Soviet demands as a ban on nuclear armaments and tests, the liquidation of all foreign bases in Europe, and a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The principal feature of the disengagement proposals that he formally indorsed was Eden's plan to create a demilitarized area and Rapacki's plan to prohibit the stationing and production of atomic weapons in a Central European zone.* Although the British government favored negotiating on such a plan, the United States, supported by Germany and France, curtly rejected it as disrupting NATO's forward strategy without providing any security against violations by powers outside the proposed zone.

The major Soviet goals in Europe continued to be Western recognition of East Germany, the prevention of West German rearmament, the isolation of West Germany from her allies, the sealing-off of the East-West escape route in Berlin, and the removal of the Western presence in Berlin. However, Khrushchev preferred to pursue these goals by inviting a showdown on Berlin and exploiting Western fears of Soviet missile power in order to exacerbate the "contradictions in the capitalist camp" rather than by negotiating comprehensive disengagement schemes, which, by compelling Soviet withdrawal from East Germany, would deprive the Soviet Union of a valuable forward position, jeopardize Soviet control over the East European satellites, and revive the dreaded specter of German expansion eastward.

Thus, suddenly, on November 10, 1958, he demanded an end of the four-power occupation of Berlin and informed the Western governments that they would have to get out of West Berlin and make it a "free city" within six months or else deal with East

* However, during a television interview with American journalists in June, 1957, Khrushchev, in an expansive mood, also suggested that the United States and other countries withdraw foreign troops from Western Europe, in return for which Russia would withdraw her troops from Eastern Europe (Hinterhoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 204–5).

Germany, to which the Soviet Union intended to turn over all her rights in the city. Eventually, through a skilful combination of threats and diplomatic overtures, the Soviet premier first removed President Eisenhower's objections to a summit conference by conceding in the famous Camp David meeting that there would be no time limit on negotiations about Berlin and then succeeded in manipulating an extension of this "slow ultimatum" to get the Western governments, contrary to all their original protestations about the futility of such a vague and unpromising venture, to assemble in Paris in May, 1960, for a four-power conference. Then, when the delegates had assembled in Paris, he dramatically withdrew from the conference before it could convene, while bitterly denouncing the flight of the American U-2 espionage plane shot down over Russia.

Yet, despite this rude end to the disengagement ferment stirred up by Kennan's lectures two-and-a-half years before, there could be little doubt that, if Khrushchev so chose, still another Soviet gesture toward a negotiated "relaxation of tensions" would revive Western interest in the project. For disengagement continued to be the most hopeful political means of relieving NATO's military troubles. And disengagement seemed like the only feasible means of resolving the problem of a divided Germany, which could otherwise ignite the spark of a military conflict that even the most complete military preparation might not prevent or extinguish. Therefore, disengagement deserves serious analysis in a study of the strategic problems of NATO because any plan to mitigate the political source of security problems is intrinsically important, because such plans could someday become mutually acceptable, and because, even if they do not, their mere formulation or lack of formulation will affect one of the primary political issues in the cold war: the place of Germany in Europe.

For the purposes of this analysis we can think of disengagement as including any one or all of the following three components: (*a*) the withdrawal of Soviet and American and other foreign troops from a zone embracing the two Germanys or beyond; (*b*) arms reduction, limitation, and control in such a

zone; (*c*) a political settlement unifying Germany and determining the restrictions, if any, upon her armament and upon her political commitments; (*d*) some guaranty by the United States, the Soviet Union, and other powers of these three components.

From the West's standpoint the principal value of any scheme of disengagement will lie in alleviating the military and political sources of tensions that jeopardize the maintenance of security by peaceful means. Through disengagement the West may also seek to strengthen its political position and weaken Russia's, just as Russia would cetainly hope to advance her political ends against the West. But it is unreasonable to expect either of the two competing nations or blocs of nations to enter knowingly into an agreement that would result in a significant accretion of the relative power of the other. On the other hand, disengagement might reasonably require one or both sides to sacrifice something of immediate security, political advantage, or the immediate reduction of tensions and the risk of war in order to promote the achievement of these goals in the long run. Yet there are clearly stringent limits on the extent to which nations can legitimately sacrifice familiar conditions of military security in the short run—which, after all, may be decisive—for the sake of achieving hypothetical military and political advantages in the future. Accordingly, every disengagement proposal should be assessed in terms of a balance of military and political objectives in the short run and long run. With these standards of appraisal in mind, let us consider each of the four components of disengagement to see whether it would be desirable if it could be negotiated. Then we can consider whether a negotiated agreement would be feasible.

2. WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES

Would the withdrawal of Soviet, American, and other forces from a central zone help to reduce tensions and the danger of war in a manner compatible with Western security? The answer would seem to be, "By itself, no," for the proximity of Soviet and American troops is not the source of tensions in Europe.

The real source of tensions is, first, the deep conflict of interests and aims between the NATO powers and a dynamic state moved by a revolutionary ambition to which their very existence is an obstacle and, second, growing out of this fundamental conflict, the explosive political situations, such as the division of Berlin and Germany, from which military conflicts might result. Military disengagement might be the necessary condition for the political amelioration of these situations, for it might adjust the military balance to support a new political configuration; but, in the absence of such amelioration, military *engagement* is probably the best assurance of peace with security.

To be sure, a disturbance in Berlin or East Germany would be less apt to involve foreign troops immediately if they were disengaged; but, if neither the Soviet Union nor the United States wanted to engage in an armed conflict, both powers would have a greater incentive and would be in a better position to control a disturbance and to see that the other side or its allies did not foment or exploit it if their troops were on the forward line. Far from reducing tensions, the withdrawal of foreign troops, in the short run at least, would remove a stabilizing influence from an area that would be inherently unstable politically. A withdrawal of foreign troops that left Germany divided would be especially conducive to tensions and warfare.

But what if there were also some political settlement of the German problem? Let us assume that, as in Kennan's proposal, withdrawal would be a concomitant of the unification and neutralization of Germany. Would it then promote military and political stability?

The process of unification would have to be carefully phased with the process of withdrawal in order to preserve a safe balance of power during the transition; but, at best, withdrawal would create a dangerous period during which rival groups would struggle for political control and try to settle old grievances. A settlement of the Oder-Neisse border would be indispensable if disengagement were not to agitate this old source of German-Polish conflict. Yet, if the zone of withdrawal included

the East European satellites, there would be many other ethnic and territorial differences to jeopardize a peaceful withdrawal, and the resulting tensions would be compounded by the internal upheavals accompanying the departure of the Red Army.

The transition to a new military and political order in Europe might well lead to a reintroduction of Soviet forces, for, regardless of Soviet good intentions in withdrawing troops, a violent transition threatening the survival of "friendly" elements might lead Soviet leaders to change their minds. In any case, with a huge Soviet army intact on the border of withdrawal and with Communist agents still active in the satellite states, the Russians would have to exercise unprecedented forbearance to refrain from indirect intervention by subversion, political infiltration, or the support of civil war. Yet the Western powers would find it politically very difficult to intervene to counter Soviet pressure, short of a massive Soviet military reoccupation. And if American forces had been withdrawn from the Continent, even the direct intervention of Soviet forces would be militarily very difficult to counter quickly enough to be effective.

However, we are speaking here of risks, not certainties. It is also possible that the Soviet Union would not withdraw her troops in the first place if she had not correctly assessed the consequences and reconciled herself to the risk of counter-revolutionary regimes or a number of "revisionist" regimes coming to power. It is plausible to suppose that Moscow would undertake such a drastic step as withdrawing the Red Army only in anticipation of securing some general political advantage that would outweigh this risk, and that, having taken this step, it would be prepared to accept reversals in the zone of withdrawal rather than sacrifice the overriding purpose of the withdrawal by trying to restore Russian occupation. It is not inconceivable that the states from which the Red Army was withdrawn would ease the transition to independence by remaining sufficiently friendly to the Soviet Union and sufficiently aloof from the West and by retaining sufficient internal stability, together with adequate conventional resistance strength, to enable the Russians to withdraw gracefully and to discourage

them from returning. If so, the risk of inciting new tensions and new dangers of war in the short run might be moderate enough to be a price worth paying for long-run stability.

In estimating the dimensions of this risk, the crushing of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 is not a directly relevant precedent, since Soviet forces had never been withdrawn from Hungary and Hungary's independence was not guaranteed by an East-West agreement. A more relevant precedent might be the experience of Yugoslavia, Austria, Finland, or Sweden, who, even without a specific Western guaranty of their sovereignty, have succeeded in retaining their independence—and, in the case of Yugoslavia and Finland, in the face of great Soviet pressure and the proximity of overwhelming Soviet military strength. The analogy between the position of these neutral states and the hypothetical position of Germany and East European states in a zone of withdrawal is imperfect, since the present neutrals are beneficiaries of a general balance of military power on the Continent that would be substantially altered by Germany's withdrawal from NATO. But the point here is simply that neutral states are not necessarily helpless Soviet pawns, subject to imminent Russian occupation, merely because they are denied ties of military collaboration with NATO. Their independence depends equally upon their internal strength and cohesion, the quality of their diplomacy, and the nature of the general military balance that is maintained by others.

In our preoccupation with the military requirements of containment, reinforced by the oversimple analogy we tend to draw between the problem of containing the Soviet Union and containing Hitler's Germany, we tend to forget that countervailing military power projected abroad by formal commitments to protect territorial boundary lines is only one factor among a variety of non-military factors that may account for the deterrence of aggression. The image of the Soviet Union being restrained from occupying every piece of territory near its borders that is not already under the domination of the Red Army solely by the fear of military resistance or nuclear reprisals is a great

oversimplification of the complex motives that actually guide the policy of a regime which by ideology and experience is acutely sensitive to the political and psychological conditions of national power.

Nevertheless, it would be foolhardy for nations who have a choice to intrust their security entirely to non-military deterrents or to ignore the political and psychological conditions of security that depend upon the mere existence of a certain balance of military strength and upon expectations about when and how armed force might be used. In this respect, it is apparent that a withdrawal of foreign troops from the center of Europe would directly contravene the conditions of allied security that previous chapters have discussed.

One essential condition of allied security is the belief which NATO creates in the Soviet mind that one member cannot be attacked without involving the Soviet Union in a war with all members and, especially, with the United States. The neutralization of Germany and the withdrawal of American and other NATO troops could not help but weaken this belief. The withdrawal of foreign forces from the forward line would render Germany more dependent upon the deterrent effect of the West's strategic nuclear power while reducing the credibility of that deterrent in both Soviet and non-Soviet eyes. The Eastern European states, which the United States has clearly considered beyond the sphere of interest that she would protect at the risk of war, would be far more isolated and vulnerable than the Western European states were before the establishment of NATO.

The corrosive impact of disengagement upon the credibility of the American commitment to defend Western Europe, let alone Eastern Europe, would be especially severe if American troops withdrew from the Continent altogether. Perhaps this complete withdrawal would not be inevitable. The insistence of General Norstad and other American military authorities that withdrawal from the Continent would be necessary because of the great expense and difficulty of relocation and the lack of space for realistic training and maneuvers may, as Michael

Howard suggests, be due to "the very natural reluctance of men who have spent nine years in creating a complex and expensive organization to contemplate dismantling their creation and going through the whole business again,"[2] rather than to insurmountable obstacles. The presence of a few American divisions in France and the Lowlands, although foreign troops are never completely welcome anywhere for long, should not prove politically unacceptable, if the host countries regarded them as the price of securing the overriding advantages of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Nevertheless, at best, even partial withdrawal would tend to undermine the deterrent and resistance functions that NATO's shield is supposed to perform. Certainly, it would put Germany in an intolerably exposed position unless Soviet forces were withdrawn beyond the Polish-German frontier to the borders of Russia.

Mr. Kennan contended that even if American and British troops were withdrawn from the Continent, Europe would not be less secure militarily:

> We must get over this obsession that the Russians are yearning to attack and occupy Western Europe, and this is the principal danger. The Soviet threat . . . is a combined military and political threat, with the accent on the political. If the armed forces of the United States and Britain were not present on the Continent, the problem of defense for the continental nations would be primarily one of the internal health and discipline of the respective national societies, and of the manner in which they were organized to prevent the conquest and subjugation of their national life by unscrupulous and foreign-inspired minorities in their midst.[3]

These words describe a conception of the requirements of cohesion and security which Kennan and many others considered adequate when the alliance was established, but many things have happened since then to enlarge and complicate those requirements. Most important, the growth of Soviet nuclear striking power has made more urgent the need for ground forces capable of an "intermediate response," and this is not a function which could be performed by the "paramilitary" and civil resistance forces which Kennan originally proposed to sub-

stitute for "foreign garrisons."[4] Kennan himself eloquently expressed the reason for this need:

> The beginning of understanding rests, in this appalling problem, with the recognition that the weapon of mass destruction is a sterile and hopeless weapon which may for a time serve as an answer of sorts to itself and as an uncertain sort of shield against utter cataclysm, but which cannot in any way serve the purposes of a constructive and hopeful foreign policy.... The suicidal nature of this weapon renders it unsuitable both as a sanction of diplomacy and as the basis of an alliance. Such a weapon is simply not one with which one readily springs to the defense of one's friends. There can be no coherent relations between such a weapon and the normal objects of national policy. A defense posture built around a weapon suicidal in its implications can serve in the long run only to paralyze national policy, to undermine alliances, and to drive everyone deeper and deeper into the hopeless exertions of the weapons race.[5]

Nevertheless, if the allies remain unwilling to increase the capacity of NATO's shield for conventional resistance, and thereby adopt a suicidal defense posture by default, there is merit in Kennan's judgment that it is more desirable to get the Soviet forces out of Central and Eastern Europe than to retain foreign garrisons in Germany and cultivate a German contribution to NATO for the purpose of opposing them while they remain there.[6] Would Western Europe be any less secure from Soviet aggression than at present if Soviet forces were five hundred miles eastward? Surely Western forces on the Continent could return to their former position in the center of Europe before Soviet forces. Suppose, as Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Healey proposed, that Germany and the other nations in the zone of withdrawal were armed with substantial conventional forces of their own. Could they not perform the functions of NATO's present shield? Assuming the internal stability of these states and their willingness to combine militarily, their conventional forces could at least prevent infiltration, stop the Russians from making a territorial grab without a major effort, and delay a massive invasion. In fact, such a conventionally armed buffer zone might come closer to providing the kind of intermediate

response General Norstad has called for than NATO's present forward line, which seems unable to assume any role between that of a conventional police force and that of a tactical nuclear trip-wire. Militarily, at least, the extra space provided by the buffer zone might compensate for the absence of the integration and joint planning with Western forces that NATO's present forward line enjoys.

However, the crucial consequences of a new military balance under disengagement would be its political and psychological effects. Would the nations in the buffer zone, deprived of their formal connections and the ties of collaboration with Western forces, be able to muster the will and common purpose to withstand Soviet pressure backed by an overwhelming military machine designed to isolate and intimidate them? Even within NATO the security and cohesion of the alliance have come to require more than a mere political guaranty. No political guaranty given by NATO to the states in the zone of withdrawal could compensate for the absence of tangible ties of military collaboration. As Michael Howard has observed, "It is one thing to go to the help of a powerful and integrated alliance capable itself of considerable resistance; it is quite another to help effectively a small power whose neighbors have been bribed or intimidated into neutrality and which would probably be overrun in a few hours."[7] Therefore, again, it would appear that disengagement would be compatible with European security only if the nations in the zone of withdrawal had adequate internal stability and the political capacity to present a common front to Soviet blackmail. But these conditions are not likely to exist, especially during the period of transition from engagement to disengagement.

3. ARMS LIMITATION AND CONTROL

Like the withdrawal of foreign troops, a thinning-out or denuclearization of forces in the central buffer zone would fail, by itself, to mitigate the basic cause of tension and the danger of war, which lies in the division of Germany and in other concrete manifestations of the underlying East-West political conflict in

Europe. At the same time, regional arms limitation and control would not help much, if any, to stabilize the military balance, in the absence of a political accommodation.

The prohibition of nuclear arms would somewhat reduce whatever risk there is that states in the zone might stumble into a nuclear war by accident, but it would not impede nuclear weapons from being quickly introduced into a conventional conflict from beyond the zone, whatever formal prohibitions against the use of nuclear weapons there might be.* At the same time, it would deny West Germany access to tactical nuclear weapons on an equal basis with the other NATO members and confine her exclusively to the role of a conventional buffer, while the adversary retained a full arsenal of nuclear and conventional forces beyond the zone of withdrawal.

Nevertheless, a denuclearized zone would not impose a decisive military disadvantage on NATO in protecting Europe if West Germany remained a member of NATO and were permitted to have a conventional force of from twelve to eighteen divisions integrated with other alliance forces under SHAPE. And one can imagine a limitation of conventional forces in the central zone that would also be compatible with Germany's and Europe's military security. In fact, establishment of a suitable ratio of German forces within such a limitation might be a more effective way of meeting the requirements of an intermediate response than trying to build NATO's forward line up

* Khrushchev has conceded that any atom-free zone would be within range of Russian and Western nuclear weapons and has said that the guaranty of such an agreement would depend merely on the promise of the nuclear powers not to employ weapons against the zone. Thus, in answering arguments put forward by some Scandinavian politicians for Soviet reciprocity in banning atomic weapons on Soviet territory, he said, "If we consider the range and power of the contemporary rocket and nuclear weapons, a mere 100, 200, or 300 kilometers is of no real importance. Thus rocket- and atom-free zones in a part of Soviet territory will give no guaranty to the Scandinavian countries. If we speak about the problem of guaranteeing the security of the Scandinavian countries in case they are included in an atom- and rocket-free zone, we should take into consideration that both the Western countries and the Soviet Union should undertake to treat the territories covered by this zone as situated beyond the range of rocket and nuclear weapons and to respect the status of that region. The United Nations could be invited to take part, in some form or other, in the solution of the problem" (from a speech in Poland on July 21, 1959, quoted in Hinterhoff, *op. cit.*, p. 294).

to thirty divisions with a dual capability—an effort which, even if it succeeded, might lead the Russians to counteract it with increases in their own conventional forces. On the other hand, if the Federal Republic were deprived of her NATO ties, a ban upon her possession of nuclear weapons would only further isolate and weaken her in the face of Russian pressure. She would be especially susceptible to a Russian offer to grant her reunification on Russian terms.

Nevertheless, a denuclearized zone including Germany might be an indispensable condition for achieving the reunification of Germany through an East-West settlement. Thus Sir Anthony Eden regarded his proposal of a demilitarized zone as a means to "insure that the unification of Germany and her freedom to associate with countries of her choice shall not involve any threat to anybody."[8] Rapacki and Khrushchev, however, regarded a denuclearized zone only as a means of preventing West Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons. They did not couple it with German unification. In addition, they held out the prospect, always appealing in the West, that the achievement of one arms agreement would lead to other arms agreements. Eden also pointed to this prospect in presenting his own plan, when he said that it was, in part, "intended to make a practical experiment in the operative control of armaments" and expressed his hope that "this, if locally successful in Europe, might, as it were, extend outwards from the center to the periphery."[9]

It is reasonable to envisage a plan for a regional nuclear ban and the limitation of conventional forces as the necessary condition for the unification of Germany in a manner compatible with the security of Germany and her neighbors, but it is difficult to see how it might become a first step to broader disarmament agreements, which the great powers have been unable to achieve by more direct means. The reasons that broader disarmament agreements have proved unacceptable are far more deeply rooted than any superficial distrust and suspicion that might be dissolved by a harmonious experience in administering a Rapacki-like agreement. Surely, if the nuclear powers cannot agree on a nuclear test ban or a nuclear production cut-off

as a step toward limiting the diffusion of nuclear capabilities and production, a denuclearized zone in the center of Europe would not be a step toward that end. And neither the general problem of reducing armaments nor the more limited problem of providing mutual assurance against surprise attack is analogous to the special problem of limiting and controlling arms in a geographical zone.

Therefore, if there are net advantages to be gained from a plan for nuclear and conventional restrictions in a zone of withdrawal, they are, first, that it might be the necessary condition for securing the unification of Germany and, second, that it might then provide protection against the threat of limited aggression, as a supplement to what would remain of NATO's shield.

4. THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY

If disengagement is to reduce tensions and the danger of war in a manner compatible with European security, this will be principally because it facilitates a political resolution of the problem of the two Berlins and two Germanys and because it leads to a settlement of the problem of the relation of Germany to the rest of Europe. For these are the basic sources of conflict in Central Europe, not the proximity of foreign troops or their numbers and armament.

The long-run problem of Germany's place in Europe is how to satisfy the legitimate national aspirations and guard the security of a mighty nation in a central strategic position without alarming other European powers and tempting them to make her the object of their diplomatic and military incursions, either to weaken her or to add her power to their own. The more immediate form this problem assumes is how to gain Soviet agreement to the unification of Germany without undermining the security of Germany and Western Europe or, failing that, how to permit the continued division of Germany without weakening Germany's allegiance to NATO or driving her into a bilateral deal for unification with the Soviet Union.

But at the beginning of the 1960's the German problem was posed most directly by the renewed Soviet threat to Berlin. The

Western position in Berlin was a precarious one, which Moscow showed a disturbing determination to make more precarious by a variety of harassing moves directed against the viability and independence of West Berlin. The position of the West in a divided Berlin could not, however, be separated from the position of a divided Germany in Europe.

To appreciate the immense political significance of this dual division, one must first understand that for the present Russian leaders, as for Lenin and the Bolsheviks, the capture of Germany is the key to the domination of all Europe, and that West Germany, next to the United States, is the greatest single national obstacle to Soviet ambitions in the world, as well as the greatest potential asset. If Germany cannot be captured, it must at least be weakened and denied to the West. Second, one must understand that the occupation of East Germany and East Berlin is vital to either the neutralization or the acquisition of West Germany, quite apart from its independent value as a military base and a dependably orthodox adherent of the Soviet bloc. For, since the Russians cannot militarily capture the whole of Germany without precipitating a war they wish to avoid, they must at least consolidate their rule in the Eastern part and exploit the division of Berlin, as means of gaining their dual objectives by diplomacy and subversion.

Yet in this endeavor the Russians encounter major obstacles in the weakness and unpopularity of their East German satellite, in the strength and vitality of West Germany, and in the existence of a free and thriving West Berlin in the midst of Communist territory. They must, therefore, at least secure the West's full recognition of East Germany, because this would bolster the Communist regime, demoralize those who seek self-determination there and in the other satellites, end the free Germans' identification of their hopes for unification with their Western ties, and make it apparent to the Germans and all other parties concerned that the Soviet Union has the sole power to grant or withhold this major national goal. And they must also try to gain control of all Berlin or at least destroy its vitality, because this would eliminate the symbolic capital of an even-

tually united and free Germany, completely destroy the prospect of deliverance throughout Eastern Europe, close an embarrassing and debilitating escape hatch, and seriously damage confidence throughout the world in the trustworthiness of American and allied guaranties of security. The effect of either the full recognition of East Germany or the capture or emasculation of Berlin would be to demoralize and isolate West Germany, humiliate her allies, and lay the foundation for the Soviet Union to deal with her on a bilateral basis.

It was undoubtedly with these considerations uppermost in his mind that Khrushchev reactivated the Berlin crisis in November, 1958, and began heating it up in the summer of 1961. He was probably emboldened by his interpretation of the favorable shift in the world balance of military power, tempted by signs of Western division, and perhaps prodded by internal pressures and by Chinese disaffection to distinguish himself as the leader of international communism—to make his mark on history as more than just the successor of Stalin—by gaining a victory against the heartland of the capitalist world.

Even if he should not succeed this time, he or some future Russian leader would try again. Therefore, for the West the division of Berlin was a distracting and dangerous source of tension, which could be alleviated, if at all, only by a political settlement. On the one hand, the NATO powers could not afford to let such a powerful symbol of Western vitality, honor, and cohesion come under Communist control. But, on the other hand, they could at best only maintain the status quo against non-military incursions intended to isolate and conquer the city, while they were certainly unable to defend Berlin *with* local military action and probably unable to sustain it against another blockade *without* local military action.*

* Although more supplies were stockpiled in West Berlin in 1961 than in 1948, the standard of living there was much higher and the city was much more dependent on outside supplies. Airlift capacity was greater in 1961, but new electronic devices would permit the Communists to interfere with all but visual landings by allied aircraft and so greatly reduce the airlift capacity, which narrowly saved Berlin in 1949. Consequently, if the Russians chose to institute another blockade and maintain it long enough, the West would probably have to supply Berlin on the ground by armed convoy.

Yet it was probably futile to try to remedy the Berlin situation by any diplomatic settlement confined to Berlin itself. For, considering the irreconcilability of the Eastern and Western interests involved, no redefinition of rights would eliminate the source of tension as long as Berlin remained a city under divided control, with its routes of access to West Germany passing through Communist territory; and no system of international control of a united Berlin could supplant the city's direct association with West Germany and her allies as an effective guaranty of its security. Western hopes for this kind of solution betrayed a misapprehension that the Soviet Union had a mutual interest with the West in alleviating a source of tensions in Berlin or that she was in such a weak position that she was compelled to stabilize the local situation. Actually, the Soviet interest lay in exploiting tensions arising from the division of Berlin in order to gain recognition of the East German regime and, if possible, to unify Berlin under Communist control. She was certainly under no compulsion to stabilize the Western position in Berlin. Therefore, from the Western standpoint the resolution of the Berlin problem could come only from the unification of Berlin within a reunified Germany. Otherwise, the Soviet Union could always precipitate a crisis that would compel the NATO powers to go to the brink of war or incur the odium of appeasement.

The desirability and feasibility of reunifying Germany were intimately tied up with disengagement, for if the Russians would agree to the unification of Germany under any circumstances, they would certainly agree to it only if a united Germany's military and political ties with NATO were severed and foreign troops were withdrawn. Whatever else one might say in behalf of the West's insistence that a united Germany should have a free choice in determining its military and political orientation, one could not reasonably maintain that the Soviet Union would ever accept such a provision, since a united Germany with a free choice would join NATO.

But let us assume that military withdrawal and neutralization would make the unification of Germany feasible. Would it also

be desirable? I have already discussed the likely effects of disengagement upon the security of a united Germany and the rest of Europe. They would be serious but not disastrous, if the terms of withdrawal were equitable and if the states in the zone of withdrawal were sufficiently stable, militarily strong, and united to protect themselves from indirect aggression and discourage the Soviet Union from attacking one in the expectation that the others would not join its defense. Reunification would be incompatible with German security if Soviet troops withdrew no farther than the Oder or if American troops withdrew from the Continent. A nuclear arms prohibition and a limitation of conventional forces might be necessary for a safe and politically acceptable agreement. Politically, an orderly process of unification consistent with genuine self-determination would have to be based on internationally supervised free elections, not on some kind of "confederation" negotiated by the two German governments. Disengagement would have to be accompanied by recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the German boundary, so that a united Germany would not be a continual source of political instability in Central and Eastern Europe. (Indeed, there is a good case for the NATO powers, with West German assent, publicly accepting this line as permanent anyway, as a means of improving West German–Polish relations and depriving Russia of a lever to reinforce Polish dependence.)

But even if German unification could be brought about under these optimum conditions, there was a widespread fear in Europe that a united Germany would be a disturbing and dangerous influence because she would return either to an imperial policy or to a policy of collaboration with the Soviet Union. The fear was understandable. Yet, if this was a danger at all, it was less serious than the danger of a divided Germany.

Militating against the resurgence of an imperialist Germany, there would be not only the chastening impact of the Hitler era but also the novel risks of military expansion in the nuclear age. These restraining influences would be reinforced by a nuclear prohibition and a numerical limitation upon German forces. One cannot exclude the possibility of a Russo-German alliance.

But the common analogy of the Rapallo treaty of 1922 is strained, since the Soviet Union would not be a weak state seeking German economic and military assistance, and Germany would not see herself as a nation isolated and suppressed by an unjust Western peace treaty, which she was determined to rectify by turning to the East for help.* If there is a serious danger of a united Germany's severing her ties with the West and joining with the Russians, it lies in the possibility that the division of Germany will lead a desperate and frustrated Federal Republic, unable to get support for her security or for unification from her Western allies, to seek support from Russia.

Nevertheless, an inherently powerful, though formally neutralized, Germany might very well be a disturbing influence in Europe in other ways. It is difficult to imagine such a strong nation in such a crucial geopolitical position placidly playing the non-alignment role of Switzerland or Austria, and it is difficult to imagine the Soviet Union and the United States indefinitely allowing her to play such a role. The question of which way and for what purposes Germany might throw her weight would create a far more fluid and unstable political balance in Europe than the division of Germany permits. Even the most circumspect German diplomacy might not appease the fears and suspicions of her smaller and weaker neighbors. Only if a unified Germany were to become an integral part of a larger European federation, together with neutral East European states, might she mitigate the unsettling consequences of her neutral status; but the political conditions for such a federation scarcely exist.

On the other hand, the continued division of a resurgent

* The Rapallo treaty is commonly regarded as a symbol of the whole development of military, economic, and political collaboration between Germany and the U.S.S.R in the postwar years, culminating in the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1939. But, actually, it provided merely for the resumption of full diplomatic relations, the mutual cancellation of claims, and most-favored-nation treatment. Secret arrangements for military collaboration had already been made, without the knowledge of German civilian cabinet members. The significance of Rapallo was that it marked the success of Soviet diplomacy in splitting Germany off from the Western community, which had already ostracized her.

Germany could be even more disturbing from the West's standpoint, if, as seems likely, reunification remains a compelling national goal, which the Federal Republic cannot afford to abandon.[10] For, unless the West can convince the Germans that their alliance with NATO is a better assurance of reunification than neutralization and military withdrawal—a proposition that must seem more untenable the longer Germany remains divided—they may conclude some day that the principal obstacle to unity is Germany's membership in NATO, not Soviet imperialism. With a little Soviet encouragement, some future Bonn government might then be tempted to use its economic and military potential (perhaps including a nuclear capability) to bargain directly with Moscow, trading Germany's NATO attachment (and certainly her nuclear arms) for reunification. As Kennan warned, such a bilateral deal, "however innocuous or even constructive in its consequences" it might be, "would set in motion trains of memory, suspicion, and resentment of which only the Communists could be the beneficiaries," if it were made against the wishes of "a Western community which had nailed its flag to the mast of an unconditional capitulation of the Soviet interest in Central and Eastern Europe."[11]

To be sure, in 1961 it was as difficult to foresee conditions under which the Soviet Union would actually grant Germany unification as it was to foresee conditions in which the West German government would accept unification on Soviet terms. But, since Russia was the only country that could grant unification, it would be remarkable if she did not some day, as before the Paris Agreements, use this powerful card in her deck at least to exploit the *prospect* of unification in order to isolate West Germany from the Western community. To offset this danger was one of the best reasons for the NATO powers to formulate and propose a reasonable agreement for German reunification, in order to demonstrate who was to blame for partition. But since such an agreement, to be reasonable, would have to be acceptable not only to the Western powers but also, within some plausible bounds, to the Soviet Union, a proposal of reunification would have to include neutralization (that is,

a prohibition upon Germany's joining NATO or the Warsaw Pact), arms limitation, and military withdrawal.

Of course, even to present such a proposal tentatively without assurance that West Germany approved it would defeat its purpose. In 1961, the Bonn government remained adamantly opposed to any disengagement plan. Hence, her allies could scarcely press this major power to contravene her government's conception of a vital interest merely in order to place the onus of German division on Russia. On the other hand, the Bonn government and her allies could not indefinitely pretend that unification might be obtained by integrating West Germany into the Western community. If reunification through comprehensive disengagement were to be ruled out, West Germany would sooner or later have to accept the fact that the implicit condition of her entanglement in NATO is the suspension of her ambition to unite with East Germany. This would not solve the problem of Berlin, but it would at least impede the Russians from exploiting the division of Berlin and Germany to divide the alliance.

As long as the West Germans know that it is the Russians and not their allies who bear the onus of partition, the security of Western Europe will be served better by the Federal Republic's membership in NATO than by her unification with East Germany under the only terms that Russia might conceivably accept. As long as the West German government is not tempted to make a separate deal with the Russians for unification, the liabilities of a divided Berlin and Germany, from the standpoint of NATO as a whole, are counterbalanced by the advantages of West Germany's integration in NATO and by avoiding the risks of reunification through disengagement.

However, Kennan rightly suggested that more is at stake in the issue of German reunification than the welfare of NATO and *Western* Europe; the welfare of Eastern Europe is also involved, and the interests of the United States are bound up with the state of Europe as a whole. For the division of Germany, he said, is inseparable from the larger issue of the division of

Europe. Here he put his finger on a basic difference of outlook that separated him from the opponents of disengagement. The difference sprang from divergent conceptions of NATO's purpose.

What concerned Kennan most deeply was that the division of Germany meant the division of the Continent into two hostile blocs and that, with time, this alienation of the eastern from the western half would become irreparable and the absorption of Eastern Europe into the Russian empire final. This prospect was the antithesis of Kennan's original and abiding conception of NATO's purpose as a political guaranty extended to Western Europe to permit the Europeans to recover their inherent strength and stability and to permit the West to negotiate an all-European settlement with the Russians. Describing his view of the original presuppositions of the North Atlantic alliance, Kennan wrote in 1959:

> There were those of us who, in the inspiring days of the birth of the Marshall Plan and NATO, conceived that the purpose of the cultivation of Western strength was to place the West in a position where it would some day be able to negotiate the liquidation of the vast misunderstanding represented in the division of the continent. What loomed to us at the end of this road we were entering upon was not the crushing of Soviet power by the force of our actions but compromise—compromise on terms more favorable to ourselves than the conditions of that day would have permitted—compromise that would have given not only to a portion of Europe but to the great body of it the possibility to live. Here lay the connection, which so many have found it so hard to discern, between "containment" and "disengagement." And while it did not occur to us that the *substance* of the gains we hoped to see made in Western Europe could ever be regarded as expendable for purpose of negotiation . . . it also did not occur to us that there was to be, in the institutional and particularly the military devices which we were then creating, anything so sacrosanct that these devices could not one day be modified to be exchanged in favor of one with a wider range of relevance and acceptance.[12]

In contrast to this vision of a united Europe, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower and Secretaries of State Acheson and

Dulles were content, for all practical purposes, to look forward to a strong and united *Western* Europe. When they looked beyond the immediate problem of redressing the imbalance of power on the Continent, they were inspired, not by the rather nebulous image of a general European community, but rather by the vision of a united Western Europe tied to the United States in an Atlantic community, including Germany firmly integrated with her democratic neighbors through a network of political, military, and economic strands that permitted her to regain her natural power within the restraints, and for the benefit, of a Western coalition[13]—a vision that coincided with Chancellor Adenauer's eagerness to associate German nationalism with a larger European loyalty. Consequently, whereas Kennan deplored the entanglement of Western European economic collaboration with military obligations, because it would prejudice the extension of the institutions of collaboration to the whole Continent,[14] his opponents applauded the further elaboration of these institutions in a Western European framework and welcomed the entanglement of Western Europe's economic ties with local and transatlantic political and military obligations as one of the most encouraging developments in the cold war. They warned that disengagement would destroy this evolving integration in the Atlantic community and that a neutralized Germany would be a danger to the West, to the Soviet Union, and to the Germans themselves.

As for entering into negotiations to end the division of Germany and Europe, all spokesmen of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations officially looked forward to a negotiated removal of what Kennan called the "great political and military cramp" in the center of Europe, but they professed to believe that this would come about when the West achieved such a powerful political and military posture and when a prospering democratic West Germany exerted such an irresistible "attractive power" that the Soviet government would have no alternative but to accept unification on the basis of Germany's freedom to join NATO. By this formula they paid the verbal price for West Germany's willing collaboration with NATO and per-

petuated a delusion, which served, in effect, as a justification for keeping Germany divided.

Secretary Acheson often described the purpose of building "situations of strength" as enabling the West to reach political settlements with the Soviet bloc on outstanding differences. But, typically, he made this point in the context of explaining to those who were urging the American government to enter into negotiations that it was fruitless to expect acceptable accommodations with the Soviet Union until the unfavorable distribution of power on the Continent had been rectified. This was his response to the Soviet proclivity for timing proposals for German unification to coincide with crucial periods of Western integration and military build-up. He believed that when the Russians saw an interest in making some genuine political accommodation, they would do so suddenly and quietly, without regard for the fanfare of negotiations, as in terminating the Berlin blockade of 1949 or signing the Austrian State Treaty in 1955.

In truth, neither Acheson nor Dulles was disposed to sacrifice the tangible progress, so laboriously achieved, in strengthening and knitting together a European-Atlantic community incorporating West Germany, in order to engage in dubious diplomatic ventures directed toward some improbable new European order. They were convinced that the Soviet Union regarded these ventures as only a species of political warfare to confound, divide, and undermine the North Atlantic alliance in order to prevent the Western powers from getting on with the main task of building up the common defense. On this point Dulles differed from Acheson only in emphasis. Secretary Dulles made fewer verbal concessions to the sentiment for negotiated settlements with the Russians than Acheson, openly taking the position that agreements with a state dominated by Lenin's ideology and the Communist party could not be trusted and meeting Soviet overtures for conferences with demands that she first demonstrate "good faith." In Dulles' mind, useful negotiations would have to await not merely a situation of strength but the transformation of Soviet society.

As for the consequences of this NATO-first policy for the future of Eastern Europe, Acheson held that the necessary condition for the Soviet satellites to recover their national identity and keep up their hopes in the meantime was a strong NATO. Anyway, in his view, the Russians could not afford to withdraw their troops as long as withdrawal would lead to the immediate overthrow of Russian-controlled regimes. Therefore,

> A further process of evolution is necessary, both within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, before a change to more complete national identity in the latter can take place without erupting into a violence which might engulf the world. When that evolution occurs, Russian and American troop withdrawals may be possible without destroying the basis of American association in the security of Europe.[15]

This was much too indefinite and unlikely a prospect to suit Kennan. "The rosy prospects which Acheson and others discern at the end of the present road of Western policy," he wrote, "seem to rest in general on the possibility for an extensive breakdown of Soviet power," which, in 1959, he regarded as too improbable to figure seriously in the calculations of Western policy.[16] However, Kennan misconceived the nature of the expectations about Soviet power held by the opponents of disengagement, and he exaggerated the significance of these expectations in determining their views on containment.

Kennan himself had once regarded the natural outcome of containment as the "break-up" or "mellowing" of Soviet power.[17] President Truman and Secretary Acheson put more stress on the latter prospect than on the former.[18] Secretary of State Dulles expressed early optimism about the break-up of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe but later looked chiefly toward the moderation of Soviet policy.[19] Yet there is no evidence that these hopes entered into the calculations of Western policy in any concrete way, any more than hopes for "liberation" affected actual policies.

In the minds of most American policy-makers the task of containment in Europe—building up a strong coalition in which West Germany would be an essential participant—was desir-

able in itself, for political as well as military reasons, and would have to persist as long as the Soviet threat to Europe remained. But in Kennan's view containment would not achieve its legitimate purpose until a broad European community emerged from the preliminary effort to restore a situation of strength in Western Europe. Having lost his original confidence in the break-up or mellowing of Soviet power in the course of the first decade of the cold war, in the second decade he looked to a negotiated settlement to prevent the irrevocable division of Europe into hostile military coalitions.

Between these two views of the future of Europe, the prevailing one, which underlay the creation and evolution of NATO, is the more promising as a basis of policy. For NATO has consolidated a military and political framework of security in Western Europe that probably could not be achieved in a general European community even if the Soviet Union were to abandon her ceaseless political warfare. Nevertheless, Kennan's proposal was directed toward a serious policy vacuum that needs to be filled by something besides the delusions that Bonn can have both German unification and integration with the West and that Western firmness will lead to a mellowing or break-up of Soviet power. A democratic coalition can acquiesce in the division of Europe and make the best of it, if it has made every reasonable effort to end the deadlock, but it cannot afford simply to adhere doggedly to the status quo, to base its whole security and welfare on the continued partition of Germany and the division of Europe into hostile blocs, on the untenable premise, which most of its members in fact reject, that this will unite Germany and restore peace to Europe. Nor can it afford to seem to have a vested interest, with the Soviet Union, in perpetuating Communist rule over peoples who once were and still yearn to be free.

If a reasonable plan of reunification under comprehensive disengagement remains unacceptable to both West Germany and the Soviet Union—which seems almost certain—the Western powers should, nevertheless, continue to assert their interest in ending the partition of Germany and the Russian occupation of

Eastern Europe. They should assert it, not by mere exhortation and idle demands upon the Russians to remove their troops, but by presenting concrete diplomatic alternatives and taking specific actions which the peoples and even the governments of Eastern Europe will understand as genuine efforts to move toward a viable alternative to their present servitude. The most effective actions would be part of what has been called a policy of "peaceful engagement";[20] that is, actions designed to increase political, economic, cultural, and other informal contacts between the West and Eastern Europe, including those between West and East Germany, toward the end of stimulating further diversity in the Communist bloc and enabling the Soviet satellites to achieve a greater measure of independence within the bloc. The ultimate goal of this policy, as of disengagement, would be not the merging of Western with Eastern Europe and certainly not the sacrifice of Western political, economic, and military integration for the sake of some larger European community, but rather the creation in Eastern Europe of a cohesive group of non-aligned states, enjoying genuine self-determination in their internal affairs—a "cordon sanitaire" that would be neither a threat nor a temptation to the Soviet Union. If such a neutral belt of nations could gain sufficient stature and confidence to be a genuine buffer zone instead of a power vacuum, the Soviet Union might finally see her mutual interest with the NATO powers in bringing about the reunification of Germany under disengagement—a Germany that would retain all her ties to the Atlantic community except those of military alliance but that would no longer be a menace in the eyes of those east of the Oder-Neisse. If Moscow still rejected this solution, the division of Germany would at least be less of a menace to the security and peace of Western Europe.

5. POLITICAL GUARANTY

Any form of disengagement, but especially one embracing political as well as military changes, would be a potentially disturbing alteration of the status quo. The stabilization of the new political and military relationship would require the absolute

co-operation of the most powerful signatories. Consequently, many proposals of disengagement have envisaged a formal political guaranty by the signatories to enforce it. Kennan, for example, proposed writing into the treaty sanctions, which, in the event of an infringement by one party of its provisions for withdrawal, would give the other party clearly specified and automatic rights of re-entry.

The only effective guaranty from the West's standpoint would be one whose violation the West could readily redress by political and military counteraction. However, any agreement guaranteeing a zone embracing Eastern Europe would be far easier for the Soviet Union to subvert and violate than for the West to enforce or rectify. Once the United States withdrew her forces and accustomed herself to the new order of things, it would be extremely difficult for her to retain the level of physical and psychological preparedness necessary to deter or counter Soviet-inspired subversion, infiltration, and limited aggression in the Eastern zone. With the present configuration of national power in Europe, NATO can, with difficulty, sustain the preparedness to guarantee its commitments, but with an altered configuration of power, in which West Germany were no longer an ally, it would hardly be prepared to guarantee additional commitments in Eastern Europe without a major reorientation of its political outlook and its military capabilities as well.

The fact is that NATO exhibits the inertia of an organization whose mutual commitments and contributions have become routine. For that reason it is difficult to enlarge those commitments and contributions, but it is also difficult to reduce them, even though, in the absence of NATO, its members would not now undertake the commitments and marshal the joint effort that has grown out of their original perception of an imminent threat to their security. No new political and military order, adopted as a means of relieving tensions and calling for a reduction of NATO's forces and even membership, and yet entailing an expansion of commitments, could readily become the focus of the same degree of organized vigilance as the present

alliance. That, in itself, is not sufficient reason for retaining the status quo, but it should warn us against the danger of altering it.

In order to appreciate the danger of entering into an arrangement so dependent upon Soviet co-operation and yet so difficult to enforce, one need not assume that the Soviet Union would accept such a far-reaching agreement with the express purpose of violating it. For regardless of the Kremlin's original intentions, subsequent developments, including those beyond Soviet control, might well confront her with new dangers and new opportunities that would induce her to undermine the agreement. Considering the likely instabilities in the zone of her former satellites, we must not underestimate Soviet incentives and Soviet resourcefulness in subverting disengagement with sufficient deception and ambiguity to avoid a massive, clear-cut violation. Indeed, circumstances might arise that would permit the Soviet Union, with some color of legitimacy, to construe the very terms of a guaranty to provide a right of intervention. Less flagrant transgressions—say, of the terms of neutralization or arms limitation and inspection—would be correspondingly more difficult to counteract, because the remedy would probably always seem more drastic than the violation.

However, just as important as what the United States and her allies actually might or might not do to redress a violation is what the neutral powers in the zone of withdrawal would believe they might or might not do, in the absence of an actual violation. For the Kremlin's penchant for blackmail—for the political exploitation of military power—would be a more immediate threat than an overt attempt to recover physical control of the area. Almost instinctively, Soviet leaders would try to alienate the neutral nations from the NATO powers and, through a combination of conciliation and threat, orient their policies toward the East. According to a long revolutionary tradition and experience, these veterans of political warfare would surely seek to convince the neutrals that they were exposed and helpless and that they must turn to Russia for guidance and

protection. By humiliating the Western powers, by demonstrating NATO's inability and unwillingness to protect the neutral states, and by offering these states favored economic and political treatment in return for obedience, the Kremlin would hope to gain political control under the shadow of Russian military might. Against this kind of threat no political guaranty of the independence of a group of neutral nations would be nearly so convincing as NATO's present guaranty to her allies. If Russia's nuclear might and NATO's' weakness in conventional resistance now raise doubts about the efficacy of the present guaranty, how much confidence could any nation place in the proposed guaranty of disengagement? The question is not rhetorical. It implies only that comprehensive disengagement would entail great risks for the West, not that these risks are under no circumstances worth taking or that there are not comparable risks in the status quo.

6. THE RUSSIAN ATTITUDE

One can argue that the West should formulate reasonable proposals of comprehensive disengagement, providing that West Germany is willing to be a partner to them, if only because Moscow itself may some day hold out the prospect of disengagement and German reunification on terms that a West German government would find difficult to refuse. One can argue that the West must demonstrate with its own plan for reunification and disengagement that Russian design, not Western intransigence, blocks German unification in freedom. Yet a sober appraisal of the history of disengagement raises serious doubts about Moscow's interest in any political and military accommodation in the center of Europe that would be compatible with Western interests.

None of the various proposals for disengagement that the Soviet Union put forward in the period from 1947 to 1961 met the minimum conditions of security, stability, and self-determination that the West could safely accept. The closest that Moscow came to indorsing an acceptable comprehensive disengagement plan was in its note of March 10, 1952, which Molotov reaffirmed in about the same form at the four-power

Berlin conference in February, 1954. This note called for four-power talks on a German peace treaty based on a unified and neutralized Germany, the withdrawal of foreign troops within a year, and a limitation on German armed forces (in contrast to earlier Soviet demands for complete demilitarization), and it dropped the standard Soviet demand for the dismantling of all American overseas bases. However, the note said nothing about free and secret all-German elections, which the West considered an indispensable preliminary to unification,* and it included an ominous insistence on "democratic rights" for all Germans. And, of course, it would have left Soviet troops on the eastern border of Germany.

In Western eyes, another basic defect of the note, which in itself presented a significant concession compared to previous Soviet proposals and which might possibly have been improved upon through negotiation, was its obvious timing to coincide with a critical moment in Western negotiations on the European Defense Community. A fruitless attempt to pin Moscow down to a procedure of all-German elections that would not be rigged in favor of the Communists confirmed the Western decision to reject this diplomatic overture as an attempt to forestall E.D.C. Subsequent Soviet proposals of a similar nature were rejected for similar reasons.

---

* Molotov's 1954 version of this plan followed earlier Soviet unification proposals in providing for electoral procedures calculated to assure Communist domination. It called for intrusting responsibility for the conduct of "free all-German elections" to a provisional all-German government, which would be formed from the parliaments of the two Germanys after the withdrawal of occupation forces. Secretary Dulles, at a press conference on January 13, 1959, led some to think that the United States might be abandoning its demand for free elections and moving closer to the Soviet position when he remarked that free elections were not "the only method by which reunification could be accomplished." However, he seems to have intended only to suggest a more flexible approach to the timing of free elections, which the West had until then always put at the beginning of the whole reunification process. At the Geneva conference of May, 1959, Dulles' successor, Christian Herter, put forward a phased plan for reunification, according to which a mixed German committee (twenty-five from West Germany and ten from East Germany) would be responsible for drafting an electoral law for "general, free, and secret elections," to be submitted for approval to an all-German plebiscite. However, the plan called for the reunification of Berlin in the first phase, with Berlin to be governed by a council chosen by free elections under UN supervision (Hinterhoff, *op. cit.*, Appendix 9).

After the ratification of the Paris Agreements in 1955, when the Federal Republic finally joined NATO, the Soviet Union expressed little or no interest in comprehensive disengagement and took the position that unification must be left to negotiations between the two German governments and must take the form of a neutralized confederation in which the "social achievements" of East Germany would be preserved—a formula clearly calculated to lead Germany down the path of previous coalition governments in China, Poland, Rumania, and Hungary.* Separated from this position were several vague and sweeping proposals calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and bases from Europe and the dissolution of military blocs. In 1958 Moscow indorsed the Rapacki Plan but did not associate it with the unification of Germany and was not even clear about whether the Red Army would withdraw from East Germany. Thus, although both East and West officially supported the reunification of Germany, the conditions upon which they would accept reunification were totally irreconcilable, and both sides seemed content to leave the situation at that. The Soviet government—with, seemingly, the French and British

* In a speech in Leipzig on March 7, 1959, Khrushchev made it clear that the only unified Germany he wanted was a Communist Germany and that he considered Western recognition of the East German regime as a step in that direction: "We stand for the unity of Germany and the German people want unity. But can the peoples of the world exist if the two German states are not unified? They can, and they can exist quite well. Can the Germans live without reunification? They can, and they can even live quite well. Why, therefore, do we attach such importance to the German problem? Because it is a key link in the problem of war and peace and one of the main sources of international friction and conflict. . . . This is why we are pressing and will continue to press persistently for a normalization of the situation in Germany. . . . But how and on what principles can the reunification of Germany take place? We do not favor reunification in just any form . . . the problem of reunification should be approached primarily from class positions. . . . Why not reunify Germany by abolishing capitalism in West Germany and establishing a working class regime there? This is unrealistic at the present time. But it is even more unrealistic to nurture illusions regarding the liquidation of socialist achievements in the G.D.R. . . . I repeat we are for German unity and the German people will be reunited. It is merely a question of time. . . . Therefore, do not be in a hurry. . . . If our grandchildren are to have grateful memories of us, we must fight unremittingly for the conclusion of a German peace treaty, which will be an important step in the reunification of Germany. What must be done now? A peace treaty must be signed with the two German states in actual existence" (*Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XI, No. 13, 3–5).

governments in tacit agreement—had decided as a matter of national policy to keep Germany divided.

On November 27, 1958, in notes to the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic, Moscow turned to a campaign for disengagement from West Berlin alone, calling for the end of the "unlawful occupation of West Berlin" and the establishment of a "demilitarized Free City" there under a rather ambiguous threat to alter the existing procedure for military traffic between West Berlin and West Germany and to bestow full sovereignty upon the East German government in the city if the Western powers did not display sufficient interest in this proposal within six months.[21] Eighteen months of active political warfare waged with this lever won Khrushchev a trip to the United States, President Eisenhower's admission that the situation in Berlin was "abnormal," and a summit conference in Paris but no tangible Western concessions on the Soviet plan to isolate disengagement in Berlin from the problem of disengagement and reunification in Germany. Khrushchev's spectacular torpedoing of the summit conference in May, 1960, ended that particular phase of diplomatic harassment, but with every indication that a new phase would begin with a new President. It did—in August, 1961.

Of course, this unpromising history of disengagement proposals and counterproposals does not prove that the Soviet Union and the Western powers could not have reached at some point—perhaps in 1952 or after the East Berlin riots in 1953 and before the ratification of the Paris Agreements in 1955—a mutually acceptable agreement if the West had really been more anxious to sit down and bargain about the terms; nor does it exclude the possibility in the future. However, the skeptical appraisal of this possibility that emerges from the record of diplomatic parrying is confirmed by the general nature of Russian foreign policy in this period of "peaceful coexistence," as revealed in pronouncements and practice.

Disengagement proposals, like disarmament proposals, presuppose that the Soviet Union has the same interest in reducing international tensions and stabilizing the political and mili-

tary environment as the non-Communist powers. But there is no indication that the Soviet leaders are frightened of international tensions. Rather, all the evidence indicates that they regard tensions as an instrument of policy to be manipulated so as to overthrow the status quo and advance the predestined triumph of the Communist system. In fact, they regard the status quo itself as the progressive revolution in social and economic relations that is leading to the new world order and resistance to this revolution as a reactionary attempt to change the status quo.[22]

In Khrushchev's view, the proximity of Eastern and Western forces in the center of Europe constituted no danger.[23] The danger to Soviet interests lay in the weakness of East Germany and in the strength of West Germany and the symbolic capital of a reunified Germany, West Berlin. The Soviet forces in East Germany were an essential means of preserving the "achievements of socialism," keeping West Berlin a hostage, and inducing the Western powers to recognize Communist control of East Germany and the other satellites as permanent. International tension was inherent in the opposition of the "capitalist-imperialist warmongers" to these purposes. This tension had to be raised or lowered as the tactical needs of the conflict required.

In the eyes of the Western proponents of disengagement, the terrible possibilities of mutual destruction that lay in such conflicts and tensions made a peaceful accommodation of interests compelling, but in Soviet eyes they made only Western concessions to Communist interests compelling. From Khrushchev's standpoint the spectacular growth of Soviet nuclear striking power could not help but convince the NATO powers that the tensions resulting from their resistance to the progressive alteration of the status quo carried intolerable risks of precipitating a thermonuclear war, which they could avoid only by timely concessions to Soviet demands. For he claimed, and appeared to believe, that Soviet military achievements had effected a fundamental shift in the world balance of power, which had

neutralized America's protective nuclear umbrella and rendered her forward positions, as in Berlin, untenable.

But even if Khrushchev had been less confident of the political implications of Soviet nuclear power, he would have had good reasons for preferring the existing political impasse in Europe to any of the schemes for disengagement proposed in the West. The best reason was Russia's inability to withdraw from an area which provided a valuable forward position and a vital buffer zone without a solid guaranty that her satellites would not abandon the "achievements of socialism" and align themselves with the enemy. Developments since the death of Stalin demonstrated that no such guaranty was possible. If Khrushchev had entertained any doubts on the subject, the Berlin riots of 1953 and the Hungarian revolution of 1956 must have convinced him that military occupation by the Red Army was the only safe assurance of friendly Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

After all, Russia has won no satellite except by military conquest or, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, by subversion under the shadow of conquest; and she has lost the heretical Yugoslavia because she did not occupy it. She has tolerated free, neutral neighbors, like Finland and Austria, but has never withdrawn her forces from an area upon which she had imposed a Communist regime. To do so would be to risk the reversal of the irreversible historical process that prescribes the decay of the capitalist system and the triumph of the socialist system. That would be an intolerable blow to Soviet prestige and to the whole ideological foundation of Soviet authority at home and Soviet influence abroad. Why should any Soviet leader take that risk just when Russia's rising economic, military, and scientific strength and the intensification of the indigenous revolution in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa appeared to promise the extension of Soviet influence and control? What would be the overriding incentives for disengagement?

Fear of unrest in the satellite area might be one of them. For Khrushchev confronted a dilemma in trying to relax the bonds of control over the satellites in order to base Russia's

empire on a larger measure of consent than was necessary in Stalin's time, while trying to maintain obedience against the very stirrings of nationalism and freedom that this relaxation encouraged. Yet the more dangerous this predicament might become, the less likely Khrushchev would be to try to resolve it by withdrawing under conspicuous pressure. In any case, the crushing of the Hungarian revolution and the patent unwillingness of the West to intervene seemed to be a decisive reason for restive satellites to seek improvement of their status according to the Polish formula, under Soviet control, rather than the Hungarian formula, against Soviet control. If the Russians ever decided to rid themselves of the burdens of empire in Eastern Europe, it would be because developments in the satellite states themselves gave them assurance of friendly, neutral regimes, which they had no reason to expect in 1961.

Another overriding incentive the Kremlin might have for assuming the risks of disengagement would be the neutralization and denuclearization of Germany. Between Germany's political ties and her nuclear armament, the Russians probably regarded the former as the more fundamental liability, for their overriding objective was to prevent the capitalist adversaries from combining with the United States and with each other, and they considered that Germany's membership in NATO made her an extension of American military power in any case.[24] Yet they would almost certainly prefer a divided Germany with the East firmly under Soviet control to a united Germany whose political orientation was uncertain. For Germany was inherently too powerful and her history too menacing for Russians to trust her as they did Austria or Finland. Consequently, Russia would be extremely unlikely to withdraw her forces unless a Communist or at least a Soviet-oriented regime were assured. Yet there could be no such assurance without the presence of Soviet forces. Under the circumstances, the Russians seemed content to live with the existing division of Europe and to count on time to work in their favor, as they utilized the vulnerable position of Berlin, the threat of German nuclear armament, and the presence of Soviet forces in the

center of Europe, backed by Soviet nuclear might, to divide the Western coalition and undermine its will to support an outpost that it could defend only at grave risk of precipitating a nuclear holocaust.

Only if the Soviet Union, pressed by rising unrest in the satellites and thwarted in her ambitions to consolidate Germany under Communist rule, felt compelled to retrench and stabilize her western front in order to contain a threat from Communist China—a contingency that seemed quite remote in 1961—would she be likely to regard the reunification of Germany under comprehensive disengagement as a profitable bargain. But, short of an improbable diplomatic revolution resulting from some such major reversal in Russia's power position, any mutually acceptable disengagement in the center of Europe is virtually precluded.

Yet even if a diplomatic revolution should lead to comprehensive disengagement, this would not eliminate the Communist threat to Europe or the need for NATO to contain it, as long as the Soviet government continued to be moved by a compulsive image of inevitable Western hostility and by a dynamic drive to destroy the centers of Western power. After all, the West's wartime alliance with the Soviet Union did not eliminate that threat. Disengagement would alter—and, in some ways, aggravate—the conditions of tension and conflict in the center of Europe; it would not terminate the cold war. Therefore, insofar as any kind of disengagement is desirable or feasible, it should be viewed as a complement, not as an alternative, to the strategic requirements of allied security and cohesion. In effect, that means that the external and internal strength of NATO is the prerequisite of acceptable disengagement in a general European settlement, just as it is the prerequisite of acceptable engagement in a divided Europe.

11
Conclusion

1. THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL FUNCTIONS OF A TRANSATLANTIC ENTANGLEMENT

The evolution of NATO from a simple guaranty pact to a semi-integrated military organization has been marked by the progressive entanglement of the United States in the military and political policies of Western Europe and by the progressive entanglement of the major European allies in each other's policies. Yet the economic resurgence of Europe and the active reassertion of separate European national purposes, combined with the growth of Soviet nuclear power, the post-Stalinist phase of political warfare, and the prospect of nuclear diffusion, have exerted a centrifugal force within the alliance, while vastly complicating the requirements of collective security. At the root of NATO's resulting troubles is a complex of related strategic issues—all of them revolving around the central issue of the deployment, use, and control of nuclear weapons—which severely taxes the capacity of this peacetime democratic coalition to meet the requirements of allied cohesion with military plans and forces that are adequate for allied security.

For the United States and her allies these issues raise two basic questions, which are crucial to the future of NATO: (*a*) Do their vital interests in the next decade or so require the continued military entanglement of the United States with Europe, or will they be better served by a looser partnership

resembling the original conception of a guaranty pact but extended to a more nearly self-sufficient Europe? (*b*) Do their vital interests require the continued development of military integration and interdependence (whether within a European or transatlantic framework), or will they be better served by a looser form of co-operation among nations more reliant upon their independent military policies? This study leads to the conclusion that the best interests of the United States and her allies in the 1960's and into the 1970's—which, in these matters, is the "foreseeable future"—lie in the close entanglement of the United States with Europe and the further development of military integration within the alliance. But within this transatlantic entanglement the European allies must assume a larger share of NATO's collective responsibilities (including the control of nuclear weapons) and material burdens (especially those that support a capacity for non-nuclear resistance) while they continue to increase their political and economic solidarity as a third, but interdependent, force in the world balance of power.

The military and political consequences of the growth of Soviet nuclear power, the need for central but shared control of nuclear weaponry, and the enlarged requirements of a mobile dual-capability ground force have made close military collaboration within a transatlantic framework more important than ever before to all the NATO allies. On the one hand, such collaboration is physically and economically essential in order to meet the expanded and complex requirements of the over-all stability of the military balance. On the other hand, it is politically and psychologically essential, in the face of new centrifugal forces, in order to support allied interests in the continuing political warfare, which is based upon the peaceful exploitation of military power within the framework of mutual deterrence.

The fundamental material fact underlying these two judgments is that no single NATO country can acquire, independently of its allies, and no group of allies can acquire, independently of the United States, an adequate military basis for protecting its vital interests. The fundamental non-material

fact underlying the need for close transatlantic collaboration is that there exists a sounder political basis for military collaboration and political co-operation within an alliance in which the United States has a leading role than within any purely European grouping.

In assessing the material and non-material bases of allied security and cohesion, one must reckon with the intimate relationship between military and political factors. It is commonly observed that NATO is more than a purely military organization, but it is not so commonly understood how closely its military and non-military functions are related. Most directly, they are related because the military posture of the alliance is an essential basis of political warfare and diplomacy, affecting the appearance and reality of allied solidarity, determining the anticipated form and consequences of the armed conflict that might grow out of political conflict, and thereby playing a central role in the contest of will and nerves that dominates the cold war. Less directly, NATO's military and non-military functions are related because allied military collaboration calls for consultation and co-operation on the political purposes of the common military effort in order to compensate allies for the sacrifice of independent political control that accompanies the subordination of national to collective military requirements. But, more subtly, the two functions are related because military strategy (in the full sense of the word) is a major medium through which the allies exert their political influence, not only with respect to the adversary but also with respect to each other.

Consider the last point. Obviously, the members of NATO have special as well as common political interests. Yet, under contemporary military and political conditions, they do not have recourse to genuine military independence or to shifts to other alliances as means of pursuing these interests. Instead, a great deal of their effort to promote and safeguard their interests must be transmitted through their influence on the alliance. This influence is, in large measure, a function of their strategic role, which is, in turn, a product of the strategy of the alliance

and the terms of allied collaboration. Therefore, by granting or withholding their commitments and contributions in order to get the most favorable strategy and terms of collaboration, the allies try to secure an advantageous strategic role and, through that role, effective political influence.

Thus Britain's independent nuclear program was partly a means of strengthening her special relationship with the United States. West Germany's ardent support of military integration has served as a means of enabling her to become a major power on the Continent without arousing domestic or allied apprehensions, and Germany's allies have regarded her contribution to the alliance as a means of restraining her, not just as a means of enhancing their military security. Avowedly, France's withholding of naval and air units from integration, her insistence on having custody of nuclear warheads on her soil, and her independent nuclear program have been directed toward improving her terms of military and political collaboration and her general status in the alliance. The United States has maintained American troops on the Continent as a means of eliciting allied collaboration, a means more important for its political and psychological than for its military effect. The latent threat of American withdrawal to a peripheral strategy, which is the counterpart of her Continental troops, has exerted a powerful influence on her allies from the beginning. America's policy concerning the control of nuclear weapons and the related problems of nuclear strategy are as important to interallied politics as to collective security.

Of course, all the relationships between the military and political functions of NATO are suffused with another dimension of political influence: the influence of domestic politics. For democratic powers must, in some measure, defer to domestic interests and opinions in pursuing national interests. And the less overt and urgent the threat to allied security, the greater this deference tends to be. A conspicuous example has been the declaratory and operational strategy for the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

These political functions and effects of military strategy em-

phasize the importance of a transatlantic framework of military collaboration. For America's active and leading role in shaping military strategy and the terms of collaboration has become vital in accommodating the divergent as well as convergent political interests among the European allies. NATO is not only the essential instrument of American entanglement; through that entanglement it is also the essential instrument of European solidarity.

The blending of German, French, and British interests has become so entangled with the terms of military collaboration that to cut or loosen the military ties would be as disruptive to interallied relations as to collective security. Yet, left to themselves, these countries would find such blending far more difficult than within a transatlantic alliance. For American military commitments and contributions exert a preponderant influence upon the terms of allied military collaboration, of which they are an integral part. And American political influence, acting through the leverage of these commitments and contributions, serves as the kind of balance wheel in interallied relations that no other ally could provide.

Therefore, any basic move toward military independence and away from interdependence, particularly the multiplication of independent allied nuclear capabilities or the creation of a European nuclear deterrent group, would tend not only to erode America's commitment to the defense of Europe but also to intensify the divisive and neutralist forces within Western Europe itself. In determining the control of nuclear weapons, as in determining other aspects of NATO's military posture, only the United States has the resources and the political position to elicit the terms of allied military collaboration that will be compatible with both the security and cohesion of the European members. Hence, the advancement of collaboration in NATO and the growth of European solidarity—whether through closer economic co-operation, as in an enlarged Common Market including Britain, or through political and military co-operation—should be considered complementary, not conflicting, processes.

Yet, while the American entanglement is essential to European as well as to American interests, it is equally important that the European members assume, within this transatlantic framework, a larger measure of strategic responsibility, commensurate with the increase of their relative power during NATO's first decade. For the United States will be physically unable and politically unwilling to sustain the military containment of the Soviet Union by itself. If the allies are not given commensurate responsibility, they will not act responsibly; and if they do not act responsibly, the United States will not long discharge the burdens of NATO's strategic tasks for them.

These strategic tasks require hard and unpopular decisions by the allied governments. No member of the alliance is likely to make those decisions unless the other members give tangible evidence of doing the same. But when all members share the burden equitably, governments can appeal for popular support in the name of allied collaboration. Moreover, when there is an equitable division of responsibility, allied governments are more likely to approach the hard decisions squarely on their merits and to educate their citizenry to do the same. Otherwise, they are inclined to play the role of a passive critic of those who seem to control their fate or else to seek control over their own fate by pursuing an illusory course of military independence.

Therefore, a continuation of the dominance of American strategic responsibility in the alliance would be unhealthy. The present dominance is a remnant of a lopsided distribution of allied power that ended with Europe's economic recovery. It becomes more clearly obsolete with every evidence of Western Europe's remarkable economic growth and integration and with every manifestation of the will and capacity of the European allies to assume political initiatives, independently and in concert. Hitherto, the preponderance of American financial, industrial, and military power has served as a substitute for joint planning and multilateral decision-making. Now this preponderance must be altered in favor of a larger and more system-

atic participation of America's allies in concerting military and political policies.

One striking irony of the cold war is that now the formerly isolationist United States, by virtue of her preponderant power, feels more directly involved in the practical tasks of the power conflict than her front-line allies, who are tempted to view this conflict with something of the disdain, aloofness, and escapism with which Americans once viewed the Old World. Yet the security of the European allies is far more directly and immediately involved in the toils of NATO than the security of the United States was ever involved in the toils of European politics during the heyday of American isolation. What nourishes the illusion of European detachment, as much as any other single factor, is the convenient belief that nuclear deterrence will automatically preserve the military balance and render the collective management of military power unnecessary—a belief for which the United States own strategy is largely responsible. As a result, the alliance suffers from an imbalance of burdens and responsibilities, which impedes a rational response to the objective needs of security and the subjective needs of cohesion.

As James Reston has observed, "The alliance is out of balance mainly because Europe is not doing what it could do, and it is not doing what it could do, partly because it has abdicated and partly because the United States has been willing to carry the load long after Europe was able to do much more in self-defense."[1] It follows that the initiative for a more equitable division of responsibility must come from the United States. Sharing control of the deployment, strategy, and the decision to use nuclear weapons would be a dramatic indication that the United States had assumed that initiative. However, the sharing of military responsibilities cannot be separated from the nature of the whole strategy for which the allies are responsible. Strategically, what is needed, in the first instance, is a less dramatic but more urgent collective effort to relieve defense and diplomacy from the thraldom of inordinate nuclear dependence.

2. THE STRATEGIC BASIS OF ALLIED COLLABORATION

This study stresses the view that allied collaboration can flourish and perform its vital military and political functions only if it proceeds from a continual adjustment of military strategy to meet the changing requirements of allied security and cohesion. At the end of the Eisenhower administration such an adjustment was long overdue. For NATO was becoming more dependent on nuclear weapons, whose warheads were still under independent American (and, to some extent, British) control, while the credibility of a nuclear response and the willingness of allies to remain dependent on American control of a nuclear response was steadily diminishing. At the same time, allied strategy had become permeated with contradictions and ambiguities that prevented the formulation of a coherent military concept, without which there could be no incentive for a basic adjustment.

The history of NATO's strategy (by which I mean the total interaction of allied strategies) demonstrates that perfect strategic logic is precluded by the process of consensus-building among the allies, a process which, quite properly, makes strategy responsive to the non-strategic demands of domestic and foreign pressures. Up to a point, one can regard the resulting strategic contradictions and ambiguities as a necessary concession to the political basis of collective security. However, in the 1950's NATO's strategy exceeded that point; for it no longer provided the minimum conditions of allied security, and it threatened to destroy the incentives for effective collaboration.

As NATO entered its second decade, there was a widespread recognition in all allied countries that the alliance was undergoing some sort of "crisis of confidence" because it had failed to adjust to radically altered conditions. However, in official quarters there was a widespread reluctance to attribute this crisis to serious military-strategic deficiencies or, in any case, to take any measures to remedy such deficiencies. Instead, there was a strong disposition to intrust all security needs to

the balance of terror, to turn away from military problems (except for the acquisition or maintenance of an independent nuclear force) and seek salvation in increased political consultation and the further integration of NATO's institutions.

Associated with this disposition, there was a common diagnosis of NATO's troubles which held that its members had been preoccupied with military objectives at the expense of political considerations. But this diagnosis, although substantiated in some instances, missed a more important point: that some kinds of political considerations have exerted too *much* influence, at the expense of military requirements. The diagnosis arose, in part, from a too literal interpretation of superficially military decisions, which, in fact, were made as much on the basis of domestic or interallied political considerations as on the basis of strategic logic. Ostensibly on military grounds, the allies had, in reality, too often sacrificed strategic logic for the sake of domestic and foreign consensus. Hence, in large measure, NATO's military deficiencies and strategic anomalies were the unco-ordinated by-product of an agglomeration of domestic and foreign political pressures, undisciplined by coherent strategic guidance.

In both the cause and cure of NATO's strategic deficiencies, the major role had to be assigned to the United States, who, by virtue of her vast economic and material resources, continued to exert, whether by action or inaction, the preponderant influence on allied military policies. The contradictions between strategic plans, strategic declarations, and actual capabilities for deterring and resisting aggression in Europe; the confusion about the weapons, the targets, and the methods of using nuclear weapons; the indecision and drift concerning the command and control of nuclear weapons; the conflict between military strategy and arms control policy; the ambiguities about the function of local resistance and tactical nuclear weapons in NATO's shield—these deficiencies were, in large measure, a reflection of the contradictions, ambiguities, confusion, and indecision in America's own military strategy. In the absence of an integrated and comprehensive American strategy for stabi-

lizing the whole military environment and an adequate appreciation of the vital role of military power as a political and psychological instrument of foreign policy, the Eisenhower administration was unable to provide the kind of strategic leadership that could orchestrate into some coherent composition the conflicting strategic themes and motifs within the alliance or even within its own government.

3. THE KENNEDY REVISION

The Kennedy administration, in its first eight months, made a start in the right direction toward a comprehensive revision of America's military strategy, a revision which, if carried out in actual capabilities, was bound to have a marked impact on the military posture of the alliance as a whole. Necessarily, the revision began at home. Exactly what it would mean for NATO would become apparent only when America's long-term military program had gained sufficient scope and momentum to permit a range of new decisions and initiatives directly concerning allied strategy and capabilities.

The best-advertised feature of President Kennedy's revision of American strategy was the program to build up non-nuclear limited-war forces, with special attention to guerrilla and "sub-limited-war" forces for use outside of Europe, but also with explicit recognition of NATO's needs. The explicit purpose was to raise the threshold of a limited conventional conflict that the United States and her allies could deter or successfully counter without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. As the President said in his message on the Berlin crisis, in appealing for an increased defense effort, "We intend to have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action."[2] To this end, he requested and received additional appropriations for increasing the Army and Marine Corps combat-ready divisions, the nation's airlift capacity for ground forces, and the development and procurement of advanced conventional weapons. This represented only a minimal rearmament program, but it was, at least, a well-considered step away from the United States overdependence upon nuclear weapons to deter and fight limited wars.

The other aspects of American strategy were not so clearly or completely delineated, but their general nature was foreshadowed at the outset, because it was evident that they would be parts of a comprehensive, integrated strategic concept of achieving stable nuclear deterrence and maximizing the chances of controlling and limiting nuclear warfare if deterrence should fail. In accordance with this concept, the new administration continued but accelerated its predecessor's program to preserve an adequate second-strike force, based primarily on the qualities of concealment and mobility of strategic nuclear weapons. But it also began a real innovation in the strategy and in the command-and-control system of employing nuclear missiles and bombers in order to mitigate the danger that any use of nuclear weapons would lead automatically to an all-out use and in order to provide civilian authorities with new powers of military discretion and discrimination in exercising political control over a nuclear exchange. Consistent with this objective of rationally fighting as well as deterring a nuclear war, the administration also made civil defense an integral part of military strategy, putting it under the Office of the Secretary of Defense and initiating a moderate shelter program designed to reduce civilian damage in the event that nuclear war should occur by irrationality, miscalculation, accident, or escalation.

In the first months of this strategic revision, however, the central matter of the weapons, magnitude, and targets of the strategic striking force and their relationship to the role of a nuclear counterforce capability was not clarified. In its declaratory strategy the administration went further than its predecessor toward ruling out the initial use of strategic nuclear weapons,[3] while it followed its predecessor in publicly formulating the requirements of a strategic striking force entirely in terms of a second-strike force. And, like the Eisenhower administration, the Kennedy administration tried, with partial success, to resist congressional pressure for greater expenditures on the pre-eminent counterforce weapon, the B-70 bomber, while its expenditures on solid-fuel missiles and the bombers already in production did not approach the dimensions that would be

required for a useful first-strike capability. But, perhaps because the United States and her allies would not for some time actually possess the conventional capabilities the administration aimed to create, government spokesmen pointedly held open the possibility—while indicating their intention to avoid the necessity—of initiating the use of tactical nuclear weapons, as a last resort, when a major aggression could not be repulsed with non-nuclear weapons.[4] Unlike the previous administration, however, they did not exclude the possibility that a tactical nuclear war might be limited.

Only in the field of disarmament and arms control was there *no* indication of a comprehensive reformulation of a policy that would be integrally related to the nation's total military posture. Here policy remained piecemeal and improvised, a warmed-over version of the incongruous combination of fresh contrivances and stale formulas devised during the previous five years.

Insofar as the administration dealt directly with NATO strategy, it did so largely as an extension of the revision of American strategy. Thus, it explicitly extended the concept of raising the threshold of non-nuclear resistance to the European area, and it urged the major European allies, with little success, to follow America's example in increasing their monetary and manpower contributions to conventional ground forces. At the same time, it indicated that additional American divisions would be prepared to supplement the shield in Germany. On the other hand, in an effort to guard against overdepreciating the credibility of a tactical nuclear response to conventional aggression in Europe and arousing allied (especially German) suspicion that the United States might withhold her nuclear deterrent in an armed clash involving their survival, it joined with allied governments in warning that NATO forces would not refrain from using nuclear weapons rather than suffer defeat without them.[5]

The problem of making the transition from NATO's existing military posture to one that would reserve tactical nuclear weapons as a second-strike and last-resort capability was eased

by the renewal of active pressure on Berlin in August, 1961, in that it helped the administration to initiate measures of rearmament it had planned to take anyway. On the other hand, the administration sought to moderate and soft-pedal the transition in order not to appear provocative or militaristic, to avoid starting an arms race in conventional forces, and to allay allied apprehensions that the threat of a tactical nuclear response to conventional aggression might be undermined at a critical moment, while they lacked adequate means of non-nuclear resistance. Yet, despite the difficulty of moving away from NATO's nuclear-bound strategy under the pressure of the Berlin crisis, the Kennedy administration made an important advance by putting prime emphasis on a build-up of non-nuclear capabilities. In time, this initiative might yet overcome the legacy of the past by inducing the allies to abandon their convenient reliance on nuclear deterrence and meet the real military necessities.

On the tangled and sensitive issue of the political and military control of nuclear weapons, however, the new administration retreated from the tentative initiative of the Eisenhower administration, foregoing any action on nuclear sharing at least until more progress should be made toward NATO's non-nuclear goals and until it were satisfied that nuclear sharing could be reconciled with effective and safe central command and control and with congressional sensitivities.

Nevertheless, at the meeting of the NATO foreign ministers at Oslo in May, 1961, Secretary of State Rusk adopted part of Secretary Herter's proposal of the previous December in pledging that the United States would assign Polaris submarines to NATO, evidently under American operational control.[6] And a week later President Kennedy told the Canadian parliament that the United States was looking forward to "the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO sea-borne missile force which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired and found feasible by our allies once NATO's non-nuclear goals have been achieved."[7]

4. POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

However important the advancement of NATO's military integration and political co-operation might be, the revision of American and allied strategy was surely the first order of business in the 1960's. *Without* the formulation of an internally consistent over-all NATO strategy and the development of suitable military capabilities to support it, military and political interdependence would provide no solution to NATO's problems of security and cohesion. *With* a well-conceived strategy and supporting capabilities, NATO would not need to carry military and political interdependence to the extremes that were required purely by the demands of military and economic efficiency.

NATO is and will remain, so far as one can foresee, a coalition of sovereign nations for the protection of a limited, though vital, core of identical security interests within a mass of convergent and divergent political interests. The effective collaboration of its members depends upon a degree of military independence and, concomitantly, political independence that transcends the requirements of technical efficiency. After all, the nation-state is still—and, in some respects, more conspicuously than ever—the primary focus of political loyalty in human society, even in the advanced industrial democracies, which have cultivated some remarkable new instruments of transnational co-operation.

Nevertheless, it is true that NATO's essential strategic requirements do demand a degree of sustained military integration and collaboration that is unprecedented in peacetime alliances and even in the history of wartime coalitions; and that this degree of integration and collaboration, in turn, demands an unprecedented degree of political co-operation among the allies. The nature, scope, and instrumentalities of political co-operation, however, are things to be developed pragmatically within a pluralistic framework, as the will and habit of interdependence evolve; they are not to be determined mechanically by some doctrinaire conception of unity.

NATO will not elicit the requisite measure of military collaboration if its strategy fails to serve the primary policy goals of the allies, whose freedom of national action it circumscribes. Consequently, military interdependence, in proportion to the restrictions it places on an ally's capacity to support his foreign policy with independent military force, requires that ally's agreement to the political policy for dealing with the central threat that interdependence is intended to counter. In particular, interdependence requires the concerting of allied policy in dealing with the sources of conflict with Russia in Europe, especially because the Soviet threat is posed most directly in non-military forms. Yet political consultation, like interdependence, is no end in itself; its proper form depends on a balance between the theoretical requirements of efficient collaboration and the actual political requirements of blending allied interdependence with national independence.

Despite a tendency to confer verbal indorsement upon the principle of consultation in sweeping terms, the actual approach of the member governments to consultation has been pragmatic and diversified—and properly so. Where they have perceived common interests and dangers, as in their relations with the Soviet Union in Europe and on matters related to the terms of collaboration in the NATO area, they have extensively and effectively used the institutions of NATO not only for military collaboration but also for the co-ordination of foreign policies, a co-ordination which has extended beyond the development of a basic consensus to the formulation of collective positions.[8] Here, what Lord Ismay, the first secretary general of NATO, called "the NATO method"—that is, unanimity through discussion—has worked remarkably well.[9] It must be further cultivated if the reality and appearance of cohesion are to prevail over the centrifugal forces in the continuing political warfare of the future.

Yet the NATO method, carried to extremes, could paralyze allied diplomacy by reducing every diplomatic response and initiative to the lowest common denominator of consensus established by the most obstructionist power, however slight

his capacity for coping with the consequences might be. Heretofore, the adverse effects of this method have been mitigated by the reality of American political dominance and by the lack of scope for genuine political maneuver and accommodation with the adversary. But the situation has changed. On the one hand, whether the diplomatic stalemate continues or abates, allied dissatisfaction with American political dominance is bound to increase. On the other hand, whatever may be the disadvantages of dealing collectively with the Soviet Union on European issues, the allies cannot afford to deal with her separately. Therefore, if NATO's collective and internal political necessities are to be reconciled, there must be a more active and purposeful political consultation among the allies, and this consultation must permit a greater flexibility in the modalities of reaching and implementing allied diplomatic positions.

This kind of interallied political activity cannot flourish if it is confined and institutionalized solely within the formal organs of NATO. Actually, the total of allied political cooperation has always far exceeded the sum of political consultation within the organization's regular channels. Collective diplomacy has not prevented political co-ordination bilaterally and within special groupings of allies both inside and outside NATO's auspices. Indeed, it would be unfortunate if the sentiment for multilateral diplomacy, of which the smaller allies (following the lead of Secretary General Spaak) have been, naturally, the strongest advocates, should inhibit individual and bilateral diplomacy in deference to a façade of unity and equality. For, even on matters of common concern in the NATO area, there are important degrees and shadings of interest and responsibility among the allies and obvious limits to the utility of seeking a consensus among fifteen nations.

Presumably, it was to allow proper scope for these political degrees and shadings that the meeting of the NATO foreign ministers at Oslo in May, 1961, rejected the idea of adding any permanent consultative organs to the already complicated bureaucratic apparatus and decided, instead, to rely primarily on *ad hoc* committees, in which only the allies with mutual inter-

ests and the most direct commitments with respect to an issue would co-ordinate their policies. On the other hand, if we think of consultation as merely sharing information and explaining and debating policies, the Oslo meeting also indicated a proper and probably inevitable tendency to consult with all allies even on matters outside the NATO area.

The issue of whom to consult, in which way, when, and on what, cannot profitably, at this rudimentary stage of allied integration, be predetermined by fixed institutional arrangements. The allies must, instead, rely primarily upon a few working principles and the informal codification of experience. The greater is the divergence of allied interests and responsibilities on political issues of general concern, the less useful are formal organizational obligations for consultation—especially, consultation leading to decisions. Instead of creating greater unity, such obligations will either create political paralysis or merely aggravate the divisions in the alliance.

Outside the NATO area, where the interests and policies of the allies diverge most seriously, experience demonstrates that there may be no suitable political basis for useful consultation for the purpose of decision-making either inside or outside NATO institutions, except, perhaps, for informal discussions and exchanges of information among the two or three powers with commitments in the area. But this is not the fault of the machinery of consultation, and it cannot be remedied by more machinery. It is the result of the fact that at least three of the major powers in the alliance have important interests in other parts of the world which by no means coincide, even though their pursuit of these interests affects the security and welfare of all the allies.

Clearly, allied foreign policies outside as well as inside the NATO area may impinge upon military interdependence in NATO, and military interdependence in Europe may restrict political independence outside Europe. Therefore, it is true that NATO collaboration would be eased if the allies could accommodate their divergent extra-European policies by political consultation. It is unreasonable, however, to expect allies who

have combined to protect a common interest in one crucial area of the world to posit their collaboration within that area upon political agreement in all parts of the world. That is an impossible condition. It is also unnecessary.

Secretary Dulles stated the applicable principle in 1956 when he observed:

> All NATO members would, I think, agree that NATO should not attempt to represent the totality of their policies. . . . Every NATO country . . . has certain vital national interests that may sometimes require independent judgment. Some of us have grave worldwide responsibilities that cannot be effectively discharged unless there is capability of prompt decision and corresponding action. Our consultations must be designed to assure essential harmony in our viewpoints on fundamentals. But the processes of consultation should never enmesh us in a procedural web so that we fall victim to the ability of despotisms to act suddenly and with all their might.[10]

NATO has surmounted major conflicts of interest and policy in the Middle East (especially during the Suez War), North Africa (with respect to Algeria and Tunisia), and Eastern Asia (during the crises in the Formosa Straits and Indochina).* It will continue to surmount similar conflicts as long as the core of mutual security interests that NATO was created to protect seems more important to the key allies with commitments outside Western Europe (particularly, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) than the divergent extra-European interests that compete for their military support. On the other hand, no measure of allied political consultation can sustain interdependence in NATO if the priorities are reversed, especially in the case of those allies who lack the military power to support both independent and collective commitments.

In this connection, the proposal by President de Gaulle, Viscount Montgomery, and others that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France constitute themselves a political

---

* This is not to say that allied cohesion would not have been benefited by fuller and more candid consultation, if only the exchange of information—especially in the Suez War.

Standing Group in NATO to co-ordinate Western policies throughout the world is unnecessary, unworkable, and perhaps disadvantageous in any case (considering the adverse reaction of extra-European states and of other members of the alliance). In general, all members of the alliance favor consultation; but, in fact, the members of the proposed Standing Group welcome only the *support* of others, not their *advice,* on political problems outside Europe. This situation cannot be altered and might be aggravated by establishing a global triumvirate within the organization. Of course, it is proper and wise that the three allies with the most extensive extra-European commitments should regularly consult each other on global as well as European concerns, but such consultations had better be undertaken informally than institutionalized within the alliance. Actually, in 1960 and 1961, De Gaulle, by virtue of his stature and diplomatic skill, seemed to be achieving the assurance of regular tripartite consultations through conventional diplomatic channels that he had proposed to obtain through NATO.

5. DE GAULLE AND INTERDEPENDENCE

Not only in this respect but in the whole matter of military integration and political co-ordination, President de Gaulle performed the annoying but valuable service of forcing the members of NATO to look again at the fundamental presuppositions of the alliance. He did this by withholding French participation in some aspects of military integration, pursuing an independent nuclear capability, and insisting that France's interdependence with her allies presupposed a larger share in the determination of policy.

These moves were, in part, efforts to restore France's international prestige and national self-esteem. They reflected De Gaulle's particular ambition to gain equality with the Anglo-American entente in the making of strategy and policy and his conviction that NATO integration had been a guise for American dominance.[11] In part, they were also manifestations of his philosophy that national military "co-operation," instead of "co-ordination," is the only relationship compatible with na-

tional (or, at least, French) dignity and morale and military efficiency. They sprang, too, from his deeply ingrained view that military power must serve national policy and that, therefore, military interdependence must be based upon a proportionate degree of political consultation.

However, De Gaulle's assertion of France's role in NATO also reflected his assessment of the capacity of NATO to support French security. On this issue De Gaulle seemed to have decided long before he became President that, since NATO could not live up to the pretense of defending France on the ground without obliterating her, France's security would depend almost wholly upon nuclear deterrence. In his view the growth of Soviet nuclear power meant that France could not afford to rely exclusively upon the American deterrent, which might either fail to deter or else rashly precipitate a thermonuclear war. Moreover, in the light of the changing military balance, the United States, he repeatedly predicted (evidently with no tinge of regret), was bound to pull out of Europe and take her warheads with her. Therefore, France needed her own nuclear capability. If France could reinforce deterrence in Europe with her own nuclear capability, then, in De Gaulle's view, the principal task of containment would fall upon France, the United Kingdom, and the United States in areas outside Europe, where Communist advances by military and, especially, non-military means threatened to encircle and isolate the West. As for the limited function of ground defense in Europe, De Gaulle seemed willing to accept the leading role of West German forces on the Continent, which he would reconcile with French power and interests by means of close Franco-German collaboration rather than by the earlier French formula of integration. Therefore, behind De Gaulle's challenge to allied interdependence there lay his reasoned appraisal of strategic as well as political realities.

Considering the critical interest of all the allies in the success of De Gaulle's bold effort to restore France's stability and self-esteem, it seemed expedient and just, at the beginning of NATO's second decade, to give France an equal voice with

Britain in the inner councils of the alliance.* De Gaulle's objectives of political equity for France and mitigation of America's political dominance were compatible with the changes in the modes of political co-operation and the configurations of political influence that were required, in any case, by the general shifts of power inside and outside the alliance. Political equity, however, is a nebulous and subjective thing, which France cannot obtain by mere formal equality; and there may be no concrete concessions in this realm that would induce De Gaulle to alter France's terms of collaboration. Yet, contrary to a general impression, De Gaulle's views on military integration were not inflexible or doctrinaire, as was demonstrated by his acceptance of SHAPE's command-and-control arrangements over French contingents in NATO's shield, France's participation in NATO's air defense system, and her agreement to place German supply and training bases on French soil. With the possible exception of his insistence upon an independent French nuclear force, these views could be reconciled with the imperatives of NATO's security and cohesion, even if not with the aspirations of the most ardent proponents of integration.

However, this reconciliation would depend, not only upon internal political revisions in the alliance, but, equally important, upon a revision of allied strategy to relieve NATO of its paralyzing overdependence on the panacea of nuclear deterrence, a revision which would provide a rational justification for interdependence and assure the firm commitment of the United States to the defense of Europe. Given such a revision, the sharing of nuclear control might be turned toward the consolidation and away from the disintegration of the alliance by offering France, as an alternative to the pursuit of an independent nuclear capability, a share in the control of a NATO

* Inevitably, many aspects of Britain's special relationship would survive any procedural equality of consultation with France on allied strategy and diplomacy. But Britain would have to recognize that, in the long run, she can enjoy no relationship with the United States that impedes the solidarity of NATO, which is America's prior interest; and that her military and political future, like her economic welfare, lies in a closer relationship with the Continental allies.

deterrent that would be compatible with her desire for equal military and political partnership with the United States and Britain.[12] At least one cannot exclude the possibility that France, even under De Gaulle, might prefer to participate in a multilateral system of nuclear control rather than pursue an independent nuclear capability outside the system. Within the framework of a truly flexible military strategy and an integrated NATO nuclear force, the influence of France in the alliance might then be clearly related to her contribution to the needs of collective security rather than to her independent nuclear strength.

But whether or not the joint control of nuclear weapons should prove feasible as an alternative to independent nuclear capabilities, the most important contribution to NATO's security and cohesion would be a strategy that would logically relate the security of all the allies to the compelling advantages of a collective effort instead of one that put a premium upon independent nuclear enterprise. With this kind of strategy the needs of military integration and political co-ordination might readily be met by a degree of interdependence somewhere between De Gaulle's national co-operation and Spaak's supranationalism. Certainly, the alliance could afford to sacrifice something of the efficient and economical use of total resources for the sake of enlisting the collaboration of its members in a strategy more compatible with their security. What it could not afford for long was a military posture so dependent upon nuclear weapons that the members who could acquire them would stake their security primarily upon an independent nuclear effort, while those who could not would seek refuge in political dissociation.

6. NATO IN PERSPECTIVE

In the latter half of 1961, Moscow more openly concentrated its politico-military pressure once again directly against one of the two world centers of non-Communist power, Western Europe, where the cold war had begun. In doing so, it put

NATO back into its proper perspective as the pre-eminent instrument of American security and policy.

This perspective had been somewhat blurred by the apparent achievement of a stalemate in Europe, following the termination of the Berlin blockade, and by the active extension of the cold war into areas outside Europe. It had been partially distorted by a general confidence in the automatic stability of the over-all military balance and by widespread expectations in the United States that the resolutions and operations of the UN, competition for the moral and intellectual allegiance of the new, non-aligned nations, and programs for the economic development of underdeveloped societies would be the dominant instruments of containment in the post-Stalinist phase of the cold war. The turn of events in 1961 did not diminish the importance of the portentous political and social upheavals in the colonial and recently colonial areas. Rather, it emphasized the central significance of the temporarily muted competition of interests and aims that impinged directly upon the area of the advanced industrial democracies.

This change of emphasis in the cold war, in turn, illuminated the crucial, subtle, and pervasive role of military power in the cold war. It demonstrated that, although the balance of terror might have made unlimited war obsolete as a useful instrument of policy, the combination of that balance and the deep-seated political conflict of the cold war had actually enhanced the importance of the *capacity* to wage war, while suffusing it more profoundly with political implications. At the same time, the intensification of the cold war in Europe reinforced the absolute necessity of being able to impose political controls and material limits upon every overt use of armed force if the capacity to wage war should fail to prevent war.

Considering NATO's existing capabilities, together with the irremediable facts of geography, the West operated at a perilous disadvantage in withstanding the calculated piecemeal incursions of the Soviet Union in Berlin. But if this immediate threat could be surmounted with honor and with the alliance intact, the allies might yet profit from the experience by draw-

ing together to buttress the Continent's auspicious economic growth and integration with an integrated military structure of commensurate strength. In the long run, NATO might then make an indispensable contribution to one of the great tasks of modern statecraft: to expand and stabilize an area of mutual restraint upon the use of military power within a hazardous field of antagonistic interests and aims—to achieve essential forms of equilibrium within unavoidable configurations of conflict. Admittedly, in itself the fulfilment of this task would be only a holding action, intended to go as far as possible in civilizing and pacifying the continuing international conflict. But if the NATO nations could achieve that much—if they could develop a military posture that would reliably deter at least the extremities of violence without provoking it and one that could defend free peoples without obliterating them—they might also induce the Russians, and permit themselves, to turn seriously to the task of alleviating the *political* sources of tension and violence, as in the center of Europe. If they could make the military holding action safe enough and reliable enough to remove the constant shadow of catastrophic violence, they might also develop among themselves, as a concomitant of this achievement, new modes of political association, which would show the world that independent nations who concert their arms against the threat of aggression can transcend the limitations of independence by cultivating a broader entanglement for the purposes of protracted peace.

Notes

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1. The text of this report appears in the *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* (hereafter cited as *Bulletin*), XXXVI (January 7, 1957), 18-27.

2. *Ibid.*, XXIV (April 30, 1956), 710. Nevertheless, Dulles was careful to qualify the principle of political consultation so as to reserve to the United States the power of independent judgment and action on vital interests requiring prompt decision—especially those interests outside the NATO area that were covered by other political obligations. See the same address, pp. 709–10, and Dulles' news conference on April 24, 1956 (*New York Times*, April 25, 1956, p. 10). On December 12, 1956, Dulles specifically excluded the defense of Taiwan from prior consultation with NATO allies (*ibid.*, December 13, 1956, p. 1). He pledged even more stringent qualifications upon NATO's role in economic co-operation, taking the view that such co-operation was adequately and more properly dealt with through existing organizations created for the purpose. See, for example, his congressional testimony in May, 1956 (House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Mutual Security Appropriations for 1957*, 84 Cong., 2 sess., p. 15). For three analyses of the opportunities and limitations of political consultation in NATO, see Gardner Patterson and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., *NATO: A Critical Appraisal* (Princeton: Princeton University Conference on NATO, 1957); Ruth C. Lawson, "Concerting Policies in the North Atlantic Community," *International Organization*, XII (Spring, 1958), 163–79; and Carol E. Baumann, *Political Co-operation in NATO* (Madison: National Security Studies Group, University of Wisconsin, June, 1960).

3. For a brilliant analysis of the political role of economic aid in the cold war, see George Liska, *The New Statecraft* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

4. On the most fundamental level of analysis, the outstanding contributions to the systematization of subjective strategic logic are Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), and Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). The single most extensive application of strategic logic to the determination of military responses and capabilities is Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

5. Karl von Clausewitz, *On War,* trans. O. J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: Random House, 1943), p 580.

6. George F. Kennan, *Russia, the Atom and the West* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 93.

7. The novel feature of contemporary military planning is not only the dominant stress upon deterring a potential aggressor from undertaking a variety of military actions, as opposed to defeating him at an acceptable cost if deterrence should fail, but, even more, the stress upon deterring the aggressor by disposing a capacity to inflict drastic and unacceptable costs through reprisals delivered directly upon his homeland, as opposed to relying upon a capacity to deny him his objective by resisting his military effort in the area of battle. The dependence of nations upon deterrence by reprisals means that military plans must largely be based on speculation about what costs, under various circumstances, a potential aggressor will consider disproportionate to the value of his intended objective and his anticipation of achieving it, in the light of the credibility of one's reprisals—a credibility which, in turn, depends upon the aggressor's speculation about one's own balance between expected cost and benefit, in the light of one's anticipation of the probability of aggression and counter-reprisals. Such speculations become especially imponderable when deterrence depends upon such drastic reprisals as to lead to mutual destruction that would be as unacceptable to the deterrer as to the aggressor. For an intensive analysis of the peculiar problems of deterrence by reprisals and by denial in the nuclear age, see Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence by Denial and Punishment* (Princeton: "Princeton University Center of International Studies Research Monographs," No. 1, January 2, 1959), and *op. cit*, especially chaps. i and vi.

8 The mutual obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty are defined primarily in Article 5, which states that the "Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force." The British wanted the Treaty to commit the signatories to take military and other action, in accordance with the terms of the Brussels Treaty. But the United States, mindful of constitutional obstacles and senatorial opposition to such a tight commitment, insisted on the less binding terms (*New York Times,* December 1, 1948, p. 13; *The Times* [London], February 11, 1949, p. 4).

9. The regional aspect of the alliance was one of several aspects to which the proponents of the North Atlantic Treaty pointed in order to show that it was different from traditional military alliances, which were associated with an obsolete international system that the United Nations, under American leadership, had supplanted. So great was the interest in this argument that the State Department submitted a memorandum to substantiate it (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, North Atlantic Treaty,* 81 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 334 ff.).

CHAPTER 2

THE INITIAL PHASE

1. For a detailed reconstruction of Soviet plans and maneuvers and a description of the improvised Western reactions, see W. Phillips Davison, *The Berlin Blockade* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958).

2. In Soviet strategic doctrine under Stalin, a decisive role in war was at-

tributed to the "permanently operating factors" (morale, economic and industrial capacity, command, and qualitative and quantitative military elements), as opposed to the temporary factors, such as surprise. Even after the Soviet Union had become a full-fledged nuclear power and recognized the immense destructiveness of a general nuclear war, military writers continued to stress the importance of war production, large reserves, and other factors they believed to be decisive in a long total war (Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* [New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958]). According to this view, and especially before Russia acquired a nuclear strategic striking force, the United States must have seemed like a formidable obstacle to direct military aggression in Europe in spite of the disintegration of her forces-in-being, for, although Russia's large submarine fleet might harass the Atlantic lines of supply, the United States itself would remain an invulnerable bastion of war matériel and reserve manpower, as in World War II.

3. The most revealing account of America's military and strategic unpreparedness at the time of the Berlin blockade is Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), chap. xii, "The Berlin Blockade and the Atomic Bomb."

4. James E. King, Jr., "NATO: Genesis, Progress, Problems," in Gordon B. Turner and Richard D. Challener (eds.), *National Security in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960), pp. 150–51.

5. For a description of the British role in promoting Western Union and its enlargement into an Atlantic alliance, see Bernard Law Montgomery, *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery* (New York: World Publishing Co., 1958), pp. 447 ff.; and Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman* (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1956), II, 245.

6. See, for example, Undersecretary of State Lovett's remarks on March 3, 1948 (*New York Times*, March 4, 1948, p 3), and President Truman's reference to the Brussels Treaty in his address to Congress on March 17, 1948: "I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires" (*Congressional Record* [hereinafter cited as *Cong. Rec.*], 80 Cong., 2 sess., 2996–98).

7. Walter Millis, *Arms and the State* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 237.

8. Montgomery, *op. cit.*, p. 455. For the plans this group produced, see Roger Hilsman, "NATO: The Developing Strategic Context," in Klaus Knorr (ed.), *NATO and American Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 13–16.

9. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.), *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), pp. 419, 495.

10. Hilsman, *loc. cit.*, pp. 14–16.

11. In accordance with this military conception, the State Department, in communications directed especially to the Scandinavian countries, strongly suggested that membership in the North Atlantic alliance was a condition for receiving military assistance (*New York Times*, January 15, 1949, pp. 1, 7). President Truman, responding to the views of the military planners, decided that the State Department should explore the possibility of including in the alliance Sweden, Spain, Germany, and Austria (Truman, *op. cit.*, II, 246). British statesmen and political leaders opposed expanding the membership of NATO for fear that this would spread American military assistance too thin. However, the French government supported the inclusion of Italy, with whom it was promoting a rapprochement as a counterpoise to Germany. Canada's inclusion was assured by her membership in the Commonwealth and her early active role in promoting the expansion of the Brussels Treaty into an Atlantic treaty.

12. While the North Atlantic Treaty was before Congress, James Reston reported confusion in the American government and elsewhere surrounding two conceptions of the alliance. "One is that we were trying to create a military combination so strong, so well armed and so well supplied with actual and potential bases within striking distance of the Soviet Union that the Politburo in Moscow would not dare to risk aggression. The other conception is that we were trying to create an institution that would make clear to our people that certain areas of Europe were vital to our security and provide the machinery for planning the defense of the North Atlantic area." He represented the first conception as being primarily the view of the Pentagon and the latter as primarily civilian but held that the issue between the two was undefined (*New York Times*, February 20, 1949, Sec. 4, p. 3).

13. George F. Kennan, *Russia, the Atom, and the West* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), pp. 88–90, 91.

14. *New York Times*, January 21, 1949, p. 4.

15. From a plea for acceptance of the North Atlantic Treaty, delivered to the House of Commons on May 12, 1949 (*Parliamentary Debates* [Commons], CDLXIV, 2016).

16. In testifying for the Treaty before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Secretary of State Acheson asserted that the economic recovery of Western Europe was "the first prime necessity" and would receive a clear priority in providing military assistance. "That means," he said, "that there are very definite limitations on the size of the military forces which Western Europe can maintain, because if you withdraw greatly increased numbers of men from production and put them into military service, you would impair recovery and you would impair the very ability of these nations to resist and to remain as free nations" (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, North Atlantic Treaty*, p. 37).

17. *New York Times*, March 3, 1949, p. 5.

18. In October, 1948, General de Gaulle sharply criticized the Western Union's military arrangements on this ground (*ibid.*, October 2, 1948, pp. 1, 3).

19. Thus French Foreign Minister Schuman, in hailing the proposed Atlantic pact, said that it would entail no increase of French military expenditures that year and that no extension of military service was contemplated. Yet, as he left for Washington to sign the pact, Paris officials, in emphasizing the urgency of American military assistance, explained that lack of enthusiasm for the alliance in France sprang from doubts that it would protect France in the event of an attack (*ibid.*, March 19, 1949, p. 3; March 31, 1949, p. 3).

20. *Times* (London), March 11, 1949, p. 5.

21. With the addition of Greece and Turkey to NATO, the allied countries contained about 436 million inhabitants to about 300 million for the Soviet Union and its European satellites. In 1959 it was estimated that the Soviet bloc (excluding China) had 58.4 million fit males, whereas the NATO countries had 85.4 million (Foreign Policy Research Institute, *United States Foreign Policy: Western Europe* [Washington, 1959], a study prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86 Cong., 1 sess. [October 15, 1959], p. 49).

22. F. O. Miksche makes some interesting estimates of relative division slices in *The Failure of Atomic Strategy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958), pp. 60–67. However, in his criticisms of the unfavorable comparison between Western and Soviet division strength he does not take account of the different standards of living, logistics requirements, deployments, and missions of Soviet and Western forces. The Soviet army raises about 175 divisions from an approximate strength of 2,500,000 men, as opposed to the 14 divisions the United

States raises from 870,000 men. However, aside from the relative austerity of Soviet programs in medical care, housing, food, entertainment, etc., the functions of military police and research and development, unlike those in the United States, are performed or strongly supported by outside agencies; and a large portion of American armed strength is allocated to non-divisional combat units in order to provide more flexibility in employment. Moreover, because approximately 40 per cent of the American army is deployed overseas, it requires extensive logistics support.

According to figures published by Hanson Baldwin, in the spring of 1959 the NATO members had earmarked 2,202,000 troops for service under SHAPE, not counting Greek and Turkish troops; whereas 1,770,000 Soviet troops (including 1,250,000 in the Soviet Union) and 1,195,000 satellite troops were assigned to Europe (*New York Times,* March 29, 1959, Sec. 4, p. 1). The NATO troops totaled about 21 divisions; the Soviet troops, about 120. (Baldwin's figures did not make allowance for alleged Soviet troop reductions since 1955, which, if they were actually carried out, would make his estimate of Soviet bloc figures as much as 10 per cent too high.)

23. The question of obligation arose because of Article 3, which stated that the signatories "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

24. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, North Atlantic Treaty,* 81 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 12–13, 22, 24, 25, 33, 36.

25. *Ibid.,* pp. 47, 57.

26. *Ibid.,* p. 44.

27. *Ibid.,* p. 287.

28. Among other reporters who covered the congressional debate on the Treaty, Marquis Childs and James Reston were struck by the ease and relative lack of excitement with which this radical departure in American foreign policy was accepted, indicating, they thought, that its full seriousness and implications had not been grasped. Childs noted, "I had the impression in talking with members of several foreign delegations present for the signing that it was a foregone conclusion that arms would follow automatically as the implementation of the political understanding expressed in the Pact. But in the Senate one quickly discovered that this was an area of unhappy misgiving. There were Senators who looked rather cynically at the treaty as a bargain if it cost nothing in dollars. Others, sincerely and deeply concerned with the issues of peace or war, were fearful that the shipment of American arms to Europe would only heighten the danger. For still others a major concern was how the Pact and the arms to implement it, if arms were necessary, would impinge on domestic policy" (Marquis W. Childs, "Washington and the Atlantic Pact," *Yale Review,* XXXVIII [June, 1949], 581). Reston summed up the popular and congressional attitude: "In short, there seems to be ignorance about specific parts of the treaty, indifference or a certain fatalistic approach to the future, combined with an acceptance of the idea of 'doing something' about the Russians" (*New York Times,* May 19, 1949, p. 10).

29. *Cong. Rec.,* 81 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 8893–94.

30. *Ibid.,* pp. 9205 ff.

31. *Bulletin,* XXI (August 8, 1949), 188.

32. *Ibid.*

33. Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, *Hearings, Military Assistance Program of 1949,* 81 Cong., 1 sess., p. 108.

34. *Ibid.,* p. 27.

35. *Bulletin,* XXI (August 8, 1949), 193.

36. See the statements by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (chief of staff, United States Air Force) and Mr. Stuart Symington (Secretary of the Air Force) in House Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, The National Defense Program—Unification and Strategy,* 81 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 63, 316, 403, 455–56. The same conception of the role of airpower was elaborated by General Carl Spaatz, commander of the Army Air Force, in 1947, before the subcommitte of the House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1948,* 80 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 401, 601–2.

37. *Hearings, The National Defense Program,* pp. 518 ff. Bradley disagreed with the Navy's estimate of the importance of warfare at sea to secure the lines of communication. He even went so far as to suggest that the atomic bomb made surface fleets en masse "a thing of the past," which precluded the possibility of another large-scale amphibious operation as in World War II. But he did not reconcile this view with his conception of American troops participating in large-scale land warfare in Europe (*ibid.,* p. 525). See also General Bradley's and Admiral Denfeld's descriptions of the Army's and Navy's respective roles in general war in Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1950,* 81 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 567 ff. and Part 3, p. 30.

38. Despite the fact that the Russians had already exploded their first atomic bomb, the hearings on military doctrine in October, 1949, were conspicuous for their lack of attention to this event and its strategic implications. Those military experts who took note of the event at all mainly drew the implication that the United States had to reinforce her efforts to preserve her atomic superiority. The only exception was Admiral Blandy (commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet), who wondered if the American bomb would henceforth retain its deterrent value but, nevertheless, envisioned a European war being fought with the atomic bomb combined with World-War-II-type operations (*ibid.,* pp. 204–5).

39. Admiral Radford presented the burden of the Navy's argument (*ibid.,* pp. 46 ff.).

40. *New York Times,* April 6, 1949, p. 3.

41. Robert A. Taft, *A Foreign Policy for Americans* (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1951), pp. 97–99.

42. Vandenberg, *op. cit.,* pp. 510–14.

43. Statement on August 8, 1949, before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, *Bulletin,* XXI (August 22, 1949), 265.

44. *Bulletin,* XXI (December 19, 1949), 948; XXII (January 16, 1950), 104.

45. *New York Times,* January 28, 1950, p. 2.

46. "First, the United States will be charged with the strategic bombing. We have repeatedly recognized in this country that the first priority of the joint defense is our ability to deliver the atomic bomb.

"Second, the United States Navy and the Western naval powers will conduct essential naval operations, including keeping the sea lanes clear. The Western Union and other nations will maintain their own harbor and coastal defense.

"Third, we recognize that the hard core of the ground power in being will come from Europe, aided by other nations as they can mobilize.

"Fourth, England, France, and the closer countries will have the bulk of the short-range attack bombardment, and air defense. We, of course, will maintain the tactical air force for our own ground and naval forces, and United States defense.

"Fifth, other nations, depending upon their proximity or remoteness from the possible scene of conflict, will emphasize appropriate specific missions" (House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings, Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949,* 81 Cong., 1 sess., p. 71).

47. Churchill expressed this oft-quoted opinion on several occasions. At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology convocation in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on March 31, 1949, he said, "It is certain that Europe would have been communized like Czechoslovakia and London would have been under bombardment some time ago but for the deterrent of the atomic bomb in the hands of the United States" (*New York Times,* April 1, 1949, p. 10). Several days later, speaking in the House of Commons, he said, "The situation [in Europe] is . . . from many points of view unprecedented and incalculable. Over the whole scene reigns the power of the atomic bomb, ever growing in the hands of the United States. It is this, in my view, and this alone that has given us time to take the measures of self-protection and to develop the units which make those measures possible" (*Parliamentary Debates* [Commons], CDLXIV, 2030). Cf. Churchill's warning on March 16, 1950, that the Soviet atomic bomb greatly worsened the West's position and made more urgent a political settlement (*ibid.,* CDLXXII, 1297–98).

48. *Cong. Rec.,* 81 Cong , 1 sess., p. 13086; cf. Dulles' estimate of the nature of the Soviet threat in a magazine interview in July, 1949 (*United States News and World Report,* XXVII [July 8, 1949], 31). In 1957 Kennan recalled that in 1948 and 1949 he and others had also believed that the most threatening danger in Europe was not Soviet military aggression but Soviet exploitation of Europe's internal problems—especially her economic weakness and lack of purpose and self-confidence in the wake of World War II (Kennan, *Russia, the Atom, and the West,* pp 89–90).

CHAPTER 3

THE IMPACT OF SOVIET NUCLEAR POWER

1. Remarks in the House of Commons on March 16, 1950 (*Parliamentary Debates* [Commons], CDLXXII, 1297–98).

2. For a description and analysis of the ambiguous decisions, the arguments and counterarguments, underlying America's hydrogen-bomb program, see Warner R Schilling, "The H-Bomb Decision," *Political Science Quarterly,* LXXVI (March, 1961), 24–26.

3. Perhaps the most revealing statement of the Eisenhower Administration's reasons for suppressing nuclear information was a talk by Robert Cutler, the President's special assistant on national security affairs, published in the *Harvard Alumni Bulletin* of June 5, 1955, p. 665; cited and quoted in W. W. Rostow, *The United States in the World Arena* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), pp. 318–19. Cutler here expounded the arguments against "Operation Candor," the chief proponent of which was Robert Oppenheimer, who published the arguments for releasing more atomic information in his article, "Atomic Weapons and American Policy," *Foreign Affairs,* XXXII (July, 1953), 530–32.

4. In February, 1954, Sterling Cole, chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, released details about America's first thermonuclear explosion at Eniwetok (*New York Times,* February 18, 1954, pp. 1, 8). In March, 1954, Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, released details of the effects of the *Lucky Dragon* shot and information about Soviet progress in multimegaton weapons (*Christian Science Monitor,* February 10, 1955, p. 1; *New York Times,* February 16, 1955, p. 18; February 22, p 8).

5. In an address on January 7, 1953, explaining the implications of the Eniwetok explosion (*Bulletin,* XXVIII [January 19, 1953], 94).

6. The Stockholm Peace Appeal originated at the third session of the Permanent Committee of the World Peace Congress, held in Stockholm, Sweden, on

March 15-19, 1950. It read: "We demand the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon as a weapon of intimidation and mass extermination of human beings. We demand the institution of strict international control to enforce this. We shall consider as a war criminal that government which first employs the atomic weapons against any country. We call upon all people of good will throughout the world to sign this appeal" (*USSR Information Bulletin,* X [April 28, 1950], 234). In August the sponsors of the campaign claimed the implicit support of 600 million men, women, and children and over 273 million actual "mainly adult" signatures (*ibid.,* September 8, 1950, p. 520).

7. For a discussion of the calculated techniques of "nuclear blackmail," with special attention to the Suez War of 1956, see Hans Speier, "Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance," *World Politics,* IX (April, 1957), 307–28. Speier cogently describes the mingling of threat and conciliation in Soviet blackmail techniques as follows: "In order to exact compliance with an effort at blackmail, the cost of failing to comply must appear disastrously high to the victim. But once fantasies of disaster are aroused, they must be controlled. When they are once aroused, the relatively lesser cost of compliance appears a blessing. This technique corresponds to that of a holdup man who brandishes a gun in front of an armed victim but who, for fear that the frightened man may fight for his life, quickly tells him that he only wants his money" (*ibid.,* p. 323).

8. For a selection of Khrushchev's statements about the shift of the military and political balance toward the Soviet Union, see Senate Document No. 57, a special study prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, *Khrushchev on the Shifting Balance of World Forces,* 86 Cong., 1 sess.

9. For an analytical narrative of this Berlin crisis, see Hans Speier, *The Soviet Threat to Berlin* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1960).

CHAPTER 4

REARMAMENT AND RELAXATION

1. For example, Italian Foreign Minister Count Sforza sought and received such reaffirmations in order to counteract repeated reports that the strategic plans of the Atlantic powers called for the abandonment of Italy in case of a Russian attack (*New York Times,* May 24, 1950, p. 15).

2. See, for example, Acheson's testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in June, 1950 (House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings, To Amend the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949,* 81 Cong., 2 sess., p. 22).

3. *New York Times,* April 10, 1950, pp. 1, 7.

4. Message of June 1, 1950 (*Bulletin,* XXII [June 12, 1950], 938–40).

5. *Ibid.,* XXII (May 29, 1950), 830.

6. Foreshadowing his famous "balance of terror" statement five years later, Churchill emphasized the deterrent effect of the unprecedented destructiveness of nuclear war and declared that "moralists may find it a melancholy thought that peace can find no nobler foundations than mutual terror" (speech in the House of Commons on March 28, 1950, *Parliamentary Debates* [Commons], CDLXXIII, 197). Cf. Churchill's speech to the House as Prime Minister on March 1, 1955: "Then it may well be that we shall, by a process of sublime irony, have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation" (*New York Times,* March 2, 1955, p. 8; *Parliamentary Debates* [Commons], DXXXVII, 1894–1905).

7. "France Proves She Is Still a Power," *New York Times Magazine*, June 25, 1950, p. 19.

8. *Bulletin*, XXII (May 29, 1950), 830.

9. *New York Times*, May 16, 1950, p. 23.

10. *Bulletin*, XXII (May 29, 1950), 830.

11. Testimony on June 5, 1950 (*New York Times*, June 6, 1950, p. 3). Also, Joint Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, *Hearings, Mutual Defense Assistance Program*, 81 Cong., 2 sess., p. 22.

12. The modern conventional weapons were designed to check the offensive superiority of the tank-and-tactical-airpower team that had proved so effective in World War II. Their great possibilities were discussed in an Army study during the winter, which had enlisted the assistance of Dr. Vannevar Bush and a group of the Army's leading combat generals and senior planners (Tracy S. Voorhees, "To Prevent a 'Korea' in Western Europe," *New York Times Magazine*, July 23, 1950, pp. 10 ff.). See Hanson Baldwin's skeptical report concerning the publicity releases on the new weapons in the *New York Times*, June 8, 1950, p. 6. The two Senate committees that considered the Mutual Defense Assistance Program for 1950 reported, on the basis of their findings, that the "most modern" weapons would enable Europe to defend herself at less cost in men and money. But the weapons it mentioned specifically were recoilless antitank weapons, shaped charges, non-magnetic mines, and proximity fuses (*ibid.*, June 23, 1950, p. 10).

13. In an article in the *Saturday Evening Post*, dated October 13, and reproduced in House Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, The National Defense Program—Unification and Strategy*, 81 Cong., 1 sess., p. 320.

14. Statement on June 27, 1950 (*Bulletin*, XXII [July 3, 1950], 5).

15. Statement submitted to Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Supplemental Appropriations for 1951*, 81 Cong., 2 sess., p. 272.

16. "To Save Humanity from the Deep Abyss," *New York Times Magazine*, July 30, 1950, p. 35.

17. Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Supplemental Appropriations for 1951*, pp. 268–69.

18. The concept of the "year of maximum danger" was originally based on a calculation of the time by which Russia would acquire sufficient atomic capacity to be in a position to utilize her numerically superior manpower to exert intensive political or military pressure on the West. NSC 68, the document that grew out of the State Department Policy Planning Staff's memorandum on the strategic significance of Russia's atomic explosion, set this year as 1954. However, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently regarded the "year of maximum danger" as a convenient guideline for planning rather than as a crucial target date. In the fall of 1950 they moved the guideline date to 1952. Later, when the administration cut their recommended force levels for 1952, the date was extended to 1954. See General Bradley's, General Vandenberg's, and General Twining's explanations of the concept in Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1953*, 82 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 332–35, 385. Roger Hilsman discusses the meaning of the concept in "NATO: The Developing Strategic Context," in Klaus Knorr (ed.), *NATO and American Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 20.

19. Referring to the situation prevailing at the end of the first year of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program in October, 1950, President Truman stated in his semiannual report, "The time for giving economic recovery a clear priority over efforts to build military strength was passing, and the day was fast approaching when all aid to NATO countries, whether military or economic in

nature, would need to be related to, and conditioned upon, the performance by the recipients of the various defense tasks called for by North Atlantic Treaty planning, and upon the undertaking of those complementary measures which were needed, in conjunction with American assistance, to assure attainment of the now inseparable goals of military strength and continuing economic stability" (United States President, *Third Semiannual Report of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program* [Washington: 1950], p. 3).

20. *New York Times,* August 8, 1950, p. 14.

21. *Ibid.,* September 10, 1950, pp. 1, 11.

22. See the statements by Senator Taft on November 10 and 13 (*New York Times,* November 11, 1950, p. 8; November 14, p. 1) and the speeches by Herbert Hoover on October 19 and December 20 (*ibid.,* October 20, 1950, p. 2; December 21, p. 22). Taft challenged the thesis that Europe was America's first line of defense or that it was defensible and urged the 82d Congress to reexamine the scope, methods, and character of American military assistance to Europe. Hoover also doubted that Europe could be defended on the Continent, but he nevertheless insisted that Europe create an army large enough to stop the Russians before the United States sent "another man or another dollar," while maintaining that the United States could defend herself by holding the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans with her sea- and airpower.

23. Communiqué of September 27, 1950, *Bulletin,* XXIII (October 9, 1950), 588.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *New York Times,* December 20, 1950, p. 1.

26. European fears of American action in Korea probably reached a peak when, following the Chinese intervention in the war, President Truman, in response to questions in a press conference on November 30, indicated that the United States might use the atomic bomb if the military situation called for it. This statement aroused such a storm in the House of Commons that Prime Minister Clement Attlee rushed to the United States to seek the President's assurance that the government would not act rashly. The final communiqué of this conference included the statement that "the President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation." For the fullest account of this incident, see Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1956), II, chap. xxv.

27. Speech in the House of Commons on December 6, 1951 (*Parliamentary Debates* [Commons], CDXCIV, 2592).

28. Speech at Des Moines, Iowa, on February 16, 1952 (*Cong. Rec.,* 82 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 1800–1802).

29. In France it was not just the left-wing parties and the Communists who charged that NATO would not and could not defend French territory but also the right-wing elements and the Gaullists. Thus General de Gaulle, looking toward the coming national elections, asserted, "Our Atlantic allies do not contemplate protecting the territory of the old Continent effectively in case of invasion" but, instead, are "disposed to limit their effort to defense of a few points: England, Spain, a 'Breton Redoubt'" (*New York Times,* April 13, 1951, p. 8). He demanded that the cession of bases and communication facilities on French soil should be conditional upon a strategic plan for NATO that would protect Europe from invasion and not undertake an initial retreat (*ibid.,* May 2, 1951, p. 15).

30. *Cong. Rec.*, 82 Cong., 1 sess., p. 52.

31. Address to Congress on February 1, 1951 (*Bulletin*, XXIV [February 5, 1951], 249).

32. *Ibid.*, p. 248. In hearings during July, 1951, General Gruenther, Eisenhower's chief of staff, explained more definitely that Eisenhower conceived the sole purpose of American troops as reviving the confidence of the European countries and that he expected them to be withdrawn "eventually." He represented Eisenhower as believing that airpower would be the dominant element of defense in Europe despite all the talk about divisions (Joint Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, *Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1951*, 82 Cong., 1 sess, pp. 209 ff.).

33. Joint Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, *Hearings, Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area*, 82 Cong., 1 sess., p. 79.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 106–7. Acheson's theory of the declining advantage of America's nuclear superiority and the corresponding need for ground troops was developed more fully in an anonymous article, "The Balance of Military Power," *Atlantic Monthly* CLXXXVII (June, 1951), 21–27.

35. Joint Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, *Hearings, Assignment of Ground Forces . . .*, p. 79. Acheson cited a build-up of satellite forces as indicating the danger of proxy aggression. Secretary of Defense Marshall confirmed this intelligence in his testimony of May, 1951, in the so-called "MacArthur hearings": "The impression from the reports that we gather from many sources is there has been a continuous build-up, and not necessarily in strength, though it may be, but particularly in arrangements specifically in the satellite states, and in regard to disposition of Soviet troops in Western Europe" (Joint Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, *Hearings, Military Situation in the Far East*, 82 Cong., 1 sess., p. 593).

36. Joint Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, *Hearings, Assignment of Ground Forces . . .*, p. 80. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, chief of staff of the Air Force explained that, unless the ground forces could delay the invaders, Russia would gain access to a greater war potential in Western Europe than strategic bombing could knock out in the heartland. Thus, he implied that the Kremlin would be willing to trade a devastated homeland for control of Western Europe (*ibid.*, pp. 222, 227).

37. *Ibid.*, p. 80; also, statement on June 1, 1951 (*Bulletin*, XXIV [June 11, 1951], 926).

38. Joint Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, *Hearings, Assignment of Ground Forces . . .*, pp. 186–88.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 20, 27; *New York Herald Tribune*, November 27, 1951, p. 1.

40. Reflecting the general optimism about achieving this deterrent capability, Drew Middleton reported in July, 1951, that by the end of the year NATO would have 500,000 soldiers, which would be enough to prevent a *fait accompli* by the 300,000 Soviet troops in East Germany unless they received considerable reinforcement. He said that allied strategists foresaw that the forces available by the spring of 1952 would be strong enough to engage the Russian armies in strength east of the Rhine (*New York Times*, July 25, 1951, p. 6; September 9, 1951, p. 1). Stewart Alsop gave a similarly optimistic report in December (*New York Herald Tribune*, December 26, 1951, p. 21). By the end of 1953 there were 15 allied divisions, with supporting forces, on the front from the Swiss border to the mouth of the Ijssel, over 100 airfields, and an extensive supply and communications network (Roger Hilsman, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–23).

41. *New York Times*, September 19, 1951, p. 6.

42. For representative statements of Bevan's views, see *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), CDLXXXVII, 34-43, and *One Way Only: A Socialist Analysis of the Present World Crisis,* published in July, 1951. For an analysis of the nature and significance of the entire Bevanite attack upon British and American policy toward NATO, see Leon D. Epstein, *Britain, Uneasy Ally* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), chap. xi.

43. *New York Times,* September 17, 1951, p. 5.

44. *Ibid.,* November 28, 1951, pp. 1, 14, 15. The TCC was established in October, at Acheson's suggestion. The actual survey of capabilities was to be made by a three-man committee (dubbed the "Three Wise Men"), composed of W. Averell Harriman of the United States, as chairman, Jean Monnet of France, and Sir Edwin Plowden of Great Britain (replacing Hugh Gaitskell after the defeat of the Labor government).

45. *Ibid.,* December 14, 1951, p. 1.

46. *Ibid.,* November 28, 1951, p. 1.

47. The Mutual Security Act for fiscal year 1952 provided $1 billion for economic aid and $4.8 billion for military aid for Europe. However, it authorized the President to transfer up to 10 per cent of the military funds to economic aid.

48. The administration requested $4.1 billion in direct military aid, arms, and equipment for Europe and $1.8 billion in "defense support," the new name for economic aid, designed to enable recipients to sustain and increase their rearmament programs. Congress authorized $3.4 billion and $1.2 billion, respectively, for these purposes. It cut the appropriation for military aid even further.

49. *New York Times,* November 28, 1951, p. 15. In September, 1951, the administration decided to moderate the pace of rearmament in order to attain peak strength in 1954 instead of 1952. The decision was revealed by Secretary of Defense Lovett in February, 1952 (*ibid.,* February 5, 1952, pp. 1, 8).

50. Secretary of State Acheson gave the concept of a European army qualified indorsement in February, 1951, but international discussions of the French scheme reached a deadlock until General Eisenhower, in July, 1951, accepted the establishment of a European Defense Community as prior to German rearmament and persuaded the French to agree to integration at the army group rather than the divisional level. Soon afterward the North Atlantic allies accepted an interim agreement to this effect, leaving the details to be worked out in the next few months before the Lisbon conference of the North Atlantic Council (Lewis J. Edinger, *West German Rearmament* [Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Documentary Research Study, 1955], pp. 17–21).

51. Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron, (eds.), *France Defeats EDC* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957), pp. 12 ff.

52. Gordon A. Craig, "Germany and NATO: The Rearmament Debate, 1950–1958," in Knorr (ed.), *op. cit.,* pp. 237–39.

53. At the Lisbon conference the North Atlantic Council took the unusual step of publishing the force goals for the end of 1952. Customarily, NATO had not officially released either prospective or actual force levels. The other levels stated here and elsewhere are derived from reports in the press, which show the kind of consistency that could only come from information acquired at SHAPE.

54. The North Atlantic Council had approved the accession of Greece and Turkey, in principle, in October, 1951. However, all the divisions that Greece and Turkey could raise would be needed locally.

55. *Times* (London), February 26, 1952, p. 5.

56. For General Eisenhower's statement, see Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, *First Annual Report* (Paris: SHAPE, 1952), p. 21. For General Ridgway's

statements, see *Times* (London), September 30, 1952, p. 4; SACEUR, *Second Annual Report* (Paris: SHAPE, 1953), p. 21. For General Gruenther's statements see *New York Times,* April 22, 1952, p 24; address on October 8, 1953, *Bulletin,* XXIX (November 9, 1953), 634; address on September 29, 1954, *Bulletin,* XXXV (October 18, 1954), 563; testimony in March, 1955, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, NATO and the Paris Accords Relating to West Germany,* 84 Cong., 1 sess., p 8.

57. Statement on February 20, 1952, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), CDXCV, 232. Churchill repeated this explanation on March 5 (*ibid.,* CDXCVII, 433 ff.).

58. *New York Herald Tribune,* November 21, 1952, p. 21. According to Charles Murphy, the underlying strategic reappraisal was produced by the three British military chiefs between January and July, 1952 ("A New Strategy for NATO," *Fortune,* XLVII [January, 1953], 80 ff.; and an unsigned article, "Defense and Strategy: New Accents in Military Thinking and Spending," *Fortune,* XLVIII [December, 1953], 77 ff.).

59. *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), DIV, 1492–1509.

60. *Economist,* November 22, 1952, p. 539.

61. *New York Times,* August 18, 1952, p. 4.

62. Peter Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1952* (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 36–41, contains a good summary of the events leading to France's relaxation of her defense effort.

63. According to Acheson's testimony, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings, Mutual Security Act Extension,* 82 Cong , 2 sess., p. 11. The annual cost of the Indochinese war was estimated to be $1.25 billion in 1952.

64. Statements by Secretary of State Dulles, *Bulletin,* XXVIII (April 27, 1953), 604, *New York Times,* April 22, 1953, p. 1. North Atlantic Council communiqué, *ibid.,* April 26, 1953, p. 31. Statement by Supreme Allied Commander General Ridgway, *Bulletin,* XXVIII (June 22, 1953), 871–72. President's annual report on the Mutual Security Program, August 17, 1953, *ibid.,* XXIX (September 21, 1953), 385. Statement by Supreme Allied Commander General Gruenther, *ibid.,* XXIX (November 9, 1953), 634. However, speaking in December, 1953, about the recent Council meeting, Dulles said, "At our Paris meeting we discussed the Soviet position and the estimate of the risk. And it was generally judged—I think I can say unanimously judged—by the NATO Ministers that the danger of open military aggression from Soviet Russia was less than it had been a year or two before" (*New York Times,* December 23, 1953, p. 4).

65. Radio-television reports by Secretary Dulles on April 18 and 29, 1953, *Bulletin* XXVIII (April 27, 1953), 599–608; (May 11, 1953), 672. Council communiqué, April 25, *New York Times,* April 26, 1953, p. 1. Dulles' statement on April 30, 1953, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings, Mutual Security Act Extension,* 83 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 145 ff.

66. SACEUR, *Second Annual Report,* p. 21; address in New York, May 21, *Bulletin,* XXVIII (June 22, 1953), 863–65.

67. Thus in May, 1953, General Ridgway emphasized in his annual report as Supreme Allied Commander that the military mission intrusted to him remained, first, "In war to defend NATO's European territories. This mission was not qualified in either space or time. It was not merely to defend certain parts of the NATO European area and their peoples. Nor was the responsibility only to become effective in some future year when means might be available. The task was to defend all, at any time, if war should occur" (SACEUR, *Second Annual Report,* pp. 7–8). In April, 1954, President Eisenhower conveyed official as-

surances to the six signatories of EDC that "the United States and its allies are working to build the concrete strength needed to deter aggression and, if aggression occurs, to halt it without the devastation or occupation of any NATO country" (*Bulletin,* XXX [April 26, 1954], 619).

68. SACEUR, *First Annual Report,* p. 2.

69. Statements by Generals Gruenther, Eisenhower, and Ridgway (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1952,* 82 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 203, 218; SACEUR, *First Annual Report,* p. 27; *Bulletin,* XXVII [November 24, 1952], 818).

70. *Bulletin,* XXVI (June 9, 1952), 897.

71. *Ibid.,* p. 895.

72. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, Convention on Relations with the Federal Republic of Germany,* 82 Cong., 2 sess., p. 64.

73. See, for example, the opinions of German military men cited in Hans Speier, *German Rearmament and Atomic War* (White Plains, N.Y.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1957), p. 57. Dulles indicated that such opinions had had their desired effect when he stated on September 3, 1953, before the German elections, that the failure to retain Adenauer "would be disastrous to Germany and to the prospects of reunification" (*New York Times,* September 4, 1953, p. 1).

74. See, for example, the text of a letter from President Eisenhower to Chancellor Adenauer, dated July 23, 1953, and released on July 25 (*ibid.,* July 26, 1953, p. 20).

75. Message of President Eisenhower to the prime ministers of the six EDC countries, dispatched on April 15, 1954, after consultation with congressional leaders of both parties (*Bulletin,* XXX [April 26, 1954], 619–20). On April 13 the British conveyed the same pledge and similar reaffirmations.

76. *New York Times,* January 31, 1954, p. 4; cf. Dulles' statement on December 22, 1953 (*ibid.,* December 23, 1953, p. 4).

77. *Ibid.,* December 15, 1953, p. 14. In a speech to the National Press Club on December 22, Dulles stated more explicitly that the government's reappraisal would apply to the "forward strategy," which he defined as "a plan . . . to defend the entire area of the prospective EDC countries rather than to contemplate from the beginning the abandonment of advanced positions in Germany, which might make the rest of Europe untenable" (*ibid.,* December 23, 1953, p. 4). Dulles repeated substantially the same warning on June 4, 1954, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and on June 10, 1954, in an address in Seattle (*Bulletin,* XXX [June 14, 1954], 922, and XXX [June 21, 1954], 938). President Eisenhower indorsed Dulles' warning in a White House release on December 23, 1953 (*ibid.,* XXX [January 4, 1954], 7).

78. *New York Times,* January 25, 1953, pp. 1, 18; February 13, p. 4; *Manchester Guardian,* February 6, 1953, p. 1; *Bulletin,* XXVIII (February 23, 1953), 287–90.

79. According to the final version of the Richards Amendment, half of American aid would be made available to the Defense Community rather than to individual countries unless the President recommended and Congress authorized otherwise (*Cong. Rec.,* 83 Cong., 1 sess., p. 8683). In a press conference on December 17, 1953, President Eisenhower referred to the Richards Amendment in expressing surprise that Dulles' "agonizing reappraisal" statement should have been considered new or particularly blunt (*New York Times,* December 17, 1953, p. 22).

80. *Ibid.,* June 5, 1954, p. 1. Italy had made her acceptance of EDC contingent upon French ratification.

81. Speaking on November 17, 1954, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons),

CDLXIII, 400–405, 685. Denis Healey of the Labor party supported Eden's position on the same grounds: "The problem we are now discussing is not simply whether or not Germany is to be rearmed, but whether or not we can fit a resurgent Germany—a great power in Europe, with 50 million people of unexampled energy, intelligence and skill—into the framework of Western unity which we developed in the years following the war" (*ibid.*, p. 504).

82. *New York Times*, October 7, 1954, p. 5.

83. See, especially, Khrushchev's address to the Congress on February 14, 1956 (excerpts in *ibid.*, February 15, 1956, p. 10).

84. See Philip E. Moseley, "Soviet Myths and Realities," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIX (April, 1961), 341–54; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Challenge of Change in the Soviet Bloc," *ibid.*, pp. 430–43; Center for International Affairs, *United States Foreign Policy: Ideology and Foreign Affairs*, study prepared for Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 19–36.

CHAPTER 5

NATO GOES NUCLEAR

1. Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 201–3.

2. Statement in a press conference on April 30 (*New York Times*, May 1, 1953, p. 9).

3. In an address on December 14, 1953 (*ibid.*, December 15, p. 31).

4. *Bulletin*, XXX (January 25, 1954), 107–10.

5. Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 210–12.

6. "Policy for Security and Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXII (April, 1954), 358.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 363.

8. The United States tested the first small tactical nuclear weapons in the Nevada desert on October 28, 1951.

9. See above, p. 68.

10. The Vista report was submitted to the service secretaries in February, 1952, but encountered great opposition from the Air Force and was never officially approved (James M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age* [New York: Harper & Bros., 1952], pp. 132–34). See also "The Hidden Struggle for the H-bomb," *Fortune*, XLVII (May, 1953), 109, 110, 230.

11. *New York Times*, September 7, 1952, p. 1.

12. *Statement on Defense, 1953* (February, 1953), Cmd. 8768, p. 3.

13. *New York Times*, September 17, 1952, p. 7.

14. Gavin, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

15. Report of views expressed on February 13, 1953, to visiting NATO information officers (*New York Times*, February 14, 1953, p. 5).

16. Address in New York on October 8, 1953 (*Bulletin*, XXIX [November 9, 1953], 636).

17. *New York Times*, February 25, 1953, p. 5.

18. *Ibid.*, April 29, 1953, p. 16.

19. *Ibid.*, September 2, 1953, pp. 1, 16.

20. *Ibid.*, July 9, 1953, p. 4; December 16, p. 1; December 17, p. 22. President's statement, January 21, 1954. *Bulletin*, XXX (February 1, 1954), 144. Testimony by Secretary of State Dulles and Assistant Secretary of Defense Quarles on June 3 and 4, 1954, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Hearings, To Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946*, 83 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 703, 734.

21. Under Section 123 any executive agreement to give such information to another nation had to be submitted to the JCAE, where it was required to lie for a thirty-day review period before it could become effective. Although representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Justice Department publicly complained about this provision, Secretary of State Dulles did not. Later, AEC testimony on the 1958 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act indicated that the government viewed this legislative check on the dissemination of nuclear material and information as a more politically palatable substitute for executive restrictions designed to prevent the spread of nuclear capabilities to the NATO countries while making preferential agreements with the British. See Harold L. Nieburg, "Atomic Secrecy and Foreign Policy" (Chicago, unpublished MS, 1961), pp. 90 ff.

22. *New York Times,* October 17, 1953, p. 3; October 20, p. 1.

23. *Ibid.,* October 21, 1953, p. 1; October 28, p. 19; October 29, p. 26.

24. Senate Report 1699 (Senate Report Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1946) 83 Cong., 2 sess. (June 30, 1954), in Atomic Energy Commission, *Legislative History of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,* I, 750–51.

25. Address in June, 1954, in Atomic Energy Commission, *Legislative History . . . ,* I, 1614.

26. *New York Times,* January 18, 1954, p. 2. Casting an apprehensive eye toward current disarmament discussions, Gruenther added, "We must try to determine what X is. But if we build on that basis and then atom bombs are outlawed, where are we?"

27. *Ibid.,* January 12, 1954, p. 3.

28. *Ibid.,* July 25, 1954, p. 1.

29. *Ibid.,* August 14, 1954, p. 3.

30. Address in New York on September 29, 1954, *Bulletin,* XXI (October 18, 1954), 562–66.

31. Interview with Brig. Gen. (ret.) T. R. Phillips, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* October 31, 1954, p. C3. Gruenther had earlier stated, in a speech on June 8, that the NATO command was planning on using nuclear weapons (*New York Herald Tribune,* June 9, 1954, p. 9).

32. *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute,* XCIX (November, 1954), 508; cf. lecture at the California Institute of Technology, reported in *New York Times,* November 30, 1954, p. 13.

33. Joint Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, *Hearings, Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area,* 82 Cong., 1 sess., p. 79.

34. *New York Times,* March 3, 1955, p. 1.

35. Evidence later published in the United States tended to confirm the claim of the Soviet atomic scientist Kurchatov that the Soviet thermonuclear device was a true bomb, capable of being transported, whereas the Eniwetok device was too large and heavy to be portable. The Soviet explosion was evidently accomplished with a form of lithium deuteride as a solid, while the American explosion depended upon bulky refrigeration apparatus to keep the heavy hydrogen in liquid form. The evidence suggests that the United States did not succeed in exploding a lithium deuteride bomb until March, 1954 (*ibid.,* February 8, 1960, p. 2).

36. According to Cole's report, the November, 1952, explosion had torn a crater 175 feet deep and a mile wide in the ocean bed, and, if it had exploded in a modern city, it would have created an area of complete destruction six miles in diameter (*ibid.,* February 18, 1954, pp. 1, 8). Churchill, explaining to the House of Commons in April his decision to go to Washington in June, expressed his astonishment at the lack of reaction to this information (*Parliamentary De-*

bates [Commons], DXXVI, 47). In Washington he received further information on the destructive effects of hydrogen explosions.

37. Address on March 1, 1955 (*New York Times,* March 2, 1955, p. 8).

38. Statement to the House of Commons, December 1, 1954 (*Parliamentary Debates* [Commons], DXXXV, 176).

39. *New York Times,* February 16, 1955, p. 18.

40. *Bulletin,* XXIX (October 19, 1953), 507–8.

41. *New York Times,* December 15, 1954, p. 8; December 18, pp. 1, 2.

42. *Ibid.,* December 22, 1954, pp. 1, 4.

43. North Atlantic Council communiqué, December 14, 1956 (*NATO Letter,* V [January 1, 1957], p. 4).

44. See pp. 161–64, below. The reserve forces goal was reported to be 60 divisions, excluding Greek and Turkish forces. As Roger Hilsman has pointed out, the 30 divisions were slightly more than the ready-mobilized divisions required on the forward line according to the Lisbon goals, based on a conventional strategy. However, they constituted a somewhat larger proportion of the total NATO force goals, including reserves (Hilsman, "NATO: The Developing Strategic Context," in Klaus Knorr [ed.], *NATO and American Security* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959], p. 31).

45. See Hanson Baldwin's report on the tactical nuclear war game Operation Sagebrush, *New York Times,* December 5, 1955, p. 12. Conclusions drawn from the 1958 studies and games were reported in *ibid.,* March 14, 1958, p. 1; October 27, p. 1. General Taylor and General Ridgway supported these conclusions in congressional testimony in February, 1956 (Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957,* 84 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 482, 566).

46. For an authoritative exposition of the view that atomic weapons would help the defender more than the attacker, see General J. Lawton Collins, "NATO: Still Vital for Peace," *Foreign Affairs,* XXXIV (April, 1956), 367–79. Collins, who had been Army Chief of Staff from 1949 to 1953, wrote as the United States member of NATO's Standing Group.

47. *New York Times,* May 26, 1958, p. 17. In December, 1958, the Army announced that it was modifying its pentomic infantry divisions to give them greater conventional capacity. The change was attributed to a conviction that nuclear war was less likely than conventional war and to insufficient light dual-purpose missiles (*Washington Post,* December 24, 1958, p. A5).

48. *New York Times,* March 2, 1955, p. 8.

49. *Statement on Defense, 1955* (presented February, 1955), Cmd. 9391; *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), DXXXVII, 1910 ff.

50. In 1956 British Minister of Defense Sir Walter Monckton said that it did not seem to him that the tactical use of nuclear weapons "would necessarily lead to full-scale global war" (*Parliamentary Debates* [Commons], DXLIX, 1035). On March 15, 1955, Dulles told a news conference that smaller atomic weapons offered a chance of victory on the battlefield without harming civilians, but he was speaking of the doctrine of selective nuclear retaliation as a deterrent against limited aggressions in the Far East (*New York Times,* March 16, 1955, p. 1). Only once, in an article in 1957, did he suggest that the use of these weapons in the NATO area might achieve victory without involving "vast destruction and widespread harm to humanity" ("Challenge and Response in United States Policy," *Foreign Affairs,* XXXVI [October, 1957], 31).

51. According to General Maxwell D. Taylor, this was the gist of the document called the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for Fiscal Year 1960; that is, the midrange planning document that estimates force requirements four years in

advance and is, theoretically, the basic document by which the Joint Chiefs translate National Security Council guidance into specific plans and programs (Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* [New York: Harper & Bros., 1960], pp. 38–39).

52. This information was published by Anthony Leviero in the *New York Times*, July 13, 1956, p. 1. The armed forces were to be cut from 2,850,000 to 2,000,000.

53. Lippmann approved the calculation that he attributed to the government as a prudent risk and argued that, as the cost of weapons rose, it would not be possible to keep two military establishments—one for conventional local wars and one for general nuclear war (*Washington Post*, July 19, 1956, p. 13).

54. Testimony on January 24 and July 2, Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957*, pp. 31, 116, 118; Subcommittee on the Air Force, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, Study of Airpower*, 84 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 1732–33.

55. *Washington Post*, August 3, 1956, p. 10.

56. One exception was General Maxwell D. Taylor, who denied that an overt military conflict in the NATO area would necessarily be a general atomic war. However, even he did not clearly commit himself to the possibility of a conventional limited war in Europe. See the article he wrote in the spring of 1956, which was denied clearance because of Defense and State Department opposition (Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 186–87, 190, 193). The previously cited article by General Collins, which also dealt with NATO's strategy and was published in the same periodical in the spring of 1956, argued that tactical nuclear weapons could save Europe from being overrun and that "it would be unsafe to assume that strategic atomic bombing would not be used by both sides" (Collins, *op. cit.*, pp. 375–77).

57. Subcommittee on the Air Force, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, Study of Airpower*, p. 23.

58. Statement to House of Commons, December 1, 1954, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), DXXXV, 177.

59. At the Council meeting, representatives of Great Britain and the small powers were reported to have opposed the American position that the decision to use tactical nuclear weapons should be left to the Supreme Allied Commander. The American government agreed that this decision should be made by civilians, but there remained a difference of opinion on whether the deciding body should be the fourteen Council members or the three powers represented on the Standing Committee—a procedural matter that was further complicated by the fact that the United States owned the tactical nuclear stocks, which, by law, could be used only on direct authorization of the President (*New York Times*, December 14, 1954, p. 10; December 15, p. 8; December 18, pp. 1, 2; December 22, pp. 1, 4). Secretary of State Dulles later qualified his concession to governmental decision when he stated that if an attack were made on NATO forces "like that on Pearl Harbor," the decision to shoot back would be made by the commanders on the spot (*ibid.*, November 21, 1957, p. 1).

60. Collins, *op. cit.*, p. 378. British Defense Minister Harold Macmillan raised the same question in arguing for a forward strategy in the Parliamentary debates of March, 1955 (*Parliamentary Debates* [Commons], DXXXVII, 2182–83).

61. From an unpublished article of 1956, reproduced in Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 190. Although the State Department approved the publication of Collins' query, it commented after Taylor's statement, ". . . it is seriously questioned whether the statement about the restrictions to the use of atomic weapons in relation to the NATO armies should be stated in public."

62. Hans Speier describes and interprets the reaction to "Carte Blanche" on

the basis of his personal interviews as well as his reading of the press in *German Rearmament and Atomic War* (White Plains, N.Y.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1957), pp. 144–47, chaps. x, xi.

63. These assurances were conveyed, most notably, by Chancellor Adenauer himself and by Franz Joseph Strauss, who became his defense minister in October, 1956 (*ibid.*, pp. 161, 169).

64. *Ibid.*, p. 207.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

66. A large majority of West Germans responding to polls in 1954 and 1955 opposed the United States using nuclear weapons to defend Germany against non-nuclear Soviet attack (Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959], p. 27).

67. Speier, *op. cit.*, pp. 189, 206.

68. *New York Times*, September 28, 1956, p. 1.

69. Speier, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 219.

71. Thus Chancellor Adenauer told the Bundestag in March, 1958, "If an important part of NATO doesn't possess weapons as strong as those of its potential opponent . . . then it has neither significance nor importance. If the strategical planning of NATO . . . desires that we too . . . make use of this development of weapons technique, and if we hesitate to do so, then we automatically leave NATO" and are left at the mercy of the Soviet Union (*Das Parliament*, March 26, 1958, pp. 4–5, quoted in Gordon A. Craig, "Germany and NATO: The Rearmament Debate, 1950–1958," in Knorr, *op. cit.*, p. 244).

72. For example, the Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments of WEU reported in December, 1958, that, although British commanders envisaged no war in Europe in which nuclear weapons would not be used, German military authorities could envisage a local conflict, growing out of the political tension in East Germany and Central Europe, in which the aggressor would not employ nuclear weapons and allied forces would not find it appropriate to initiate a nuclear war. Therefore, the German authorities thought that sufficient conventional firepower should be retained in NATO's new formations to deal with limited wars (Assembly of Western European Union, "State of European Security," *Proceedings*, document 105 [December 8, 1958], p. 6).

73. The overwhelming majority of respondents to a poll in 1958 opposed equipping German forces with nuclear weapons or installing launching platforms for missiles in the Federal Republic (Deutsch and Edinger, *op. cit.*, p. 27).

74 Gordon Craig describes this controversy in Knorr, *op. cit.*, pp. 246–49.

75. French attitudes and policies toward nuclear weapons are discussed in Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), pp. 297–306, and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., *France: Troubled Ally* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), pp. 249–50, 283–88. The most active discussion of the strategic implications of nuclear weapons was carried on, largely by military officers, in the pages of *Revue de Défense Nationale*.

76. On April 13, 1955, the French government renounced the development of military applications of nuclear energy, subject to re-examination in 1958 (*New York Times*, April 14, 1955, p. 6). However, research and development on atomic weapons, which had begun as early as 1952, continued. In April Premier Edgar Faure declared that France had to embark on a research program that would prepare her in two years to manufacture her own nuclear weapons, if that were necessary (*ibid.*, April 6, 1955, p. 5; April 14, p. 6). On May 20, 1955, the first protocol was signed authorizing the Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (CEA) to carry out a nuclear development program, including

military applications ("France's First Atomic Explosion" [English translation of the French "White Paper"], *Service de Presse et d'Information*, February 13, 1960, pp. 8–9).

77. *Statement on Defense*, 1955, p. 7.

78. *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), DXXXVII, 1931–37.

79. *Ibid.*, col. 2183.

80. *Ibid.*, DXLIX, 1035.

81. *Defense: Outline of Future Policy* (presented April, 1957), Cmd. 124, pp. 2–3.

82. Statement on April 16, 1957, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), DLXVIII, 1765.

83. *Ibid.*, col. 1979.

84. *Ibid.*, col. 1791.

85. *Ibid.*, col. 1966.

86. See Sandys's defense of the 1958 white paper in the House of Commons on February 26, 1958 (*ibid.*, DLXXXIII, 395, 410). The white paper, in a statement that aroused particular opposition, said, "The democratic Western nations will never start a war against Russia. But it must be well understood that, if Russia were to launch a major attack on them, even with conventional forces only, they would have to hit back with strategic nuclear weapons. In fact, the strategy of NATO is based on the frank recognition that a full-scale Soviet attack could not be repelled without resort to a massive nuclear bombardment of the sources of power in Russia. In that event, the role of the allied defense forces in Europe would be to hold the front for the time needed to allow the effects of the nuclear counter-offensive to make themselves felt" (*Report on Defense* [presented February, 1958], Cmd. 363, p. 2).

87. *Times* (London), October 15, 1958, p. 13; October 16, p. 13.

88. Montgomery, "A Look through a Window at World War III," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute*, XCIX (November, 1954), 510.

89. "Organization for War in Modern Times," *ibid.*, C (November, 1955), 523.

90. "The Panorama of Warfare in a Nuclear Age," *ibid.*, CI (November, 1956), 503–20.

91. "The Present State of the Game in the Contest between East and West, and the Future Outlook," *ibid.*, CIII (November, 1958), 479.

92. On the evolution of strategic thinking about limited war, see Morton H. Halperin, "Limited War: An Essay on the Development of the Theory and an Annotated Bibliography" (Cambridge: Mimeographed MS, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1961).

93. Morton H. Halperin reviewed the literature on the use of nuclear weapons in limited war in "Nuclear Weapons and Limited War," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V (June, 1961), 146–66. The most notable expositions of a strategy of limited nuclear war were by Henry A. Kissinger, "Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIV (April, 1956), 349–66, and *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), and by Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, "Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deterrence," *World Politics*, VIII (January, 1956), 228–37. Kissinger publicly revised his views on this question in "Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear? —A Reappraisal," *Daedalus*, LXXXIX (Fall, 1960), 800–818.

94. The earliest reasoned criticism of the doctrine of massive retaliation to present this view and attract widespread attention in the government and press was William W. Kaufmann's memorandum, *The Requirements of Deterrence* ("Memorandum," No. 7 [Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1954]). For a similar contemporaneous analysis, see Bernard Brodie, "Unlimited

Weapons and Limited War," *Reporter*, XI (November 18, 1954), 16–21. It should be noted that in his 1954 memorandum Kaufmann assumed that massive retaliation was still a credible response to "an attack on areas which have come to be regarded as of vital interest to us," since a "majority of people, both here and abroad" would be willing to see nuclear weapons used in such circumstances.

95. Statement in April, 1958 (Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959*, 85 Cong., 2 sess., p. 370).

96. *Ibid.*, p. 378; statement in January, 1959, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Armed Services and on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Hearings, Missile and Space Activities*, 86 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 34, 42).

97. Statement in January, 1959, Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960*, 86 Cong., 1 sess., p. 68. McElroy had stated the same view on May 29 and June 6, 1958 (*New York Times*, May 30, 1958, p. 3; June 7, p. 9).

98. Thus, in a press conference on December 15, 1954, President Eisenhower expressed the view that, in order to preserve the free enterprise system and a level of taxation the people would support, he preferred to plan military policies to meet the great threats and rely on improvisation to handle the small wars, since he believed that if you can win a big war, you can certainly win a little one (*New York Times*, December 16, 1954, p. 24). In slightly qualified form Secretary of Defense McElroy repeated this view in January, 1959, in submitting to the House Committee on Appropriations a prepared statement that limited-war and general-war capabilities were the same thing; that the former was applicable to the latter and the latter, "with a few exceptions," was equally applicable to limited-war situations (Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960*, p. 254). Although this view was openly opposed by the Army and, after 1958, by the Navy, it remained the operational guidance for defense policies and was continually affirmed by Air Force spokesmen As the chief of staff of the Air Force, General White, put it in 1958, "The real deterrent to significant local conflict is nuclear firepower. The whole of this firepower, up to the total necessary to achieve resolution, is the adequate force for local warfare" (*Air Force*, XLI [January, 1958], 49). In December, 1957, General LeMay, vice-chairman of staff for the Air Force, testified, "I do not understand why a force that will deter a big war will not deter a small one, too, if we want it to and say it will. . . . I think we are going to have to build for the worst cases and then use that for all the others. . . . We have been in some minor skirmishes because we did not make it clear that we would use our full power if necessary. I think that a clarification along that line might be a little helpful, and then I think that a force that would deter a big war will deter a small one" (Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs*, 85 Cong., 1 sess., p. 913).

99. Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959*, p. 389.

100. *New York Times*, October 8, 1958, p. 12.

101. Statement on April 9, 1959, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1959*, 86 Cong., 1 sess., p. 466.

102. *New York Times*, April 21, 1959, p. 1.

103. Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 61–62, 64.

104. General Taylor maintained that, as a result of the strategic stalemate

among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "we have never had any centralized limited war planning at the Pentagon level. Most of the planning was done in the field by the commanders," who usually did not have "enough forces to execute even one of these plans" (Testimony on June 14, 1960, Senate Committee on Government Operations, *Hearings, Organizing for National Security,* 86 Cong., 2 sess., Pt. V, pp. 787–90, 793).

105. *New York Times,* April 26, 1960, p. 26.

106. For a discussion of several likely reasons that the United States did not use nuclear weapons in the Korean War, see Morton H. Halperin, "The Limiting Process" (draft chapter of an unpublished MS on limited war; Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1961), pp. 24–27.

107. Robert J. Donovan, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), pp. 302, 307; James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," *Life,* XL (January 16, 1956), 70 ff.; Chalmers M. Roberts, "The Day We Didn't Go to War," *Reporter,* XI (September 14, 1954), 31–35; Marquis Childs, *The Ragged Edge: The Diary of a Crisis* (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1955).

108. The specific proposal that the President turned down was, apparently, that the Chinese Nationalist air force should be permitted to bomb targets far inland on the mainland and that, if the Communists launched a retaliatory assault on Quemoy or Formosa itself, American planes should be allowed to join in attacking mainland targets, with nuclear weapons if necessary (Chalmers M. Roberts, "Battle on the Rim of Hell: President vs. War Hawks," *Reporter,* XI [December 16, 1954], 11; *New York Times,* April 7, 1955, p 15; April 21, p. 1.

109. On September 7, 1958, the Soviet news agency Tass made public a letter, delivered the same day, from Khrushchev to Eisenhower, warning that an attack on Communist China would be an attack on the Soviet Union and that "in the age of nuclear and rocket weapons of unprecedented power and rapid action" warships like those of the seventh fleet were "fit, in fact, for nothing but courtesy visits and gun salutes, and can serve as targets for the right types of rockets." This threat had been preceded by a top-level Sino-Soviet meeting, which had been followed by obviously planted rumors that the Soviet Union had agreed to give the Chinese nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles (Tang Tsou, *The Embroilment over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang, and Dulles* ["International Study Paper," No. 2 (Institute of International Studies, University of Utah, 1959)], pp. 12–14, 31–32).

110. Taylor, *op. cit.,* p. 9.

111. *Ibid.,* p. 117.

112. Malcolm W. Hoag, "The Place of Limited War in NATO Strategy," in Knorr, *op. cit.,* p. 108.

CHAPTER 6

TOWARD A STRATEGY OF LIMITED RESISTANCE

1. In the copious literature on limited war the advocates of a strategy of nuclear limited war were a minority, whose views reached their height of popularity in 1956 and 1957. One analysis received more attention than all the others put together: Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957). See, especially, chap. vi. However, by 1960 Kissinger, without abandoning his advocacy of preparedness for limited nuclear war, had come to regard conventional limited war as the best strategy, reserving nuclear weapons as a deterrent to Soviet nuclear weapons and as a

last resort in case conventional resistance should prove ineffective ("Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear? A Reappraisal," *Daedalus*, LXXXIX [Fall, 1960], 800–817). For a review of the literature on nuclear weapons and limited war, see Morton H. Halperin, "Nuclear Weapons and Limited War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V (June, 1961), 146–66.

2. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, pp. 194 ff.

3. The critique of a strategy of nuclear limited war and the argument for major reliance upon a strategy of conventional limited war were presented most cogently by James E. King, Jr., in "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXV (January, 1957), 238–56, and in a review of Kissinger's book by the same author in two issues of the *New Republic*: "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," CXXXVII (July 1, 1957), 18–21 and (July 15, 1957) 16–18; and also by William W. Kaufmann, "The Crisis in Military Affairs," *World Politics*, X (July, 1958), 579–603; Arnold Wolfers, "Europe and the NATO Shield," *International Organization* XII (Autumn, 1958), 425–39; Roger Hilsman, "On NATO Strategy," in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), *Alliance Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), pp. 173–77; Malcolm W. Hoag, "The Place of Limited War in NATO Strategy," in Klaus Knorr (ed.), *NATO and American Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), chap. v; P. M. S. Blackett, *Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1956); and F. O. Miksche, *The Failure of Atomic Strategy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958).

4. See the discussion of this relationship in analytical and historical terms in Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 22 ff. and chap. iv.

5. Bernard Brodie stresses this point in his discussion of limited war in *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 309–14.

6. The qualities of weapons systems that facilitate or obstruct agreement on reciprocal restraints are discussed in Thomas C. Schelling, *Nuclear Weapons and Limited War* (RAND Corporation Study P-1620, February 20, 1959). Schelling analyzes the process of "tacit bargaining" in reaching mutual limitations more intensively in "Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, I (March, 1957), 19–36.

7. One can imagine target and geographical restrictions on nuclear warfare that, theoretically, would be relatively susceptible to mutual verification, but they would seem to place one or the other side at too great a military disadvantage for the belligerents to have a mutual interest in observing them. For example, confining nuclear bursts to antiaircraft shells, to employment at sea, or to use by a belligerent within his own territory would seem to suffer from this difficulty.

8. Roger Hilsman, *loc. cit.*, p. 32.

9. Hoag, *loc. cit.*, p. 119.

10. Most of the considerations that make primary reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons inadvisable also make primary reliance upon biological and radiological weapons inadvisable. However, a strategy for using disabling, as opposed to lethal, chemical weapons might be compatible with the comparative advantages of relying upon conventional resistance, if they could be successfully distinguished from lethal weapons in the eyes of the enemy and allies.

11. Henry Kissinger presents the case against dual-purpose units and for separate nuclear commands in *The Necessity for Choice* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1961), pp. 91–93.

12. As Malcolm Hoag has pointed out, the expense of adding an adequate con-

ventional limited-war capability to a tactical nuclear war capability would depend upon the degree of preparation NATO sought in the latter sphere. To be thoroughly prepared for tactical nuclear warfare (which would include being prepared to fight effectively if one received the first nuclear blow) would entail great expense, but to settle for something like the present inadequate level of preparation for tactical nuclear warfare would not. If the primary function of nuclear weapons were to deter the other side from using them, such a subordination of nuclear to conventional capabilities would be an acceptable compromise between inadequate and thorough preparation for both kinds of warfare (Hoag, *loc cit.*, pp. 121–23); see also, by the same author, "What Interdependence for NATO?" *World Politics*, XII (April, 1960), 369–90.

13. Senate Special Committee To Study the Foreign Aid Program, *Hearings, The Foreign Aid Program*, 85 Cong., 1 sess., p. 402.

14. *New York Times*, March 16, 1955, p. 1.

15. *Ibid.*, November 29, 1954, p. 4. In January, 1955, James Reston reported that a strategy called "2X" was being discussed in the administration. He explained that the strategy meant punishing the aggressor with twice his anticipated gain (*ibid.*, January 9, 1955, Sec. 4, p. 8).

16. "Challenge and Response in United States Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVI (October, 1957), 25–43; see, especially, pp. 30–33.

17. Statement to a press conference on March 11, 1959 (*New York Times*, March 12, 1959, p. 12). When Eisenhower was asked whether, having ruled out a ground war and having said that a nuclear war would not free anyone, he would recommend any intermediate response if the Russians really started something, he replied, "No . . . I didn't say that nuclear war is a complete impossibility. I said it couldn't, as I see it, free anything. Destruction is not a good police force." He concluded that the West had to protect itself and never "back up on our rights and our responsibilities." At another time he said that, since the West would not fight a ground war, it would have to go to "other means" and "think in much, much bigger terms." On the other hand, General Maxwell Taylor, a few hours after General Eisenhower's press conference, told a Senate committee that he could envision the Berlin crisis resulting in a conventional war in which the Soviet Union elected to throw its satellite forces against the West without committing its own power. In this event, he said, the West could win a prolonged conventional ground war in Central Europe (*ibid.*, March 15, 1959, p. 1).

18. *Ibid.*, March 8, 1959, pp. 1, 8.

19. General Norstad's major statements on NATO strategy and forces appear in the *New York Times*, June 25, 1956, p. 22; *Bulletin*, XXXVI (February 18, 1957), 251–55, and XXXVII (December 16, 1957), 952–55, "The Sword and the Shield," *Army*, VIII (December, 1957), 44–47; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1958*, 85 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 185 ff.; Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Mutual Security Appropriations for 1959*, 85 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 564–65; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1959*, p. 466; and "NATO: Strength and Spirit," *NATO Letter*, VIII (January, 1960), 7–11.

20. One indication that MC-70 did envision a contingency between a brief conventional holding action and a general nuclear war was its requirement for supplies and equipment to keep troops in the field for ninety days. In March, 1960, the British submitted a paper to the Defense Ministers arguing that this requirement should be based on no more than a thirty-day war, since a war in Europe would be either strictly localized or one of total destruction (*Manchester Guardian Weekly*, March 31, 1960, p. 5).

21. The word "interdependence" probably first gained currency when it appeared in the communiqué of October, 1957, following President Eisenhower's and Prime Minister Macmillan's meeting in Washington: "The arrangements which the nations of the free world have made for collective defense and mutual help are based on the recognition that the concept of national self-sufficiency is out of date. The countries of the free world are interdependent, and only in genuine partnership, by combining their resources and sharing tasks in many fields, can progress and safety be found. For our part, we have agreed that our two countries will henceforth act in accordance with this principle." However, here the principle was applied quite narrowly to America's sharing of nuclear information and weapons with Great Britain (*Bulletin,* XXXVI [November 11, 1957], 739–40). "Interdependence" has subsequently been applied to the objectives of strategic, logistical, and political specialization and co-ordination. For analysis of the problems of interdependence in NATO, see Alastair Buchan, *NATO in the 1960's: The Implications of Interdependence* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960); Denis Healey, "Interdependence," *Political Quarterly* (January–March, 1960), 46–56, and Hoag, "What Interdependence for NATO?" *World Politics,* XII, 369–90, "On NATO Pooling," *World Politics,* X (April, 1958), 475–83; and "The Economics of Military Alliance," in Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean (eds.), *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), chap. xv.

22. For example, in 1960 Alastair Buchan noted that the existing system of ground defense was too unintegrated to permit the necessary mobility. "The present twenty-one divisions in Europe," he stated, "are nearly static, in that they are tied to national lines of communication and have so few standardized components that it would be virtually impossible to despatch, say, two American divisions to Westphalia or a British division to Bavaria" (Buchan, *op. cit.,* p. 97).

23. See the statistical tables on gross national product and production of basic commodities in the study prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, *United States Foreign Policy: Western Europe* (1959), 86 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 85–86. In part, the tremendous rate of growth reflected the low postwar (1948) base from which it was calculated. However, the growth after 1953 was equally impressive. Buchan noted that industrial production was 52 per cent higher in the six countries of the European Economic Community in mid-1959 that it was in 1953 (Buchan, *op. cit.,* p. 39).

24. In 1958 the Institute of Strategic Studies estimated that the United States, Britain, and France were spending over 8 per cent of their national income on defense, whereas the alliance as a whole was spending only 5.3 per cent. West Germany had never spent over 4 per cent (*ibid.,* p. 39). The Enskilda Bank of Stockholm estimated that the United States spent 10 per cent of its gross national product on defense, Britain, 7 per cent; France, 6 per cent (including Algerian war costs); and the other allies, 3 or 4 per cent (cited in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Foreign Policy,* 87 Cong., 1 sess., Part 2, p. 379). At the end of 1959 it was estimated that the re-equipment of NATO forces up to minimum requirements in the next five years would cost the European members about 10 billion dollars more than they were currently spending. This would mean that the European allies would have to increase their defense budgets by 5 to 25 per cent. Yet, since 1952, their defense spending, on the average, had dropped from a peak of 7.6 per cent of total national spending to about 6 per cent in 1959, compared to United States defense spending of about 11.2 per cent of national spending (*U.S. News and World Report,* December 28, 1959, p. 27). On the complexities of reaching an efficient and equitable burden-

sharing formula, see Hoag, *World Politics,* X, 481–83, and Lincoln Gordon, "Economic Aspects of Coalition Diplomacy: The NATO Experience," *International Organization,* X (Autumn, 1956), 531–37.

25. On the process and effect of the Annual Review, see M. Margaret Ball, *NATO and the European Union Movement* (London: Stevens & Sons, 1959), pp. 78 ff.

26. Buchan discusses the opportunities and problems of standardization and common financing in *op. cit.*, chap. viii, "The Underpinning of Interdependence."

27. Gallois advocated greater integration of logistics and of the development and manufacture of weapons, their disposition, emplacement, and maintenance. However, in the "strategy of operations," as opposed to the "strategy of means," he advocated greater national responsibility. To correct the two great weaknesses of NATO's defense posture, an inadequate limited-resistance capability and strategy of means, he contended that "what is now a national concern—namely the assembling of the means required to wage war—must be made a collective one, while responsibility for the use of the arsenal thus assembled must be shifted from the collective to the national level" (Pierre M. Gallois, "New Teeth for NATO," *Foreign Affairs,* XXXIX [October, 1960], 80).

28. Malcolm Hoag noted that the Netherlands' production of British-designed aircraft fitted with Belgian-manufactured engines and Italy's assembling of U.S. Sabres represented uneconomic diversions of aircraft production from the United Kingdom and the United States, although they were examples of international cooperation (*World Politics,* X, 478). However, such dispersal of production is not necessarily intended to economize; it may be intended to distribute economic benefits equitably or, as in the case of Britain's production of V-bombers, to serve as a concession to national pride and independent deterrence. Of course, whether these purposes should take priority over the economic use of over-all resources is not an economic question. Considerations of equity and politics also figure strongly in the much agitated problem of burden-sharing. Thus by 1960 the United States, surveying the increasing expenditures required to expand and re-equip NATO forces and an adverse international balance of payments, was growing increasingly dissatisfied with what she regarded as her disproportionate share of NATO's financial burden, in view of her allies' greatly increased economic capacities and their large share of the benefits of collective defense in comparison to the size of their military efforts (*New York Times,* December 18, 1959, p. 3). See Lincoln Gordon's trenchant discussion of the relationship between the economy, the equity, and the adequacy of allied defense efforts (*op. cit.*).

29. One example of this relation between integration and strategy, with important political overtones, was pointed up by West Germany's move in February, 1960, to acquire supply bases in Spain, which touched off a storm of apprehension and protest in Europe and especially in Great Britain. The German defense minister, Franz Josef Strauss, defended the move as a means of acquiring the necessary rear-area supply bases that NATO had failed to provide according to an earlier NATO plan for a network of such bases. Although NATO had written off this integrated logistics plan on the grounds that it would be unnecessary in the nuclear war that it planned to fight, West German leaders, with NATO encouragement, had continued to plan for a strong conventional resistance on the forward line, for which a rear-area supply system would be essential (*New York Times,* February 25, 1960, p. 3; March 6, p. 5). Before the end of 1960 Germany agreed with France to place German supply bases on French soil.

CHAPTER 7

THE ONSET OF THE MISSILE AGE

1. Intelligence estimates, prompted by the unprecedented appearance of formations of Soviet long-range and medium-range jet bombers in the May Day parade of 1954, led the Air Force to the conclusion that the Soviet Union was producing strategic jet bombers at a rate at least as high as the American rate and was capable of building a bombing force of from 600 to 800 Bison bombers, comparable to the American B-52, by 1959–60. In the spring of 1956 concern over this prospect led to congressional hearings on airpower, in which Air Force officers, Senator Symington, and others expressed alarm about the possibility that the Soviet Union might gain a first-strike capability that could knock out all the United States key bases in a surprise attack unless the B-52's rate of production were increased (Subcommittee on the Air Force, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, Study of Airpower,* 84 Cong., 2 sess). A few years later, however, the Soviet Union appeared not to have built more than one-sixth of their estimated theoretical capabilities—perhaps because she decided to put her strategic effort into missiles instead—and the original estimates were revised sharply downward in 1957. Yet another Moscow air show on July 9, 1961, revealed many varieties of new and far-advanced bombers and fighters, which led to a counter-revision.

2. In October, 1959, Joseph Alsop stated that "the best official forecast" of American-Soviet ICBM numbers was 30 to 100 in 1960, 70 to 500 in 1961, 130 to 1,000 in 1962, and 130 to 1,500 in 1963 (*Washington Post,* October 7, 1959, p. A17). For another alarmed account of the "missile gap," based on published accounts and interviews, see Thomas R. Phillips, "The Growing Missile Gap," *Reporter,* XX (January 8, 1959), 10–16. James R. Shepley reported that Secretary McElroy estimated a possible Soviet missile lead of three-to-one ("Life and Death Debate over Missile Program," *Life,* XLVI [March 9, 1959], 116 ff.). This allegation was later widely repeated, but there is no record of McElroy's statement. His successor, Thomas S. Gates, originally accepted the view that McElroy had anticipated the possibility of a three-to-one ratio but later said that, although he assumed from the repeated allegations to that effect that McElroy must have made such a statement, his research staff had failed to verify the assumption (Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961,* 86 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 476–78). In January, 1960, SAC Commander General Thomas S. Power declared that if the Russians had 300 ballistic missiles, only 150 of which were ICBM's, they could "virtually wipe out our entire nuclear strike capability within a span of thirty minutes" (Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961,* pp. 274–79). However, he did not assert that the Russians actually had this number of missiles on launching pads.

3. The most influential statement of this view was written by a RAND specialist, Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs,* XXXVIII (January, 1959), 211–34. For an equally authoritative and more comprehensive analysis of the implications of missile technology for deterrence, based on unclassified sources, see *Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy,* study prepared at the request of

the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, December, 1959.

4. See, particularly, McElroy's testimony in Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960,* in January, 1959, and Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960,* in May, 1959.

5. Testimony of administration spokesmen, Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Aeronautical and Space Services, *Hearings, Missiles, Space, and Other Major Defense Matters,* 86 Cong., 2 sess. Also, Charles J. V. Murphy, "Defense: The Converging Decisions," *Fortune,* LVIII (October, 1958), 230.

6. In May, 1959, McElroy explained that official estimates of Soviet ICBM's were based on the "properly conservative practice" of projecting what the Soviet Union seemed capable of producing and that "it is when the number of ICBM's which the United States actually plans to produce is compared to the number it is estimated the Soviet Union can produce that the so-called missile gap arises." He went on to say that the Soviet Union does not always produce what estimates say it could produce (Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960,* pp. 9–10). In January, 1960, Secretary of Defense Gates explained that additional intelligence information had enabled the government to downgrade the estimated number of Soviet ICBM's, which had been based on what they theoretically could produce (Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961,* p. 24). In an article in April, 1959, Charles J. V. Murphy stated that intelligence estimates were first revised in early 1958, less than a year after the first successful Russian ICBM test in August, 1957, because the ICBM firings came to a long halt and were resumed only at a slow rate thereafter ("The Embattled Mr. McElroy," *Fortune,* LIX [April, 1959], 242).

7. See pp. 200–201, below.

8. Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961,* pp. 4, 26, 136.

9. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* XIV, No. 2, p. 11.

10. Quoted by Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Book the Russians Would Like To Forget," *Reporter,* XXIII (December 22, 1960), 30.

11. "On the Character of Modern Warfare," *International Affairs,* X (October, 1960), 25, 26.

12. *New York Times,* December 7, 1960, p. 15. The complete text of both the Moscow statement and Khrushchev's speech is reproduced in *Two Communist Manifestoes* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1961).

13. *Ibid.,* pp. 53–54.

14. *Ibid.,* p. 15.

15. The most systematic expositions of the strategy of limited nuclear retaliation are Morton A. Kaplan, "The Calculus of Nuclear Deterrence," *World Politics,* XI (October, 1958), 20–43, and "The Strategy of Limited Retaliation" ("Policy Memorandum," No. 19 [Princeton University Center for International Studies, April 9, 1959]). For a balanced appraisal of this strategy, see Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 69–75, 193–224. See also Leo Szilard, "How To Live with the Bomb and Survive," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* XVI (February, 1960), 59–73.

16. The Soviet doctrine of pre-emptive attack is discussed in Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,

Inc., 1958), and at greater length in Herbert S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1959).

17. See Thomas C. Schelling's seminal discussion of different kinds of safeguards against surprise attack: "Surprise Attack and Disarmament," in Klaus Knorr (ed.), *NATO and American Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), and the elaboration and refinement of this discussion in Schelling and Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).

18. Henry A. Kissinger and Thomas C. Schelling have suggested that, physically, such communication could be promoted by the establishment in the United States and the Soviet Union of observation and communications teams with special equipment capable of instantaneous communication to the Soviet and American governments and between the two (Kissinger, "Arms Control, Inspection, and Suprise Attack," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVIII [July, 1960], 566–67; Schelling, "Arms Control: Proposal for a Special Surveillance Force," *World Politics*, XIII [October, 1960], 11). On the opportunities and difficulties of informal and tacit arms control agreements, see Schelling, "Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization," *Daedalus*, XXCIX (Fall, 1960), 902–10, and Schelling and Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control*, chap. viii.

19. In the articles and books above, Schelling and Kissinger outline formal agreements designed to enable the parties to provide each other with positive evidence that they are not preparing a surprise attack.

20. Remarks on the Berlin crisis in a press conference, *New York Times*, March 12, 1959, p. 12; and remarks at a state dinner in Manila, *ibid.*, June 16, 1960, p. 14.

21. The Air Force just barely got a budgetary concession to a major counterforce program: the development and production of the B-70 bomber. However, it did better in getting counterforce targets included in the integrated strategic target list. As Hanson Baldwin wrote of the target compromise in 1960, "The nation's current strategic concept is keyed to a target list that includes Soviet cities as well as missile sites and air bases. . . . Any contemporary target list must include both military installations and cities, many high-ranking Pentagon officials maintain" (*ibid.*, January 14, 1961, p. 10).

22. Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960*, p. 71.

23. Senate Subcommittee on the Air Force, *Study of Airpower*, p. 10.

24. McElroy testified that "an attack upon our forces and friends in Western Europe would be an attack upon the United States" (Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960*, p. 68). LeMay defined the first objective of SAC's role as deterring aggression against the United States and her allies and defined the other objectives—gaining air superiority and winning the war—without distinguishing between first- and second-strike missions (Senate Subcommittee on the Air Force, *Study of Airpower*, p. 102).

25. Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960*, p. 929.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 850.

27. Senate Subcommittee on the Air Force, *Study of Airpower*, p. 102.

28. Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960*, 86 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 254, 287.

29. The most complete published exposition of the strategy of minimum deterrence by a Navy officer was Cmdr. P. H. Backus' "Finite Deterrence, Controlled Retaliation," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, LXXX (March,

1959), 23–29. However, Backus' article was more extreme than official Navy doctrine.

30. Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960,* pp. 329–30. General Taylor presents a similar formula in *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), p. 148.

31. Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960,* pp. 477, 591, 594.

32. *The Uncertain Trumpet,* pp. 140–42; testimony on February 4, 1960, Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, *Missiles, Space and Other Major Defense Matters,* p. 194.

33. In his book General Taylor wrote that by 1961 Soviet missiles would be so concealed, dispersed, and mobile that "it will become impossible for our U.S. bombers and missiles to eliminate the Soviet missile threat even by an anticipatory strike" (*op. cit.*, pp. 132–33). Admiral Burke testified on February 8, 1960, that the United States did not have "the least idea" where Soviet missile sites were—except for test sites—and would never know where many of them were (Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommitte, *Missiles, Space, and Other Major Defense Matters,* pp. 287, 338).

34. *Ibid.*, p. 258. Lemnitzer drew the conclusion that limited war was rendered more likely.

35. From Power's speech to the Economic Club of New York on January 19, 1960, and from his testimony on February 2 (*ibid.*, pp. 7, 1–56).

36. Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961,* pp. 232–33.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 6. The italics are mine.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

42. *New York Times,* February 19, 1960, p. 4.

43. On May 25, 1960, in his radio and television address to the nation, explaining the U-2 incident and the collapse of the summit meeting, President Eisenhower appealed for a "world of open societies" and an international open skies agreement. After describing the ease with which the Soviet Union could acquire information about American cities, dams, highways, and the like, he said, "Soviet distrust, however, does still remain. To allay these misgivings I offered five years ago to open our skies to Soviet reconnaissance aircraft on a reciprocal basis. The Soviets refused. That offer is still open. At an appropriate time America will submit such a program to the United Nations, together with the recommendation that the United Nations itself conduct this reconnaissance" (*ibid.*, May 26, 1960, p. 6).

44. Address on September 22, 1960 (*ibid.*, September 23, 1960, p. 14).

45. Walter Lippmann, *The Communist World and Ours* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1958), pp. 13–14.

46. *Two Communist Manifestoes,* p. 61.

47. Speech on January 6, 1961 (*ibid.*, p. 56).

CHAPTER 8

THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR DIFFUSION

1. According to estimates made by a committee of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (*The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control* ["National Planning Association, Planning Pamphlet," No. 108 (1959)]). This report con-

cluded that as of 1959 eleven countries could produce nuclear warheads by themselves in five years if they wanted to; eight others could follow shortly; and in a decade at least six others could join the nuclear club.

2. In October, 1960, private firms in West Germany and the Netherlands had advanced so far toward developing a relatively cheap process for producing enriched uranium that the United States induced the West German government to classify the process as a state secret in order to prevent the spread of nuclear production to other nations (*New York Times,* October 12, 1960, p. 1; October 13, p. 18).

3. In his testimony for the 1954 Act, Dulles said, "The art of telling people what a weapon is like, what it can do to others, what it can do to you, how you can protect yourself, and at the same time not tell anybody how you produce the weapon, that undoubtedly is a difficult task of definition" (Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Hearings, To Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,* 83 Cong., 2 sess., p. 702).

4. *Ibid.,* p. 703.

5. *New York Times,* December 14, 1956, p. 1.

6. *Ibid.,* February 1, 1957, p. 1; *New York Herald Tribune,* December 15, 1956, p. 8.

7. In 1942 the United States entered into an agreement with Britain and Canada for unrestricted exchange of information on atomic energy. However, British and Canadian scientists complained that Americans (especially the military leadership of the Manhattan project) imposed restrictions upon full nuclear sharing and co-operation. Churchill repeatedly sought the resumption of full exchange of information. Finally, when he threatened to carry out a program of separate research, President Roosevelt arranged a heads-of-government agreement, signed at Quebec in August, 1943, which set up a Combined Policy Committee for the complete interchange of information and ideas and which stipulated that neither power would use the weapons against third parties without the other's consent or communicate any nuclear information to third parties without mutual consent.

After the end of the war the American government treated this wartime agreement as void and stopped exchanging information on atomic weapons developments. The McMahon Act was intended to close the door completely on the sharing of nuclear weapons information, on the supposition that sharing would destroy the secrecy necessary to preserve America's nuclear monopoly against the Russians.

Nevertheless, the Atomic Energy Commission, largely on the initiative of Chairman Lilienthal and Dr. Oppenheimer of the General Advisory Committee, undertook an energetic program of disseminating unclassified atomic information, including a tripartite declassification program with Britain and Canada. In January, 1948, the United States reached a *modus vivendi* whereby the British granted the United States an approximately equal division of uranium produced in the Congo, the United States agreed to disclose nuclear data in nine categories excluding weapons production, and the provision of the Quebec agreement on mutual consultation before using the bomb was explicitly revoked. In 1949 President Truman was even prepared to seek the amendment of the McMahon Act to permit a "full partnership" with Britain in nuclear know-how, including the exchange of information on atomic weapons production. However, the attacks of the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on alleged AEC security laxness, beginning in 1948, and the objections of Senator Vandenberg discouraged the President from carrying out his plans for nuclear sharing.

In the meanwhile, the British undertook their own nuclear program, while continually urging the United States to negotiate a freer exchange of informa-

tion (Leonard Bertin, *Atom Harvest* [London: Secker and Warburg, 1955], pp. 5, 70 ff.; Winston S. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate* [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950], pp. 381, 809; Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952], pp. 252–65; Walter Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries* [New York: Viking Press, 1951], pp. 336–39, 471–72; Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc.], II, 294–304).

8. British pressure for nuclear sharing won the first amendment of the Atomic Energy Act in 1951, but it was not until after the Russian H-bomb explosion in 1953 had dramatically undermined the original reason for the McMahon Act that the way was opened for substantial sharing with Britain under the 1954 amendment. The provision in this 1954 law (Section 123) that all agreements for nuclear co-operation had to lie before the Joint Atomic Energy Committee for a thirty-day period of review before becoming effective facilitated the government's policy of giving Britain preferential treatment; for, in effect, it enabled Congress to administer the legal criteria for sharing with a discrimination among allies that the executive branch would have found embarrassing. (To reject an executive agreement under this provision, a congressional concurrent resolution would be necessary.) In June, 1956, the Defense Department, with presidential and State Department support but against AEC and JCAE objections, used a legal technicality to conclude an agreement to give the British secrets about the atomic submarine "Nautilus," exchanging information on small military reactors and ship propulsion reactors and sending Britain enriched uranium in return for depleted uranium (*New York Times*, November 16, 1957, p. 1). The United States began to provide information under this agreement in April, 1957.

9. *Ibid.*, March 12, 1957, p. 14; *NATO Letter*, V (April, 1957), p. 22.

10. In his speech on December 8, 1953, the President proposed that the United Nations should sponsor a program for the peaceful application of atomic energy under inspection and control to prevent the misapplication of fissionable and other materials which participating nations would allocate to the international agency.

11. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, Statute of IAEA*, 84 Cong., 1 sess., p. 4.

12. Dulles said that the administration had considered making fissionable materials available to Britain if she would agree to stop production, but that he thought it would be better to deal with all the allies through NATO in order to avoid "drawing lines of distinction" between them. He pointed out that the nuclear stockpiles might be under the command of NATO's supreme commander in his capacity as the commander of American forces in Europe, but he said that the stockpiling plan might, nevertheless, require a change in the Atomic Energy Act (*Washington Post*, July 17, 1957, p. 1).

13. *New York Times*, July 18, 1957, p. 4.

14. Secretary of Defense McElroy told a NATO parliamentarians' conference that the United States would seek IRBM launching sites in Europe and was considering a plan for giving certain allies control of the warheads as well as the missiles (*ibid.*, November 16, 1957, p. 1; *New York Herald Tribune*, November 17, 1957, p. 1). A few days later Secretary of State Dulles told a press conference that the United States would help establish missile bases in NATO countries that wanted them; that stockpiles of nuclear warheads for both strategic and tactical weapons, under American custody, would be provided at points of ready access during war; and that the United States would give her allies "a deeper sense of responsibility for their safety" by insuring

"a very considerable measure of allied participation" in the handling of the missiles (*New York Times,* November 20, 1957, p. 1).

15. On the submarine suggestion, see *New York Herald Tribune,* December 17, 1957, p. 1; *Christian Science Monitor,* December 17, 1957, p. 1.

16. *NATO Letter,* VI (January, 1958), pp. 11–12.

17. According to C. L. Sulzberger, writing from Paris (*New York Times,* June 25, 1960, p. 20).

18. For the original research and analysis of the military implications of Euratom I am indebted to Harold L. Nieburg for his unpublished doctoral dissertation, "Atomic Secrecy and Foreign Policy" (University of Chicago, 1961).

19. *Times* (London), April 18, 1958, p. 12; *New York Times,* April 15, 1958, p. 1.

20. Atomic Energy Committee, *Twenty-fourth Semiannual Report* (1958), pp. 24–25; Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Proposed Euratom Agreements with Associated Documents and Materials,* 85 Cong., 2 sess., p. 21.

21. *Proceedings,* Assembly of Western European Union, Document 87 (June 2, 1958), pp. 120–21.

22. Statement on January 31, 1958, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Hearings, To Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,* 85 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 90–94.

23. Statement on April 17, 1958, before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (*Bulletin,* XXXVIII [May 5, 1958], 741–42.

24. The discriminatory intent of this provision was implicit in the report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the bill, which defined "substantial progress" as follows: "The cooperating nation must have achieved considerably more than a mere theoretical knowledge of atomic weapons design, or the testing of a limited number of atomic weapons. It is intended that the cooperating nation must have achieved a capability of its own of fabricating a variety of atomic weapons, and constructed and operated the necessary facilities, including weapons research and development laboratories, weapons manufacturing facilities, a weapon testing station, and trained personnel to operate each of these facilities" (Senate Report 1654, House Report 1859, 85 Cong., 2 sess., p. 12). The capacity of Congress to discriminate in behalf of certain allies and against others was further enhanced by an amendment to Section 123, which provided that co-operation pertaining to military information or materials could be undertaken only after "the proposed agreement for cooperation, together with the approval and determination of the President . . . has been submitted to the Congress and referred to the Joint Committee, and a period of sixty days has elapsed while Congress is in session, but any such proposed agreement for cooperation shall not become effective if during such sixty-day period the Congress passes a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the proposed agreement for cooperation."

25. *New York Times,* July 6, 1958, p. 1. American assistance was said to include development of a propulsion reactor and the transfer of enriched nuclear fuel. Some press reports indicated that Dulles had gone so far as to offer a submarine reactor, as had been promised to Britain (*ibid.,* March 15, 1959, p. 1).

26. Thus the special assistant to the secretary of state for atomic energy and disarmament told the JCAE on June 17, 1959, "The bar to our cooperation with France . . . has not been security in the French defense establishment, but has been our own national policy of not assisting fourth countries to become nuclear powers" (Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Hearings, Agreements for Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes,* 86 Cong., 1 sess., p. 46). And on June 11 the deputy assistant secretary of state for European affairs said, "In my judgment, France–the De Gaulle administration and De Gaulle specifically–could

not be satisfied with anything short of an agreement which would enable France to become a nuclear power" (*ibid.*, p. 9).

27. *New York Times,* May 15, 1960, p. 4; June 10, p. 3.

28. Speech on December 6, 1959, to the Institute of World Affairs at the University of Southern California, *NATO Letter,* VIII (January, 1960), p. 10.

29. *Times* (London), December 3, 1959, p. 10; December 4, p. 9; *Manchester Guardian,* December 4, 1959, p. 1.

30. When asked by a reporter whether he favored a change in the law so as to provide allies with custody of weapons that Russia already possessed or knew how to make, the President said, "Well, from the very beginning, from what I knew about allied cooperation, and so on, I have always been of the belief that we should not deny to our allies what the enemies, what your potential enemy already has. We do want allies to be treated as partners and allies, and not as junior members of a firm who are to be seen but not heard. So I would think that it woud be better, for the interests of the United States, to make our law more liberal, as long as . . . we are confident, by our treaties and everything else [that the recipient countries would] stand by us in time of trouble" (*New York Times,* February 4, 1960, p. 12).

31. *Ibid.*, February 8, 1960, p. 3.

32. JCAE press release, No. 253-A, February 3, 1960; *New York Times,* February 7, 1960, p. 1.

33. *Ibid.*, February 14, 1960, p. 2.

34. *Ibid.*, March 3, 1960, p. 1.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

36. *Ibid.*, March 8, 1960, p. 13.

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid.*, March 20, 1960, p. 1.

39. Speech on March 9, 1960, *Congressional Record,* 86 Cong., 2 sess., p. 5067.

40. *New York Times,* March 11, 1960, p. 1.

41. *Ibid.*, March 20, 1960, p. 1.

42. *Washington Post,* April 15, 1960, p. A6; *New York Times,* July 23, 1960, p. 1.

43. *New York Times,* April 14, 1960, pp. 1, 3; May 31, pp. 1, 8; June 2, p. 3.

44. C. L. Sulzberger, *New York Times,* June 25, 1960, p. 20.

45. *Ibid.*, July 23, 1960, p. 1.

46. See Sulzberger's account of the meeting of these three leaders at Lake Como on September 9 (*ibid.*, November 23, 1960, p. 28).

47. *Ibid.*, October 20, 1960, p. 13.

48. The private study was undertaken by Robert R. Bowie, director of the Center of International Affairs at Harvard and formerly a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Although the Bowie study was not made public, its general contents were reported in the press (*ibid.*, October 30, 1960, p. 2; November 24, p. 1; *Chicago Sun Times,* October 13, 1960, p. 1).

49. *Ibid.*, November 22, 1960, p. 2.

50. *New York Times,* November 24, 1960, p. 10; November 27, p. 1.

51. *Ibid.*, December 17, 1960, p. 1; *Washington Post,* December 19, 1960, p. 6.

52. *New York Times,* December 19, 1960, p. 12.

53. See Alastair Buchan, "Britain and the Nuclear Deterrent," *Political Quarterly,* XXXI (January–March, 1960), 36–45.

54. The white paper of 1954 stated, "The primary deterrent . . . remains the atomic bomb and the ability of the highly organized and trained United States strategic air power to use it. From our past experience and current knowledge we have a significant contribution to make both to the technical and to the

tactical development of strategic air power. We intend as soon as possible to build up in the Royal Air Force a force of modern bombers capable of using the atomic weapon to the fullest effect."

"As the deterrent continues to grow it should have an increasing effect upon the cold war by making less likely such adventures on the part of the Communist world as their aggression in Korea. This should be of benefit to us by enabling us to reduce the great dispersal of effort which the existing international tension has hitherto imposed upon us" (*Statement on Defense, 1954*, Cmd. 9075, p. 5).

The implications of this confidence in nuclear deterrence for defense expenditures were logically counteracted by the paper's view that preparations for global war should contemplate a period of "broken-backed" war after the atomic phase, a view that was not abandoned until 1957. However, actual preparations for broken-backed war were largely confined to a moderate continuation of certain naval expenditures.

55. *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), DXXXVII, 1905.

56. *Ibid.*, col. 1938 ff., 1945–46, 2187.

57. See the statement of Denis Healey, *ibid.*, col. 1931–37.

58. *Statement on Defense, 1956*, Cmd. 9691, p. 4.

59. Statement by Duncan Sandys on April 16, 1957, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), DLXVIII, 1759.

60. *Ibid.*, col. 1760–61.

61. Motion presented in parliament on February 28, 1956 (*Parliamentary Debates* [Commons], DLXIX, 1036).

62. *56th Annual Report of the Labor Party* (1957), pp. 177, 181. See also the report of the party conference in the *Times* (London), October 4, 1957, p. 4.

63. *Report on Defense*, 1958, Cmd. 363, p. 2.

64. *Times* (London), February 24, 1958, p. 3.

65. *Ibid.*, November 14, 1958, p. 4.

66. *Ibid.*, October 15, 1958, p. 13; October 16, p. 13.

67. *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), DLXXXIII, 633–35.

68. A Gallup poll published in December, 1958, reported that 60 per cent of Labor supporters and 54 per cent of Conservative and Liberal supporters, when asked whether the proposed missile bases should be built, answered "No" (Reported in Alastair Buchan, "Britain Debates the 'Balance of Terror,'" *Reporter*, XVIII [April 3, 1958], 8–11). The Labor press, led by the *Daily Herald*, and the Liberal *Manchester Guardian* were especially active in opposing the missile bases. Sixty-nine Labor party members, or about one-quarter of the membership, signed a letter indorsing the *Daily Herald's* position, which included the proposal that Britain renounce the production of nuclear weapons. The official Labor position opposed the installation of missile bases until after Summit talks with the Soviet Union, but did not oppose the H-bomb program.

69. Hedley Bull, in pointing to the emotional content of the unilateralist movement, characterized the campaign as "the inheritor of the radical tradition of dissent from British foreign policy," drawing its support from the desire to revive the "moral enthusiasm and heroic spirit" of the Labor Party and from the desire that "Britain should play once again an independent role on the center of of the World's political stage" ("The Many Sides of British Unilateralism," *Reporter*, XXIV [March 16, 1961], 35–37). For a similar interpretation, stressing also the CND's tone of national self-righteousness and anti-Americanism, see David Marquand, "England, the Bomb, the Marchers," *Commentary*, XXIX (May, 1960), 380–86.

70. *New York Herald Tribune*, February 19, 1958, p. 1; *Christian Science Monitor*, February 19, 1958, p. 6; *New Leader*, XLI (May 26, 1958), 9–10;

Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959).

71. Bertrand Russell, "The Case for Neutralism," *New York Times Magazine*, July 24, 1960, pp. 10 ff. Hugh Gaitskell argued the case against British unilateral nuclear disarmament and neutralism in *ibid.*, pp. 11 ff.

72. *Defense in the Nuclear Age* (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1958), p. 141.

73. *New York Times*, October 3, 1958, p. 9.

74. For the full text of this proposal, see the revised joint declaration on nuclear weapons and disarmament issued on June 24, 1959, by the Labor party and the Trades Union Congress, reported in the *Manchester Guardian*, June 25, 1959, p. 2.

75. *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), DCXVIII, 1136–39.

76. *New York Times*, June 23, 1960, p. 11; *Manchester Guardian*, June 23, 1960, p. 1. The full text of the Labor party's statement on defense and disarmament policies was published on page 3 of the same issue.

77. *New York Times*, October 6, 1960, p. 1.

78. Cited in Buchan, "Britain Debates the 'Balance of Terror,'" *loc. cit.*, p. 10, and in the *Observer*, June 28, 1959, p. 11.

79. Gallup poll of April, 1958, cited in Leon D. Epstein, "Britain and the H-bomb, 1955–1958," *Review of Politics*, XXI (July, 1959), 515 n.

80. Gallup polls in December, 1957, and February, 1958, cited in *ibid.*, notes on pp. 526, 521.

81. Speech by Defense Minister Strauss, *Die Welt*, June 24, 1959, cited in Gerald Freund, *Germany between Two Worlds* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1961), p. 152

82. In an interview with R. H. S. Crossman in the *Daily Mirror* (London), April 2, 1958, and with Gerald Freund—both interviews in March, 1958 (Freund, *Germany between Two Worlds*, pp. 154–55).

83. *New York Times*, October 20, 1960, p. 13, November 2, p. 7.

84. Press conference on September 5, 1960 (*ibid.*, September 6, 1960, p. 14).

85. Speech of Le Vigan on February 27, 1960 (*ibid.*, February 28, 1960, p. 21).

86. *Ibid.*, October 26, 1960, p. 11; November 11, p. 1.

87. Radio and television address on May 31, 1960 (*ibid*, June 1, 1960, p. 9).

88. *Ibid.*, June 21, 1959, IV, p. 5.

89. Press conference on November 10, 1959 (*ibid.*, November 11, 1959, p. 10).

90. On the many material, technical, and organizational obstacles to building an adequate strategic nuclear deterrent, see Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII (January, 1959), 211–34; and, with special regard to the obstacles facing prospective or aspiring nuclear powers, Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIX (April, 1961), 361–71.

CHAPTER 9

THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. *New York Times*, November 22, 1960, p. 13.

2. Gallois, "New Teeth for NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIX (October, 1960), 67–80.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

5. The most comprehensive advocacy of the first plan was by Ben T. Moore, in his *NATO and the Future of Europe* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1958), and by TEMPO, in *International Stability: Problems and Prospects* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: General Electric Co., 1961), chap. vii. The most comprehensive advocacy of the second was by Alastair Buchan, in his *NATO in the 1960's* (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1960). For an illuminating discussion of both plans, see Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 174–92.

6. *NATO in the 1960's*, p. 70.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

8. Henry A. Kissinger, "For an Atlantic Confederacy," *Reporter*, XXIV (February 2, 1961), 20.

CHAPTER 10
DISENGAGEMENT

1. For a description and analysis of the principal disengagement proposals, see Michael Howard, *Disengagement in Europe* (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1958); P. J. D. W., "The Pursuit of Disengagement," *The World Today*, XV (April, 1959), 156–68; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, *Handbook on Arms Control and Related Problems in Europe*, 86 Cong., 1 sess.; and, most comprehensive of all, Eugène Hinterhoff, *Disengagement* (London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1959).

2. Howard, *op cit.*, p. 61.

3. George F. Kennan, *Russia, the Atom and the West* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), pp. 62–63.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 63. In a 1959 article Kennan looked forward to the creation of twelve German divisions rather than paramilitary forces as an adequate substitute for foreign garrisons ("Disengagement Revisited," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII [January, 1959], 200).

5. Kennan, *Russia, the Atom and the West*, p. 55.

6. In his book of 1957 Kennan wrote, "I would only say that it seems to me far more desirable on principle to get the Soviet forces out of Central and Eastern Europe than to cultivate a new German army for the purpose of opposing them while they remain there" (*ibid.*, p. 45). However, in his 1959 article, in which he placed his hopes for replacing foreign garrisons on twelve German divisions instead of on paramilitary forces, he asked rhetorically, "Is the retention of the foreign garrisons in Western Germany, themselves no longer the essential element in Germany's local protection, of greater value than the strategic advantage to be obtained by the removal of the Soviet divisions now in Eastern Germany to a point several hundred miles further east?" ("Disengagement Revisited," *op. cit.*, p. 200).

7. Howard, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

8. Hinterhoff, *op. cit.*, p. 389.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 389.

10. For a balanced estimate of the strength of West German sentiment for reunification, see Flora Lewis, "The Unstable States of Germany," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVIII (July, 1960), 588–97, and Gerald Freund, *Germany between Two Worlds* (Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1961), pp. 94–100. Summing up reunification sentiment, Freund wrote, "Significant forces in the Federal Republic are unenthusiastic about reunification. One finds conflicts of interest, especially

in the commercial world, which dissipate the power behind reunification efforts. Such conflicts are not of lasting importance and in all sectors of society one finds a keen awareness of the partition problem which, as interest in foreign policy increases, will inevitably arouse a more widespread concern" (*ibid.*, p. 100).

11. Kennan, "Disengagement Revisited," p. 205.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 206–7.

13. Thus, President Eisenhower, commenting on disengagement proposals in a press conference on January 14, 1959, said, "Now as to the different proposals of the Soviets and ourselves respecting Germany and Europe, we think it is just an exercise in futility to try to demilitarize, neutralize, and completely disarm a people as strong, as important and virile as is the German people. On the other hand, that being the general tenor of the Russian proposals, we oppose to that concept this one: that we would say we don't believe in the free arming of Germany in the sense that Hitler tried to rearm it. We would like to see Germany so intertwine itself with other European nations in its economy and its thinking and its defense exercises that it doesn't have to do this. It is a part of a community. Now this has been started so far as the West is concerned in the Euratom, the Coal-Steel Community and the Free Market, that kind of thing. And we think it's a very great development for the benefit and strength of Western Europe. . . . But it's also a development that almost proves they cannot be aggressive. They couldn't move except with the consent of a whole bevy of nations" (*New York Times*, January 5, 1959, p. 18). Dulles, testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1958, had presented the same argument against German reunification at the price of neutrality in even more unequivocal terms and had identified his views with those of Chancellor Adenauer (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, Review of Foreign Policy, 1958*, 85 Cong., 2 sess., Pt. 4, pp. 804–5).

14. Kennan, "Disengagement Revisited," p. 197.

15. Dean Acheson, *Power and Diplomacy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 93.

16. Kennan, "Disengagement Revisited," pp. 207–8.

17. Thus in his famous "Mr. X" article of 1947, Kennan wrote that, if the Western world could contain Soviet power for ten or fifteen years, the limits to the physical and nervous strength of the Russian people, Russia's economic vulnerability, and the difficulties of transferring power after the death of Stalin might bring about the decline of Soviet power; and that, in fact, the sprouting of the seeds of decay might already be well advanced. The United States, he declared, "has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up of the gradual mellowing of Soviet power" (George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951], pp. 120–26).

18. In 1949 President Truman once spoke of his hope that the "war of nerves" would end in Communist "surrender," just as the shooting war had ended, which was a view consistent with one he was reported to have expressed privately in the same year: that in two years communism would be forced into a great decline and peace and the weight of American policies would be assured (*New York Times*, September 3, 1949, p. 1). However, in later years Truman looked forward not to Soviet decline or defeat but to the moderation

of her policy and a willingness to live and let live. See, for example, his speech on October 15, 1951 (*Bulletin,* XXV [October 29, 1951], 680). Acheson also anticipated that as the free world grew stronger the Kremlin would conclude that Russia's own interests required that she abandon expansionist policies. See, for example, his speeches in 1950 and 1951 (*Bulletin,* XXIII [July 3, 1950], 16; [October 2, 1950], 524; [December 18, 1950], 965; XXV [October 29, 1951], 680.

19. Dulles relied primarily on certain internal developments in the Communist system to bring about a reduction of the Soviet threat—especially a growing critical faculty in the Russian people due to increased education, the moderation of state claims on the individual due to the demands of the people for consumers' goods and for greater personal security, and the dilemma posed by the need to propitiate nationalism and individualism in the satellite countries. See, for example, his statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 6, 1958 (*New York Times,* June 7, 1958, p. 8) and also his statements on May 15, 1956 (*ibid.,* May 16, 1956, p. 8) and December 7, 1957 (*ibid.,* December 8, 1957, Sec. 4, p. 5).

20. Zbigniew Brzezinski and William E. Griffith, "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs,* XXXIX (July, 1961), 642–54.

21. The text of the Soviet note appears in the *New York Times,* November 28, 1958, p. 8. For a critical analysis of the meaning and intent of this note and the subsequent Soviet positions based upon it, see Hans Speier, *The Soviet Threat to Berlin* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1960).

22. See Walter Lippmann's reports of his interview with Khrushchev in October, 1958, published in his book, *The Communist World and Ours* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1958), p. 13.

23. In a speech before the Supreme Soviet on January 14, 1960, Khrushchev depreciated the significance of forward troops in the outbreak of a war in the context of denying that Russia would be weakened militarily by the reduction of ground forces: "In present-day conditions wars would not take the course they took in the past and would bear little resemblance to former wars. In the past states tried to keep their armies as close as possible to their frontiers so that a living fence, as it were, of soldiers and cannon could be formed at the needed moment. If a state wanted to invade another country, it had to attack these troops on the border. This is how a war usually started. During the first days the battles would rage on the borders of warring states, and that is where the troops were moved to. If a war should break out today, military operations would take a different course, for the states would have means of delivering weapons over distances of thousands of kilometers. The war would start for the most part deep within the belligerent countries, and not one capital, not one major industrial or administrative center, not one strategic area would escape attack in the first minutes, let alone the first days of the war. Thus war would begin differently, if it began, and would develop differently" (*Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* XII, No. 2, p. 13). However, in a different context, justifying his demand for a peace treaty between the two Germanys, Khrushchev told an East German audience at Leipzig, on March 7, 1959, "Large armed forces of countries of the West and the East are concentrated in Germany. And when two armies confront each other and are in direct contact, any spark may set off a war conflagration and all sorts of unexpected developments may arise" (*ibid.,* No. 13, p. 4).

24. The Russians might correctly calculate that a denuclearized Germany that remained a collaborating member of NATO would constitute more of an obstacle to Soviet political and military pressure than a politically isolated Ger-

many with nuclear weapons. One possible indication of the relative importance that they attached to Germany's armament and her political affiliation was Khrushchev's statement in a press conference on November 27, 1958, that Russia would not change her policy of making Berlin a free city even if West Germany were to give up her rearmament program. "Should Western Germany declare that she will not arm herself, with the occupation regime of Berlin still maintained," he said, "the source of tension and conflict will not be stamped out" (*Soviet News,* November 28, 1958, p. 191, as quoted in Speier, *op. cit.,* p. 26).

CHAPTER 11
CONCLUSION

1. *New York Times,* May 28, 1961, Sec. 4, p. 8.

2. Radio and television address to the nation, July 25, 1961 (*ibid.,* July 26, 1961, p. 10).

3. In a special message to Congress on the defense budget, delivered on March 28, 1961, Kennedy said, "Our arms will never be used to strike the first blow in any attack. . . . We must offset whatever advantage this may appear to hand an aggressor by so increasing the capability of our forces to respond swiftly and effectively to any aggressive move as to convince any would-be aggressor that such a movement would be too futile and costly to undertake. In the area of general war, this doctrine means that such capability must rest with that portion of our forces which would survive the initial attack. We are not creating forces for a first strike against any other nation. We shall never threaten, provoke, or initiate aggression—but if aggression should come, our response will be swift and effective."

These words seemed to rule out a strategic first strike even against major conventional aggression, although they left room for distinguishing a first strike "out of the blue" from a first strike in response to aggression. Yet, clearly, the President did not mean to rule out the initial use of all kinds of nuclear weapons, for he also said, "In the event of a major aggression that could not be repulsed by conventional forces, we must be prepared to take whatever action with whatever weapons are appropriate" (*ibid.,* March 29, 1961, p. 16).

In a television interview shown in Britain shortly before this address, Kennedy said, "We have to assume, after this first blow had been struck against us, what would we have left—with what could we retaliate, and how much of a deterrent, therefore, is there to Russia from making the first strike." "I hope," he continued, "that the people in your country realize that neither we nor they would have any difficulties if it were not that, as a democracy, we will not strike first and that therefore we always have to consider what we have left" (*ibid.,* March 27, 1961, p. 1).

4. Thus, in a speech on April 25, 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara said, "We have moved to strengthen our non-nuclear limited war forces." But he added, "This does not modify existing national policy to employ nuclear weapons when it is necessary to do so. Rather it is designed to avoid situations in which we might be forced to use nuclear weapons because too narrow a range of non-nuclear weapons were available to us" (*ibid.,* April 24, 1961, p. 29).

5. On May 14, 1961, West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss expressed his government's uneasiness that the new emphasis on conventional weapons would weaken the credibility of the nuclear deterrent (*ibid.,* May 15,

1961, p. 10). On June 1, British Defense Minister Harold Watkinson told the Assembly of the Western European Union that, although Britain recognized the danger of overdependence on nuclear weapons, "On the other hand, we do not believe that NATO can or should provide such massive conventional forces as could hope to deal with any conventional attack, however large, without recourse to nuclear weapons. Such a policy might merely indicate that we should not have the courage ever to use the nuclear weapon in any circumstances. Between these two extremes we must strike a balance on what the alliance can afford without waste of resources" (*ibid.*, June 2, 1961, p. 1). In a news conference at SHAPE on June 4, President Kennedy allayed French and allied apprehensions springing from the new emphasis on limited war by declaring, "We are determined to resist aggression whatever its force and whatever kind of force is needed to resist it" (*ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 13). On June 6 the American deputy secretary of defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric, told a news conference, "The current doctrine is that if NATO forces were about to be overwhelmed by non-nuclear attacks from the [Communist] bloc countries, NATO would make use of nuclear arms." And he added that he did not believe in the possibility of limiting a nuclear war (*ibid.*, June 7, 1961, p. 21).

6. *Ibid.*, May 10, 1961, pp. 1, 8.

7. *Ibid.*, May 18, 1961, p. 23.

8. Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak, speaking in December, 1958, described the extent of political consultation in the following words: "On certain questions, particularly those concerning relations with the East, with the Communist world, for months and months now, not a single initiative has been taken by the more powerful partners in the Atlantic alliance without their having obtained, during preliminary discussion, the agreement and support of all the less large and the smallest partners. The results of this political consultation have, in certain spheres, been perfect . . . I should like you to realize that these consultations have not been a matter of pure form. Many of the drafts submitted to the Atlantic Council have been not only discussed, but also commented on and criticized and . . . in nearly all cases, I think, the large countries which have submitted the text of their letters or notes have taken the remarks made into account" (*NATO Letter*, VI [December, 1958], 7–8).

For an analysis of the meaning, the extent, and consequences of political consultation among the members of NATO, see Carol E. Baumann, *Political Cooperation in NATO* (Madison, Wisconsin: National Security Studies Group, 1960); and Ruth C. Lawson, "Concerting Policies in the North Atlantic Community," *International Organization*, XII (Spring, 1958), 163–79. For a critical appraisal of proposals to increase political consultation, see Gardner Patterson and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., *NATO: A Critical Appraisal* (Princeton: Princeton University Conference on NATO, 1957), chap. iv.

9. Lord Ismay, *NATO: The First Five Years, 1949–1954* (Paris, 1954), p. 10.

10. Address to the Associated Press at New York, N.Y., on April 23, 1956 (*Bulletin*, XXXIV [April 30, 1956], 709–10).

11. In a press conference on September 5, 1960, De Gaulle recalled the American dominance and European weakness at the inception of the alliance and said, "So the alliance was set up on the basis of integration, that is to say, of a system whereby the defense of each of the countries of Continental Europe, of Western Europe—not counting England—does not have a national character; a system in which, in fact, everything is under the command of the Americans and in which the Americans decide on the use of the principal weapons—that is to say, atomic weapons." Then he noted, however, that much had changed in the

past ten years. Parts of the world outside the NATO area became danger spots, and the countries of Europe regained their balance and began to prosper, and England built its own nuclear weapons. "Now under these circumstances," he concluded, "France considers that what was done ten years ago within this limited field and on the single exclusive basis of integration must be brought up to date." The two essential points of revision, he declared, were the organization of three-power political and strategic co-operation in areas outside Europe and a change in the integration of European defense to permit the defense of a country, "while being of course combined with that of other countries," to have "a national character" (*NATO Letter,* VIII [November, 1960], 24).

12. As a contribution to this end Alastair Buchan suggested giving the Standing Group more prestige and influence in military planning, partly by increasing the stature of the American, British, and French representatives who composed it (Alastair Buchan, *NATO in the 1960's* [New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960], pp. 78–79). Within a revitalized Standing Group, and with the addition of a German representative, France might no longer find herself in the position of a second-class partner to the Anglo-American entente.

Buchan also suggested assigning command of a NATO nuclear deterrent force to a European officer, rather than to SACEUR. Whether by this means or by some other, it would seem necessary to centralize the military planning and control group for a joint nuclear force. A French representative ought to have a prominent position in such a group, at least equivalent to the position of a British representative.

Similarly, it would be necessary and might be feasible to centralize the political control of a joint deterrent in a way that would recognize France's special and equivalent status. A far-reaching plan for such a political body was made by Henry Kissinger, who proposed the creation of a political mechanism "with the power to make binding decisions for the Western alliance as a whole in certain specified fields, particularly NATO strategy, arms control, and those negotiations with the Soviet Union which affect NATO as a whole, such as the issue of Berlin, German unification, and European security." The political body would also "determine the circumstances in which nuclear weapons would be released to SHAPE" (Henry A. Kissinger, "For an Atlantic Confederacy," *Reporter,* XXIV [February 2, 1961], 20).

Index

Acheson, Dean, 40, 42–43, 46, 70, 79, 80, 92, 331, 333, 334
Adenauer, Konrad, 86, 94, 128, 233, 255, 289, 332
Armed forces levels: American, 29, 48, NATO, 35, 39, 65, 83, 87, 88, 118, 163–64, 375 (n. 22); Russian, 29, 48, 374–75 (n. 22)
Arms control, 193, 195, 204–7, 227–28, 305–7, 321–23, 358; *see also* Nuclear test ban
Atomic Energy Act (MacMahon Act), 105, 106, 107, 108, 216, 217, 218, 220, 224, 225, 230, 276
Austria, 316, 333, 344

Berlin blockade, 28, 29, 34, 344
Berlin crisis of 1958, 58, 160, 311, 325–26, 342, 359, 369
Bevan, Aneurin, 82, 242, 247
Bevin, Ernest, 36
Bradley, General Omar N., 40, 42, 44, 45, 47, 68, 106, 122
Brown, George, 134, 247
Brussels Treaty, 25, 28, 32, 33, 96
Buchan, Alastair, 168, 299
Burke, Admiral Arleigh, 200–201
Buzzard, Admiral Sir Anthony, 139

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 212 n., 245–47
"Carte Blanche" war game, 126–27, 255
China (Communist), 179, 186, 228, 325, 346
Churchill, Winston S., 49, 52, 66, 73, 75, 88, 111, 119–20, 122–23, 183, 239, 241, 287, 377 (n. 47)
Clausewitz, Karl von, 8
Cole, Sterling, 108, 111
Collins, General J. Lawton, 68, 80, 105, 106, 125
Crossman, R. H. S., 134, 244

De Gaulle, Charles, 165, 223, 226, 230, 232, 255, 256–59, 283, 289, 364, 365–68, 380 (n. 29)
Deterrence: active nuclear, 60–61, 103, 132–39, 139–44, 150, 177, 184–87, 189, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 240, 249, 254; conjectural nature of, 12–13, 269; meaning of, 10 n.; minimum or finite, 178 n., 180, 198, 200–201, 202; as opposed to defense, 12, 119, 124, 372 (n. 7); passive, 60, 113, 136, 173–76, 177–84, 194, 196, 198, 199, 206, 240; punitive or reprisal, 12, 119, 124, 372 (n. 7); stability of, 9–14, 60, 119; *see also* Military strategy
Disengagement, 213, chap. x
Dulles, John Foster, 4, 50, 69, 76, 94–95, 102, 103, 108, 116, 117, 140, 158–59, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 225, 226, 332, 333, 334, 340 n.

Eastern Europe, 325, 330–31, 334, 336, 337, 345–46
Eden, Anthony, 57 n., 95, 309

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 26, 73, 78, 80, 88, 91, 103, 108, 110, 112, 160, 197, 205, 206, 210 n., 220, 230, 257, 312, 331, 342
Euratom, 219, 222
European Defense Community (EDC), 85–86, 91–96, 340

France: and Algeria, 118, 164; and the Anglo-American bloc, 22, 71, 257–58, 288, 289, 365, 380 (n. 29); and the Indochina war, 90, 144; policy of, toward Great Britain, 67, 92, 280; policy of, toward nuclear control, 130–32, 168, 218, 219, 221, 223, 226–28, 229, 230, 256–59, 280–81, 288–89, 304, 350, 367–68; policy of, toward the United States, 31, 37, 38, 92, 366; policy of, toward West Germany, 85, 92–96, 97, 289, 366; strategy and defense policies of, 37, 70–71, 81–82, 83, 89–90, 118, 131, 366; and the Suez War, 57

Gaitskell, Hugh, 247, 248, 249, 310, 319
Gallois, General Pierre M., 169, 283–85
Gates, Thomas S., Jr., 143–44, 180, 202–23, 232
Gavin, General James M., 106, 119
Grant, John, 136
Great Britain: and H-bomb, 119–20, 239, 242, 246, and missiles, 222, 232, 243, 244–45, 251; policy of, toward France, 38, 67, 86; policy of, toward nuclear control, 89, 129, 218, 222, 223, 230, 232, 237–52, 281, 290, 350; policy of, toward the United States, 31, 38, 82, 86, 222, 238, 242, 243, 244, 250, 251, 367 n., 401 (n. 7); policy of, toward West Germany, 86, 97, 252; strategy and defense policies of, 70–71, 82, 88–89, 106, 118, 119–20, 132–39, 167, 238–45, 250–52; and the Suez War, 57, 243; troops of, on Continent, 92, 97, 135, 164, 249
Gruenther, General Alfred M., 28, 107, 109

Healey, Denis, 132, 247, 319
Herter, Christian A., 205, 233, 340 n., 359
Holifield, Chet, 230–31
Hoover, Herbert, 71–72
Howard, Michael, 317–18, 320
Hungarian revolution of 1956, 316, 344

International Atomic Energy Agency, 219–20
Italy, 286, 288

Johnson, Louis, 67, 69
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 108, 111, 217, 226, 231

Kahn, Herman, 190 n.
Kennan, George F., 9, 35–36, 310, 318–19, 329, 330–31, 334–35, 337
Kennedy, John F., 356–59
Khrushchev, Nikita, 56, 58, 164 n., 180–81, 182–83, 186 n., 206, 209 n., 231, 310–12, 321 n., 322, 341 n., 342, 343, 344, 345
King-Hall, Stephen, 246
Kissinger, Henry A., 139, 149–50
Korean War, 61, 68–69, 98, 144

Lebanon crisis, 141, 144
LeMay, General Curtis, 199
Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., 201
Lippmann, Walter, 121, 208

McElroy, Neil H., 141, 174, 198, 199
Macmillan, Harold, 133, 243, 257
MC-70 ("minimum forces" study), 118, 161
Military strategy: counterforce, 178, 184–85, 197, 198, 357; declaratory, 32, 47, 49, 110, 116, 123, 141–42, 146, 197, for defense of Europe from occupation, 35, 37, 40–45, 48, 49, 61–62, 68, 72, 80, 116–17, 145; domestic and other non-military influences on, 7, 19–23, 40, 76, 81–84, 89–90, 93–94, 102, 124–26, 127–30, 131, 132–39, 166, 169, 238, 240, 350, 355; dual task of, in NATO, 2, 18; forward strategy, 72, 91, 92, 104, 117; function of ground forces in, 61, 72, 79–80, 116–23, 127, 147–65; as instrument of political and psychological warfare, 9, 16–17, 56–59, 317, 320; and interallied politics, 21–23, 31, 38, 67, 71, 73–74, 85–86, 91–97, 267–68, 350–51, 364, 366;

limited (or graduated) retaliation, 156, 158, 178, 185, 358; limited war (or local resistance), 61, 121, 122, 127, 139, 147–65, 185–86, 196, 197, 356; massive retaliation, 54, 55, 59, 103, 120, 140–41, 184, 204; meaning and nature of, 4–9; military services and, 43–44, 92, 113, 180, 184, 198–204; and mutual assurance, 187–95, 196, 210; pre-emptive, 187–89; and trip-wire concept, 118, 123, 145; *see also* Deterrence; Nuclear weapons
Missile gap, 173–77, 198, 202, 221
Missiles, 113, chap. vii, 221–22, 232, 247–48; *see also* Military strategy
Montgomery, Viscount Bernard L., 33, 110, 124–25, 132, 137–38, 364

NATO: Congress and, 34, 44–46, 71–72; force levels of, 35, 39, 65, 83, 87, 88, 118, 163–64, 375 (n. 22), as guaranty pact, 25, 30, 32, 33, 34, 36, 41, 47; as integrated military organization, 26, 32, 33, 35, 37, 74, 114; joint nuclear force, 229–34, 236, 255–56, 295–307, 359, and military interdependence (or integration), 22, 46–47, 66–67, 73, 165–71, 348, 351, 360–61, 365, 395 (n. 21); military strategy of, 35, 41–47, 91–92, 103–4, 105–10, 116–18, 132–34, 137–39, 145, 161–65, 354–55, 358–59, organization of, 26, 46, 73, 87, 298–300, 364–65; origins of, 28–29, 32; political co-operation in, 87, 280, 349, 360–65; political functions of, 3, 4, 17–18, 349–51, 360–61
Norstad, General Lauris, 143, 160–63, 229, 233, 265, 317
NSC 68, 61, 79
Nuclear test ban, 227–28, 305–7
Nuclear weapons: diffusion of, 62, 129, 131–32, 164, 196, chap. viii, 281–82, 304–6; and the H-bomb, 53, 54, 56, 110–12; inhibitions toward, 53–55, 123–26, 135, 138, 142–44, 146, 244–52, 270; and nuclear blackmail, 57–58; sharing the control of, 62, 214–17, 221–26, 228–34, 255–56, chap. ix, 359, 401–2 (n. 7); Soviet acquisition of, 52–53; tactical, 68, 105–10, 116–18, 125, 126, 128–29, 139, 141, 150, 152, 158, 217, 253–54, 279, 293, 358; and unilateral nuclear disarmament, 245–47, 249–50, *see also* Missiles

Oder-Neisse boundary, 314, 327

Paris Agreements (1955), 96–98, 241
Poland, 314, 327

Quemoy and Matsu crisis, 57, 141, 144

Radford, Admiral Arthur W., 103, 121–22, 127
Rapacki Plan, 309, 311, 322, 341
Ridgway, General Matthew B , 88, 90–91, 107, 144
Russell, Bertrand, 245, 246

Sandys, Duncan, 133, 134, 241
Soviet Union: armed forces of, 29, 99, 112–13, 118, 163–64 n.; estimates of the threat posed by, 37, 43, 49–50, 66, 68–70, 75–76, 90, 100, 114; and H-bomb, 111, 240; implications of emergence of, as nuclear power, 52–63, 79, 100, 234–35; military strategy of, 28–29, 142, 180–83, 186, 188–89, 372–73; and missiles, 113, 172–77, 182–83, 221; and nuclear blackmail, 57–58, 221; policy of, toward disengagement, 314–15, 321 n., 322, 336, 338–46; policy of, toward nuclear diffusion and sharing, 228, 231; policy of, toward West Germany, 311–12, 324–26, 340–46; political doctrine and strategy of, 1–2, 14–17, 56, 98–101, 186–87, 207–11, 333, 342–44; and political exploitation of military power, 56–59, 100–101, 142, 273, 284, 338–39; and Sputniks, 54, 174, 221, 310, and Twentieth Party Congress, 99
Spaak, Paul-Henri, 232, 233, 362
Stability: and balance-of-power system, 10–11; of deterrence, 9–14, 60, 119, 172, 183, 186, 195–97; and nuclear diffusion, 196, 307; Soviet attitude toward, 15, 100–101, 207–11; *see also* Deterrence
Stalin, J. V., 2, 29, 50, 114

Strategic Air Command (SAC), 30, 31, 48, 52, 55, 69, 79, 174, 176, 199, 201, 228, 232, 241, 295
Strauss, Franz Joseph, 128, 231, 255
Suez War, 57, 135, 186 n., 218, 243, 266, 364

Taft, Robert A., 41, 42, 44–45, 71–72, 77
Talenski, Nicolai A., 181
Taylor, General Maxwell D., 125, 143, 144, 200–201
Temporary Council Committee, 4, 83–84
The Times (London), 39, 136, 244
Truman, Harry S., 36, 41, 46, 55, 65, 71, 331, 334
Twining, General Nathan F., 122, 203

U-2 reconnaissance airplane, 205, 210 n., 312
United States: armed forces of, 29, 48; military assistance program of, 40–45, 66, 71; and nuclear control, 195, 214–26, 231–34; policy of, toward France, 94–95; policy of, toward Great Britain, 222, 251, 290, 367 n., 401 (n. 7); role of, in NATO, 25, 31, 71, 77, 78, 114–15, 215, 236–37, 272, 276, 351–53, 355; strategy and defense policies of, 41–45, 49, 54, 55, 77–78, 84, 102–4, 121–22, 140–45, 197–204; troops of, on Continent, 62, 71, 78, 92, 116, 272, 280, 350

Vandenberg, Arthur H., 34, 41, 45

West Germany: and disengagement, chap. x (*passim*); membership of, in NATO, 38, 40, 49, 72–73, 74, 85–87, 91–98; and nuclear control, 126–30, 217, 219, 233, 252–56, 350; policy of, toward France, 86; policy of, toward the United States, 94; strategy and defense policies of, 126–30, 253; unification of, 309 n., 310 n., 314, 322, 323–32, 335–36
Western European Union, 95–96, 224, 229
Western Union Defense Organization, 33, 34
White, General Thomas D., 190 n., 199, 202
Wilson, Charles E., 121

PRINTED IN U.S.A.